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**Motion for Admission Pro Hac Vice Pending*

*Attorneys for Proposed Intervenor-Defendant
Pennsylvania Alliance for Retired Americans*

**IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
OF LEHIGH COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA**

CIVIL DIVISION

SEAN GILL, ROBERT SMITH, TIM RAMOS and
JACKIE RIVERA,

Plaintiffs,

v.

LEHIGH COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS,
PHILLIPS ARMSTRONG, JENNIFER ALLEN,
DENNIS NEMES, TIMOTHY A. BENYO and
DIANE GORDIAN,

Defendants,

and

PENNSYLVANIA ALLIANCE FOR RETIRED
AMERICANS,

[Proposed] Intervenor-
Defendant.

No. 2022-c-1849

**PENNSYLVANIA ALLIANCE FOR RETIRED AMERICANS’
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION TO
PETITIONERS’ MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION**

Proposed Intervenor-Defendant Pennsylvania Alliance for Retired Americans (“the Alliance”) submits this Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Petitioners’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction.

INTRODUCTION

Four Allentown voters ask this Court to rewrite the Lehigh County Board of Elections’ drop box policies. Specifically, they seek to prohibit the Board and its staff (“Defendants”) from making drop boxes available outside of weekday business hours, and they demand that this Court issue a mandatory injunction requiring the Board to supply in-person monitoring of all drop boxes in the county. But Plaintiffs’ action is nothing more than an improper effort to convince this Court to impose Plaintiffs’ own policy preferences and preferred logistical decisions about election administration on the Board. The General Assembly has entrusted this decision-making to Defendants’ discretion. Plaintiffs identify no basis for usurping that authority here.

Most conspicuous about Plaintiffs’ petition is what it omits. While they purport to seek compliance with the Election Code, they nowhere mention any provision of that Code that limits drop box hours or requires around-the-clock staffing. Nor do they identify any cause of action authorizing their claim. Plaintiffs broadly reference their “fundamental right to vote,” but fail to ground their alleged injury in any state or federal law. Notably, a federal court in Pennsylvania recently rejected a similar argument that the federal Constitution requires in-person drop box monitoring, holding that the same alleged “vote dilution” injury Plaintiffs rely on here was entirely speculative and insufficient to override Pennsylvania’s reasonable election procedures. *Donald J. Trump for President, Inc. v. Boockvar* (“DJT II”), 493 F. Supp. 3d 331, 382 (W.D. Pa. 2020).

That same logic applies here, where Plaintiffs fail all six of the prerequisites for a preliminary injunction. *First*, Plaintiffs provide no evidence of immediate and irreparable harm, and instead offer pure speculation about drop box use in future elections. *Second*, Plaintiffs' requested injunction would directly harm Defendants by requiring them to divert scarce resources to monitoring drop boxes. The harm to the Alliance, its members, and other Lehigh County voters would also be severe, as voters' lone opportunity to submit their ballot in a drop box outside of regular business hours would be eliminated. *Third*, Plaintiffs seek a mandatory injunction that would upset the status quo without providing the requisite extraordinary justification. *Fourth*, Plaintiffs have no right to relief on the merits, as they have failed to identify any actionable legal violation. *Fifth*, the requested injunction is poorly tailored to the alleged harm. And *sixth*, the requested injunction would adversely affect the public interest by restricting valid means that Defendants have provided for voters to cast lawful votes. The motion for a preliminary injunction should be denied.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants offer five indoor drop boxes that are monitored by video, one of which is available 24 hours a day, seven days a week. *See* Pls.' Mot. for Prelim. Inj. ("Mot.") ¶¶ 5-8, 12. Plaintiffs further allege that Defendants have provided bolded guidance instructing voters that absentee and mail ballots must be delivered in person or by mail, with special exceptions for overseas voters and voters with a disability. *Id.* ¶ 4. Dissatisfied with Defendants' chosen policies, Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction, and subsequently petitioned for a special injunction, that would require Defendants to restrict drop box availability to weekday business hours and provide in-person monitoring of each drop box while the drop boxes are

available. The Alliance moved to intervene on September 9, 2022, and a hearing on this matter is scheduled for October 7.

LEGAL STANDARD

Plaintiffs seek a mandatory injunction compelling Defendants to perform further acts, which courts may grant only where plaintiffs establish a “clear right to relief.” *Roberts v. Bd. of Dirs. of the Sch. Dist. of Scranton*, 341 A.2d 475, 478 (Pa. 1975). A mandatory injunction is “an extraordinary remedy that should be utilized only in the rarest of cases.” *Summit Towne Ctr., Inc. v. Shoe Show of Rocky Mount, Inc.*, 828 A.2d 995, 1005 n.13 (Pa. 2003). The injunction is improper if defendants show that their “conduct was reasonable or that a defense exists to the plaintiff’s claim.” *Sovereign Bank v. Harper*, 674 A.2d 1085, 1092 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996).

A party seeking a preliminary injunction must establish every one of the following six prerequisites: 1) the injunction is necessary to prevent immediate and irreparable harm that cannot be adequately compensated by damages; 2) greater injury would result from refusing an injunction than from granting it, and concomitantly, that issuance of an injunction will not substantially harm other interested parties in the proceedings; 3) a preliminary injunction will properly restore the parties to their status as it existed immediately prior to the alleged wrongful conduct; 4) plaintiffs are likely to prevail on the merits; 5) the injunction plaintiffs seek is reasonably suited to abate the offending activity; and 6) a preliminary injunction will not adversely affect the public interest. *Warehime v. Warehime*, 860 A.2d 41, 46-47 (Pa. 2004). A court should deny injunctive relief when any one of these “essential prerequisites for a preliminary injunction is not satisfied.” *Id.* at 46 (quotation omitted).

ARGUMENT

I. Injunctive relief is not necessary to prevent immediate and irreparable harm.

Plaintiffs are not entitled to a preliminary injunction because they are unable to demonstrate, through “concrete evidence,” that such relief is necessary to prevent immediate and irreparable harm. *Kiddo v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., and Mun. Emps.*, 239 A.3d 1141, 2020 WL 4431793, at *9 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2020) (quoting *Summit Towne Centre, Inc.*, 828 A.2d at 1001-02, and citing *Novak v. Commonwealth*, 523 A.2d 318, 320 (Pa. 1987)); *Reed v. Harrisburg City Council*, 927 A.2d 698, 706 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007) (requiring “actual proof of irreparable harm”). Likewise, “the harm [must] not [be] speculative in nature.” *Kiddo*, 2020 WL 4431793, at *109; accord *Reed*, 927 A.2d at 706 (“[S]peculation and conjecture will not suffice.”).

Plaintiffs allege two harms, both purely speculative. First, Plaintiffs allege that “defendants are receiving and counting void ballots in violation of the Election Code,” and that this statutory violation is sufficient to establish immediate and irreparable harm. Pls.’ Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Prelim. Inj. (“Mem.”) at 5. A statutory violation, however, may constitute irreparable harm only where such a violation is certain. *See SEIU Healthcare Pa. v. Commonwealth*, 104 A.3d 495, 508-09 (Pa. 2014) (finding immediate and irreparable harm where it was “undisputed” that defendant planned to take an action that would “direct[ly] contravene[e] . . . the plain language of [a statute]”). Plaintiffs here do not even allege that Defendants have violated the Election Code. To the contrary—as Plaintiffs themselves acknowledge—Defendants have published guidance making clear that they will not accept mail ballots delivered by third parties unless authorized on behalf of a voter with a disability. *See Mem.* at 6.

Additionally, nothing in Pennsylvania law requires drop boxes to be limited to weekday business hours or monitored in-person. The Election Code vests Defendants with broad powers to

administer elections. *See* 25 P.S. § 2642. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has confirmed that drop boxes are legal. *See Pa. Democratic Party v. Boockvar*, 238 A.3d 345, 361 (Pa. 2020) (holding “the Election Code permits county boards of election to accept hand-delivered mail-in ballots at locations other than their office addresses including drop-boxes”). And the Department of State has provided guidance authorizing precisely the system that Defendants intend to pursue. *See* Pa. Dep’t of State, *Pa. Absentee & Mail-in Ballot Return Guidance* at 3 (Aug. 19, 2020) (“Business hours for [drop box] sites do not have to be limited to weekdays or normal business hours. Counties are encouraged to offer business hours outside of these time frames, including weeknights or weekend hours to enable maximum flexibility and convenience to voters.”).¹

Second, Plaintiffs allege that they will suffer irreparable harm because their “valid ballots” will be commingled with “void ballots” delivered by third parties, Mem. at 7, but this too is mere speculation. Plaintiffs have adduced no evidence that “void ballots” will be delivered by third parties; they suggest only that some people have deposited multiple ballots in the drop box in the past. But the mere deposit of multiple ballots is not inherently illegal and does not automatically render all such ballots void. Pennsylvania law explicitly permits an “authorized representative” to deposit an absentee ballot; in fact, the law allows “[m]ultiple people” to “designate the same person.” 25 P.S. § 3146.2a(a.3)(4), (5). Plaintiffs make no mention of this. Instead, they ask the Court to simply presume that voters violated state law in the past and then extrapolate that voters will therefore violate state law in the future.

This alleged harm “rel[ies] on a chain of theoretical events,” which courts have consistently rejected. *DJT II*, 493 F. Supp. 3d at 377. First, Plaintiffs assume that the lack of in-person

¹ Available at https://www.dos.pa.gov/VotingElections/OtherServicesEvents/Documents/PADOS_BallotReturn_Guidance_1.0.pdf (last accessed Sept. 27, 2022).

monitoring of drop boxes creates a *risk* of illegal voting through unlawful third-party ballot delivery. And, *if* that happens, Plaintiffs surmise that their votes will be diluted in violation of some unspecified right. *Cf. id.* Such speculation and conjecture is insufficient to demonstrate immediate and irreparable harm. *See Novak*, 523 A.2d at 320 (rejecting speculative considerations as legally insufficient to support preliminary injunction); *Sameric Corp. of Mkt. St. v. Goss*, 295 A.2d 277, 279 (Pa. 1972) (same); *Kiddo*, 2020 WL 4431793, at *13 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2020) (reversing trial court’s grant of preliminary judgment because plaintiffs’ alleged harm was speculative).

A Pennsylvania federal district court rejected a similar theory of harm in an action brought by former President Donald Trump’s campaign and others in 2020. *Donald J. Trump for President, Inc. v. Boockvar* (“*DJT I*”), No. 2:20-CV-966, 2020 WL 5407748 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 8, 2020); *see also DJT II*, 493 F. Supp. 3d at 379. There, the plaintiffs sought an injunction based in part on the supposed harm flowing from the risk that unmonitored mail-in voting could lead to the casting and counting of unlawful votes, thus diluting lawful votes. *Id.* at *3. Denying injunctive relief, the court held that “the harm Plaintiffs fear has not yet materialized in any actualized or imminent way.” *Id.* at *1. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to show irreparable harm because they did not present evidence that county officials were “‘likely’ to disobey the unambiguous election code or the Secretary’s clarifying guidance forbidding third-party delivery.” *Id.* at *9. Plaintiffs have similarly failed to present any evidence that anyone—let alone any Defendant—is likely to disobey the unambiguous Election Code or the Defendants’ clear warnings about third-party ballot delivery.

The limited legal authority Plaintiffs provide is also lacking. *Pierce v. Allegheny County Board of Elections*, 324 F. Supp. 2d 684 (W.D. Pa. 2003), which Plaintiffs cite for the proposition that injunctive relief is necessary to preserve any future challenge to void ballots, does not help

them. In that case, the court found the Allegheny County Board of Elections (“Allegheny Board”) adopted three inconsistent policies regarding third-party delivery of absentee ballots, and that the Allegheny Board “failed to publish its three policies in a manner likely to notify the general public of its existing policies and policy changes.” *Id.* at 690. Additionally, two of the Allegheny Board’s three policies expressly violated the Election Code: the first allowed unrestricted third-party ballot delivery, despite the Election Code’s limitations, and the second prevented even authorized agents of disabled voters from delivering another person’s ballot. *Id.* at 689-90. Under those peculiar facts, the court ordered the Allegheny Board to set aside any ballots that were hand-delivered for later adjudication. *Id.* at 709.

The facts here are very different (and far simpler). Defendants have adopted only one policy limiting third-party ballot delivery to authorized agents; that policy perfectly tracks the Election Code’s requirements; and the policy has been publicized without any confusion. Because Plaintiffs fail to offer any evidence—let alone the requisite “concrete evidence,” *Kiddo*, 2020 WL 4431793, at *9—that ballots will be cast or accepted contrary to state law, they cannot demonstrate that their requested relief is necessary to preserve a challenge to void ballots that do not exist and may never exist. *See DJT I*, 2020 WL 5407748, at *1 (declining to order injunctive relief to prevent comingling of ballots to preserve challenge to harm that “has not yet materialized in any actualized or imminent way”); *see also New Castle Orthopedic Assocs. v. Burns*, 392 A.2d 1383, 1384 (Pa. 1978) (reversing grant of preliminary injunction); *Credit All. Corp. v. Phila. Minit–Man Car Wash Corp.*, 301 A.2d 816, 818 (Pa. 1973) (finding trial court properly denied preliminary injunction where no showing made of necessity to avoid immediate and irreparable harm).

II. Issuance of an injunction would disenfranchise voters, impose new burdens on election officials, and wreak havoc on get-out-the-vote efforts, causing greater injury than refusing the injunction.

Because Plaintiffs provide no evidence of any actual harm, *any* injury from granting the injunction is definitionally greater than the harm from refusing it. Indeed, substantial harm would flow from Plaintiffs' requested relief, manifesting in three different but related ways.

First, the injunction sought would impose additional burdens on the right to vote for voters in Lehigh County, including members of the Alliance; that burden is all the more acute in light of the imminent election. *Cf. Hackett v. President of City Council of City of Phila.*, 298 F. Supp. 1021, 1028 (E.D. Pa. 1969) (denying writ of election in part due to proximity to election as it "could result in the disenfranchisement of some persons entitled to vote by absentee ballots"). For example, limiting the availability of drop boxes to Monday through Friday from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. will preclude a substantial number of voters from using the drop boxes at all. Furthermore, Plaintiffs' demands that the drop boxes be "physically monitored in-person" may impose costs substantial enough that Defendants will reduce or eliminate the use of drop boxes entirely. Taken together, these restrictions are likely to result in the disenfranchisement of at least some voters.

Second, the drop box restrictions would harm county election officials by requiring them, at this late date, to quickly reconfigure their plans for administering the election, all while they work around the clock to send out mail-in ballots and prepare for the upcoming election. *Cf. Valenti v. Mitchell*, 962 F.2d 288, 301 (3d Cir. 1992) (noting "strong public interest in an orderly primary [election] less than three weeks away"). For example, Defendants would need to adjust decisions about the location and number of drop boxes, assignment and placement of staff, and budgeting to account for the proposed in-person monitoring requirement. Plaintiffs' conclusory assertion that there is no risk of administrative chaos ignores reality. *See Mem.* at 7.

Third, Plaintiffs' proposed restrictions, which come just a few short weeks before voters begin returning mail ballots to drop boxes in Lehigh County, would inject chaos into get-out-the-vote operations. *See id.* (noting importance of "adequately . . . consider[ing] the impact of" issuance of injunction on "the media efforts and campaign strategies of other candidates").

Plaintiffs' speculation pales in comparison to each of these substantial harms. As a result, this element precludes Plaintiffs' requested relief.

III. Plaintiffs' requested mandatory injunction will not restore the status quo ante.

Far from seeking to restore any status quo ante, Plaintiffs seek a mandatory injunction that would impose new responsibilities on Defendants and impose an extraordinary change in drop box availability. A mandatory injunction "alter[s] the status quo by commanding some positive act or [] provide[s] the moving party with 'substantially all the relief sought and that relief cannot be undone even if the defendant prevails at a trial on the merits.'" *Pub. Int. Legal Found. v. Boockvar*, 495 F. Supp. 3d 354, 358 (M.D. Pa. 2020) (citation omitted). Defendants have never previously been required to station a county employee at every drop box for every minute that they are available. Plaintiffs do not allege or show that there has ever been a requirement or even a practice of restricting the availability of the drop box at the Lehigh County Government Center to weekday business hours. In fact, virtually all voters who return their mail-in or absentee ballots by mail do so without the direct monitoring or supervision of county election officials.

If Defendants are required to redirect staffing from election preparation to in-person monitoring of each drop box in the county, those resources will have been permanently squandered even if Defendants prevail on the merits. And if Defendants choose to conserve these resources by eliminating drop boxes, voters will be deprived of critical opportunities that cannot be restored

retroactively. In short, “[r]ather than preserve the status quo the injunctive relief [if] granted would destroy it.” *Herman v. Dixon*, 141 A.2d 576, 578 (Pa. 1958).

IV. Plaintiffs are unlikely to prevail on the merits.

Plaintiffs lack any right to relief—indeed, they never even identify a cognizable harm or the basis for any relief. It is Plaintiffs’ burden to establish that “the activity it seeks to restrain is actionable, that [their] right to relief is clear, and that the wrong is manifest.” *Warehime*, 860 A.2d at 46-47. Plaintiffs are unable to do so.

A. Plaintiffs are not “aggrieved.”

As a threshold matter, “a controversy is worthy of judicial review only if the individual initiating the legal action has been ‘aggrieved.’” *Pittsburgh Palisades Park, LLC v. Commonwealth*, 888 A.2d 655, 659 (Pa. 2005) (quoting *In re Hickson*, 573 Pa. 127, 821 A.2d 1238, 1243 (2003)). Plaintiffs here are not “aggrieved” because they cannot “establish that [they] ha[ve] a substantial, direct, and immediate interest in the outcome of the litigation[.]” *Id.* at 660.

Plaintiffs’ alleged interests in preventing vote dilution are not “substantial” because they do not “surpass[] the common interest of all citizens in procuring obedience to the law *In re Hickson*, 821 A.2d at 1245 (plaintiff’s interest not substantial where he failed to establish “any peculiar, individualized interest in the outcome of the litigation that is greater than that of any other citizen”); *Pittsburgh Palisades Park, LLC*, 888 A.2d at 660 (same); *Allegheny Reprod. Health Ctr. v. Pa. Dep’t of Hum. Servs.*, 249 A.3d 598, 604 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021) (“[I]t is not sufficient for the person claiming to be ‘aggrieved’ to assert the common interest of all citizens in procuring obedience to the law.”) (quoting *William Penn Parking Garage, Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh*, 464 Pa. 168, 346 A.2d 269 (1975)). Here, Plaintiffs’ generalized interest in a lawful election is indistinguishable from ordinary interests held by every other Pennsylvanian.

Plaintiffs' alleged interests also are not direct and immediate. "A direct interest requires a causal connection between the asserted violation and the harm complained of." *Phantom Fireworks Showrooms, LLC v. Wolf*, 198 A.3d 1205, 1215 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018). "An interest is immediate when the causal connection is not remote or speculative." *Id.* Here, Plaintiffs cannot plausibly demonstrate a nonspeculative causal connection between their alleged violation and alleged harm. Plaintiffs assert merely that some unknown third parties *might* violate the law in the future by committing voter fraud at unmanned drop boxes, that the Board of Elections *might* count these "invalid" votes, and that this counting *might* have the effect of diluting Plaintiffs' votes. A federal court in Pennsylvania has previously rejected this very theory of harm, finding that plaintiffs who alleged "a risk of vote fraud by other voters" "absent implementation of the security measures that they seek [such as guards by drop boxes]" offered nothing more than "the possibility of future injury' based on a series of speculative events." *DJT II*, 493 F. Supp. 3d at 342, 377 (granting summary judgment for defendants). Because Plaintiffs' alleged harms are not immediate and are purely speculative, Plaintiffs are not "aggrieved," and this controversy is not "worthy of judicial review." *Pittsburgh Palisades Park, LLC*, 888 A.2d at 659; *see also supra* at 5-7 (explaining Plaintiffs' asserted harms are speculative).

B. Plaintiffs' Complaint fails to specify the cause of action or right implicated.

Plaintiffs purport to "seek an injunction to assure that the Lehigh County Board of Elections receives and counts votes consistent with Pennsylvania law," Mem. at 2, but they conspicuously fail to specify their cause of action. They do not identify any authority for private citizens to demand judicial remedies for technical noncompliance (let alone speculative future noncompliance) with the Election Code, and instead gesture vaguely at their "fundamental right to vote." Mot. ¶¶ 35, 39. But Plaintiffs offer no indication whether they intend to vindicate statutory

or constitutional rights, or whether those rights arise under state or federal law. Because the nature of the right will determine the legal test to be applied, Plaintiffs' total failure to elucidate any of this is fatal to their action. The Court cannot adjudicate a claim that has never been identified. Even if the Court were to litigate Plaintiffs' case for them and assume they intend to assert individual constitutional rights, Plaintiffs would not be entitled to relief—a federal court adjudicated nearly identical arguments just two years ago and determined that Pennsylvania voters lack a federal right to require all drop boxes to be monitored in person. *DJT II*, 493 F. Supp. 3d at 382. The court also recognized that county boards of elections have “important and precise interests in regulating elections” in the manner that they deem appropriate. *Id.* at 385.

V. The injunctive relief Plaintiffs seek is not reasonably suited to abate the allegedly offending activity.

The relief Plaintiffs request is not reasonably suited to abate the offending activity, as required to receive preliminary injunctive relief, because—again—Plaintiffs have not demonstrated the existence of any offending acts committed by the Board. *See Red Oak Water Transfer NE, LLC v. Countrywide Energy Servs., LLC*, No. GD 11-17598, 2012 WL 13118519, at *13 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Civil Div. July 20, 2012) (injunctive relief not reasonably suited to abate an offending activity where plaintiffs failed to demonstrate existence of any offending activity).

In any event, Plaintiffs' subjective and highly restrictive policy preferences about the availability and monitoring of drop boxes are not the least restrictive means of ensuring that Defendants do not count any ballots unlawfully delivered by third parties. *See Big Bass Lake Cmty. Ass'n v. Warren*, 950 A.2d 1137, 1144–45 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008); *Red Oak Water Transfer NE*, 2012 WL 13118519, at *13 (denying preliminary injunction in part because requested relief was “overbroad and unduly restrictive”). According to Plaintiffs' own allegations, Defendants have published bolded guidance about third-party ballot delivery rules, and they provide video

monitoring of drop boxes in use. *See* Mot. ¶¶ 4, 12. Because these are reasonable methods to mitigate improper delivery, Plaintiffs' motion must be denied. *See Harford Penn-Cann Serv., Inc. v. Zymblosky*, 549 A.2d 208, 210 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (reversing grant of injunctive relief where relief was overly broad and less "drastic" alternatives may have addressed the harm to plaintiffs); *see also DJT I*, 2020 WL 5407748, at *9 (denying preliminary injunction where plaintiffs were unable to show that requested relief was "the *only* way of protecting [them] from harm" in this instance") (quoting *Campbell Soup Co. v. ConAgra, Inc.*, 977 F.2d 86, 91 (3d Cir. 1992) (emphasis in original)).

VI. Issuance of a preliminary injunction would harm the public interest by restricting the ability to vote and creating confusion while the mail-in and absentee voting process is already underway.

Finally, issuance of the requested preliminary injunction would conflict with and harm the public interest. As discussed *supra*, the relief Plaintiffs seek would wreak havoc on election administration and necessarily result in the disenfranchisement of voters; these unacceptable outcomes are contrary to the public interest. *See Pa. Democratic Party*, 238 A.3d at 370 (observing "orderly and efficient election process" may be "crucial to the protection of a voter's participation in that process"); *Green Party of Pa. v. Aichele*, 103 F. Supp. 3d 681, 693 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (noting "[t]he Commonwealth's interest in orderly elections that do not accidentally disenfranchise some portion of the electorate"); *cf. In Re: Recount of Ballots*, 325 A.2d 303, 308 (Pa. 1974) ("Unreasonable impairment or unnecessary restrictions upon this right [to vote] cannot be tolerated[.]"). And the potential harm that would result from Plaintiffs' proposed relief is only exacerbated by the proximity of the upcoming election and the attendant chaos that accompanies substantial restrictions in voting access even as voters have already begun to request and return mail ballots. *See Valenti*, 962 F.2d at 301 (noting "strong public interest in an orderly primary [election] less than three weeks away").

These harms to the public interest are unabated by the speculative benefits to the public interest Plaintiffs assert without either authority or evidence. *See* Mem. at 7. Plaintiffs' incantations of "election fraud (real or perceived)" and "integrity of elections" do not by mere recitation justify the requested relief. As movants, the onus is on Plaintiffs to make the requisite showing not only that evidence of election fraud exists, but also that these specific measures are narrowly tailored to effectively reduce fraud. *Warehime*, 860 A.2d at 47. They have failed to do so.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth therein, this Court should deny Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction.²


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² The Alliance refers to the request for injunctive relief as a "Motion" because Plaintiffs have so styled it, though such requests are not properly raised by motion but instead by petition. *See* Pa. R. Civ. P. 208.1(b)(1)(iii).