1	LAURA HOBBS 6751 W. Waverly Ave.							
2	Redding, California, 96001 Mrs.LauraHobbs@Protonmail.com							
3	Tel: (805-710-4905	APR 0 3 2024 8V						
4	LAURA HOBBS, IN PRO PER	SHASTA COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT						
5		BY: S. WILLIS, DEPUTY CLERK						
6								
7	SUPERIOR COURT OF TH	E STATE OF CALIFORNIA						
8	FOR THE COUNTY OF SHASTA							
9		<i>A</i>						
10	LAURA HOBBS) Case No.: 204675						
11	Plaintiff(s),) AMENDED DECLARATION OF LAURA						
12	vs.	HOBBS IN SUPPORT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW FOR ELECTION CONTEST						
13	ALLEN LONG, an individual	DATE:						
14	CATHY DARLING ALLEN, in her canacity as	† TIME: DEPT:						
15	Shasta County Clerk of Elections	j Judge:						
16	Defendant(s).	Dept: Action Filed:						
17		f Trial Date:						
18) ·						
19	\$2°							
20	DATED: 4/3/24							
21								
22	y Hule							
23	LAURA HOBBS							
24	In Pro Per							
25	AMENDED DECLARAT	ΓΙΟΝ OF LAURA HOBBS						
26	I, Laura Hobbs, declare:							
27	1. I am a resident of the State of California over the	he age of 18 years and am a Petitioner in this action.						
28	nave personal knowledge of the facts set forth	herein, except those matters which are stated upon						
	AMENDED DECLARATION OF LAURA HOBBS IN	SUPPORT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW FOR ELECTION						

CONTEST

information and belief, and as to those matters, I believe it to be true. If called to testify, I would and could testify competently as to the following:

- 2. I reside at 6751 W. Waverly Ave, Redding Ca.
- 3. I am candidate in the March 5, 2024 election for Shasta County Supervisor in District 2. I wish to contest the results of this election based on Ca Election Code 16101 section c, and e.
- 4. The Shasta County Register of Voters (ROV) Cathy Allen certified on Thursday March 28, that Allen Long avoided a run off and won the contest of district 2 supervisor by garnering 50% plus 14 votes. The minimum needed for him to avoid a run off was 50% plus 1 vote. This is a request for judicial review and an official contest of the election results.
- 5. Mal-administration of the election lead to Hobbs losing approximately 539 votes, far exceeding the 14-vote margin of outright victory for Allen Long. The Randomized Alphabet Drawing Memorandum #23149 (see Exhibit A) assigned by the Secretary of State on 12-14-23 to be used by all the counties in the assigning the official order of the placement candidates on the ballot was not followed in this race. Previous court precedent found a 5% advantage to the candidate listed first and required a random selection be conducted to determine ballot placement order (Gould v. Grubb). According to memorandum #23149 Hobbs should have been placed first on the ballot, letter "G" was first but there were no other contestants whose last name started with a "G". Letter "H" was the next letter called this would place Hobbs in the first position (the other candidates in this race were Long, Sloan, and Baremore). Hobbs was listed third on the ballot. Five percent of votes cast (10,792) in district two equals 539 votes.
- 6. The ROV discriminated against Hobbs during the ballot designation process. She was not allowed to state her occupation as "microbiologist", even though she has credentials in that field; a Ph. D that will never expire. Hobbs explained that she took time off to raise her children. They stated that she could only use her current occupation. Because she wasn't permitted to list her true career, she suggested they use Election Data Analyst and submitted evidence to substantiate that occupation. They refused this designation because no money changed hands during this occupation and assigned her with the designation "Parent" (a designation that is also lacking monetary exchange). She contested this designation. (see Exhibit B, Ballot Designation Email). They did not apply the same principle to Allen Long. Though he is currently a school board member and a parent, they did not use either as his ballot designation. They afforded him special favor and permitted him to use his career designation as retired police officer. The favor granted to him in this process lead to an immeasurable vote advantage for Long.
- 7. Ca Election Code 16101 states "(e) Due to mistake, error, or misconduct the votes in any precinct were so incorrectly counted as to change the result." The audit log contains precinct numbers for each batch written in the notes section (e.g. in line 209607 of the audit log it states: Batch 194 created, Type: 'Vote By Mail', Voting Method: Paper Ballots, Notes: '0431004') that does not match the precinct numbers we witnessed fist hand. For batch 194 we observed on March 11th, at 1:51pm that the precinct '0391210' was written in the notes (see Exhibit J, line 2). The first precinct number corresponds to district 4 (as it begins with 04) and the second precinct number corresponds to district 3 (as it begins with 03). The fact that these were two entirely different

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districts is cause for alarm. This was not an isolated occurrence precinct mismatches occurred in 91 out of 92 VBM batches examined (see Exhibit L, VBM Observed Precinct vs Audit Log Precinct). When the entire election is examined, this number will rise considerably. This represents an egregious error. The elections results are balanced by precinct according to Joanna Francescut the Deputy ROV (personal communication 3/28/24). This is the very framework by which all ballots are tallied, and if this framework or scaffolding is not correct it calls into question the validity of all election results.

- 8. Audit log problems continued: There are many discrepancies in the audit log time and dates vs the time and date recorded by observers at the ROV office during the scanning of the ballots (see Exhibit C, Observer Tabulator Screen and Exhibit J, Sample Observation Data). I also witnessed that the number of ballots in each batch did not match the audit log.
- 9. Many batches were run in tabulators that had the wrong dates and/or times on the monitors. On 3/22/24 the time was off by 1 hour on the only functioning unit (workstation D2200309706). The actual time was 9:55am, but the computer said it was 8:55am. The ROV ran them anyways stating they would file an incident report. With an incorrect audit log, it is almost impossible to recreate the ballot processing which is the purpose of the audit log.
- 10. There was a problem observed with the scanner/computer combos on March 11, 2024. Two of the four computers did not have the correct time listed. They shut those two computers down and just used the two with the correct time. Joanna Francescut later explained that it could not update after the time change because it was not connected to the internet. This begs the question, "Why were two computers telling the correct time, was it because they were connected to the internet?". It is against state law for a voting system to be connected to the internet CA Elec Code § 19205 (2017) (a). The following day March 12, 2024, only one of the four computer clients had the correct time. One of the two that were working the day before had the correct time but was now 1 whole day off. They shut that machine off and then went to using one computer client. On Friday March 22nd, the last remaining computer would no longer tell the correct time, it was one hour behind. They went ahead and counted despite this problem, saying that it would be noted on the statement of votes.
- 11. Many batches were discarded. In the case of a scanner error a re-run is justified. However, by comparing user name, precinct number, and tabulator number we are able to distinguish the batches that were discarded unnecessarily from routine re-runs. If a batch is created by a different user, different precinct, and different tabulator then the duplicate should be retained and not discarded. To date, I have found approximately 40 duplicate batches that were wrongfully discarded. This, in-effect, wrote over the data in the previous batch with the same batch number. The duplicate batches were then discarded according to the audit log. In district 1 there were 1438 ballots wrongfully discarded, in district 2 there were 253 ballots wrongfully discarded, in district 3 there were 940 ballots wrongfully discarded, in district 4 there were 375 ballots wrongfully discarded, and in district 5 there were 790 wrongfully discarded ballots. (see Exhibit D, Discarded Batches). County-wide, this amounts to approximately four thousand votes discarded. This number is anticipated to increase as the remainder of the election is analyzed.

- 12. Audit log "Ballots Cast Count" and the observed "Ballot Count" did not match on multiple occasions. Example: VBM Batch 121 (290462 in district 2) ran on 3/8/24 at 11:53, contained 14 ballots based on observations. The audit log says that this same batch contains 100 ballots, a difference of 86 ballots. This was observed primarily in the VBM ballots and not in the election day ballots. Of 67 election day batches examined, only two batches had ballot numbers that did not match our observations, and they were only off by one vote each. However, the mail-in batches had many errors, of 107 batches examined 52 batches had ballot totals that did not match our observations. As a result, ballots were either added or lost to each batch. In total district 1 had 579 ballots added or lost, district 2 had 339 ballots added or lost, district 3 had 162 ballots added or lost, district 4 had 260 ballots added or lost, and district 5 had 65 ballots added or lost. This number is expected to grow as it only one third of all VBM batches have been analyzed (see Exhibit E, VBM Saved Batches).
- 13. Cast Vote Record (CVR): A Cast Vote Record file is an auditing document that allows you to replay the election from start to finish. It also tells you how each ballot was voted. Concerningly, the batch precinct number in the CVR data does not match the batch precinct number observed first hand. Additionally, the number of ballots per batch in the Cast Vote Record does not match the number of ballots per batch observed first hand. The date and time on the Cast Vote Records does not match the dates on the audit log nor the dates of observation. For instance, in the CVR file one set of batches are listed as 4am-6am on 3/6/24 however there was no tabulation taking place during that time period at the ROV's office. (see Exhibit F, CVR Batches vs Observed Batches). How is a proper accounting or audit possible with so many of these inconsistencies present?
- 14. CVR data of the Long vs. Hobbs contest exhibits two unusual patterns, that may be indicative of computer manipulation during the election. Both a precipitous decline and a steady decline were observed in the cumulative ratio. The precipitous decline is a striking change in the character of the contest and the steady decline is not normal in a fair election (which consists of randomized data) that should stabilize before the mid-point of counting (see Exhibit G, Cast Vote Record Review).
- 15. Large differences in a candidate's percentage were noted between Early Vote and Election Day. When examining the ballot drops subsequent to the 8:09PM 3/5/24 drop, we see some notable differences. There was a large difference between the percentages seen at 8:09PM and the election day votes (released at 1:12 am on 3/6/24). Historically, we have had differences of 0-7% between the early vote and election day (see Exhibit H, Historical Data). However, in this election, between the early vote and election day, we saw unbelievable differences of up to 33%. (see Exhibit H, Historical Data). These differences cannot be accounted for by demographics alone. Using VBM ballot tracks data it was determined that in all districts analyzed (D1-D4) more Republicans voted early than Democrats (see Exhibit I, Early Votes Demographic).
- 16. Many illegal ballots were cast in this election (see Exhibit K, Illegal Ballots).
- 17. I desire to have access to all related election materials in order to conduct a thorough comparison of documentary and electronic records in possession of the Registrar of Voters to ensure all cast ballots were legitimate. The materials include, but are not limited to, Cast Vote Records, digital ballot images, original vote by mail envelopes received from voters by the ROV, and complete scanning and tabulation audit logs.

18. This lawsuit seeks to ask the court to find moot the nomination of Allen Long as winner of the March 5, 2024, primary election. Also, that if this court finds that there were substantial election errors to demand either a new election for the district 2 primary, or allow Laura Hobbs to be declared as qualified to an election runoff against Allen Long. One possible remedy would be a recount under additional parameters specified by the plaintiff. I seek also that the court issue a Writ of Mandate to the County Registrar of Voters to follow all remedies approved by the court for the administration of future elections.

Executed on April 3, 2024 at Redding, Ca
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California the foregoing is true and correct.

Laura Hebbs

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Exhibit L, VBM Observed Precinct vs Audit Log Precinct (1 of 2)

VBM Observed Precinct vs Audit Log Precinct

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