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		PERIOR COURT	
23	MARICOF	PA COUNTY	
24	KARI LAKE,	No. CV2022-095403	
25	Plaintiff/Contestant,		
	V.	CONTESTEE KATIE HOBBS'S	
26	KATIE HOBBS,	MOTION TO EXCLUDE	
27	Defendant/Contestee.	PLAINTIFFS' EXPERTS CLAY PARIKH AND RICHARD BARIS	
		AND STRIKE EXPERT REPORTS	
28		Assigned to Hon. Peter Thompson	

Defendant Governor-Elect Katie Hobbs moves under Arizona Rule of Evidence 702 for an order (1) excluding the declarations of Clay Parikh and Richard Baris; and (2) excluding their testimony at trial.

### Introduction

Yesterday, this Court dismissed eight of Plaintiff Kari Lake's ten claims, allowing only Counts II and IV to proceed to trial. Those claims relate to alleged misconduct with (a) Maricopa County's printing issues (Count II) and (b) Maricopa County's compliance with chain of custody laws (Count IV).

To support her allegations, Lake relies on the testimony of two supposed experts:

First, Clay Parikh submitted a declaration opining that, among other things, Maricopa County's printing issues must have been "intentional" because (1) these printing issues arose at multiple voting centers, (2) Maricopa County "downplayed" the issue, and (3) Maricopa County did not tweet out all five possible solutions to fixing the problem. [Compl. Ex. A-13 at 9–10] He also opined—with no explanation—that "the most serious" issue was a "break[]" in "the chain of custody." [Compl. Ex. A-13 at 21 ¶ 31]

Second, Richard Baris submitted a declaration opining that Maricopa County's printing issues affected the outcome of the election because (1) some Election Day voters answered in the affirmative when asked whether they had "any issues or complications when trying to vote in person," [Compl. Ex. A-11 at 1], and (2) if an additional 2.5% of people had cast ballots on Election Day and if 75% of those votes favored Lake, then Lake could have won. [Compl. Ex. A-11 at 10]

Neither one of these so-called experts has any business testifying at trial. Their anticipated testimony is, in various parts, unreliable, unhelpful, and irrelevant. That's especially true given that these "experts" are unqualified to offer these opinions to begin

with. As a result, under Arizona Rule of Evidence 702, this Court should exclude their declarations and bar these witnesses from testifying.

## **Legal Standard**

"A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education" may offer expert testimony only if (a) "the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue"; (b) "the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data"; (c) "the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods"; and (d) "the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case." Ariz. R. Evid. 702.

The "proponent of the expert" has the burden of "proving admissibility." *Cooper v. Brown*, 510 F.3d 870, 942 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). "Rule 702 embodies the twin concerns of reliability and helpfulness." *Stilwell v. Smith & Nephew, Inc.*, 482 F.3d 1187, 1192 (9th Cir. 2007) (cleaned up). Because "expert testimony can be both powerful and quite misleading," judges should exclude expert testimony "unless they are convinced that [the testimony] speaks clearly and directly to an issue in dispute in the case." *Senne v. Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp.*, 2022 WL 783941, at \*9 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2022) (cleaned up). This is true even in a bench trial, where the gatekeeper and the trier of fact are one and the same, because the Rule 702 inquiry concerns the admissibility—not the weight—of expert evidence. *F.T.C. v. BurnLounge, Inc.*, 753 F.3d 878, 888 (9th Cir. 2014).

Here, as explained below, Lake cannot carry her burden of proving that the anticipated testimony of either Clay Parikh or Richard Baris is admissible.

### Argument

# A. Neither of Lake's proposed experts is qualified to provide expert testimony.

Lake first must establish that both of her proposed experts are qualified to testify in this election case. She cannot do so, as neither is qualified, and both have developed their opinions solely for the purpose of undermining confidence in Arizona's 2022 election.

First, Baris lacks the qualifications to testify on his proposed opinion that, for example, there is "a reasonable degree of mathematical certainty that a modest depression in turnout on Election Day would be significant enough to cast doubt on the overall result." [Compl. Ex. A-11 at 10] In support of this opinion, Baris does not reference any "training[] or education," Ariz. R. Evid. 702, including in mathematics or statistics. Nor does Baris have any experience in election administration—including in Maricopa County or Arizona. Rather, the basis for Baris's testimony is only that he conducted an "exit poll in the state of Arziona [sic] from November 1 to November 8 2022," and that for several years he has worked as a "pollster," including as the Director of Big Data Poll. [Compl. Ex. A-11 at 1] That is not enough—and would permit any pollster to qualify as an expert on election administration. See Koppell v. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections, 97 F.Supp.2d 477, 481–82 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (excluding testimony of political scientist who had "significant political experience" but "lack[ed] any particular expertise" on the election practices at issue, and where his work had "neither been tested nor subject to peer review"). 2

Indeed, rather than "proposing to testify about matters growing naturally and directly out of research [he] ha[s] conducted independent of litigation," Baris has "developed [his] opinions expressly for purposes of testifying." *Daubert*, 43 F.3d at 1317.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Big Data Poll is not well regarded in the polling community. It is one of 11 pollsters (out of 493 total pollsters) that is banned from FiveThirtyEight due to receiving an "F" grade for unreliable methodology, nontransparent methods, or inaccurate results. *See* <a href="https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/pollster-ratings/big-data-poll">https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/pollster-ratings/big-data-poll</a>. It also does not appear to be included in RealClearPolitics polling aggregations, or to be a member of any of the major national associations of polling professionals. *See* DEFS00013 & n.19.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Baris also claims he has "served as an expert . . . in both state and federal court cases" involving "elections" (and "civil rights" cases) but does not identify any such case. [Compl. Ex. A-11 at 1.] Nor has undersigned counsel been able to locate any so far.

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For example, Baris posted on social media just yesterday about how "[p]eople have become so accustomed to an unelected administrative state influencing elections." And he similarly has criticized the "lack of universal condemnation over Maricopa—or, rather, the acceptance of such blatant voter suppression." Baris is not qualified to testify here.

Second, Parikh similarly is not qualified to testify, including as he proposes about how alleged printing issues and "numerous procedural violations ... can only be categorized as *intentional*." [Compl. Ex. A-13 ¶ 7] In contrast to Baris, Parikh outlines some education and training, including in computer science, cybersecurity, and information technology. [Id.  $\P$  2–3] But the extent of Parikh's experience in the field of elections appears to be that he has worked in laboratories that attempt to hack voting systems. [See id. ¶ 5] Of course, expertise in one field does not "automatically translate into expert status" in another field. Aloe Vera of Am. Inc. v. United States, No. CV-99-01794, 2014 WL 3072981, at \*7 (D. Ariz. July 7, 2014). Therefore, even to the extent that Parikh has some training and education in IT issues, he is not an expert on the topics he proposes to testify about—including actual election administration, election-day operations, the reliability of election results, as well as his opinions that "[t]here were many disenfranchised Maricopa County voters" or that "the most serious violation by a county official was breaking the chain of custody." [Compl. Ex. A-13 ¶¶ 31, 33] And there is certainly no basis to believe that his technical background qualifies him to opine on the "demeanor" of election officials as indicative of intent. [Id. ¶ 16]

In another case challenging Arizona election results, in fact, Parikh was asked whether he had ever "actually examine[d] in any way the Electronic Voting Systems that

https://twitter.com/Peoples\_Pundit/status/1604968376790487042?s=20&t=pczOTeH3IN WLozmzONUsYA; see also https://twitter.com/Peoples\_Pundit/status/1601735915923046406?s=20&t=pczOTeH3IN WLozmzONUsYA ("The 2022 Arizona midterm elections were not conducted

WLozmzONUsYA ("The 2022 Arizona midterm elections were not conducted legitimately.").

https://twitter.com/Peoples\_Pundit/status/1597650900767895552?s=20&t=pczOTeH3INWLozmzONUsYA.

are currently being used in either Maricopa County," to which Parikh responded: "Not physically, no." [*Lake v. Hobbs*, No. 2:22-cv-00677-JJT (D. Ariz.), 07/21/2022 Hr'g Tr. at 119:21-24, attached as Ex. 1] Parikh similarly offers no indication that he has actually inspected the voting equipment at issue in this case. He therefore "lack[s] any particular expertise" on these issues, and his work has "neither been tested nor subject to peer review." *See Koppell*, 97 F.Supp.2d at 481–82.

As demonstrated by his involvement in this and other litigation, in fact, Parikh is biased in favor of undermining election systems and results wherever possible. In an October 2022 interview about a case challenging Alabama's voting machines, Parikh admitted that he views *no* election hardware or software to be adequate and that he views this as a matter of "good versus evil." This viewpoint is evident from Parikh's declaration in this case, theorizing that unspecified actors committed *intentional* misconduct—without citing any evidence or data or identifying any such individual. Parikh thus is not qualified to testify as an expert in this case.

# B. The anticipated testimony of Clay Parikh and Richard Baris is unreliable.

An expert's proponent "must explain the expert's methodology and demonstrate in some objectively verifiable way that the expert has both chosen a reliable scientific method and followed it faithfully." *State ex rel. Montgomery v. Miller*, 234 Ariz. 289, 298 ¶ 23 (App. 2014) (quoting *Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.*, 43 F.3d 1311, 1319 n.11 (9th Cir. 1995)). To assess an expert opinion's reliability, courts consider:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Andrea Tice, *Black box voting: Confessions of an elections hacker (Part 2)*, 1819 News (Oct. 16, 2022), <a href="https://1819news.com/news/item/black-box-voting-confessions-of-an-elections-hacker-part-2">https://1819news.com/news/item/black-box-voting-confessions-of-an-elections-hacker-part-2</a> ("Parikh spent nine years as a hacker in an election systems lab and, as such, considers all election hardware and software to be woefully inadequate when it comes to voting security. ... 'This is about power,' [Parikh] said. 'The haves against the have-nots and who is willing to pay to keep the power. Ultimately, I sum it up as good yersus evil."').

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Many of Parikh's erroneous conclusions also undermine the credibility of his other opinions. For example, Parikh opines that malfunctions nullify the election's certification. That opinion, however, clearly contradicts Arizona law, as this Court knows. [Dkt. 926 at 6.]

(1) whether the expert's theory or technique can be or has been tested; (2) whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) whether the technique or theory is generally accepted within the relevant scientific community; (4) the known or potential rate of error of the technique or theory when applied; and (5) the existence and maintenance of standards controlling application of the technique.

Id. at 299 ¶ 24 (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593–94 (1993)). Other factors include whether: (1) "the expert's testimony is prepared solely in anticipation of litigation[] or is based on independent research; (2) the expert's field of expertise/discipline is known to produce reliable results; [and] (3) other courts have determined that the expert's methodology is reliable." Id. ¶ 25. Under this standard, an expert's testimony is properly excluded when it is based only on "subjective beliefs or unsupported speculation" that amounts to no more than "unreliable *ipse dixit* guesswork." Friend v. Time Mfg. Co., 422 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1080 (D. Ariz. 2005).

Lake's purported experts do not even come close to meeting these requirements. Citing YouTube, Twitter, and public news sites, Parikh suggests that Maricopa County's printing issues "can only be categorized as intentional" because (1) they happened at more than one vote center, (2) Maricopa County "downplayed" the issue, and (3) Maricopa County did not tweet out all five possible solutions to fixing the problem. [Compl. Ex. A-13 ¶¶ 7, 16, 17, 18] This is as unscientific as it gets. Far from establishing a reliable, tested, peer-reviewed, generally accepted scientific method for reaching his "conclusion" that someone, somewhere, intentionally did something, Clay Parikh stitches together one speculative belief after the next having never even inspected the voting machines at issue. This is "the antithesis of the scientifically reliable expert opinion admissible under *Daubert* and Rule 702." *Cabrera v. Cordis Corp.*, 134 F.3d 1418, 1423 (9th Cir. 1998); *see also Haynes ex rel. Haynes v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp.*, 319 F. App'x 541, 543 (9th Cir. 2009) (affirming the exclusion of testimony that was based on a Google search and a

CNN.com report because they would "ordinarily be a basis for little more than lay speculation" and "do not provide an appropriate basis for expert opinion").

Parikh's opinion on chain of custody issues fares no better. He baldly opines that "the most serious" issue that he learned about was a "break[]" in "the chain of custody." [Compl. Ex. A-13 ¶ 31] He offers no explanation about the methodology that he applied to reach his opinion that one poll worker's observations raised "the most serious" issue that occurred on Election Day. Nor does he try to show that an expert in the relevant field would "reasonably rely" on this poll worker's observations in the first place. Ariz. R. Evid. 703. "Rule 703 does not authorize admitting hearsay on the pretense that it is the basis for expert opinion when, in fact, the expert adds nothing to the out-of-court statements other than transmitting them to the [factfinder]." *State v. Carlson*, 237 Ariz. 381, 391 ¶ 26 (2015) (citation omitted); *see also State v. Lundstrom*, 161 Ariz. 141, 148 (1989) (holding that expert testimony that merely parrots or summarizes another's opinion is inadmissible). Because Clay Parikh adds nothing to this poll worker's observations besides the gloss that he believes that the observations are "serious," this Court should exclude this testimony.

Equally unreliable is Richard Baris' anticipated testimony. His whole analysis is based on an exit interview of Election Day voters—all of whom cast a ballot. [Compl. Ex. A-11 at 5] He does not report a single person who said that they were unable to vote. Utterly lacking from his declaration is any effort to establish a reliable, tested, peer-reviewed, generally accepted scientific method that would allow anyone to infer anything about the motivations of hypothetical non-voters based only on the experiences of voters.

His analysis only devolves from there. He bases his conclusions on one (and only one) question: "Did you have any issues or complications when trying to vote in person, such as tabulators rejecting the ballot or voting locations running out of ballots?" [Id.] But basing anything on answers to this question defies all logic because it encompasses "any

issue[]" that a voter may have experienced (including issues unrelated to this case) and includes a false premise (there is no allegation of any vote centers "running out of ballots"). Then, he leaps to speculate about what might have happened if an additional 2.5% of voters had cast ballots on Election Day. [*Id.* at 10] But he plucks this number out of thin air. At no point does he estimate that 2.5% of voters were discouraged from voting because of printing issues.

Compounding this error, he next applies this 2.5% to the total number of votes cast in Maricopa County (1,562,758), including the more than one million voters who had already voted absentee and could not have been affected by printing issues on Election Day. [Id.] Even then, he finds that Governor-Elect Hobbs still would have won if 70% of those hypothetical 2.5% additional voters had voted for Lake. [Id. (finding that Hobbs still would have won by 2,000 votes)] It is only when he calculates what would have happened if Lake had won 75% of those additional votes—an outcome that he fails to establish occurred in any precinct for Lake—that he claims that Lake could have won. [Id.] This is nonsense, not science. Putting one speculative assertion on top of another is precisely the type of unreliable "guesswork" that courts exclude. Friend, 422 F. Supp. at 1081.

# C. The anticipated testimony of Clay Parikh and Richard Baris will not help resolve Lake's remaining claims.

As set forth in the Court's dismissal order, Lake "specifically alleges [in Count II] that a person employed by Maricopa County interfered with BOD printers in violation of Arizona law." [Dkt. 926 at 6] The Court laid out a specific roadmap for what Lake must therefore prove at trial for her claim for misconduct, *see* A.R.S. § 16-672(A)(1): "Plaintiff must show at trial that the BOD printer malfunctions were intentional, and directed to affect the results of the election, and that such actions did actually affect the outcome." [Dkt. 926 at 7] Moreover, because of Lake's specific allegations that a particular person interfered

with the BOD printers, the Court clarified that, as to the first element, Lake must prove "the malfeasant person was covered under" A.R.S. § 16-672(A)(1). [Dkt. 926 at 6]

Neither Parikh nor Baris provide any assistance to the trier of fact in resolving any of these issues. The Court should therefore issue an Order precluding Plaintiff from presenting opinions or testimony from either "expert" for this additional, independent reason.

# 1. Clay Parikh

The Court's December 19, 2022 dismissal order renders much of Parikh's commentary completely irrelevant, including all of his statements that certain components of the voting system, such as the BOD printers and others, did not meet certification requirements under Arizona and federal law. [Compl. Ex. A-13 ¶ 8-15] Because the certification portion of Lake's claim was dismissed [Dkt. 926 at 5], Parikh's certification opinions will not only *not* assist the trier of fact in resolving any claim still at issue in the case, but would also confuse and mislead the issues actually before the Court.

The rest of Parikh's opinions fare no better in terms of assisting the trier of fact on anything still at issue in the case. Although sometimes difficult to discern, the remaining portion of Parikh's declaration offers commentary on the following topics:

- (1) That a percentage of tabulators was not functioning properly on election day and that election officials downplayed the issue and did not adequately inform voters of all of their options in the event of a tabulation error [Compl. Ex. A-13 ¶¶ 16-19];
- (2) The mechanics of how a tabulator reads a ballot and how a ballot is printed—such as the size of the paper—may impact its tabulation [id. ¶¶ 20-25]; and
- (3) That County officials did not properly follow "plans and procedures." In support of this point, Parikh states that: (i) in troubleshooting the printers, the County did not act quickly enough, adapt well enough, and sometimes did not fix the printer issue [id. ¶¶ 27, 28, 30]; (ii) County officials did not properly spoil ballots [id. ¶29]; (iii) one poll worker tried to shut down two printers that were not

working properly and a County Inspector turned them back on [id.]; and (iv) preelection Logic and Accuracy tests were invalid because of updates to the printers that Maricopa County performed prior to election day  $[id. \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ ]$  32].

Not one of Parikh's statements would assist the trier of fact in determining whether the "BOD printer malfunctions were intentional," the first element of Claim II as set forth in the Court's dismissal order. [See Dkt. 926 at 7]<sup>7</sup> Rather, except for his statements regarding how a tabulator objectively reads a ballot and what factors may objectively impact that (none of which suggest anything about malfunctioning or intentionality) [Compl. Ex. A-13 ¶¶ 20-25], nearly all of Parikh's statements concern actions that occurred post-malfunctioning.

Assuming without conceding that Parikh's characterization of events was true, the fact that troubleshooters did not arrive (in Parikh's opinion) fast enough or were sometimes unable to fix the printing issue has nothing to do with whether the malfunctioning was intentional in the first place. Similarly, Parikh's statements that certain Tweets by election officials sent after malfunctioning was discovered did not adequately convey to voters all of their options says nothing about the malfunctioning itself being intentional. Likewise, who and how officials spoiled ballots *after* particular *tabulators* failed to read them does not aid the trier of fact in determining that BOD *printer* problems were intentionally caused by anyone.

Indeed, Parikh's only statement regarding any action that purportedly took place *before* the malfunctioning occurred is in regard to the pre-election Logic and Accuracy tests. [Compl. Ex. A-13 ¶ 32] But Parikh's single paragraph on this topic utterly fails to support an inference that any printer malfunctioning was intentional. Instead, he merely asserts that Maricopa County did not conduct testing on every ballot style before the election. But the fact that the County allegedly did not perform unspecified testing on every

 $<sup>^7</sup>$  Parikh's conclusory deduction that these discreet issues lead to the conclusion that the malfunctioning was intentional (Compl. Ex. A-13 ¶ 7) does not help the trier of fact because none of his underlying statements themselves support that inference.

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single type of ballot in no way supports a conclusion that the printer malfunctioning on election day was intentional.

Nor does any of Parikh's commentary assist the trier of fact in resolving the other two issues that the Court held Plaintiff must prove to succeed under Count II: that the "intentional" BOD printer malfunctions were "directed to affect the results of the election," and that "such actions did actually affect the outcome." [See Dkt. 926 at 7] Parikh does not purport to offer opinions on either of these issues in any event.

#### 2. Richard Baris

Baris purports to offer opinions on the "likely voter suppression" that he claims occurred on election day by providing purported statistics about voting preferences and voter exit-polling opinions. [Compl. Ex. A-11 at 3] He does not purport to offer opinions regarding whether the malfunctioning of the printers was intentional, the first element required to prove Plaintiff's misconduct claim under Count II, as set forth in the Court's dismissal order. [See Dkt. 926 at 6, 7] Rather ostensibly, Baris is being offered by Plaintiff to attempt to show that the printing malfunctioning affected the outcome of the election. But none of Baris's statements would aid the trier of fact in making that determination, and he should therefore be precluded from offering any testimony.

Baris's declaration is primarily made up of repetitive statistics aimed at demonstrating the well-known fact that voters are more likely to vote for Republicans on Election Day and more likely to vote for Democrats in early voting. [Compl. Ex. A-11 at 2-5] This does not help the trier of fact determine any fact in issue in Claim II.

Beyond that, Baris states that in an exit poll of 813 voters, 58.6% of voters identifying as Republicans "reported having issues while trying to cast a ballot on Election Day," whereas Democrats and Independents reported having issues in lower numbers. For several reasons, these limited exit poll responses do not assist the trier of fact in determining whether the malfunctioning printers affected the outcome of the election. First, the question itself that was allegedly posed to voters, Question 6, includes "tabulators rejecting the

ballot" as just one example of "issues" that voters may have had on election day. [See Compl. Ex. A-11 at 5] The very question also provides another example—"voting locations running out of ballots"—as being an "issue" that a voter could report, which has nothing to do with the remaining claim regarding the BOD malfunctions. [Id.] Second, and importantly, Baris does not state that these alleged "issues" actually caused any of the polled voters to not cast a vote. In other words, simply because voters had "issues" "when trying to vote in person" in no way supports an inference that they did not, let alone that those "issues" affected the outcome of the election.

In short, Baris and Parikh offer nothing that could aid the trier of fact to resolve the very limited remaining issues in this case. Under this Court's gatekeeping function, they should therefore be precluded from offering an opinion.

## Conclusion

For the above reasons, this Court should exclude the purported expert testimony of Clay Parikh and Richard Baris.

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# Rule 7.1(h) Good Faith Consultation Certificate

I certify that Defendant/Contestee Katie Hobbs has endeavored in good faith to resolve the matters raised herein. Undersigned counsel attempted to speak with counsel for Plaintiff, including arranging a telephone conference for that purpose. Due to the expedited nature of this proceeding, counsel for Plaintiff were unavailable to speak with Plaintiff's counsel.

Dated: December 20, 2022 /s/ Alexis Danneman

REPRIENTED FROM DEMOCRACYDOCKET, COM

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1 2	Superior Court and served through AZTurboCourt this 20th day of December, 2022:	
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