

No. 295866

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

CLARISSA CERVANTES, OSCAR ORTIZ, REBECCA
ROBINSON, AND NATHAN KEMPE

Petitioners,

vs.

CHAD BIANCO, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
RIVERSIDE COUNTY SHERIFF, AND ART TINOCO, IN
HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS RIVERSIDE COUNTY
REGISTRAR OF VOTERS

Respondents.

RESPONDENT SHERIFF CHAD BIANCO'S
PRELIMINARY OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT
OF MANDATE AND/OR OTHER EXTRAORDINARY
RELIEF AND REQUEST FOR EXPEDITED REVIEW;
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

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March 26, 2026

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CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED ENTITIES

Pursuant to California Rule of Court 8.208, Sheriff Chad Bianco, in his official capacity as Riverside County Sheriff, certifies that he knows of no entity or person, other than the parties themselves and the named real parties in interest, that have a financial or other interest in the outcome of the proceeding that he reasonably believes the justices should consider in determining whether to disqualify themselves under canon 3E of the Code of Judicial Ethics.

Respectfully submitted,



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I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioners seek extraordinary relief from this Court to stop lawful investigatory actions after a court has already found probable cause exists for the issuance of a warrant. This Court should dismiss the Petition because no counting of the ballots will take place unless and until the writ petition pending before the Riverside County Superior Court filed by the Attorney General over this matter is resolved. *See Att’y General Rob Bonta v. Chad Bianco*, No. CVRI2601580 (filed Mar. 26, 2026).

In addition, Petitioners lack constitutional standing to invoke this Court’s jurisdiction. Petitioners are four individual voters who allege no concrete, particularized injury distinguishable from the generalized grievance shared equally by every one of the approximately 650,000 Riverside County voters who cast ballots in the November 2025 Special Election.

Finally, Petitioners have failed to justify why emergency relief is warranted in this fashion and more specifically why speedy relief is not available by filing in the Superior Court. The California Court of Appeal already rejected an emergency petition filed this week by the California Attorney General based on the same underlying facts. *See Exhibit A, Bonta v. Bianco*, (filed March 23, 2026, Fourth Dist., Div. Two) Case No. E088096 (“Order Denying Writ”). This Court should give deference to that decision denying the Attorney General's Petition for Writ of Mandate and Request for Immediate Stay for failure to demonstrate an adequate remedy in the superior court. The Attorney General has

recognized as much and has now filed an action in the appropriate forum, the Superior Court of California, to litigate this matter on the merits. Petitioners, who possess no greater standing or legal authority than the Attorney General, cannot justify bypassing that same avenue simply by filing directly in this Court. This Court should decline to exercise its original jurisdiction where the ordinary course of law provides the relief sought.

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

A. **The Riverside County Sheriff's Department ("RSO") Obtained And Executed Judicial Search Warrants To Seize Ballots And Election Materials Due To Concerns Regarding Reconciliation Discrepancy**

RSO obtained and executed two judicial search warrants authorizing seizure of ballots and other election materials from the Riverside County Registrar of Voters ("ROV") related to the November 4, 2025 Special Election. (Ex. A, Declaration of Sheriff Chad Bainco). RSO's investigation is premised on credible evidence that the number of physical ballots may be approximately 45,896 fewer than the total votes certified by the ROV for the November 2025 Special Election. *Id.* The ROV Ballot Warrant concerned the fact that an audit of the 2025 Special Election performed by a group of election observers demonstrated that the ROV's internal logs for counting the total number of ballots cast in the election did not match the ROV's certified results. The ROV's certification identifying the total number of ballots cast was based on the County's computerized election management system. In

contrast, the internal logs prepared by ROV personnel are derived and reflect a physical count of ballots. Personnel count the ballots received on a daily basis and record their count in handwritten logs in accordance with the ROV's established practice for the 2025 Special Election. The same group of observers asserted that their findings after an audit of the immediately preceding election resulted in a similar discrepancy of more than 30,000 votes. This reporting by election observers caused RSO to seek the warrants to investigate the alleged discrepancies in order to determine whether there is in fact an actual discrepancy as reported by the election observers. If true, the Sheriff's Department reasonably believes that this investigation would lead to evidence of a felony occurring in the 2025 Special Elections. The warrant was granted by this Court and the RSO seized the ballots in accordance with the warrant. *Id.*

RSO believes the lack of reconciliation between certified vote totals and the ballot-accounting records and/or the number of physical ballots constitutes evidence of one or more felony violations of California law. *Id.* A controlled count of the seized ballots, coupled with comparison to certified totals and ballot-accounting records, is a direct and minimally intrusive method to test whether this discrepancy exists and, if so, to quantify it reliably.

RSO complied with the Attorney General's demand that this investigation be paused. *Id.* RSO has preserved the seized items as evidence, consistent with the Attorney General's request that the

RSO preserve the seized materials. *Id.* RSO will be providing a report of this investigation to the Attorney General.

B. The Attorney General Is Now Seeking A Writ In Superior Court

On March 26, 2026, the Attorney General filed for a writ of mandate in the Superior Court of California, Riverside County, concerning the ballots and this criminal investigation. *Id.* The RSO has agreed to not count ballots and has paused its investigation pending the resolution of the writ of mandate. *Id.*; see also *Att’y General Rob Bonta v. Chad Bianco*, No. CVRI2601580 (filed Mar. 26, 2026). Importantly, the Attorney General filed this new writ in the superior court after he sought original jurisdiction in the California Court of Appeal Fourth District. However, the court of appeal denied the writ of mandate and request for immediate stay because the Attorney General “failed to demonstrate he lacks an adequate remedy in the superior court.” (Ex. A, Order Denying Writ.)

**III. PETITIONERS LACK CONSTITUTIONAL
STANDING BECAUSE THEY HAVE SUFFERED
NO CONCRETE, PARTICULARIZED INJURY-IN-FACT**

To establish constitutional standing under California law, a petitioner must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an injury that is concrete and particularized; (2) that the injury is actual or imminent; and (3) that the injury is distinct from the generalized interest shared by all members of the public in lawful government conduct. *Common Cause v. Board of Supervisors*, 49 Cal. 3d 432,

439–441 (1989). These requirements are not merely procedural formalities. Rather, they define the outer boundary of the judicial power itself, ensuring that courts resolve actual disputes between parties with genuine stakes rather than rendering advisory opinions on matters of general public concern. *Weatherford v. City of San Rafael*, 2 Cal. 5th 1241, 1248 (2017). Petitioners satisfy none of these requirements. Their alleged injuries are speculative rather than concrete, contingent on a chain of inferences rather than actual or imminent, and shared identically with every one of the approximately 650,000 voters who cast ballots in the November 2025 Special Election — making them the quintessential generalized grievance that California courts have consistently held insufficient to invoke judicial power.

A. California Courts Require A Genuine Case Or Controversy Grounded In Actual, Individualized Injury

California courts have long recognized that the judicial power extends only to genuine cases or controversies, not to abstract, generalized grievances about governmental compliance with law. *Id.* This requirement is independently codified in Code of Civil Procedure §367, which mandates that every action be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest — the party possessing an actual, personal stake in the litigation rather than a generalized interest in seeing the law followed. *County of Alameda v. Carleson*, 5 Cal. 3d 730, 737 (1971). Together, these requirements demand that a petitioner demonstrate an injury that

is: (1) concrete and particularized, not abstract or hypothetical; (2) actual or imminent, not conjectural or speculative; and (3) distinct from the generalized interest of all members of the public in lawful government conduct. *Common Cause v. Board of Supervisors*, 49 Cal. 3d 432, 439–441 (1989). Where any of these requirements is unsatisfied, no justiciable controversy exists and the court is without power to grant relief regardless of the legal theory invoked. *Pacific Legal Foundation v. California Coastal Comm’n*, 33 Cal. 3d 158, 170–71 (1982).

These principles apply with full force in the election context. The fact that a proceeding involves election law does not relax the requirement of actual, individualized injury, but rather reinforces it. *Edelstein v. City and County of San Francisco*, 29 Cal. 4th 164, 174–75 (2002) (statutory standing provisions in the election context must be interpreted in light of constitutional requirements of injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability; a general interest in lawful election administration does not satisfy those requirements). The constitutional floor of injury-in-fact cannot be lowered by statute, and no invocation of Elections Code § 13314 or any other provision of California law can substitute for the showing the Constitution requires. *Id.*

B. Petitioners Assert Only A Generalized Grievance Shared By All 650,000 Riverside County Voters

The constitutional standing inquiry begins and ends with a straightforward observation: every injury Petitioners allege is shared identically and in equal measure by every one of the

approximately 650,000 voters who cast ballots in the November 2025 Special Election on Proposition 50. Petitioners do not and cannot allege that their specific, individual ballots have been viewed or will be viewed, that their voter identities have been exposed, that their individual votes have been miscounted, or that they have suffered any harm distinguishable in kind or degree from the harm allegedly suffered by every other Riverside County voter who participated in that election. In fact, the ballots have no personally identifying markers.

Instead, Petitioners allege that they “have no expectation that the privacy of their ballot will be respected, or that it will be accurately tabulated.” (Pet. at 3, 29.) This is a statement about a general condition affecting all voters, not a particularized injury to these four Petitioners. It is “a grievance shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens.” *Common Cause*, 49 Cal. 3d at 440 (quoting *Warth v. Seldin*, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975)); see also *Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife*, 504 U.S. 555, 573–74 (1992) (generalized grievances shared by all citizens do not satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement; California courts have applied the same principle in analogous standing contexts). Importantly, the warrants issued were not issued for the purpose of performing a “recount” under election law, but simply to count all the ballots case, which have no personally identifying markers.

California courts have consistently held that a generalized grievance of this kind does not satisfy the constitutional floor for standing. In *Common Cause*, the California Supreme Court

considered whether organizations and individual citizens had standing to challenge election-related governmental conduct and concluded they did not because their alleged injuries were “no different in kind from the interest of every citizen in proper administration of the laws.” 49 Cal. 3d at 439–40. The Court emphasized that permitting such undifferentiated claims would effectively transform the courts into supervisory bodies over all government action, a role incompatible with the judicial function. *Id.* at 441–42.

The same analysis governs here. If these four Petitioners have standing to challenge Respondent Bianco’s conduct by virtue of having cast ballots in the affected election, then so does every other voter who cast a ballot — all 650,000 of them, without limitation or principled distinction. There is no factual or legal difference between these Petitioners and the hundreds of thousands of other Riverside County voters whose anonymous ballots were similarly seized and who similarly lack any knowledge of whether their specific ballots have been compromised. This Court has expressly declined to recognize standing theories that would “open the courthouse doors to any member of the public with a generalized interest in government compliance with law.” *Id.* at 442.

C. Petitioners’ Alleged Injuries Are Speculative And Not Yet Concrete Or Imminent

Even setting aside the generalized nature of the alleged harm, Petitioners claimed injuries are entirely speculative and

contingent on a chain of inferences that has not materialized into actual harm. Standing requires that an injury be concrete and imminent, rather than merely possible, and not dependent on a sequence of future events that may or may not occur. *Stevens v. Superior Court*, 75 Cal. App. 4th 594, 606–07 (1999); *Pacific Legal Foundation*, 33 Cal. 3d at 170–71.

Petitioners do not allege that their specific ballots have been opened or that their identities have been linked to their votes. They do not allege that any unauthorized recount results have been published, certified, or acted upon in any proceeding. They do not allege that the certified election results have been disturbed, or that any proceeding is pending that would alter those results based on Respondent Bianco’s conduct. In fact, the warrants were not issued for the purpose of performing a “recount” under the Elections Code, but to simply count the total number of ballots without regard to how any ballot was cast. The entirety of Petitioners’ claimed injury rests on the following inferential chain: ballots were seized; unqualified personnel may have handled them; that handling may have compromised privacy or accuracy; and therefore, each Petitioner’s individual ballot may have been affected in some unspecified way. This is precisely the kind of conjectural, speculative harm that does not satisfy the constitutional requirement of injury-in-fact. *Stevens*, 75 Cal. App. 4th at 607; *cf. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA*, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013) (persuasive authority for the proposition that “allegations of possible future injury do not satisfy” standing requirements).

The speculative character of Petitioners' alleged injuries is confirmed by what the Petition does not contain. There is no factual allegation that any specific ballot belonging to any named Petitioner has been compromised in any identifiable way. The verification filed by counsel does not include declarations from the Petitioners themselves attesting to any particularized harm suffered by them individually. (Pet. at 27.) Counsel's characterization of generalized harm does not substitute for a petitioner's actual, personal injury. *Schmier v. Supreme Court*, 78 Cal. App. 4th 703, 707–08 (2000) (dismissing mandamus petition for failure to allege sufficient personal injury; counsel's assertions cannot supply the jurisdictional foundation that standing requires).

D. Code Of Civil Procedure § 367 Independently Requires A Concrete Personal Stake

Independent of the constitutional analysis, Code of Civil Procedure § 367 requires that this action be prosecuted in the name of the “real party in interest”, the party who possesses the right sought to be enforced and who will be directly benefited or harmed by the judgment. *Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp.*, 67 Cal. App. 4th 995, 1004 (1998). A party who asserts only a derivative or representative interest, or who seeks to vindicate a public right no more personal to them than to any other member of the public, is not the real party in interest within the meaning of §367. *Killian v. Millard*, 228 Cal. App. 3d 1601, 1605 (1991).

The rights Petitioners seek to vindicate — proper ballot chain of custody, compliance with Elections Code ballot-handling procedures, and public transparency in vote tabulation — are public rights belonging to the electorate at large, not personal rights belonging uniquely to these four voters.

E. Elections Code Section 13314 Does Not Rescue Petitioners’ Standing

Petitioners invoke Elections Code §13314 as an independent statutory basis for standing, but that provision does not cure the constitutional deficiencies identified above for three reasons.

First, §13314 cannot lower the constitutional floor of injury-in-fact. The California Supreme Court has made clear that statutory standing grants must be interpreted consistently with constitutional requirements of justiciability and that a statute cannot manufacture a case or controversy where none exists. *Edelstein v. City and County of San Francisco*, 29 Cal. 4th 164, 174–75 (2002). Where the invoking parties only claimed injury is a generalized grievance shared equally with hundreds of thousands of other voters, the constitutional barrier to judicial cognizance remains regardless of what the statute provides. *Common Cause*, 49 Cal. 3d at 441–42.

Second, §13314 does not, on its own terms, extend to this conduct or this respondent. The statute authorizes writs directed at “election officials” as defined by Elections Code § 320 — a category that does not include a county sheriff exercising criminal warrant authority. *Yamaha Corp. of America v. State Board of*

Equalization, 19 Cal. 4th 1, 7 (1998). Moreover, every reported case invoking §13314 has arisen in the context of ongoing or imminent election processes, not post-election law enforcement activity occurring months after a certified result. The statute's location in Division 13 under "Voters' Rights," its surrounding provisions addressing ballot form and candidate qualification, and its filing deadline of "no later than the date of the election" under §13314(b)(1) all confirm it was not designed for this posture. *Harbor v. Deukmejian*, 43 Cal. 3d 1078, 1087 (1987).

Third, even if § 13314 conferred statutory standing, it would not independently satisfy the mandamus-specific beneficial interest requirement, discussed in detail below, which is a separate doctrinal obligation that must be satisfied on its own terms regardless of any statutory authorization. *Carrancho v. California Air Resources Board*, 111 Cal. App. 4th 1255, 1265 (2003). Collapsing the two inquiries would render the beneficial interest requirement meaningless in every election case, permitting any of the 650,000 voters who cast ballots in November 2025 to petition this Court individually – a result neither the statute nor the doctrine contemplates. *Common Cause*, 49 Cal. 3d at 442.

IV. PETITIONERS CANNOT ESTABLISH THE PREREQUISITES FOR MANDAMUS RELIEF UNDER CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1085

To obtain the issuance of a writ of mandamus, Petitioners bear the burden of demonstrating: (a) that they have no other

plain, speedy, and adequate remedy; (2) that Sheriff Bianco has failed to act on a clear ministerial duty; and (3) they have a clear right to such performance. *Morgan v. Bd. of Pension Comrs.* (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 836, 842–43; Code Civ. Proc., § 1085. Petitioners must show that they “will suffer an irreparable injury if the writ is not granted.” *Los Angeles Gay & Lesbian Center v. Superior Court* (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 288, 300.

Petitioners have failed to provide adequate evidence that any of these elements have been met and their request should be denied.

A. Petitioners Have Failed To Demonstrate That There Is No Other Plain, Speedy, And Adequate Remedy As The Superior Court Is Equipped To Hear This Case

The Supreme Court “will ordinarily not entertain an original application for a writ of mandate where the proceeding could have been prosecuted in the Superior Court.” *May v. Bd. of Directors of El Camino Irr. Dist.* (1949) 34 Cal.2d 125, 135. Because Petitioners bypassed the lower courts, they must explain why the Supreme Court should issue the writ as an original matter. Rules of Court, Rule 8.486.

The Court of Appeals has already decided as much when it denied the Attorney General’s writ request filed directly in the Court of Appeals based on these same underlying facts—holding that the Attorney General “failed to demonstrate he lacks an adequate remedy in the superior court.” Exhibit A, Order Denying Writ Request.

Petitioners, like the Attorney General, should have sought to file their writ in the lower courts first. Petitioners’ claims are based on election law—a topic California’s lower courts are well-equipped to rule on. *Franzblau v. Monardo* (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 522, 526 (“since jurisdiction of election contests is lodged in the superior court by the constitutional provision vesting original jurisdiction in such court in all cases except those given by statute to other trial courts, the superior court had jurisdiction to hear the instant case.”)

At the heart of this issue are the search warrants which give judicial authorization and legitimacy to the Sheriff’s acts—and these warrants are currently being litigated in the lower courts. Petitioners claim they do not have access to these proceedings or the ability to intervene directly. But this does not transform mandamus into an all-purpose supervisory tool over an investigative warrant. Nor does it answer the question posed by the Appellate Court – why was this writ not filed in the Superior Court? *See Ex. A, Order Denying Writ.*

Because Petitioners have a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy available, as the Court of Appeals has already held in a substantially similar proceeding, Petitioners’ request should be denied.

B. Petitioners Cannot Show A Ministerial Duty Owed Them By The Riverside County Sheriff

Petitioners have also failed to show that the Sheriff has “failed to act on a clear ministerial duty.” *Morgan*, 85 Cal.App.4th

at 842. A ministerial act is one which a public officer is required to perform in a prescribed manner in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard to his own judgment of opinion. *Id.* at 843.

Investigating crime is a quintessentially discretionary act. *See Venegas v. Cnty. Los Angeles* (2004) 32 Cal.4th 820, 830 (noting a Sheriff's duty to investigate crime); Gov. Code, §§ 2660, 26601, 26602 (laying forth investigative duties of a Sheriff). What to investigate, how to sequence investigative steps, and how to test an evidentiary hypothesis are, paradigmatically, questions of discretion that must be exercised by the Sheriff. *See e.g. Taliaferro v. Locke* (1960) 182 Cal.App.2d 752, 755–57 (holding that a District Attorney's decision to investigate and prosecute crime “rests in his own discretion.”) The Sheriff's choice to investigate elections fraud, to seek a warrant in furtherance of that investigation, and to seize evidence in accordance with lawfully issued search warrants were all acts within the Sheriff's discretion. Said another way, the Sheriff does not owe Petitioners a duty to conduct his investigation of elections fraud in the manner they prefer.

The Sheriff is fully within his right to investigate crimes within his county, including election fraud. California's own Attorney General's Office has previously held that under Government Code §26600 and §26601, “a sheriff is expressly authorized and directed to investigate public offenses which have been committed and to arrest and take before a magistrate all persons who have committed a public offense.” See AG Opinion No.

93-903 (May 3, 1994). Government Code §26600 states that "the sheriff shall preserve peace," and § 26601 states that "the sheriff shall arrest and take before the nearest magistrate for examination all persons who attempt to commit or who have committed a public offense." The use of "shall" makes this mandatory.

Here, the Sheriff submitted an application for the issuance of a warrant describing with particularity where evidence of a crime can be obtained. A neutral superior court judge reviewed the evidence and found probable cause and issued the warrants that are the subject of this writ. Petitioners should not be able to shut down an investigation, already based on the finding of probable cause of a crime.

C. Petitioners Have No Beneficial Interest In Proscribing The Sheriff's Ability To Investigate Elections Fraud

"A beneficial interest means the party has a special interest over and above the interest of the public at large." *Muha v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc.* (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 199, 208. The standard is equivalent to the federal "injury in fact" standard in that a party must prove it has suffered "an invasion of a legally protected interest that is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical." *Id.* (citations and quotations omitted).

Here, Petitioners are voters with no alleged injury that is particular to them, as opposed to any other voter. Petitioner's Br.,

at 8, ¶ 7. While taxpayer standing can be specially alleged to confer standing on someone who, otherwise, cannot show a particularized harm, Petitioners do not allege they have such standing. Nor could they, as they cannot point to "any illegal expenditure of, waste of, or injury to, the estate, funds, or other property of a local agency" as is required to demonstrate such standing. *See* Code Civ. Proc., § 526a; *San Diegans for Open Government v. Fonseca* (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 426, 435. And California has not recognized an analogous "voter standing" that would allow an individual to sue based on the fact that they are a voter. *Connerly v. Schwarzenegger* (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 739, 751 ("[Plaintiff] has failed to cite a single state or federal case that either establishes or recognizes 'voter standing'.")

Petitioners can allege no particularized harm that they suffer by the Sheriff's investigation of voter fraud. Petitioners aver that an investigation will invade their privacy, but do not state how this can be the case given the ballots cannot be traced to individual who cast it after it is counted. Election Code § 15101 (example of processing of vote by mail ballot involves it being separated from envelope). In fact, Petitioners would be in violation of the Elections Code if they put identifying information on their ballot. *See* § 14287 ("No voter shall place personal information upon a ballot that identifies the voter.") Petitioners' allegations fail because counting the number of ballots does *nothing* to interfere with Petitioners' privacy.

V. CONCLUSION

Respondent Sheriff Chad Bianco respectfully requests the Petition For Writ Of Mandate And/Or Other Extraordinary Relief And Request For Expedited Review be summarily denied.

Dated: March 26, 2026

Respectfully submitted,




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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I certify that the attached Respondents' Opposition uses a 13-point Century Schoolbook font and contains 4,090 words.



Robert H. Tyler, Esq.
Attorney for
Respondents

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I am an employee in the County of Riverside. I am over the age of 18 years and not a party to the within entitled action; my business address is 25026 Las Brisas Road, Murrieta, California 92562.

On March 26, 2026, I served a copy of the following document(s) described as:

**RESPONDENTS' PRELIMINARY OPPOSITION TO
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE AND/OR OTHER
EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF AND REQUEST FOR
EXPEDITED REVIEW; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES**

on the interested party(ies) in this action by-email or electronic service [C.C.P. § 1010.6; CRC 2.250-2.261]. The documents listed above were transmitted via e-mail to the e-mail addresses on the attached service list.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the foregoing is true and correct and that I am an employee in the office of a member of the bar of this Court who directed this service.



Susan Y. Kenney

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EXHIBIT “A”

3:03 pm, Mar 24, 2026

By: C. Daniels

COURT OF APPEAL -- STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO

ORDER

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,
Petitioner,

E088096

The County of Riverside

v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
RIVERSIDE COUNTY,

Respondent;

CHAD BIANCO, RIVERSIDE
COUNTY SHERIFF et al.,
Real Parties in Interest.

THE COURT

We have reviewed the petition for writ of mandate with exhibits, as well as petitioner's letter, filed March 24, 2026, seeking immediate action. The petition for writ of mandate and request for immediate stay are DENIED. Petitioner has failed to demonstrate he lacks an adequate remedy in the superior court. (*Los Angeles Gay & Lesbian Center v. Superior Court* (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 288, 299-300; See *People ex rel. Harris v. Rizzo* (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 921, 936-937.) The request for judicial notice is DENIED.

MILLER

Acting P. J.

Panel: Miller
McKinster
Raphael

cc: See attached list

MAILING LIST FOR CASE: E088096

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