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| 10 | Ryan L. Heath | Case No.: CV-23-0002 Maricopa County Superior Court |
| 11 | Petitioner, | Case No. CV 2022-095403 |
| 12 | V. | OCYL |
| 13 | | FIRST AMENDED VERIFIED |
| 14 | Honorable Peter A. Thompson | SPECIAL ACTION PETITION FOR |
| 15 | Respondent, | WRIT OF MANDAMUS ARIZONA CONSTITUTION: |
| 16 | Kari Lake, personally as Contestant/Plaintiff, | ARTICLES II, §§ 13, 21 & |
| 17 | Katie Hobbs, Contestee/Defendant personally and in her official capacity as Secretary of | ARTICLE VII §§ 1 & 12, UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION |
| 18 | State; Stephen Richer, Derendant in his official | FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: EQUAL PROTECTION & |
| 19 | capacity as Maricopa County Recorder; Bill Gates, Clint Hickman, Jack Sellers, Thomas | FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO VOTE, & |
| 20 | Galvin, and Steve Gallardo, Defendants in their | 42 U.S.C. § 1983 |
| 21 | official capacities as members of the Maricopa | |
| 22 | County Board of Supervisors; Scott Jarrett, Defendant in his official capacity as Maricopa | |
| | County Director of Elections; and the Maricopa | |
| 23 | County Board of Supervisors, | |
| 24 | Real Parties in Interest. | |
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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

For the reasons set forth below and pursuant to Arizona Constitution Articles II §§ 13, 21 & VII §§ 1, & 12, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Petitioner seeks a Writ of Mandamus Ordering Honorable Peter A. Thompson of the Maricopa County Superior Court to vacate his Under Advisement Ruling, issued December 24, 2022, "confirming the election of Katie Hobbs as Arizona Governor-Elect Pursuant to A.R.S. § 16-676(B)[,]" and to enter judgment for Real Party in Interest, Kari Lake—setting aside all votes cast in Maricopa County's November 8, 2022, gubernatorial election. *Lake v. Hobbs, et al.*, CV 2022-095403 (Ariz., filed Dec. 9, 2022).

PARTIES

1. Petitioner, Ryan L. Heath, is an Attorney licensed in the State of Arizona² and a resident of Maricopa County, Arizona. Petitioner is an elector in Maricopa County, who cast a vote, by mail, for Kari Lake during the November 8, 2022 ("Election Day"), general election for Arizona Governor. Petitioner now fears that his vote in the general election was diluted by Maricopa County's inclusion of illegal ballots due to its admitted failure to comply with the "non-technical" requirements of A.R.S. § 16-550(A). Absent this Court's intervention, Petitioner fears that his vote will continue to be diluted in future elections by the actions complained of

¹ Attached hereto as Exhibit 1 and incorporated herein by this reference.

² Petitioner is uniquely situated to bring this action—given that Petitioner graduated from law school in 2020 and was not licensed to practice law until November of 2020. Thus, even though Maricopa County apparently employed the same illegal process as described herein during the 2020 election cycle, this election cycle is the first opportunity Petitioner has ever had to challenge this process and, therefore, laches should not bar this Special Action.

herein and, worse yet, that the illegitimate results of the November 8, 2022, Arizona gubernatorial election will stand.

- 2. Respondent, Honorable Peter A. Thompson, is a Judge in the Maricopa County Superior Court having jurisdiction over *Lake v. Hobbs, et al.*, CV 2022-095403 (Ariz., filed Dec. 9, 2022), a special action election challenge brought under A.R.S. § 16-672 *et. seq.*
- 3. Real Party in Interest, Kari Lake is the Contestant/Plaintiff in the *Lake v. Hobbs, et al.* matter.
- 4. Real Party in Interest, Katie Hobbs, is a Contestee/Defendant in the *Lake v. Hobbs, et al.* matter and is currently seated as the illegitimate Governor of the State of Arizona.
- 5. Real Parties in Interest, Stephen Richer, Bill Gates, Clint Hickman, Jack Sellers, Thomas Galvin, Steve Gallardo, and Scott Jarrett are Defendants in the *Lake v. Hobbs, et al.* matter.

JURISDICTION BEFORE THE ARIZONA SUPREME COURT

- 6. Under A.R.S. § 12-2021, the Arizona Supreme Court may issue to any person a writ of mandamus "on verified complaint of the party beneficially interested, to compel, when there is not a plain, adequate and speedy remedy at law, performance of an act which the law specifically imposes as a duty resulting from an office[.]"
- 7. Respondent, Peter A. Thompson, is an Honorable Judge of the Maricopa County Superior Court. He is bound by Arizona precedent and must uphold and enforce all Arizona laws as prescribed by the Arizona Revised Statutes. No citations are needed for such basic propositions.
- 8. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, when a person acts under color of state law to deprive another person of his or her constitutional rights, the infringing party is liable at law and in equity.
- 9. This case, apparently, arises from a tragic oversight by many practitioners of law.

5

THE LEGAL STANDARD

10. In pertinent part, A.R.S. § 16-550(A) states that "on receipt of the envelope containing the early ballot and the ballot affidavit, the county recorder or other officer in charge of elections shall compare the signatures thereon with the signature of the elector on the elector's registration record."³

MATERIAL FACTS

- 11. On December 24, 2022, the Honorable Peter A. Thompson issued an Under Advisement Ruling "confirming the election of Katie Hobbs as Arizona Governor-Elect Pursuant to A.R.S. § 16-676(B)." *See* Exhibit 1, at 10 (*Lake v. Hobbs, et al.*, CV 2022-095403 (Ariz., filed Dec. 9, 2022)).
- 12. Having dismissed eight of Ms. Lake's initial counts before the special election proceeding, Judge Thompson noted that with respect to Plaintiff's remaining claims, there are "four elements to each claim." *Id.* at 3.

³ In 2019, A.R.S. § 16-550(A) was updated with the passage of SB1054, changing the phrase "registration form" to "registration record." Some may argue that this change was intended to expand the scope of available signature comparisons. However, nothing from the legislative record even suggests that this change was anything more than a mere happenstance use of a synonym. https://apps.azleg.gov/BillStatus/BillOverview/71131. This Court has long refused to interpret statutes in such a way "that would lead to a result at odds with the legislature's intent." See State v. Estrada, 201 Ariz. 247, 251 ¶ 19 (2001) (cleaned up and citations omitted). As attested to by one of the individuals involved in the adoption of SB1054, Arizona State Senator Sonny Borrelli, changing the word "form" to the word "record," was "nothing more than incidental." See Affidavit of Senator Sonny Borrelli, attached hereto as Exhibit 2 and included herein by this reference. The Final Fact Sheet for A.R.S. 1054 even explains, "the county recorder or other officer in charge of elections shall compare the signatures on completed early ballot affidavits with the signature on the elector's registration form. If the signatures match, the ballot is tallied. If the signatures do not match, the county recorder or other officer in charge of elections shall make a reasonable attempt to contact the voter. See https://www.azleg.gov/legtext/54leg/1R/summary/S.1054JUD ASPASSEDCOW.pdf (accessed January 6, 2023) (emphasis added).

- 13. Without providing further explanation or any meaningful citations, Respondent opined that "Plaintiff needed to prove *by clear and convincing evidence*, each element to be entitled to relief:
 - a. That the alleged misconduct whether the BOD printer irregularities, or the ostensible failure to abide by county election procedures was an intentional act. *See* [Findley v. Sorenson, 35 Ariz. 265, 269 (1929)].
 - b. That the misconduct was an intentional act conducted by a person covered by

 A.R.S. § 16-672(A)(1), that is an 'officer making or participating in a canvass.'
 - c. That the misconduct was intended to change the result of the November 2022 General Election. *See Findley*, 35 Ariz. at 269.
 - d. That the misconduct did, in fact, change the result of that election. See [Grounds v. Lawe, 67 Ariz. 176, 189 (1948)]."
- 14. Ultimately, Respondent found that Ms. Lake failed to meet her burden of demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that there had been: (1) an intentional act of misconduct by an individual covered by A.R.S. § 16-672(A)(1), (2) intent on behalf of the acting party to change the election results, and (3) an actual change to the election results because of the alleged misconduct.
- 15. Maricopa County includes the Phoenix metropolitan area and is among the largest voting jurisdictions in the Nation. On any given election day, it accounts for more than sixty percent of Arizona's registered voters.⁴

⁴ See https://www.maricopa.gov/5539/Voting-Equipment-Facts#:~:text=ballot%20rotation%20laws.-, https://www.maricopa.gov/5539/Voting-Equipment-Facts#:~:text=ballot%20rotation%20laws.-, https://www.maricopa.gov/5539/Voting-Equipment-Facts#:~:text=ballot%20rotation%20laws.-, https://www.maricopa.gov/5539/Voting-Equipment-Facts#:~:text=ballot%20rotation%20in%20the,percent%20of%20Arizona's%20registered%20voters (accessed January 5, 2023).

- 16. Maricopa County was plagued by many well-publicized breakdowns during the November 2022 general election.⁵
- 17. Regardless, On November 28, 2022, the Maricopa County Board of Supervisors certified their canvas of returns of the November 8, 2022, general election—declaring Katie Hobbs as victor in the Maricopa County election for Arizona Governor. In all, Ms. Hobbs received 790,352 votes, or 51.21% of total votes cast in this race. This canvas was subsequently delivered to the Secretary of State.
- 18. On December 5, 2022, Arizona Secretary of State, Katie Hobbs, canvassed the returns of the November 8, 2022, general election—declaring herself as victor in the state-wide race for Governor of Arizona. That is after having purportedly received 1,287,891 votes, or 50.33% of 2,558,665 total votes cast across the State.⁶ Ms. Hobbs, apparently, defeated her rival by 17,117 votes and, although this may seem like an insurmountable number of votes, her margin of victory was a mere fraction of a percentage—exactly 0.668982%.

The Mail-In Voting Process in Maricopa County

- 19. In Maricopa County, a person qualified to vote may cast a ballot either on Election Day or during the "early voting" period (the twenty-seven (27) days preceding Election Day).
- 20. Throughout the early voting period, a qualified voter may vote by mail by (1) depositing his or her mail-in ballot packet in an official Maricopa County drop box (of which there are two), or (2) placing it in the mail, utilizing the United States Postal Service ("USPS").

⁵See https://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/biden_administration/most_voters_shar e gop concerns about botched arizona election (accessed January 5, 2023).

⁶ See https://azsos.gov/sites/default/files/2022Dec05 General Election Canvass Web.pdf (accessed January 5, 2023).

- 21. In Maricopa County, all mail-in ballot packets are sent to voters (also called, "electors") by a county contractor, Runbeck Election Services. Runbeck prints the name and address of the voter on an outer mailing envelope. The outer mailing envelope contains a "mail-in ballot packet," which includes a ballot and a return ballot affidavit envelope. Each component of the mail-in ballot packet contains the same, unique identifying number, called a "Piece ID." A new, unique Piece ID is created for each elector for every new election.
- 22. Generally, the voter completes the mail-in ballot, seals it inside the return envelope, and signs the return envelope.
- 23. By signing the return envelope, the voter declares under penalty of perjury that he or she is the registered voter of the ballot contained in the envelope. *See* A.R.S. § 16-547(A). Signing the affidavit envelope also affirms the voter's understanding of the criminal prohibition against casting multiple ballots in the same election.
- 24. A voter may also vote early, in-person, at a vote center during the early voting period. To do so, the voter must provide identification. Then, the voter's ballot is printed on a ballot-on-demand ("BOD") printer. The voter completes the ballot, seals it inside a white affidavit envelope, signs the envelope, and deposits it in a drop box inside the vote center. These white envelopes containing BOD ballots from early voting centers are distinct from mail-in ballots because the signature of the voter on the white envelope is not required to be verified by any comparative analysis.

Maricopa County's Handling of Mail-In Ballot Packets

- 25. During the early voting period in Maricopa County, mail-in ballot packets deposited in drop boxes, white envelopes containing BOD ballots from early voting centers, and provisional ballots cast at early vote centers are retrieved, daily, by a bipartisan team of ballot couriers.
- 26. Upon retrieval from a secure drop box, an early vote center, or a vote center on Election Day, ballot packets (which may include a mixture of early mail-in ballot packets, BOD ballot packets, and provisional ballots cast at early vote centers) are placed in a transport container and sealed. After sealing these ballots in the transport container, Maricopa County's ballot couriers are required to fill out an "Early Voting Ballot Transfer Receipt" ("EVBTR"), documenting that an unspecified number of ballots were retrieved from a particular location and sealed for transportation to the Maricopa County Tabulation and Election Center ("MCTEC").
- 27. After arriving at MCTEC, a team of Maricopa County employees opens the sealed containers and documents (on the EVBTR) the identification numbers for each of the seals that are removed.
- 28. The mixture of early mail-in ballot packets, print on demand ballot packets, and provisional ballots are then separated into batches and each type of ballot packet is approximately "counted" using physical weight estimates of the sorted batches.⁷ The count is recorded by Maricopa County employees on the EVBTR.

⁷ Notably, this process is generally an accurate measurement and is objectively identical to that used by USPS when providing weight estimates of the total number of mail-in ballot packets released to Maricopa County coureurs prior to their transport to Runbeck.

- 29. After the early mail-in ballot packets are counted at MCTEC, they are co-mingled into batches with other boxes of mail-in ballot packets and sealed in secure transport bins for yet another trip, this time to Runbeck's warehouse.
- 30. Mail-in ballot packets submitted via USPS are picked up from a central USPS facility (at 48th Street and Washington) by a bipartisan courier team of Maricopa County employees. Prior to retrieval from this facility, the mail-in ballot packets are trayed, sleeved, and secured in "cages" by USPS employees. Upon retrieval, Maricopa County's couriers are provided a "postal receipt" by USPS staff. The postal receipt includes estimates of tray counts and the total number of mail-in ballot packets within each tray (based on a calculation measuring the physical weight of the ballots). Upon retrieval from USPS, Maricopa County's courier team takes these mail-in ballot packets directly to Runbeck.

Runbeck's Handing of Mail-In Ballot Packets

- 31. Upon arrival at Runbeck (either from MCTEC or USPS), all mail-in ballot packets are transferred to the custody of Runbeck employees who, in the presence of Maricopa County employees, conduct an "inbound scan" of each packet.
- 32. According to the Maricopa County Elections Department's "2022 Elections Plan: August Primary and November General" (hereafter "Elections Plan"),⁸ at § 6.3.7, "[u]pon delivery of early ballot affidavits, Runbeck conducts an inbound scan of the affidavit envelope [via mail sorter] to capture a digital binary image of the voter signatures from that packet and places those images into an automated batch system for Elections Department staff review."

⁸ See https://elections.maricopa.gov/asset/jcr:5cd67713-a05b-4ac7-896a-649a6790934f/FINAL%20-%202022%20Elections%20Plan.pdf (accessed January 9, 2023).

- 33. Per Defendant Jarrett testimony on December 21, 2022, this plan was followed by Maricopa County during the November 8, 2022, general election. *See* Tr. of Proceedings, Day 1 at 56–58, (attached hereto as Exhibit 3 and incorporated herein by this reference).⁹
- 34. This inbound scan serves three purposes: (1) capturing an image of the packet for signature comparison for verification purposes, (2) providing a detailed count of the total number of mail-in ballot packets received by Runbeck, and (3) verifying the Piece ID for each packet.
- 35. After the inbound scan, the total number of mail-in ballot packets are recorded on a chain of custody form produced by Runbeck called an "Inbound Receipt of Delivery" ("IRD"). For each delivery of these packets, Runbeck provides a copy of a new IRD to Maricopa County.
- 36. 1,311,734 mail-in ballot packets for the 2022 general election were allegedly delivered by Maricopa County to a Runbeck warehouse, which utilized mail sorters and scanners like those used by the U.S. Postal Service.¹⁰

Mail-In Ballot Packets Received at MCTEC on Election Day

37. According to Defendant Richer's sworn testimony on December 21, 2022, Maricopa County's MCTEC facility "received 120,000 more early ballot drop-offs on election night than the office had ever seen before[.]" *See* Tr. of Proceedings, Day 1 at 42, (Exhibit 3), *Lake v. Hobbs, et al.*, CV 2022-095403 (Airz. filed Dec. 9, 2022).

⁹ Tr. of Proceedings, Day 2 (although not cited herein), is also attached hereto as Exhibit 4 and incorporated herein by this reference for the Court's convenience.

¹⁰ See video at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u_t1XTnhMMU&t=8s (accessed January 5, 2023).

- 38. On the morning of November 9, 2022, Defendant Richer publicly announced, via Twitter,¹¹ that approximately 275,000 mail-in ballot packets were submitted by Maricopa County Voters during Election Day. Per Defendant Richer, these ballots were sorted from midnight until 5:00 a.m. on November 9.
- 39. On the stand, Defendant Richer confirmed that, generally, as sealed bins arrive at MCTEC, nobody knows how many mail-in ballot packets are contained within. *See* Tr. of Proceedings, Day 1 at 30 (Exhibit 3).
- 40. When asked whether these mail-in ballot packets are counted as a matter of course when they arrive at MCTEC, including those received on Election Day, Defendant Richer unequivocally responded with, "[c]orrect." *Id*.
- 41. Referring to the sealed boxes used to transport mail-in ballot packets from voting centers to MCTEC, Defendant Richer testified, "so these boxes were coming in and as we were organizing them, we were assessing them by tray before confirming the official count, *and that's how I most likely got that estimate number.*" *Id.*
- 42. Upon information and belief, the 275,000 mail-in ballot packets publicly reported by Defendant Richer as having been submitted by Maricopa County Voters reflects an accurate estimate—based on a combined measurement of the physical weight of the total number mail-in ballot packets dropped off at vote centers in Maricopa County on Election Day. Stated differently, the approximate number of 275,000 constitutes all ballots physically processed at MCTEC before being delivered to Runbeck.

¹¹ See https://twitter.com/stephen_richer/status/1590404215767461888?s=20&t=5Aqf7B-uPI-B1TtwyKFYWw (accessed January 5, 2023).

- 43. Upon information and belief, the EVBTRs from Election Day—which were inexplicably withheld by Maricopa County in response to a public records request timely filed by Ms. Lake's Counsel prior to the first day of her election challenge proceedings (December 21, 2022)—demonstrate the basis of this accurate estimate.
- 44. In his Ruling Under Advisement, Respondent determined that the EVBTRs from Election Day in fact exist but were not produced. *See* Exhibit 1, at 5 (*Lake v. Hobbs, et al.*, CV 2022-095403 (Ariz., filed Dec. 9, 2022)).
- 45. Upon information and belief, Maricopa County has yet to publicly disclose these documents because they show a large discrepancy between, on the one hand, the total number of mail-in ballot packets submitted by Maricopa County electors on Election Day that were physically processed at MCTEC and, on the other hand, the total number of mail-in ballot packets purportedly received by Runbeck Absent a proper disclosure by Maricopa County proving this assertion otherwise, Petitioner requests that this Honorable Court Order Respondent to accept this adverse inference against Maricopa County in rendering his final judgment on in this matter in favor of Ms. Lake.

Maricopa County's Signature Verification Process

- 46. To verify signatures contained on mail-in ballot packets, Maricopa County employs a needlessly complex (and patently illegal) multi-level system.
- 47. At the first level, Signature Verifiers temporary workers hired at \$15 an hour to sit at computer monitors for extended periods of time are presented with a digital display of only two signatures: a scanned image of a purported elector's signature as it appears on his or her ballot affidavit, and another from the elector's registration record.

- 48. These temporary Signature Verifiers are tasked with deciding, instantaneously, whether to verify each signature presented, accepting the signature on the mail in ballot for its tabulation, or "flagging" the ballot and moving it to an "exception" status, which triggers a second-level managerial review.
- 49. Maricopa County's Election Plan § 6.3.8 explains, "[i]f an envelope is moved to an 'exception' status, the manager *can review every signature sample we have on file for that voter*. When a signature is initially, deemed an exception, the record is systematically triaged to the 'Manager's Mode' queue where higher level management staff are tasked with performing an additional review using *all historical signatures on file for the voter*." In the "Manager's Mode" queue, staff can either accept the signature (the manager deems the ballot affidavit signature as a "good signature") or reject the signature for a "curing" process. Reasons for curing include "no signature, questionable signature, need packet, deceased, and household exchange." ¹²
- 50. According to the Election Plan, § 6.3.5, Maricopa County assigned a mere three full-time staff to handling the entire burden of processing all ballots deemed "exception" status.
- 51. Although an obviously mismatching signature can be rejected at the initial level because of clear differences between the ballot affidavit signature and the signature on the purported elector's registration record (which is the only comparison allowed by Arizona law, *see* A.R.S. § 16-550(A)), Maricopa County makes it easy for its managers to nevertheless override this statutorily proper determination and verify the mismatched signature for tabulation by

¹² See https://elections.maricopa.gov/asset/jcr:5cd67713-a05b-4ac7-896a-649a6790934f/FINAL%20-%202022%20Elections%20Plan.pdf (accessed January 9, 2023).

comparing the affidavit signature to any "historical reference signature that was previously verified and determined to be a good signature for the voter. These historical documents *may* include voter registration forms, in-person roster signatures and early voting affidavits from previous elections."

- 52. Upon information and belief, Maricopa County is the only one in the State of Arizona to employ a multi-tier approach to signature verification of mail-in ballot packets that uses unenumerated signatures for comparative verification as a means of remedying a proper rejection in accordance with A.R.S. § 16-550(A).
- 53. Importantly, Maricopa County does not provide the rejection rates for each level of their multi-tier verification process.

Signature Verification in Maricopa County by the Numbers

- 54. Upon information and belief, Maricopa County ran more than 1.3 million images, on monitors, past the eyes of a few dozen of its Signature Verifiers so fast that it was physically and mathematically impossible for them to have engaged in the statutorily mandated task of verifying signatures.
- 55. Upon information and belief, it would take at least thirty seconds for anyone viewing an image on a monitor to compare a signature on a ballot with a known or attributed signature for verification. To make matters worse, following Election Day, Maricopa County officials apparently lowered the standard by which signatures were verified to process a greater volume of mail-in ballots at an even faster clip.
- 56. To review 1.3 million ballot signatures in the allotted time (thirty–seven days) thirty–two full-time Signature Verifiers, missing not a single day of work and taking no breaks, would

need to set a blistering pace—comparing one pair of signatures every .975 seconds. At this pace, it is physically impossible for human beings to pull off any meaningful comparison with any reasonable accuracy.

| | 30-Second Review | 15-Second Review | 1-Second Review | Review Matching the Staff Available |
|-----------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|--------------------|-------------------------------------|
| Total Maricopa Cty. Mail-in | | | | |
| and Drop-off Ballots | 1,311,734 | 1,311,734 | 1,311,734 | 1,311,734 |
| Seconds Per Ballot Review | 30 | 15 | 1 | 0.975 |
| Total Seconds Required | 39,352,020 | 19,676,010 | 1,311,734 | 1,278,941 |
| Total Hours Required (Secs | | | | |
| / 360) | 109,311 | 54,656 | 3,644 | 3,553 |
| 8-hour Worker Days | | | | |
| Required* | 36,437 | 18,219 | 1,215 | 1,184 |
| | | | | |
| Number of Workers | | CA | | |
| Available | 32 | 32 | 32 | 32 |
| Number of Days | | DA C | | |
| Available** | 37 | 37 | 37 | 37 |
| Maximum Worker Days | SE SE | | | |
| Available | 1184 | 1184 | 1184 | 1184 |
| | 1184 | | | |
| * No breaks for workers | ED | | | |
| ** Business days, Oct. 13 - | PIK | | | |
| Dec. 4 | | | | |

Witness Testimony Regarding Signature Verification in Maricopa County

57. In *Lake v. Hobbs, et al.*, CV 2022-095403 (Airz. filed Dec. 9, 2022), three witnesses testified that their and their co-workers' rejection rates while verifying signatures ranged from 35-40% (Onigkeit Decl. ¶¶ 19-22), 15%-30% (Myers Decl. ¶¶ 18, 21), and 35%-40% (Nystrom

Decl. ¶ 13). These figures—easily—equate to tens of thousands of illegal ballots being counted in the state-wide election in violation of A.R.S. § 16-550(A).

- 58. Each of these witnesses testified to deep flaws in the ballot signature verification and/or curing process employed by Maricopa County.
- Jacqueline Onigkeit reviewed approximately 42,500 ballots and rejected about 13,000 to 15,000 of them, with rejection rates in the 25% 40% range. Her co-workers complained of similar rejection rates. Onigkeit Decl. ¶¶ 23, 25. Every single one of these rejected ballots was subject to an illegitimate signature comparison and, each of those accepted by the "Manager's Mode" queue inarguably violated the clear language of A.R.S. § 16-550(A).
- 60. Andy Myers, who was employed by Maricopa County to cure ballots not approved by the "Manager Mode" queue for a mismatching signature, described Maricopa's process for signature verification and curing:

In my room we had a white board that Michelle would update with the number of ballots to be verified that day. Throughout the day Michelle would update the progress the people were making in verifying signatures. *The math never added up*. Typically, we were processing about 60,000 signatures a day. I would hear that people were rejecting 20-30% which means I would expect to see 12,000 to 15,000 ballots in my pile for curing the next day. However, I would consistently see every morning only about 1000 envelopes to be cured. *We typically saw about one tenth of the rejected ballots we were told we would see*.

Andrew, one of the signature reviewers, would tell me every day that I was going to get crushed the next day because he was excepting (rejecting) a "ton" of bad signatures. However, we never saw a correlation.

The most likely explanation for this discrepancy is that the level 2 managers who re-reviewed the rejections of the level 1 workers were reversing and approving signatures that the level 1 workers excepted and rejected. This seems to me to be

¹³ These Declarations are consolidated and attached hereto as Exhibit 5 and are incorporated herein by this reference. For the Court's convenience, additional records from this matter are available here: https://www.clerkofcourt.maricopa.gov/records/election-2022/cv2022-095403

the more likely explanation. If this is the case, then the level 2 managers were changing about 90% of the rejected signatures to accepted.

Myers Decl. ¶¶ 21-23 (emphasis added).

- 61. Most of the work of these level two managers was not subject to the accountability of observers. Nystrom Decl. ¶ 16.
- 62. Additionally, Maricopa's signature verification managers had a practice of sending already rejected ballots (those unable to be cured as required by A.R.S. § 16-550(A)) back through the process and, upon information and belief, did so because they wanted those ballots approved:

On the last day of work, November 15, we were asked by manager Celia to go through perhaps 5,000 to 7,000 ballots, that had already been rejected at levels 1, 2 and 3. We were asked to go to the SHELL program and to only find one signature that matched the green envelope, even if all other signatures in the program did not match the green envelope. The implication from Celia is that [she] was desperate to get the work complete and that she wanted the ballots approved. These 5,000 to 7,000 ballots *had already been through the full level 1, 2, and 3 process and been rejected*. Therefore, I do not know why [we were] going through them again, and that is why it seemed that Celia wanted them approved."

Nystrom Decl. ¶ 21.

63. This practice of pushing rejected ballots back through the system with the hope that they would be un-rejected was also attested by Andy Myers:

When the excepted numbers grew the managers would resend those excepted signatures back out into the general pool, hoping that someone would approve those same signatures, which would thereby reduce the excepted signature load.

Myers Decl. ¶ 11.

64. Moreover, Maricopa County permitted any signature reviewer to un-reject ballots without accountability using curing stickers. Workers were able to obtain massive amounts of these stickers and use them to cure ballots without any oversight. Onigkeit explained:

In order to perform the curing process, we were given a batch of stickers to place on a ballot, which included stickers with abbreviations. Some, but not all, of the ballot stickers and abbreviations were as follows: "VER" meant that we verified the voter's information, and their ballot was approved to be counted, "WV" meant that a voter did not want to verify their ballot over the phone, and "LM" meant that we called the voter and left a message.

One of the problems with the stickers was that nothing prevented a level 1, 2 or 3 worked [sic] from requesting a massive amount of "approved" stickers and placing them on ballots. Again, observers did not watch any level 3 work and did not watch most of level 2 work. Once stickers were placed on ballots, there was no record on the ballot or elsewhere to determine who placed the sticker there. We were told to not sign or initial the sticker, but to only date it. Accordingly, there was no way to know who placed "verified" stickers on ballots. The system was wide open to abuse and allowed for potential false placement of "verified" stickers without accountability.

Onigkeit Decl. ¶¶ 17-18.

Notice of Nonsuit, *Borrelli v. Hobbs, et al.*, CV 2022-01480 (Ariz. filed Dec. 12, 2022) attached hereto as Exhibit 8 and incorporated herein by this reference. Importantly, the undersigned is apparently the only Attorney challenging the 2022 Arizona gubernatorial election that cited *Reyes v. Cuming*, 952 P.2d 329 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997) in his Complaint. Despite having ample grounds to show good cause for appealing the partial dismissal of the election challenge, the undersigned chose not to appeal that decision because he wrongly assumed that one of the numerous attorneys in Ms. Lake's case would live up to the ethical duties of care to research the law and disclose to the tribunal controlling authority. *See* Ariz. R. Prof'l Conduct R. 1.1, 1.2, & 3.3. Apparently, this was a mistake. By the time of Judge Thompson's Ruling Under Advisement (Exhibit 1), it was too late to file an appeal pursuant to A.R.S. § 16-672 *et seq*. Thus, absent this Honorable Court's intervention, no adequate remedy is available for petitioner.

ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF ISSUING WRIT

In Arizona, as throughout the United States, a voter has the right—if not the responsibility—to participate in safeguarding the integrity of an election; this includes, if necessary, initiating and prosecuting proceedings rightfully afforded to him or her by law to ensure that inaccuracies in tabulating votes are judicially remedied under the procedures set forth by law. See, e.g., Archer v. Board of Supervisors, 166 Ariz. 106 (1990) (in context of contest challenge). This ensures that election results reflect the will and actual votes of the electorate. See A.R.S. § 16-672, et seq. Indeed, "[n]o right is more precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined." Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1,37 (1964).

Arizona and federal law both mandate "uniform" administration of elections. *See* Ariz. Const. Art. II §§ 13, 21; A.R.S. § 16–449(B), 16–452(A); 42 U.S.C. § 1983; U.S. Const. Amends. 1, 14. Perfect uniformity between counties is not required, but uniform application of unambiguously prescribed statutes within each county throughout the State is both presumed and mandatory.

IMPROPER STANDARD APPLIED

Nearly a century ago, this Honorable Court explained, "[i]t is the boast of American democracy that this is a government of laws, and not of men." *See* Exhibit 1 at 3 (*Lake v. Hobbs, et al.*, CV 2022-095403 (Ariz., filed Dec. 9, 2022) (quoting *Winsor v. Hunt*, 29 Ariz. 504, 512 (1926)).

1. A.R.S. 16-550(A) is a "non technical" statute and Maricopa County's failure to comply with its clear language requires, as a matter of law, that all results for the 2022 Arizona gubernatorial race be "set aside."

Before explaining his reasons for holding that Plaintiff failed to meet her burden of proof through clear and convincing evidence of (1) an intentional act of misconduct by an individual covered by A.R.S. § 16-672(A)(1), ¹⁴ (2) intent on behalf of the subject actor to change the election results, and (3) an actual change to the election results stemming from this misconduct, ¹⁵ Judge Thompson thought it worth "mentioning that because of the requested remedy – setting aside the result of the election – the question that is before the Court is of monumental importance to every voter. The margin of victory as reported by the official canvass is 17,117 votes – beyond the scope of a statutority required recount. A court setting such a margin aside, as far as the Court is able to determine, has never been done in the history of the United States." Id. (emphasis added).

Not only does Judge Thompson inexplicably adopt a heightened "clear and convincing" burden of proof for Plaintiff to overcome, Respondent (and, apparently, <u>each Attorney involved</u>

¹⁴ Here, allegedly: (1) printer sabotage (either by overriding the image file that was sent from the site-book laptop to the printer or through the injection of impermissible "ballot definitions" or "ballot styles" onto Maricopa County's Election Management System, which can only be accessed at the "administrative level" due to security and configuration settings (per the testimony of Ms. Lake's cybersecurity expert, Clay Parikh), or (2) impermissible injection of ballots into a highly questionable supply chain, especially on Election Day—for which the County has yet to provide evidence proving a valid chain of custody.

¹⁵ Respondent reasoned that, because ballots that could not be read by the on-site tabulators could nevertheless be deposited in Door 3 of the tabulator and counted subsequently after duplication by a bipartisan adjudication board, Plaintiff could not possibly meet her burden of showing that any alleged misconduct had an actual impact on the election. For the reasons explained herein, an actual impact on the outcome of the election is not a prerequisite to overturning an election under Arizona law.

in this matter) overlooked binding precedent requiring—as a matter of law—that the Maricopa County election be set aside based solely upon the facts admitted during the election challenge proceedings. Because Maricopa County Officials admitted to willfully ignoring the "non-technical" requirements established by A.R.S. § 16-550(A) (by verifying signatures on mail-in ballot packets in their "Manager's Mode" queue using comparisons to unenumerated criteria), they irreparably tainted the result of all state-wide elections with the irredeemable stain of uncertainty and, thus, illegitimacy. *Reyes v. Cuming*, 952 P.2d 329, 331 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997). ¹⁶

In November of 1996, Marco. A. ("Tony") Reyes (a Democrat) and Clyde Cuming (a Republican incumbent) squared off as candidates for a seat on the Yuma County Board of Supervisors. *Id.* at 331.¹⁷ After an initial count, excluding absentee ballots, Reyes led Cuming 1,320 votes to 1,169 votes. After 1,210 absentee ballots were added to the total count, however, Cuming led Reyes 1,861 to 1,838. Mr. Cuming was declared the winner by the Yuma County Board of Supervisors, having secured victory by a margin of merely 23 votes—or 0.62179%.

Mr. Reyes timely filed a contest to the election. The trial court determined that the then Yuma County Recorder, Susan Marler, failed to compare "any of the signatures on the outside

¹⁶ Perhaps this tragedy by so many legal professionals is excusable—given that one of the two largest research tools available to legal practitioners across the United States, LexisNexis, failed to publish the substantive opinion from this dispositive precedent. If, at the time of this trial, one tried to access *Reyes* on the LexisNexis research engine, he or she would see an opinion simply reading: "REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS." *See* pdf of opinion from LexisNexis, downloaded on December 12, 2022, attached hereto as Exhibit 6.

¹⁷ See also, fourteen articles from the Yuma Sun—published between December 12, 1997, and September 2, 1998—reporting on the outcome of this litigation and consequences for Yuma County's failure to comply with A.R.S. § 16-550(A), attached hereto as Exhibit 7 an incorporated herein by this reference. It is the undersigned's opinion that Respondent cannot be blamed for the failure to uncover this information because such was not readily available online. In fact, the undersigned only uncovered this information after driving to Yuma to examine the records, which were available at the Yuma County Library.

of the absentee ballots with the registration lists, as required by statute." *Id.* (citing A.R.S. § 16-550(A) (1996). Despite the abject failure, the trial court determined "that compliance with the statute would place an 'undue burden on the recorder' and that there was 'no evidence indicating that any ballot was cast by any person other than the elector who requested the early ballot." Considering these findings, the trial court held that "the Recorder was in *substantial compliance* with all of the rules, regulations, and statutes governing election for this office, and affirmed the election." *Id.* (emphasis added).

Over a year after the election—despite Mr. Cuming having never stepped down from his seat as an incumbent—a three judge panel for the Court of Appeals of Arizona (Division 1) unanimously ordered that the results of the Yuma election be set aside. The court explained, "[a]t first blush," the nondiscretionary requirement for immediate signature verification set forth in A.R.S. § 16-550(A) may seem "unimportant"—just as the requirement for "mailing versus hand delivery [of ballots as required by A.R.S. § 16-542] may seem unimportant." *Id.* at 331 (*quoting Miller v. Picacho Elementary School District No. 33*, 179 Ariz. 178, 180 (1994)). However, this Court has explained, considering their purpose, such laws are "very important." Both "non-technical" statutes advance the constitutional goal of "setting forth procedural safeguards to prevent undue influence, fraud, ballot tampering, and voter intimidation." *Id.* (*quoting* Ariz. Const. Art. VII § 1)). Although seemingly trivial on their face, such laws are imperative to "secure the purity of elections and guard against abuses of elective franchise." *Id.* (*quoting* Ariz. Const. Art. VII § 12).

¹⁸ In March of 1998, this Honorable Court denied review.

The Arizona Court of Appeals concluded, despite the trial court's determination that "it would be impracticable for the [Yuma County] Recorder to comply with A.R.S. 16-550(A), we hold as a matter of law that such a finding does not excuse the complete noncompliance with this *non-technical* statute." *Id.* (emphasis added). Indeed, "election statutes are mandatory, not 'advisory,' or else they would not be law at all." *Id.* (quoting Miller, 179 Ariz. at 180). If this statute "unduly burdens election officials, the Recorder or other appropriate officials may lobby the legislature to change it; until then it is the law." *Id.* at 331-32 (emphasis added).

The "purpose of A.R.S. 16-550(A) is to prevent the inclusion of invalid votes." *Id.* at 332. "To rule otherwise would 'affect the result *or at least render it uncertain.*" *Id.* (quoting Miller, 197 Ariz. at 180). In spite of Respondent's recent determination to the contrary, "Miller established that an election contestant need only show that absentee ballots counted in violation of a non-technical statute changed the outcome of the election [or rendered it 'uncertain']; actual fraud is not a necessary element." *Id.* (quoting Miller, 197 Ariz. at 180). In other words, the absence of tangible "evidence that any ballots were cast by persons other than registered voters is irrelevant." *Id.*

Although 17,117 votes may seem like an insurmountable number, Defendant Hobbs's margin of victory was, in fact, a mere fraction of a percentage—exactly 0.668982%. Critically, this nominal margin is nearly identical to that seen in *Reyes*—0.62179%—where, more than a year after the challenged election and based on substantively identical facts, a Yuma County Election was, as a matter of law, *unanimously set aside by the Arizona Court of Appeals*.

To be lawful and eligible for tabulation, the signature on the affidavit accompanying a mail-in ballot must match the signature featured on the elector's "registration record." A.R.S. § 16-

550(A). To the extent the Elections Procedures Manual purports to authorize the validation of early ballot affidavit signatures by reference to a signature specimen that is not found on the voter's "registration record," the Manual is contrary to the plain language and intent of A.R.S. § I 6-550(A), and hence unenforceable.

Maricopa County employed an arbitrary screening system for verifying affidavit signatures that necessarily included illegal votes in the state-wide gubernatorial election for 2022. *Reyes*, 952 P.2d 329. Here, inexperienced temporary workers were paid \$15 an hour to sit at computer monitors for extended periods of time as signatures flashed rapidly before their eyes. As they sat there, all day, they saw a succession of two images: a scanned image of a ballot affidavit signature and a statutorily proper signature from the purported voter's registration record (meaning, the "registration form"). Due to their insufficient numbers, these temporary employees were tasked with deciding—within a split-second—whether the signatures matched.

Throughout the 2022 general election, Maricopa County ran more than 1.3 million pairs of images past the eyes of a few dozen temporary employees—and it did so at such a rapid clip that it was physically impossible for them to have, in fact, verified these signatures. Those signatures about which the first level Signature Verifiers were hesitant were assigned "exception" status, triggering a second level of review. Even though a signature might be properly rejected at the first level because of an unequivocal mismatch between the ballot affidavit and the signature on the purported voter's registration record (meaning, the specific form upon which the voter registered to vote—which is the only comparison allowed by Arizona law, see A.R.S. § 16-550(A)), Maricopa County makes it easy for its managers to nevertheless

verify these mismatched signatures for tabulation by illegally expanding the scope of the signature comparison—to include any "historical reference signature that was previously verified and determined to be a good signature for the voter. Again, these historical documents may include voter registration forms, in-person roster signatures and early voting affidavits from previous elections." See Election Plan § 6.3.8. ¹⁹

Here, Maricopa County's ambiguous use of the word "may" instead of the phrase "may only" means the pool documents comprising the "historical" comparison is open-ended and, thus, completely arbitrary. This standard not only provides an apparently limitless number of comparative signatures from which a manager may verify a clearly mismatched signature, it also fails to explain (a) how the "historical reference signature" was "previously verified and determined to be a good signature for the voter," or (b) who (or, *perhaps, what computer program*) made that determination.

It is indisputable that tens of thousands of mail-in ballot packets submitted in Maricopa County for the 2022 general election for Arizona Governor were transmitted in envelopes containing affidavit signatures that were, at least initially, determined not to match the signatures from the putative voters' "registration record." The Maricopa County Recorder nevertheless accepted a material number of these mismatched signatures by comparing them to statutorily prohibited documents. Consequently, these mail-in ballot packets containing statutorily unverified signatures were accepted by Maricopa County and included in their

¹⁹ See https://elections.maricopa.gov/asset/jcr:5cd67713-a05b-4ac7-896a-649a6790934f/FINAL%20-%202022%20Elections%20Plan.pdf (accessed January 9, 2023).

official canvas. Thus, Maricopa County's election was tainted by a process that rendered the outcome—as a matter of law—impermissibly uncertain. *Reves*, 952 P.2d at 331.

The mere inclusion of illegal votes in violation of the plain language and intent of A.R.S. § 16-550(A), which is a "non-technical" (*i.e.*, substantive) statute, requires this Court to set aside Maricopa County's 2022 general election results for Governor:

This is not a case of mere technical violation or one of dotting one's "i's" and crossing one's "t's." At first blush, mailing versus hand delivery may seem unimportant. But in the context of absentee voting, it is very important. Under the Arizona Constitution, voting is to be by secret ballot. Ariz. Const. art VII, § 1. Section 16-542(B) advances this constitutional goal by setting forth procedural safeguards to prevent undue influence, fraud, ballot tampering, and voter intimidation. [... A] showing of fraud is not a necessary condition to invalidate absentee balloting. It is sufficient that an express non-technical statute was violated, and ballots cast in violation of the statute affected the election. We therefore vacate the opinion of the court of appeals and reinstate the judgment of the trial court setting aside the election.

Miller, 179 Ariz. at 180, 877 P.2d at 279.

In short, "because A.R.S. section 16-550(A) is a non-technical statute and because absentee ballots counted in violation of that statute have rendered the outcome of this election uncertain," the only appropriate remedy—as a matter of law—is for the results from the Maricopa County election for Arizona Governor to be "set aside." Reyes, 952 P.2d at 331 (quoting Miller, 179 Ariz. at 180).

THE CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS

1. Even if this Court disagrees that A.R.S. §16-550(A) is a "non-technical statute," it should nevertheless grant this Writ of Mandamus and Order Respondent to rule in favor of Ms. Lake because Maricopa County's failure to follow A.R.S. 16-550(A)

also violates fundamental rights that are clearly established by both the Arizona and United States Constitutions.

"Over a century ago, the United States Supreme Court held that the right to vote was a fundamental political right." Charfauros v. Bd. Of Elections, 249 F.3d 941, 950–51 (9th Cir. 2001) (emphasis added, citations and internal quotations omitted). "It is beyond cavil that 'voting is of the most significance under our constitutional structure." Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992) (quoting Illinois Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 184 (1979)).

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States

Constitution provides that no State shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1. Generally, the Equal Protection Clause is "a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike." *Green v. City of Tucson*, 340 F. 3d 891, 896 (9th Cir. 2003) (quotations omitted). Similarly, the Equal Protection Clause of the Arizona Constitution provides that "[no] law shall be enacted granting to any citizen, class of citizens, or corporation other than municipal, privileges or immunities which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens or corporations." Ariz. Const. Art. II § 13.

Importantly, Arizona's Privileges or Immunities Clause "is substantially the same in effect as the Equal Protection Clause in the United States Constitution." *See Chavez v. Brewer*, 222 Ariz. 309, 320 (Ct. App. 2009).

The Arizona Constitution further provides that "[a]ll elections shall be free and equal, and no power, civil or military, shall at any time interfere to prevent the free exercise of the right of suffrage." Ariz. Const. Art. II § 21. "Arizona's constitutional right to a 'free and equal'

election is implicated when votes are not properly counted." *Chavez*, 222 Ariz. at 320. Here, because Maricopa County has admitted to not complying with A.R.S. § 16-550(A), Arizona's Equal Protection Clause is implicated. To "be entitled to injunctive and/or mandamus relief[,]" one need only "establish that a significant number of votes cast [in the challenged manner] will not be properly recorded or counted." *Id.* Assuming just a ten percent signature rejection rate at the first level of Maricopa County's signature verification process (five percent less than the lowest estimate provided herein (*see* Mr. Myers Decl. ¶¶ 18, 21)) means that more than 100,000 mail-in ballots (an inarguably significant number given that the election at issue was decided by 17,117 votes) were compared to statutorily illegitimate criteria. Even if one assumes that only a fraction of those ballots deemed "exception status" were accepted at the second level (which is highly unlikely given the clear weight of evidence), inclusion of such votes was likely outcome determinative.

"Because our democracy was founded on the principle that 'the right to exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and political rights,' . . . our courts *vehemently protect every citizen's right to vote, carefully and meticulously scrutinizing any alleged infringement.*" *Charfauros*, 249 F.3d at 951 (*quoting Reynolds v. Sims*, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964)) (emphasis added). "The right to vote can neither be denied outright, nor destroyed by the alteration of ballots, nor diluted by ballot box stuffing." *Reynolds*, 377 U.S. at 555 (internal citations omitted).

In cases involving disenfranchisement and undue burdens on suffrage, equal treatment must be analyzed from within the "confines of the governmental entity concerned, be it the State or its political subdivisions." *Holt Civic Club v. Tuscaloosa*, 439 U.S. 60, 68 (1978). In fact,

"[o]nce the geographical unit for which a representative is to be chosen is designated, all who participate in the election are to have an equal vote." *Id.* Put simply, each United States citizen "has a constitutionally protected right to participate in elections on an equal basis with other citizens in the jurisdiction." *Dunn v. Blumstein*, 405 U.S. 330, 366 (1972). Here, because the case at hand involves a state-wide election, electors across Arizona must be treated equally with respect to the way their votes are counted—irrespective of which county they reside in or how they vote.

The right to vote far exceeds the initial allocation of the franchise. *Bush v. Gore*, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000). "Equal protection applies *as well to the manner of its exercise*. Having once granted the right to vote on equal terms, the State may not, by later arbitrary and disparate treatment, value one person's vote over that of another." *Id.* Moreover, "[i]t must be remembered that the right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of the citizen's vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise." *Id.* at 105 (*quoting Reynolds*, 377 U.S. at 555).

Here, for each of the tens of thousands²⁰ of mail-in ballot illegitimately accepted by Maricopa County using its wholly ambiguous "historical record" for signature verification, all qualified electors across the State of Arizona experienced some level of disenfranchisement. For each signature illegally accepted in the "Manager's Mode" queue—irrespective of who benefits from the votes on the illegitimate ballot—some number of Arizona residents, in fact, have their votes relatively diluted. Maricopa County is by far the most populous county in

²⁰ Based on sworn witness testimony, Maricopa County likely verified (and, therefore, tabulated in the 2022 gubernatorial election) more than 100,000 signatures using statutorily illegitimate comparisons. *See* Exhibit 5.

Arizona and purportedly counted more than 1.3 million mail-in ballots—far more than any other County. Thus, any error in Maricopa County's process resulting in the inclusion of illegitimate votes does more relative harm as compared to an error elsewhere.

Because it would have been physically impossible for the number of workers assigned the task to check more than 1.3 million signatures during the allotted time, Maricopa County officials inevitably let an undue number of mail-in ballots get tabulated with no assurance they had, in fact, been verified. As a necessary consequence, a disproportionate number of Maricopa County mail-in ballots were included in the state-wide tally in the race for Arizona Governor. Maricopa County's counting of ballots that would have been subjected to greater scrutiny under a statutorily compliant review process (such as the uniform processes in place in all other Arizona counties) diluted the voting strength of all electors in the state-wide election, including Petitioner's vote. Effectively, Petitioner was deprived of his fundamental right to vote by having his ballot cancelled out, respectively, by each one of the tens of thousands of votes tainted by Maricopa County's patently illegal process.

Additionally, the "Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees each and every person that they will not be denied their fundamental rights—including the right to vote—in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner." *Charfauros*, 249 F.3d at 951. Thus, "it is well-established that once the legislature prescribes a particular voting procedure, *the right to vote in that precise manner is a fundamental right*, and 'one source of its fundamental nature lies in the . . . equal dignity owed to each voter." *Id.* at 953 (*quoting Gore*, 531 U.S. at 104) (emphasis added); *see also San Antonio Indep. Sch. Sist. v. Rodriguez*, 411 U.S. 1, 35 n. 78 (1973) (noting that, "implicit in our constitutional system, [is

the right] to participate in state elections on an equal basis with other qualified voters whenever the State has adopted an elective process for determining who will represent any segment of the State's population."); see also e.g., Green, 340 F. 3d at 897 ("once a state grants citizens the right to vote on a particular matter, such as municipal incorporation, that right is protected by the Equal Protection Clause.").

Here, A.R.S. § 16-550(A) is a statute passed by the Arizona legislature that prescribes a particular voting procedure with respect to how every county across Arizona must verify the signatures on mail-in ballot packets before a purported elector's vote can be counted. Accordingly, the procedural safeguards conferred by A.R.S. § 16-550(A) are fundamental rights—and they must be strictly followed. *Gore*, 531 U.S. at 104; *Charfauros*, 249 F.3d at 953 (*emphasis* added). Because the State of Arizona guarantees to Plaintiff (and all similarly situated electors) the right to have their mail-in ballot packets scrutinized for tabulation in a particular way, Maricopa County's failure to conform with the clear requirements of A.R.S. § 16-550(A), by utilizing unenumerated sources for signature verification, must withstand strict scrutiny. *Charfauros*, 249 F.3d at 950–51; *Dunn*, 405 U.S. at 343; *Green*, 340 F. 3d at 899.

If a challenged government action "grants the right to vote to some citizens and denies the franchise to others, the Court must determine whether the exclusions are necessary to promote a compelling state interest." *Charfauros*, 249 F.3d at 951 (internal punctuation and quotations omitted). State actions that burden fundamental rights "must be drawn with precision and must be tailored to serve their legitimate objectives." *Dunn*, 405 U.S. at 343 (durational residence restriction unconstitutional as drafted). Because Maricopa County unquestionably included tens of thousands of unverified mail-in ballots in the state-wide election for Arizona

Governor which "may *dilute* the effectiveness of some citizens' votes," *Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist.*, 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969) (emphasis original), Maricopa County's actions "must be measured by a strict equal protection test: they are unconstitutional unless the State can demonstrate that such laws are '*necessary* to promote *compelling* governmental interest." *Dunn*, 405 at 342 (emphasis in original) (*quoting Shapiro v. Thompson*, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) & *Kramer*, 395 U.S. at 627).

This strict scrutiny requirement of complying with prescribed voting procedures is exactly why, in *Reyes*, the Arizona Appellate Court continuously referred to A.R.S. § 16-550(A) as a "very important," "non-technical" (*i.e.*, substantive) statute which advances the constitutional goal of "setting forth procedural safeguards to prevent undue influence, fraud, ballot tampering, and voter intimidation." 952 P.2d at 331 (quoting Ariz. Const. Art. VII § 1). Such safeguards are imperative to "secure the purity of elections and guard against abuses of elective franchise." *Id.* (quoting Ariz. Const. Art. VII § 12). Although decided before *Gore*, *Reyes* rests upon the same principle, that uniform application of state election laws is necessary to guard against arbitrary and disparate determinations for what constitutes a "legal vote." The "purpose of A.R.S. 16-550(A) is to prevent the inclusion of invalid votes." *Id.*

Here, Maricopa County's desire to verify signatures using unenumerated criteria must be in pursuit of a "compelling" or "important" state interest, and the chosen course of action must not "unnecessarily burden or restrict [the] constitutionally protected activity." *Dunn*, 405 U.S. at 343. "And if there are other, reasonable ways to achieve those goals with a lesser burden on constitutionally protected activity, a State may not choose the way of greater interference. If it acts at all, it must choose 'less drastic means." *Id.* (quoting *Shelton v. Tucker*, 364 U.S. 479

(1960). Maricopa County must overcome strict scrutiny by demonstrating that the challenged procedures were no less burdensome than available alternatives and, thus, "well calculated to sustain the confidence that all citizens must have in the outcome of elections." *Gore*, 531 U.S. at 109.

This is simply an impossible burden for Maricopa County to meet because, upon information and belief, it is the only county in Arizona that uses a wholly ambiguous "historical record" to verify mail-in signatures for tabulation. Obviously, less burdensome alternatives exist. Instead of contracting with Runbeck for a purportedly more efficient yet illegal process, Maricopa County should have lobbied for the law to change or invested more resources in hiring enough staff to handle the signature verification comparison, by hand, as prescribed by A.R.S. § 16-550(A). While elected officials in Maricopa County may have felt it necessary to take shortcuts due to anticipated volume of mail-in ballots, "[t]he press of time does not diminish the constitutional concern. A desire for speed is not a general excuse for ignoring equal protection guarantees." *Gore*, 531 U.S. at 108. Accordingly, even if this Court chooses not to follow the clear standards set forth in *Reyes*, Respondent must still be compelled to vacate his ruling and find in favor of Ms. Lake, setting aside the results from Maricopa County's 2022 election for Arizona Governor because such are constitutionally void.

Petitioner (as an elector in Maricopa County that voted by mail) has suffered and (absent this Honorable Court's intervention) will continue to suffer irreparable harm—namely, disenfranchisement by vote dilution caused by Maricopa County's illegitimate signature verification policy for mail-in ballots. Based on numbers alone (with tens of thousands of mail-in ballot packets being accepted after a comparison to an utterly opaque "historical record"),

Petitioner has no confidence that Maricopa County conducted a legitimate review of the 1.3 million mail-in ballot packets allegedly received during the November 8, 2022, general election. If there is no change in the status quo, Petitioner will have no confidence in future elections. Unless Respondent is enjoined to follow binding precedent, Maricopa County will continue to inflict injuries for which Petitioner has no adequate remedy at law and—worse yet—the results of the 2022 general election for governor will improperly stand.

PRAYER AND REQUESTED RELIEF

Petitioner respectfully request the following relief:

- 66. Declare impermissible and unlawful Maricopa County's failure to conform with the unambiguous and "non-technical" requirements of A.R.S. § 16-550(A), by utilizing an openended and unenumerated "historical record" for determining the validity or invalidity of signatures on mail-in ballot packets, as violating Petitioner's rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Articles II §§ 13, 21 & VII §§ 1 & 12 of the Arizona Constitution and—after having so Declared—Order Respondent to rule accordingly.
- 67. Order Respondent to issue an Order removing Ms. Hobbs from the office of Arizona's Governor—as she has no legitimate basis for holding this elected office.
- 68. Issue a Writ of Mandamus Ordering Honorable Peter A. Thompson of the Maricopa County Superior Court to vacate his Under Advisement Ruling (Exhibit 1), issued December 24, 2022, "confirming the election of Katie Hobbs as Arizona Governor-Elect Pursuant to A.R.S. § 16-676(B)[,]" accept the adverse inference as set forth herein, and enter judgment for Real Party in Interest, Kari Lake. *Lake v. Hobbs, et al.*, CV 2022-095403 (Ariz., filed Dec. 9, 2022).

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69. Order Respondent to set aside the 2022 Maricopa County general election results for the race for governor and declare a victor based on the new totals of lawful votes cast throughout the remainder of Arizona (518,060 for Ms. Lake & 497,539 for Ms. Hobbs). Alternatively, Order Respondent to invalidate and set aside all Maricopa County mail-in ballots cast in the 2022 general election with respect to the race for Arizona Governor and Declare the victor based on the new state-wide totals. As a third alternative, Order Respondent to (1) invalidate and set aside the 2022 Maricopa County general election results in the for the race for Arizona Governor, (2) require Maricopa County (as soon as practicable but no later than February 1, 2023) to conduct an emergency special election to redo the race for Governor, and (3) Order all Maricopa County Defendants to personally pay for the cost of said special election as punishment for their reckless disregard of Petitioner's clearly established constitutional rights and Arizona law (where, as here, a state actor's conduct is shown to be inspired by evil motive or intent, or otherwise involves reckless or callous indifference to Plaintiff's constitutional rights—as demonstrated by Maricopa County's premeditated disregard of A.R.S. § 16-550(A) punitive damages may be awarded. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 103 S. Ct. 1625 (1983)).

- 70. Mandate that elections officials in Arizona seek to extend the time and resources available for signature verification to ensure such verification is constitutionally adequate to the task of verifying millions of signatures.
- 71. Grant and impose any other remedy and grant and impose such other and further relief, at law or equity, that this Court deems just and proper in the circumstances.

Dated: January 10, 2023

Respectfully Submitted,

By: /s/ RYAN L. HEATH
Ryan L. Heath, Civil Rights Activist
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VERIFICATION OF RYAN L. HEATH

Before me, the undersigned notary, on this day personally appeared Ryan L. Heath, the affiant, whose identity is known to me. After I administered the oath, affiant testified as follows:

- 1. My name is Ryan L. Heath. I am over eighteen (18) years of age, of sound mind, and capable of making this verification. I have read thoroughly the document to which this verification is attached, Petitioner's Special Action Petition for Writ of Mandamus, as well as the exhibits attached to the document.
- 2. Unless stated upon information and belief, the facts stated and set forth in Petitioner's Special Action Petition for Writ of Mandamus as well as all exhibits attached to the document are within my personal knowledge and are true and correct.
 Further Affiant Seyeth Not.

Respectfully Submitted,

By:

Ryan L'Heath, Civil Rights Activist

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Subscribed to and sworn before me on this 10 day of January, 2023.

LES FRIEDLI
Notary Public - Arizona
Maricopa County
Commission # 572708
My Comm. Expires Dec 2, 2023

By:

Notary Public in and for the state of Arizona