_ewis & Clark County District Coun STATE OF MONTANA By: Lisa Kallio DV-25-2025-0000268-IJ

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MONTANA FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, LEWIS AND CLARK COUNTY

MONTANA FEDERATION OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES,

Plaintiff,

NORTHERN CHEYENNE TRIBE, BLACKFEET NATION, CONFEDERATED SALISH & KOOTENAI TRIBES, FORT BELKNAP INDIAN COMMUNITY, and WESTERN NATIVE VOICE,

Plaintiff-Intervenors,

v.

STATE OF MONTANA and CHRISTI JACOBSEN, in her official capacity as Montana Secretary of State,

Defendants.

Cause No. **ADV-25-2025-0268**

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE

This matter comes before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Transfer Venue pursuant to Senate Bill 97 (SB 97). Having reviewed the parties' briefs, the applicable law, and the record, the Court DENIES the motion for the reasons set forth below.

I. Background

Plaintiff Montana Federation of Public Employees challenges the constitutionality of Senate Bills 490 and 276, enacted during the 2025 legislative session. Defendants seek to transfer venue to Lincoln County under SB 97, which modifies venue rules for constitutional

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challenges to legislative acts. SB 97 was signed into law on May 5, 2025, but does not specify an effective date. Under Montana law, statutes without an explicit effective date take effect on October 1 following their passage. See § 1-2-201(1)(a), MCA. SB 97 also includes a saving clause, which states that the law "does not affect ... proceedings that were begun before [its] effective date." SB 97 § 7.

II. Analysis

A. SB 97 Is Not Yet in Effect

Under Montana law, statutes without an explicit effective date take effect on October 1 following their passage. § 1-2-201(1)(a), MCA. SB 97 does not include an explicit effective date, and the legislature's website confirms that its effective date is October 1, 2025. Defendants concede this point but argue that SB 97, as a procedural law, is "functionally effective immediately" upon the Governor's signature. This argument is unpersuasive.

Montana courts have never enforced a statute before its statutory effective date. The cases cited by Defendants—*State ex rel. Johnson v. District Court*, 148 Mont. 22, 417 P.2d 109 (1966), and *City of Helena v. Community of Rimini*, 2017 MT 145, address the retroactive application of laws already in effect, not the pre-effective date enforcement of statutes. The distinction between retroactivity and effective dates is critical. As the Montana Supreme Court has made clear, a statute cannot be enforced before it becomes law. See *Johnson*, 148 Mont. at 28, 417 P.2d at 112.

B. SB 97's Saving Clause Bars Its Application to This Case

Even if SB 97 were in effect, its saving clause explicitly exempts this case. The saving clause states that SB 97 "does not affect ... proceedings that were begun before [its] effective date." SB 97 § 7. The Montana Supreme Court has consistently held that saving clauses preserve

the application of prior law to pending cases. See *Fisher v. First Citizens Bank*, 2000 MT 314, ¶ 19, 302 Mont. 473, 14 P.3d 1228. By its plain language, SB 97's saving clause "excepts" this case, which was filed on May 12, 2025, well before the statute's October 1, 2025, effective date.

Defendants argue that the saving clause does not apply because SB 97 is procedural and does not "affect" the proceedings. This argument is unconvincing. The saving clause explicitly applies to "proceedings that were begun before [the statute's] effective date," and there is no basis to exclude venue determinations from its scope. Defendants' interpretation would render the saving clause meaningless, contrary to the principle that courts must give effect to all provisions of a statute. See *Mont. Vending, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.*, 2003 MT 282, ¶ 21, 318 Mont. 1, 78 P.3d 499.

C. Venue Is Proper in Lewis and Clark County

Under existing venue laws, venue is proper in Lewis and Clark County because the State is a named defendant, Plaintiff is headquartered in Lewis and Clark County, and the cause of action arose in Lewis and Clark County. See §§ 25-2-125, 25-2-126(1), MCA. Transferring venue to Lincoln County based on a statute that is not yet in effect and explicitly exempts pending cases would be legally improper.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that SB 97 is not yet in effect and, even if it were, its saving clause exempts this case. Venue is proper in Lewis and Clark County under existing law. Accordingly, Defendants' Motion to Transfer Venue is **DENIED**.

The Clerk of Court is directed to serve all parties with a copy of this Order.

ELECTRONICALLY SIGNED AND DATED BELOW