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10	Attorneys for Recorder David Stevens	
11	IN THE CUREDIOD COURT OF THE CTATE OF A DIZONA	
12	IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA	
12	IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF COCHISE	
13		
14	ARIZONA ALLIANCE FOR RETIRED CASE NO: CV2022-00518	
15		
16	STEPHENSON	
	RECORDER STEVENS	; '
17		
18	FOR FEES AND COST	S
10	v.	
19		
20	TOM CROSBY, ANN ENGLISH, and PEGGY JUDD, in their official capacities	
21		
	Supervisors: DAVID STEVENS in his	
22	official capacity as the Cochise County	
23		
24	capacity as the Cochise County Elections	
25	Director,	
26	Defendants	
27	/	
28	3	

The Cochise County Attorney's office pays attorneys a starting salary of \$66,000 a year. For two weeks of work, Plaintiffs ask this Court to award them double this amount - enough to keep an attorney employed in this community practicing for two years. This is the very definition of an unreasonable fee. *See Blum v. Stenson*, 465 U.S. 886, 897 (1984) (cleaned up) ("[A] reasonable attorney's fee is one that is adequate to attract competent counsel, but that does not produce windfalls to attorneys."), *see also* Pls.' Mot. 1:7-11 (acknowledging that ARS 16-602 provides only for an award of reasonable fees).

"[T]he traditional measure for a fee award in public rights litigation is the reasonable hourly rate used in the community for similar types of cases." *Thompson v. Corry*, 231 Ariz. 161, 165 (Ct. App. 2012). Plaintiffs' requested windfall award of fees and costs must be denied for at least three reasons. **Firstly**, Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden of proving that the hourly rates they seek to impose are in line with the reasonable hourly rates charged in Cochise County for similar types of cases. **Secondly**, Plaintiffs' requested rates are not, in fact, in line with the reasonable hourly rates charged in Cochise County for similar work. **Thirdly**, Plaintiffs seek recovery of (i) costs not properly taxable against the County and (ii) recovery of costs unreasonably expended.

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¹ See https://www.glassdoor.com/Job/bisbee-az-attorney-i-jobs-

^{=1136043&}amp;s=21&guid=00000184c69b72bbbf772c0303adca88&pos=101&t=ESR&vt=w&uido=9DA1A1AD1B6 C680E92403A546A0D79DF&cs=1_66ea2c5f&cb=1669779387545&jobListingId=1008303738734&jrtk=3-0-1gj39mt0kihnb801-1gj39mt1qi17g800-b113cec86a593be2- (last accessed 11/29/22).

² Compare with Schweiger v. China Doll Rest., 138 Ariz. 183, 187 (Ct. App. 1983) (contrasting this rule with the rule for fee awards in corporate and commercial litigation where greater weight is placed on the rate the client agreed to pay).

I.

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"[T]he burden is on the fee applicant to produce satisfactory evidence -- in addition to the attorney's own affidavits -- that the requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the community for similar services[.]" Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n.11 (1984), see also Prescott v. Chino Valley, 163 Ariz. 608, 623 (Ct. App. 1989) ("We believe that the trial court was justified in holding the claim for fees insufficiently supported with adequate detail."), 3 Schweiger v. China Doll Rest., 138 Ariz. 183, 189 (Ct. App. 1983) (looking to U.S. Supreme Court precedent for guidance in determining reasonableness).

Despite this rule, the requested rates are supported only by a conclusory assertion from one of Plaintiffs' attorneys that the "rates are in line with standard rates of comparable firms in Arizona." Branch Dec. ¶ 12. In line with the above authorities, this is insufficient to meet Plaintiffs' burden of establishing reasonableness as a matter of law and Plaintiffs' requested fee award must therefore be completely rejected. Further, the relevant "community" is not Arizona, but Cochise County, because a community is a region such as a city or metropolitan area. See Excel Fortress, Ltd. v. Wilhelm, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180856, at *14 (D. Ariz. Oct. 18, 2019) ("the rates charged ... are reasonable rates in the Phoenix market"), Charles I. Friedman, P.C. v. Microsoft Corp., 213 Ariz. 344, 356 (Ct. App. 2006) (expert opinion sufficient to support superior court finding that rates requested were in line with "the prevailing hourly rates in the Phoenix community[.]"), Ballentine's Law Dictionary, 3rd Ed. (defining a "community" as a "town; a municipality; a district; a neighborhood").

Affirmed in part, vacated in unrelated part by *Prescott v. Chino Valley*, 166 Ariz. 480, 486 (1990) ("We affirm the decisions of the trial court and the court of appeals that Chino Valley's transaction privilege tax is not null and void for violating the open meeting law. However, we vacate those portions of the court of appeals' opinion that are inconsistent with our discussion of the open meeting law issue.").

II. Plaintiffs' requested hourly rates are not in line with the reasonable rates charged in Cochise County for similar services.

Fee awards "need not equal or relate to the attorney fees actually paid or contracted." *Flood Control Dist. v. Paloma Inv. Ltd. P'ship*, 230 Ariz. 29, 50 (Ct. App. 2012), *see also Tucson Estates Prop. Owners Ass'n v. McGovern*, 239 Ariz. 52, 55-56 (Ct. App. 2016) (purpose of fee shifting statutes is not to make litigants whole but merely to mitigate the burden of establishing a just claim or defense). Rather, what constitutes a reasonable rate for the purposes of a fee award is based upon what (i) a reasonable rate is (ii) for similar work in the community. *Blum v. Stenson*, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n.11 (1984), *City of Tempe v. State*, 237 Ariz. 360, 368 (Ct. App. 2015).

The Cochise County Attorney's office performs similar work in the community. Including the cost of salaries and overhead, its cost per hour to provide legal services is well under \$100/hr.⁴ The United States Attorney's Office ("USAO") publishes an attorney's fees matrix setting forth the presumptively reasonable hourly rates for fee awards made to private counsel in cases against the federal government in the District of Columbia.⁵ Such cases, of course, are often of a political nature and attract excellent counsel. As explained by the USAO: "The matrix is intended for use in cases in which a fee shifting statute permits the prevailing party to recover 'reasonable' attorney's fees. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act); 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (Freedom of Information Act); 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) (Equal Access to Justice Act)." In other words, cases of a similar nature and complexity subject to similar fee shifting provisions. See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 893 (1984) (statute authorizing fee awards under Civil Rights Act is based on similar fee shifting statutes used around the country for "complex Federal litigation[.]").

⁴ See Barth v. Cochise Cty., 213 Ariz. 59, 64-65, 138 P.3d 1186, 1191-92 (Ct. App. 2006) (reasonable fees for Cochise County Attorney, including overhead, are \$52.52 per hour).

⁵ See https://www.justice.gov/file/1461316/download.

Prices for a wide basket of goods and services are, on average, 46.5% less in Bisbee than in Washington, D.C.⁶ Adjusted for lesser costs in the local community, the reasonable hourly rates for each attorney according to this matrix are as follows:

Ms. Branch (10 years experience): \$246.34/hr.

Ms. Madduri and Mr. Arellano (8-10 years experience): \$241.82/hr.

Ms. DiBrell, Ms. Andrews, Ms. Ford and Mr. Cohen (4-5 years experience): \$203.30/hr.

Applying these rates yields an award of fees in the amount of \$61,675.14 and, accordingly, this is the maximum amount that should be awarded.

The rates calculated by this method are entirely in line with the Court of Appeals' holding that a "reasonable basis" existed to find that the prevailing "market rate" for work such as that performed by two assistant attorneys general would be \$300 an hour in the Phoenix market. *City of Tempe v. State*, 237 Ariz. 360, 368 (Ct. App. 2015). As Plaintiffs have sought fees under the private attorney general doctrine, they can hardly dispute that *City of Tempe* involved a fee award for similar types of work. Pls.' Mot. 5:6-7. Nor can they dispute that the attorneys involved in *City of Tempe* were similarly, indeed even more, qualified - one had twenty-five years and one had over fourteen years of experience. *City of Tempe* at 368. The only thing different is the market – Phoenix is 25.9% pricier than Cochise County.⁷

⁶ See https://www.bestplaces.net/cost-of-living/washington-dc/bisbee-az/1 ("Overall, Bisbee, Arizona is 46.5% cheaper than Washington, District of Columbia."), compare also https://www.gsa.gov/travel/plan-book/per-diem-rates/per-diem-rates-results/?action=perdiems report&state=AZ&fiscal_year=2023&zip=&city= (per diem expenses for all locations in Arizona without specified rates such as Cochise County).

⁷ See https://www.bestplaces.net/cost-of-living/phoenix-az/bisbee-az/50000 ("Overall, Bisbee, Arizona is 25.9% cheaper than Phoenix, Arizona.")

III. Plaintiffs seek recovery of unrecoverable costs and costs not reasonably expended.

Plaintiffs seek to recover \$4,242.74 in costs. However, ARS 12-2030 does not allow for the recovery of all costs. For example, it does not allow for recovery of the cost of process service. ARS 12-2030(B) (recoverable costs are "the reasonable expenses of expert witnesses, [and] the reasonable cost of any study, analysis, report, test or project found by the court to be necessary for preparation of the party's case[.]"). Though Plaintiffs have not cited any other basis for their claimed entitlement to costs, taxable costs are, of course, also recoverable in any civil action. *See* ARS 12-331, 12-341. But taxable costs also do not include the cost of process service. ARS 12-332(A). Thus, the \$1,360.60 Plaintiffs seek to recover for process service is disallowed. Exh. A to Pls.' Mot.

Further, it was wholly unnecessary to submit four pro hac applications in this matter when only one of the individuals admitted pro hac vice appeared in court and none signed any briefs or pleadings. The reasonable number of pro hac vice applications was thus one. Therefore, an additional \$1,525.00 in costs should be excluded as not reasonably incurred. Exh. A to Pls.' Mot.

Accordingly, maximum amount of costs that should be awarded is: \$1,397.14.

WHEREFORE, the Recorder prays that Plaintiffs' application for fees and costs be DENIED or, alternatively, that no more than <u>\$61,675.14</u> in fees, and <u>\$1,397.14</u> in costs be awarded against Defendants. Further, in the event an award is made, the Recorder reserves the right to seek to have that award vacated should he prevail on appeal.

- 6 -

Respectfully submitted this 30th day of November, 2022

By: /s/Alexander Kolodin
Davillier Law Group, LLC

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that a copy of the forgoing has been served on the other parties to this matter pursuant to the applicable rules of procedure. By: /s/Yuka Bacchus REFERENCE BY DENOCRACY TO COMPANY OF THE PROPERTY OF THE PROPE