

1 DAWYN R. HARRISON, COUNTY COUNSEL
2 PETER BOLLINGER, ASST. COUNTY COUNSEL (SBN 241752)
3 EVA CHU, SNR DEP. COUNTY COUNSEL (SBN 235356)
4 ADAM H. BAUMGARTEN SNR. DEP. COUNTY COUNSEL(SBN 292095)
5 648 Kenneth Hahn Hall of Administration
6 500 West Temple Street
7 Los Angeles, California 90012-2713
8 Telephone: (213) 974-0809
9 pbollinger@counsel.lacounty.gov
10 EChu@counsel.lacounty.gov
11 Abaumgarten@counsel.lacounty.gov

12 CHRISTOPHER K. PELHAM (SBN 241068)
13 ABIGAIL G. URQUHART (SBN 310547)
14 ALEX J. SCANDROLI (SBN 345278)
15 NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT US LLP
16 555 South Flower Street
17 Forty-First Floor
18 Los Angeles, California 90071
19 Telephone: (213) 892-9200
20 Facsimile: (213) 892-9494
21 christopher.pelham@nortonrosefulbright.com
22 abigail.urquhart@nortonrosefulbright.com
23 alex.scandrolis@nortonrosefulbright.com

24 Attorneys for Defendant
25 DEAN C. LOGAN, in his official capacity as the County of Los Angeles
26 Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk

27 *Additional Counsel Listed on Following Page*

28 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, SHIRLEY
N. WEBER, in her official capacity as
the California Secretary of State, and
DEAN C. LOGAN, in his official
capacity as the County of Los Angeles
Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk,

Defendants.

Case No. 2:26-cv-12025

**DEFENDANT DEAN C. LOGAN'S
COMBINED OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFF'S EX PARTE
MOTION FOR INJUNCTION
PENDING APPEAL AND
SUPPLEMENTAL OPPOSITION
TO PLAINTIFF'S APPLICATION
FOR TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER AND
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION**

Date Action Filed: 10/15/2026

PUBLIC RIGHTS PROJECT

Joshua Karsh (*pro hac vice pending*)
Toby R. Merrill (*pro hac vice pending*)
Sharanya Mohan (CA Bar No. 350675)
Christine E. Bass (CA Bar No. 334002)
Kyra Sikora (CA Bar No. 345896)
490 43rd Street, Unit #115
Oakland, CA 94609
Tel: (510) 738-6788
joshua.karsh@publicrightsproject.org
toby.merrill@publicrightsproject.org
sai.mohan@publicrightsproject.org
christine.bass@publicrightsproject.org
kyra.sikora@publicrightsproject.org

** Licensed in Illinois and Washington, D.C. Not licensed to practice law in California.*

***Licensed in Massachusetts and New York. Not licensed to practice law in California.*

Attorneys for Defendant

DEAN C. LOGAN, in his official capacity as the County of Los Angeles
Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk

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1 **I. INTRODUCTION**

2 Plaintiff United States of America, acting through the Department of Justice
3 (together, “the Executive”), asks this Court to intervene in an ongoing state and
4 federal election in one of the Nation’s largest jurisdictions on the strength of
5 nothing more than suspicion. The right to vote is the foundation of our democracy,
6 and the officials who count those votes are its custodians. Defendant Dean C.
7 Logan, the Los Angeles County Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk (the “County”),
8 leads an agency of election workers who are doing exactly that work, for their
9 community, under the shadow of criminal threat. The injunction the Executive
10 seeks would make that work impossible. It has no basis in federal law. It ignores
11 the realities of election administration. And it asks for something no court can
12 order, because no election official can perform it. Full stop.

13 Voting is already underway in Los Angeles County. Ballots have been
14 mailed, returned, and processed, ready to be tabulated after 8 p.m. on election night,
15 and election officials are working toward fixed deadlines for tabulation, canvassing,
16 and certification. The Executive asks this Court to interrupt that work. It seeks an
17 order directing the County to segregate and withhold the returned ballots of
18 registered voters whom federal investigators suspect may be noncitizens, based
19 solely on an unreliable list of more than 20,000 entries generated through bulk
20 database matching (the “October List”). The Executive’s own declarant concedes
21 that the resulting data may be “incomplete, outdated, or mismatched.” (Decl. of
22 Nicolas Bartell ISO U.S. Ex Parte Appl. for TRO, ECF No. 22-4 ¶ 16.) Yet it asks
23 the Court to withhold the ballots of those on the list, to preserve the possibility of
24 excluding those ballots if an investigation the Executive concedes it cannot finish
25 before the election ends eventually substantiates its suspicions. No federal law
26 authorizes that interference. With this brief, the County opposes the Executive’s

1 new ex parte motion for injunction pending appeal,¹ (Notice of Pl.'s Ex Parte Mot.
2 for Inj. Pending Appeal, ECF No. 76), and supplements its earlier opposition
3 (Opp'n of Def. Dean C. Logan to Pl.'s Ex Parte Appl. for TRO, ECF No. 32-1) to
4 the pending TRO and preliminary-injunction application.

5 *First*, there is nothing to enjoin “pending appeal.” This Court has not denied
6 the pending TRO application. This case was reassigned on October 21. Later that
7 day the Court scheduled a hearing on the Executive’s preliminary injunction
8 application for October 27. The Executive instead unilaterally declared its own
9 deadline for a ruling, appealed when that deadline passed, and now demands an
10 injunction pending that appeal. A court that schedules an expedited hearing has not
11 constructively refused relief merely because the movant demands a faster decision.

12 *Second*, the Executive is unlikely to succeed on the merits. Its lone claim is
13 that 18 U.S.C. § 611 — a criminal statute that forbids noncitizens to vote —
14 preempts the County’s ordinary processing of ballots. But Section 611 regulates
15 voters, not elections officials. It says nothing about how ballots are mailed, verified,
16 or counted, and nothing about holding ballots while federal investigators work
17 through a list. The Supremacy Clause makes supreme the laws Congress has
18 enacted, not the Executive’s preferred enforcement timetable. And the County’s
19 adherence to existing law neither authorizes unlawful voting nor obstructs federal
20 prosecution: the Executive remains free to investigate and prosecute anyone who
21 votes unlawfully, and it is doing just that. Refusing to comply or cooperate with an
22 unlawful request is not the same as impeding citizenship investigations.

23 *Third*, the Executive has shown no irreparable harm. It has not established
24 that the voters whose ballots it seeks to withhold are ineligible, let alone that any
25 has cast an unlawful ballot. And nothing about ordinary ballot processing impairs
26 federal enforcement: the County keeps records of who is registered and who voted,
27

28 ¹ In opposing the requested injunction, the County incorporates its opposition to the
request for temporary restraining order (ECF No. 32-1.)

1 and federal officials remain free to use them to investigate and prosecute. The
2 Executive's real complaint is that once a ballot leaves its envelope, it can no longer
3 be traced back to the voter. That is not obstruction. That is the right to ballot
4 secrecy, safeguarded by, and consistent with, California's constitutional and
5 statutory requirements. Congress has never required election officials to preserve
6 the Executive's ability to pull particular ballots while it pursues its suspicions.²
7 Instead, it has prohibited systematic list maintenance in the period immediately
8 preceding a federal election. 52 U.S.C. § 20507(c)(2)(A).

9 Any urgency, moreover, is self-inflicted. Federal agencies had the voter data
10 by May 8, 2026, yet the Executive waited until October 13 — after the County had
11 already begun processing ballots — to deliver its list with a 48-hour ultimatum.
12 (U.S.' Mem. in Supp. of Pl.'s Ex Parte Mot. for Inj. Pending Appeal, ECF No. 76-1
13 at 5, 7.) Having failed to finish its investigation before voting began, the Executive
14 now asks voters and election officials to bear the cost of its delay and risk voter
15 disenfranchisement resulting from incomplete, unverified, or inaccurate data.

16 *Fourth*, the equities and the public interest weigh decisively against an
17 eleventh-hour, mandatory order that the County **cannot** perform. The logistical
18 hurdles to compliance cannot be overstated and it would seriously jeopardize the
19 ability to comply with mandatory certification compliance, among other deadlines.
20 It would also cloud the ballots of every voter matched to the Executive's list —
21 presumptively eligible registrants, including naturalized citizens whose earlier
22 immigration records make them especially prone to false matches — without notice
23 or any opportunity to be heard. *Purcell v. Gonzalez*, 549 U.S. 1, 4–5 (2006),
24

25 ² Even the DOJ's *own* guidelines don't support this proposition: "the Department
26 should not engage in overt criminal investigative measures in matters involving
27 alleged ballot fraud until the election in question has been concluded, its results
28 certified, and all recounts and election contests concluded. Doing otherwise runs the
risk of chilling legitimate voting and campaign activities and of interjecting the
investigation itself into ongoing campaigns and the adjudication of any ensuing
election contest," 9-85.300 Non-interference In Elections When Conducting
Federal Criminal Investigations Involving Ballot Fraud, 2022 WL 20355953, at *1

1 counsels against exactly this kind of late federal-court intervention in the mechanics
2 of an ongoing election. Both applications, including the alternative request for a 30-
3 day injunction, should be denied.

4 **II. BACKGROUND**

5 Federal investigators began reviewing California voter data months before
6 this lawsuit. Homeland Security Investigations received what it described as an
7 apparent California voter roster and forwarded it to USCIS on or around May 8,
8 2026. (ECF No. 76-1 at 5.) In July, the Secretary of Homeland Security advised the
9 California Secretary of State of preliminary concerns about possible noncitizen
10 registrants and requested collaboration to verify the findings. (*Id.* at 6.) The
11 Secretary of State responded a week later and requested supporting information,
12 which the Executive declined to provide unless the State agreed to participate in or
13 use its flawed database. (*Id.* at 6-7.)

14 The Executive did not deliver its list until October 14³ — well after its initial
15 engagement with the Secretary of State and after the County began processing
16 returned vote-by-mail ballots. (*Id.* at 1, 5.) The accompanying letter demanded that
17 election officials review more than 20,000 entries within 48 hours — an impossible
18 timeline — and segregate the vote-by-mail ballots of individuals whose citizenship
19 could not independently be confirmed. (*Id.* at 7; ECF No. 32-2, Ex. D.) Notably, the
20 48-hour demand included no explanation of the methodology the Executive used to
21 determine whether an individual is a noncitizen.

22 As the Executive concedes, the list is not determinative of any voter's
23 eligibility or citizenship status. The Executive describes a process beginning with a
24 voter roster of uncertain provenance, supplemented by an unidentified third-party
25 data-analytics and investigative platform, comparisons with immigration records,
26 confidence scoring, and further investigation. (Declaration of Eric McLoughlin ISO

27
28 ³ The Executive initially provided a thumb drive which purportedly included the
list, but use of thumb drives is not consistent with County cybersecurity policies.

1 Pl.'s Ex Parte Appl. for TRO and OSC re Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 62-3 ¶¶ 16–24;
2 Declaration of Nic Bartell ISO Pl.'s Ex Parte Appl. for TRO and OSC re Prelim.
3 Inj., ECF No. 62-2 ¶¶ 14–23.) The Executive acknowledges the need to account for
4 incomplete, outdated, or mismatched information. (ECF No. 76-1 at 3-5.) Its
5 investigators characterize the resulting entries as persons believed “highly likely” to
6 be noncitizens, not persons adjudicated ineligible to vote. (ECF No. 62-2 ¶ 22.)
7 Further investigation remains underway. (*Id.* ¶ 23.)

8 The County has challenged the list’s reliability. (ECF No. 32-1 at 17.) The
9 Executive has not shown that any particular entry identifies a person who is
10 currently ineligible, much less that such a person has voted in this election.

11 Federal and California law require registrants to attest to citizenship, and
12 returned vote-by-mail ballots are subject to established procedures, including
13 signature verification procedures. *See* 52 U.S.C. §§ 20504(c)(2)(C), 20508(b)(2);
14 Cal. Elec. Code §§ 2111, 3000 *et seq.*, 3011, 3014, 3015, 3016.5, 3017, 3019, 3020,
15 3021.5. The County does not possess the records needed to conduct the
16 investigation the Executive demands, including but not limited to, federal
17 immigration or naturalization records. (Declaration of Monica Flores in Support of
18 the County's Opposition, ECF No. 32-4 ¶ 15.) Moreover, unlike the Department of
19 Justice, the County is not an investigative body with authority to seek and match
20 information in response to assertions or allegations about eligibility. It must process
21 registrations and ballots uniformly in compliance with applicable state and federal
22 law. Once a ballot is removed from its identifying envelope, it cannot be traced to
23 the voter consistent with California law. (ECF No. 32-1 at 11; Cal. Const. art. II, §
24 7.)

25 Moreover, the County diligently investigated the logistical realities of
26 compliance and was unable to find a feasible path forward. There are technological
27 hurdles, training hurdles, and physical hurdles. There are 5.9 million eligible voters
28 in Los Angeles County. Every single person who decides to vote casts a physical

1 ballot. The Executive seems to believe that compliance would be the same as
2 picking up mail from the kitchen counter—but that is not so. This is an incredibly
3 complex system involving thousands of workers and changes of this magnitude
4 simply cannot be effectively completed overnight without jeopardizing the
5 effectiveness of the system as a whole.

6 The Executive filed suit on October 15 and sought emergency relief.
7 (Compl.) The case was reassigned to this Court on October 21, and within the day,
8 the Court scheduled a hearing for October 27. (ECF Nos. 46, 64.) The Executive
9 then requested a ruling by noon October 22. (United States’ Request for Expedited
10 Ruling, ECF No. 67 at 2.) When none issued, it filed a notice of appeal and the
11 present motion, requesting another ruling by noon on October 23. (ECF 76-1 at 2.)

12 **III. ARGUMENT**

13 **A. The Executive has no basis for an injunction pending appeal from** 14 **a ruling this Court has not made.**

15 Rule 62(d) authorizes an injunction pending appeal from an order granting or
16 refusing injunctive relief. But this Court has entered no such order. (Fed. R. Civ P.
17 62(d).) It has scheduled an expedited hearing on the Executive’s application. (ECF
18 No. 64.)

19 The Executive invokes *A.A.R.P. v. Trump*, 605 U.S. 91 (2025), which
20 recognized that judicial inaction can, in extraordinary circumstances, have the
21 practical effect of refusing an injunction. There, detainees faced imminent removal
22 from the country before their claims could be adjudicated. The Court recognized the
23 need for intervention to prevent consequences that could not effectively be
24 challenged later. *Id.* at 94; see *Carson v. American Brands, Inc.*, 450 U.S. 79, 84
25 (1981).

26 This case is manifestly different. The Executive has had months to
27 investigate, has produced no reliable determination that an identified voter is
28 ineligible, and seeks to impose novel procedures during an election already

1 underway. Those procedures would not only burden the voters on its list, but all
2 voters in the County and State. The County serves approximately 5.9 million
3 registered voters and has already processed hundreds of thousands of returned
4 ballots; the staff who would have to match and review the Executive's records are
5 the same staff who verify signatures and process every other voter's ballot. (ECF
6 No. 32-1 at 31.) Segregating the ballots of 20,000 voters would also require
7 changes to multiple software systems during the County's election freeze, risking a
8 catastrophic impact on the infrastructure that runs the entire election. (*Id.* at 18–19.)
9 And the order the Executive seeks is not merely burdensome; it is logistically
10 impossible. Every vote-by-mail ballot has already been printed and mailed. (*Id.* at
11 18.) Once a returned ballot's signature is verified, the ballot is separated from its
12 envelope and commingled with others, and cannot lawfully be traced to the voter.
13 (*Id.* at 18, 31–32; Cal. Const. art. II, § 7.) The County also has no access to the
14 federal records needed to resolve anyone's citizenship, so ballots placed on hold
15 could be held indefinitely, which would prevent the County from processing and
16 tabulating ballots for certification at the County level, and ultimately delay
17 certification of statewide results. (ECF No. 32-1 at 32.) The Court's decision to
18 hold a hearing six days after reassignment is not a refusal to act; it is the measured
19 response demanded by such a sweeping and unworkable request.

20 Nor may the Executive create appellate jurisdiction by announcing when the
21 Court must rule. Even an express ruling denying a temporary restraining order
22 ordinarily is not immediately appealable. *Religious Technology Center v. Scott*, 869
23 F.2d 1306, 1308 (9th Cir. 1989). And an appeal from a plainly nonappealable order
24 does not divest the district court of jurisdiction. *Nascimento v. Dummer*, 508 F.3d
25 905, 908 (9th Cir. 2007). The Court should proceed with its scheduled hearing.

26 The ex parte posture is independently unwarranted. Such relief requires a
27 showing that the movant did not create the urgency necessitating extraordinary
28 procedure. *Mission Power Engineering Co. v. Continental Casualty Co.*, 883 F.

1 Supp. 488, 492 (C.D. Cal. 1995). The Executive cannot make that showing. It
2 began reviewing the voter information in May, delivered its findings after ballot
3 processing began, demanded action within 48 hours, and then insisted upon
4 successive judicial deadlines. (ECF 76–1 at 5-6; ECF No. 67 at 2.) That chronology
5 is not a reason to dispense with ordinary procedures for considering an injunction.
6 Delay of this magnitude also undermines a claim of irreparable urgency. *Oakland*
7 *Tribune, Inc. v. Chronicle Publishing Co.*, 762 F.2d 1374, 1377 (9th Cir. 1985).

8 **B. The Executive is unlikely to succeed on the merits of either of its**
9 **motions.**

10 Both emergency applications require a showing of likely success, irreparable
11 harm, favorable equities, and consistency with the public interest. *Feldman v.*
12 *Arizona Secretary of State’s Office*, 843 F.3d 366, 367 (9th Cir. 2016); *Winter v.*
13 *NRDC*, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). The Executive seeks more than preservation of the
14 status quo. It seeks a mandatory order imposing new responsibilities on the County
15 during an ongoing election. Such injunctions are “particularly disfavored” and
16 should not be issued unless the facts and law clearly favor the moving party. *Garcia*
17 *v. Google, Inc.*, 786 F.3d 733, 740 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc).

18 The Executive cannot satisfy even the ordinary standard. The Executive’s
19 preemption claim rests on Section 611, which imposes no duty on state election
20 officials to investigate suspected violations or segregate ballots while federal
21 investigators do so. (ECF No. 32-1 at 23-24.) And the County’s procedures
22 interfere with no federal enforcement mechanism. They prohibit no investigation,
23 refuse no lawful federal process, and confer no immunity from prosecution. (*Id.* at
24 24-26.)

25 Worse, the order the Executive seeks would require the County to violate
26 federal law. Start with the National Voter Registration Act. Congress barred States
27 from conducting any program “the purpose of which is to systematically remove
28 the names of ineligible voters” within 90 days of a federal election. 52 U.S.C. §

1 20507(c)(2)(A). That quiet period began August 5, 2026. (ECF No. 32-1 at 27.)
2 Congress drew that line for good reason: database-matching programs run on the
3 eve of an election are prone to error, and eligible voters swept up in them have no
4 time to discover the mistake and correct it before they lose their vote. The Ninth
5 Circuit has applied the bar to systematic noncitizen-removal programs and held that
6 a database comparison is not transformed into an individualized inquiry merely
7 because notices go out afterward. *Mi Familia Vota v. Fontes*, 129 F.4th 691, 716–17
8 (9th Cir. 2025). The Executive’s program is systematic by design: a bulk list,
9 generated by database matching, applied wholesale weeks before Election Day. It
10 would not formally strike names from the rolls. But setting aside registered voters’
11 ballots until an open-ended federal review ends accomplishes the same exclusion
12 the quiet period exists to prevent. A purge does not escape the statute by being
13 called a ballot hold.

14 The quiet period is not the only obstacle. The Voting Rights Act forbids any
15 person acting under color of law to “willfully fail or refuse to tabulate, count, and
16 report” the vote of a person “entitled to vote.” 52 U.S.C. § 10307(a). The Executive
17 describes the voters on its list only as “likely” noncitizens; it does not claim that all
18 are ineligible. (ECF No. 68 at 38.) A blanket hold would therefore withhold the
19 ballots of qualified citizens, and County officials would be refusing, knowingly, to
20 count them. Federal law also requires that list maintenance be “uniform” and
21 “nondiscriminatory,” and bars officials from applying different standards to some
22 voters than to others already found qualified. 52 U.S.C. §§ 20507(b)(1),
23 10101(a)(2)(A). An order singling out voters based on immigration records would
24 fall hardest on naturalized citizens. And an order withholding ballots with no notice,
25 no opportunity to respond, no standard for decision, and no deadline would deny
26 eligible voters the process the Constitution requires. *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S.
27 319, 335 (1976); (ECF No. 32-1 at 28–29.) A preemption claim cannot succeed by
28 demanding that the County break federal law to avoid an imagined conflict with it.

1
2 **C. The Executive has not established irreparable harm.**

3 The Executive's newly expanded arguments trying to establish irreparable
4 harm are unavailing. First, it argues that, once a ballot is separated from its
5 identifying envelope, it cannot later be identified and excluded from the count if the
6 voter is found ineligible. (ECF No. 76-1 at 19.) That is a consequence of the legally
7 mandated secret ballot, not an obstruction of federal law enforcement. The County
8 maintains voter-registration and participation records, which by law must be made
9 available for public inspection, that federal officials can use to investigate who
10 voted and whether anyone voted unlawfully. 52 U.S.C. § 20507(i)(1). What the
11 Executive seeks to preserve is something else: the possibility of identifying and
12 excluding particular ballots if its unfinished investigation eventually substantiates
13 its suspicions. (Compl. ¶¶ 6, 63.) Congress has imposed no such requirement. Nor
14 has the Executive established that the thousands of voters whose ballots it seeks to
15 withhold are ineligible to vote. Its claimed harm remains speculative. *See Winter v.*
16 *NRDC*, 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008).

17 Second, the Executive also invokes dilution of lawful votes. (ECF 76-1 at 1–
18 2, 16.) But vote dilution is an asserted injury to voters, not to the United States,
19 which casts no ballot. Although Congress may authorize the United States to sue to
20 protect voting rights, the Executive identifies no such authorization for the vote-
21 dilution theory it advances here. It cannot establish irreparable injury merely by
22 invoking an alleged injury to voters. It also ignores the rights of the voters whose
23 ballots the Executive seeks to indefinitely hold along with the general public, who
24 has a right to have its elections timely completed.

25 Finally, the Executive's own delay undermines its claim of urgency. Federal
26 agencies had underlying voter data in May, yet the Executive did not deliver its list
27 to the County until October 14, after ballot processing began. (ECF No. 76-1 at 5.)
28 The Executive waited more than three months after first raising this issue to seek

1 emergency relief, and that delay undercuts its claim of urgency now. *See Oakland*
2 *Tribune, Inc. v. Chronicle Publishing Co.*, 762 F.2d 1374, 1377 (9th Cir. 1985)
3 (“Plaintiff’s long delay before seeking a preliminary injunction implies a lack of
4 urgency and irreparable harm.”).

5 **D. The equities and public interest decisively oppose the requested**
6 **injunction.**

7 The injunction would disrupt an ongoing election and jeopardize the votes of
8 eligible citizens. The County has already processed hundreds of thousands of
9 ballots, with substantially greater volumes expected as it gets closer and closer to
10 Election Day. (ECF No. 32-1 at 11.) The order would require officials to identify
11 and segregate ballots based on an unverified federal list, then undertake citizenship
12 determinations the County is neither equipped nor authorized to perform. (ECF 32-
13 4 ¶ 44.)

14 Eligible voters mistakenly included on the list would have their ballots
15 withheld without notice or an opportunity to contest the determination. (ECF No.
16 32-4 ¶ 49.) That risk is especially serious for naturalized citizens whose
17 immigration records may not reflect their current status. The resulting burdens
18 implicate both the right to vote and federal protections against nonuniform
19 eligibility procedures. *See League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina*, 769
20 F.3d 224, 247 (4th Cir. 2014); 52 U.S.C. § 10101(a)(2)(A).

21 The Executive’s reliance on *Purcell v. Gonzalez*, 549 U.S. 1, 4–5 (2006), is
22 misplaced. The Executive cites *Purcell* for the proposition that “[v]oters who fear
23 their legitimate votes will be outweighed by fraudulent ones will feel
24 disenfranchised.” (See ECF No. 76-1 at 13.) But that statement in *Purcell* was made
25 in the context of the State’s compelling interest in preventing voter fraud generally,
26 not in the context of a federal agency’s own after-the-fact review of an existing
27 voter list after an election is already underway. *Purcell*, 549 U.S. at 4. *Purcell* and
28 its progeny caution against changing election procedures close to Election Day,

1 because such orders risk voter confusion and can themselves increase the very
2 disenfranchisement the Executive invokes. *Id.* at 4–5. The requested injunction
3 would do just that, after voting has already begun. The public interest in preventing
4 unlawful voting does not justify disrupting election administration and withholding
5 potentially lawful ballots based on unproven suspicions, particularly when federal
6 investigation and prosecution remain available. The equities favor denying relief.

7 **E. The proposed interim injunction fails for the same reasons.**

8 The Executive alternatively seeks an injunction lasting up to 30 days or until
9 the Ninth Circuit rules on its emergency motion, whichever is sooner. (ECF 76-1 at
10 2.) It cites *NetChoice v. Bonta*, 761 F. Supp. 3d 1232, 1236 (N.D. Cal. 2025), for
11 authority to grant temporary relief preserving appellate review.

12 But the temporary nature of relief does not justify an injunction that changes
13 rather than preserves the status quo. Unless the Ninth Circuit ruled sooner, an order
14 issued now and lasting 30 days would extend to November 22, beyond Election
15 Day. Even an injunction of only a few days would require the County to undertake
16 the very segregation-and-verification process at issue, disrupt ongoing operations,
17 impose immediate burdens on registered voters, and jeopardize the County’s ability
18 to meet required deadlines. (ECF No. 32-4 ¶¶ 38, 41.)

19 The Executive’s alternative therefore suffers from precisely the same
20 substantive and equitable defects as its principal request. Calling the interference
21 temporary does not make it harmless.

22 **IV. CONCLUSION**

23 The Executive may investigate and prosecute unlawful voting. But neither
24 Section 611 nor any other federal statute identified in its motion authorizes it to
25 compel local election officials to interrupt lawful ballot processing because a
26 federal investigation remains unfinished. This would violate both federal and state
27 law. The Executive has shown neither likely success nor irreparable harm, and the
28 consequences of its proposed intervention would fall on the County and registered

1 voters.

2 The Court should deny the motion in full, including the alternative request
3 for a temporary injunction, and proceed with the October 27 hearing as scheduled.

4
5 Dated: October 23, 2026

NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT US LLP

6
7 By: /s/ Abigail Urquhart

8 CHRISTOPHER PELHAM
9 ABIGAIL URQUHART
ALEX SCANDROLI

10 *Attorneys for Defendant*
11 *DEAN C. LOGAN, in his official capacity as*
12 *the County of Los Angeles*
13 *Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk*

14 Dated: October 23, 2026

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15 By: /s/ Joshua Karsh

16 JOSHUA KARSH (*pro hac vice pending*)
17 TOBY R. MERRILL (*pro hac vice pending*)
18 SHARANYA MOHAN (CA Bar No. 350675)
19 CHRISTINE E. BASS (CA Bar No. 345896)
20 KYRA SIKORA (CA BAR NO. 345896)

21 *Attorney for Defendant Dean C. Logan, in his*
22 *official capacity as the County of Los Angeles*
23 *Registrar-Recorder/County clerk.*

24 ** Licensed in Illinois and Washington, D.C.*
25 *not licensed to practice law in California.*
26
27
28

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH L.R. 11-6.2

The undersigned, counsel of record for Defendant Dean C. Logan, certifies that this brief contains 3980 words in compliance with L.R. 11-6.2

/s Abigail Urquhart
ABIGAIL URQUHART

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