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DISTRICT COURT
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

SCOTT GOLDMAN, an individual, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

BARBARA CEGAVSKE, in her official
capacity as Nevada Secretary of State,
JOSEPH P. GLORIA, in his official
capacity as Registrar of Voters for Clark
County, Nevada,

Defendants.

Case No. A-22-851189-C

Dept. No. XVII

Hearing Date: May 10, 2022

Hearing Time: 9:00 a.m.

**SECRETARY OF STATE'S OPPOSITION TO
EX PARTE APPLICATION ON ORDER SHORTENING TIME**

Defendant BARBARA CEGAVSKE, in her official capacity as Nevada Secretary of State, by and through counsel, Aaron D. Ford, Attorney General, and Craig A. Newby, Deputy Solicitor General, hereby opposes Plaintiffs' "Ex Parte Application for a Temporary Restraining Order to Conduct Meaningful Voter Observation in Clark County, Nevada on Order Shortening Time" (the "Application").

This opposition is made and based upon the following Memorandum of Points and

1 Authorities, all papers and pleadings on file herein, and any argument that this court
2 should choose to entertain.

3 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

4 **I. Introduction**

5 Two months ago, in accordance with Nevada statute revisions passed by the 2021
6 Legislature, the Legislative Commission adopted regulations for observing the counting of
7 ballots and for ensuring security for various aspects of Nevada's upcoming elections. The
8 Secretary has accepted the Clark County Registrar's "written plan for the accommodation
9 of members of the general public who observe the delivery, counting, handling and
10 processing of ballots," as required by NRS 293B.354.

11 Rather than addressing the applicable regulations approved on a bipartisan basis by
12 the Legislative Commission and the Registrar's accepted plan, Plaintiffs instead make false,
13 disproven allegations regarding the prior 2020 election to justify the imposition of a
14 mandatory injunction imposing additional intrusive observation requirements in the
15 upcoming 2022 election, in contradiction to state and federal rights to voter privacy.
16 Nevada courts repeatedly rejected similar demands throughout the 2020 election; this
17 court should do the same.

18 A preliminary injunction¹ is extraordinary relief to which no party is entitled as a
19 matter of right. *Dep't of Conservation & Nat. Res., Div. of Water Res. v. Foley*, 121 Nev. 77,
20 80, 109 P.3d 760, 762 (2005). Because Plaintiffs cannot meet their burden to demonstrate
21 that Nevada law entitles them to the mandatory injunctive relief they seek in this case,
22 Plaintiffs have no likelihood of success on the merits, as Clark County will provide
23 observation in accordance with Nevada statute, Nevada regulations, and its accepted plan,
24 along with daily audits of mechanical signature verifications. Plaintiffs have not delineated
25 whether or how Clark County fails to comply with any Nevada statute or regulation.
26 Defendants do not suffer any harm from Clark County complying with Nevada statute and

27 ¹ While the Application is styled as an application for a temporary restraining order,
28 Plaintiffs also request a preliminary injunction. App. at 21:19-23. The Secretary addresses
Plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction here.

1 regulations. The public interest favors the status quo, rather than violating voters' privacy
2 by conducting intrusive observation in only Clark County.

3 This court should deny the application.

4 **II. Factual Background**

5 **A. The 2020 Election**

6 Plaintiffs allege that the 2020 presidential election was the most hotly contested
7 election in history. 2d Am. Compl. at ¶ 6. Joseph Biden defeated Donald Trump by more
8 than seven million votes, receiving 306 Electoral College votes.²

9 Plaintiffs next make numerous allegations regarding ballot observation in Clark
10 County for the 2020 election. 2d Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 9, 11. However, Plaintiffs' Second
11 Amended Complaint³ omits reference to Nevada state courts consistently rejecting similar
12 2020 challenges against ballot observation by Nevada state courts. *See Kraus v. Cegavske*,
13 Case No. 20 OC 00142 1B, 2020 WL 8340238 (Nev. Dist. Ct., Oct. 29, 2020);⁴ *Law v.*
14 *Whitmer*, 477 P.3d 1124 (Nev. 2020) (affirming attached District Court order granting
15 motion to dismiss statement of contest). In fact, following an evidentiary hearing, the
16 district court held that Clark County had not interfered with any individual's statutory
17 right to observe ballot processing *Kraus*, 2020 WL 8340238 at *5-*6; *Law*, 477 P.3d at *14,
18 *20.

19 Finally, the Secretary investigated and rejected allegations made against the 2020
20 election conducted in Nevada.⁵ Stated simply, there is no "evidentiary support for the
21
22

23 ² <https://www.fec.gov/resources/cms-content/documents/2020presgeresults.pdf> at 1,
2, 8 (last visited May 3, 2022).

24 ³ Plaintiffs have filed three complaints in this action, on April 14, 2022, April 20,
25 2022, and April 22, 2022. While Plaintiffs were entitled to file the first amended complaint
26 as a matter of course pursuant to NRCP 15(a)(1), Plaintiffs did not receive the Secretary's
27 consent or the Court's leave to file the second amended complaint as required by NRCP
28 15(a)(2). The Secretary reserves her right to contest the improper filing of the Second
Amended Complaint.

⁴ A true and correct copy of the October 29, 2020 decision in *Kraus v. Cegavske* is
attached as **Exhibit A**.

⁵ A true and correct copy of the Secretary's April 21, 2021 letter is attached hereto
as **Exhibit B**.

1 contention that the 2020 general election was plagued by widespread voter fraud.” *Id.*
2 Repeating debunked allegations to the contrary does not entitle Plaintiffs to relief.

3 **B. The 2021 Statutory Changes**

4 Subsequently, the 2021 Legislature provided additional procedures for mail vote
5 signature verification by machines when passing Assembly Bill 321. Specifically, Sections
6 16 and 17 of Assembly Bill 321 read as follows:

7
8 Sec. 16. At least once each year, each county clerk and all
9 members of his or her staff whose duties include administering
an election must complete a training class on forensic signature
verification that is approved by the Secretary of State.

10 Sec. 17. If a county clerk uses an electronic device in an election
11 to verify signatures on mail ballots:

12 1. The county clerk must conduct a test of the accuracy
13 of the electronic devices before the election. The test must
14 be conducted in a manner that ensures the electronic
device will use the same standards for determining the
validity of a signature as would be used by a natural person
verifying the signature pursuant to section 11 of this act.

15 2. The county clerk must perform daily audits of each
16 electronic device during the processing of mail ballots for
the election. The daily audit must include a review of a
sample of at least 1 percent of the signatures verified each
day. The county clerk shall appoint election board officers
who must not all be of the same political party to manually
review the signatures. The county clerk must prepare a
report of each daily audit.

17
18
19
20 These statutory changes provide an additional audit process for electronic processing
21 of mail ballots to be conducted daily on a bipartisan basis, including the preparation of a
22 daily audit report.

23 **C. The 2022 Regulatory Changes**

24 The Secretary, in accordance with Nevada statute and issues raised during the 2020
25 election, proposed regulations that were adopted on a bipartisan basis by the Legislative
26 Commission in February 2022.⁶ Plaintiffs ignore this new status quo, failing to reference

27
28 ⁶ A true and correct copy of the approved regulations is accessible at
<https://www.nvsos.gov/sos/home/showpublisheddocument/10232/637823518790600000>.

1 any of these regulations within the filings for this case before seeking a mandatory
2 injunction to meet their demands.

3 Three specific regulations warrant further attention for addressing Plaintiffs'
4 allegations. First, R095-21 provides for specific procedures for bipartisan teams to audit
5 the work performed by mechanical scanning machines for initial mail vote signature
6 verification. Specifically, if any "signature that the electronic device verified" is rejected by
7 the bipartisan teams, the clerk shall immediately stop using the electronic device, notify
8 the Secretary, and work with the Secretary to identify the issue and implement a solution.
9 *Id.* This strengthens the statutory audit requirements passed by the 2021 Legislature,
10 ensuring all interested parties will know if a mechanical scanning machine has any issue
11 in such an audit.

12 Second, R098-21 provides further details for observation of the voting place,
13 including a definition for "meaningful observation." Specifically,

14 "Meaningful observation" means a person may observe the
15 identification of voters who appear at a polling place to vote, the
16 distribution of a ballot or voting machine card to a voter, the
17 movement of a voter to a voting booth, the return of a ballot or
18 voting machine card by a voter and the exiting of a polling place
19 by a voter.

20 The term does not include allowing a person to: (1) View the
21 personal information of a voter, a voter's ballot or selections on a
22 voting machine; or (2) Listen to any conversation between election
23 board officers or between a voter and an election board officer.

24 *Id.* Further, observations of voting "must not be located in an area that would allow
25 an observer to infringe on the privacy and confidentiality of the ballot of the voter." *Id.*

26 Third, R108-21 provides further details for observing the processing and counting of
27 votes. Specifically, it requires observers to "remain in an area designated by the county or
28 city clerk without interfering with the processing and counting of ballots," but the
designated area must "allow for meaningful observation and "must not be located in
an area that would allow an observer to infringe on the privacy and confidentiality of the
ballot of a voter." *Id.*

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1 **D. The Current Dispute**

2 Clark County submitted its statutorily-mandated observation plan on April 15,
3 2022. Consistent with prior practice, the Secretary accepted Clark County's plan without
4 further comment or correspondence.⁷

5 Rather than address the significant changes adopted by the Legislature and the
6 Legislative Commission since 2020 or address any further concerns with the Secretary,
7 Plaintiffs filed three iterations of this lawsuit and this application, seeking a mandatory
8 injunction to impose additional observation requirements onto these Defendants.
9 Effectively, Plaintiffs wish to substitute their judgment for that of the Legislature when
10 determining the appropriate level of observation required for an election, designating
11 themselves election arbiters.

12 **III. Standards of Review**

13 **A. Standard for Injunctive Relief**

14 A preliminary injunction is extraordinary relief to which no party is entitled as a
15 matter of right. *Dep't of Conservation & Nat. Res., Div. of Water Res. v. Foley*, 121 Nev. 77,
16 80, 109 P.3d 760, 762 (2005). To obtain a preliminary injunction, Plaintiffs must show "(1)
17 a likelihood of success on the merits; and (2) a reasonable probability that the non-moving
18 party's conduct, if allowed to continue, will cause irreparable harm for which compensatory
19 damage is an adequate remedy." *Univ. & Cmty. Coll. Sys v. Nevadans for Sound Gov't*, 120
20 Nev. 712, 721, 100 P.3d 179, 187 (2004). "In considering preliminary injunctions, courts
21 also weigh the potential hardships to the relative parties and others, and the public
22 interest." *Id.*

23 **B. Standard for Election Law Challenges**

24 Plaintiffs' demands for Defendants to do certain things inadvertently seeks
25 mandamus. A writ of mandamus is "available to compel the performance of an act that the
26 law requires as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station or to control an arbitrary or
27

28 ⁷ A true and correct copy of Clark County's plan with corresponding maps is attached
hereto as **Exhibit C**.

capricious exercise of discretion.” NRS 34.160. Mandamus will “not issue if the petitioner has a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.” *Wheble v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court*, 128 Nev. 119, 122, 272 P.3d 134,136 (2012). Further, mandamus may not be invoked by a trial court to control discretionary action unless that discretion is manifestly abused or is exercised arbitrarily and capriciously. *Round Hill Gen. Improvement District v. Newman*, 97 Nev. 601, 603, 637 P.2d 534, 536 (1981). Likewise, mandamus may not be used to compel an agency to act in a specified manner when it has no clear and present legal duty to do so. *Id.* at 604.

Here, notwithstanding Plaintiffs’ allegations, there is no clear and present duty to act in the specified manner demanded by Plaintiffs.

Further, “[w]hen a state election law provision imposes only ‘reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions’ upon the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of voters, ‘the State’s important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify’ the restrictions.” *Burdick v. Takushi*, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (quoting *Anderson v. Celebrezze*, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983)); *see also Arizona Green Party v. Reagan*, 838 F.3d 983, 988 (9th Cir. 2016). Here, Plaintiffs do not allege, must less establish, that Defendants have no interest in managing observation of ballot counting or that the Nevada observation requirements are discriminatory in any way.

IV. Legal Analysis

A. Plaintiffs are Unlikely to Succeed on the Merits

1. Plaintiffs Lack Standing to Pursue this Unripe Complaint

When plaintiffs file a complaint for declaratory, injunctive or writ relief, a court may not exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over their claims unless plaintiffs have standing to bring the claims and the claims are ripe for adjudication. *Doe v. Bryan*, 102 Nev. 523, 524-26 (1986); *Heller v. Legislature*, 120 Nev. 456, 460-63 (2004). When plaintiffs lack standing to bring their claims or those claims are not ripe for adjudication, defendants are entitled to dismissal or summary judgment on those claims as a matter of law. *Bryan*, 102 Nev. at 524-26.

1 To establish jurisdiction by reason of standing, a party must show a personal injury
2 and not merely a general interest that is common to all members of the public. *See Schwartz*
3 *v. Lopez*, 132 Nev. 732, 743, 382 P.3d 886, 894 (2016). Additionally, a party must suffer
4 harm fairly traced to the statute that invalidating it would redress. *Elley v. Stephens*, 104
5 Nev. 413, 416-17, 760 P.2d 768, 770 (1988).

6 Here, Plaintiffs do not identify how any harm is suffered by Clark County adhering
7 to Nevada statute and regulations. Plaintiffs cite not a single case that recognizes a
8 constitutional right to observe election processes and procedures. Indeed, the federal courts
9 have never recognized a constitutional right to observe the processing and counting of
10 ballots. Nevada law, not the United States Constitution, authorizes limited public access
11 to election workers as they count ballots.

12 While other states have authorized similar public access, there appears to be a
13 consensus among courts that state law governs poll watching and election observation. *See*
14 *Donald J. Trump for President, Inc. v. Boockvar*, No. 2:20-cv-966, __F.Supp.3d__, 2020 WL
15 5997680, at *67 (W.D. Penn. Oct. 10, 2020) (“State law, not the Federal Constitution, grants
16 individuals the ability to serve as poll watchers and parties and candidates the authority
17 to select those individuals.”); *Republican Party of Pennsylvania v. Cortes*, 218 F.Supp.3d
18 396, 414 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (same); *Cotz v. Mastroeni*, 476 F.Supp.2d 332, 364 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)
19 (holding that poll watching “has no distinct First Amendment protection”); *Turner v.*
20 *Cooper*, 538 F.Supp. 1160, 1162 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (“[W]e would suggest that the state is not
21 constitutionally required to permit poll watchers for political parties and candidates to
22 observe the conduct of elections. Illinois has chosen to do so, but [plaintiff’s] right to be
23 present at the polling place derive[s] solely from state law.”) Under such circumstances, it
24 is hardly surprising that different states have chosen to have different provisions. *See App.*
25 *at 17:22-18:12*. Effectively here, contrary to the separation of powers, Plaintiffs seek to use
26 this court to substitute for the observation authorized by the Legislature under Nevada
27 statute.

28 ///

1 Further, standing must be based upon a particularized injury, not a presumed injury
2 that is common to the electorate in general. Here, the alleged injury is based upon
3 Plaintiffs' unfounded fears about voter fraud absent their heightened observation. Their
4 alleged injury is hypothetical, not actual or imminent, and cannot possibly be traced from
5 Clark County's current observation protocols to actual vote dilution or voter fraud. Indeed,
6 Plaintiffs have no constitutional right to police election workers in the way that they
7 demand. As Judge Miranda Du held in a similar case in the United States District Court,
8 *see Paher v. Cegavske*, 457 F. Supp. 3d 919, 926-27 (D. Nev. 2020), plaintiffs who express
9 policy-based concerns about voter fraud do not typically have standing to pursue claims
10 that that their votes will be diluted in violation of rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth
11 Amendment. This is because such claims are "speculative, unsupported, and not
12 particularized." *Id.* See also *Donald J. Trump for President, Inc. v. Cegavske*, Case No. 2:20-
13 CV-1445 JCM (VCF), 2020 WL 5626974 at * 4 (D. Nev. Sept. 18, 2020).

14 Finally, in cases for declaratory relief or where constitutional matters arise, a claim
15 is ripe for adjudication only if it presents an existing controversy, not merely the prospect
16 of a future problem. *Resnick v. Nev. Gaming Comm'n*, 104 Nev. 60, 65-66 (1988); *Bryan*,
17 102 Nev. at 524-26. If the claim depends on an outcome that may or may not occur, it is not
18 ripe for adjudication. *Id.* Simply put, judicial relief is unavailable when "the damage is
19 merely apprehended or feared." *Bryan*, 102 Nev. at 525.

20 Here, Plaintiffs generally presume that the public observation protocols in Clark
21 County are not sufficiently robust to prevent voter fraud based on false allegations rejected
22 by Nevada courts during the prior election. Plaintiffs' presumption also ignores the
23 revisions in Nevada statutes, Nevada regulations, and Clark County's 2022 observation
24 plan. Because Plaintiffs assert, at most, their unsupported belief that there is a "prospect
25 of a future problem," Plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed on the merits because their claim is
26 not yet ripe.

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1 **2. Plaintiffs Have No Right to Mandate Defendants Perform**
2 **Additional Requirements Outside of Existing Nevada Statutes**
3 **and Regulations**

4 Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint references three provisions of Chapter 293B
5 of the Nevada Revised Statutes. *See* 2d Am. Compl. at ¶ 12 (referencing NRS 293B.330,
6 NRS 293B.335, and NRS 293B.353). Each provision allows for observation of different
7 aspects of ballot handling only if it "do[es] not interfere with [said aspect of ballot
8 handling]." *Id.* NRS 293B.354 requires Clark County to submit an observation plan to the
9 Secretary for her to accept.

10 Here, Plaintiffs do not identify how their demands are tied to the plain language of
11 Nevada statute or Nevada regulations. Stated differently, Nevada law does not require
12 allowing observers "to visually inspect each ballot," to be "within a two (2) foot radius of
13 any ballot counting system or machine," or be subject to approval by "the chair of the
14 respected parties central committee." App. at 21:23-23:16. Further, Nevada law does not
15 authorize observers to interfere by "ask[ing Clark County] to stop processing" or requiring
16 that all "drop box locations, all counting areas, EMS areas, and all board rooms used for
17 the 2022 Primary Election ... be video-taped using video surveillance at all times." *Id.*

18 Plaintiffs' demands are recycled from the 2020 election. Nevada courts repeatedly
19 rejected challenges premised on observation rights for ballot handling outside the scope of
20 Chapter 293B. Courts uniformly rejected these arguments, explaining that "the statutes
21 do not use the word 'meaningful,'" that there was no "constitutional provision, statute, rule,
22 or case that supports such a request," and that "[a]llowing such access creates a host of
23 problems," including revealing "confidential voter information that voters have no[] right
24 to know" and "slow[ing] a process the Petitioners failed to prove is flawed." *Kraus*, 2020 WL
25 8340238 at *5; *see also Kraus v. Cegavske*, No. 82018, 2020 WL 6483971 at *1 (Nev. Nov.
26 3, 2020) (denying a stay pending appeal because "Appellants' motion, on its face, does not
27 identify any mandatory statutory duty that respondents appear to have ignored").

28 Further, Plaintiffs ignore that this is the 2022 election, with new statutes,
regulations, and a new Clark County observation plan. For instance, Plaintiffs make

1 numerous demands in their Prayer for Relief pertaining to mail vote signature verification
2 and processing. *See, e.g.*, 2d Am. Compl., Prayer for Relief at ¶¶ 3(ii), (iv), and (xiv). Nothing
3 within Nevada law requires what Plaintiffs seek. However, the Legislature and the
4 Legislative Commission have adopted detailed, daily bipartisan audits for mechanical mail
5 vote signature verification to ensure accuracy while maintaining voter confidentiality.
6 There is no justifiable reason for allowing observers to interfere with Clark County's
7 processing of mail ballots, particularly given the right to secret ballots and Nevadan voters'
8 right to privacy. For instance, various provisions of Chapter 293 of the Nevada Revised
9 Statutes make voting by secret ballot. *See, e.g.*, NRS 293.269913(1)(c); NRS 293.269935(2);
10 NRS 293.3606(3). Further, NRS 200.620(1) prohibits interception of any wire
11 communication unless (a) one party to the communication provided prior consent and (b)
12 "[a]n emergency situation exists and it is impractical to obtain a court order as required
13 by" Nevada law before the interception. Plaintiffs' demand for unlimited video interferes
14 with the privacy and secret ballots of Nevada voters.

15 Because there is no additional right or duty beyond that provided by Nevada statute
16 and regulation, Plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed on the merits, warranting denial of the
17 application.

18 **B. Plaintiffs Cannot Establish Any Harm or Irreparable Harm**

19 As set forth above, Plaintiffs seek a mandatory injunction to interfere with Nevada
20 statutes and regulation governing the observation of ballot processing. It does not seek to
21 preserve the status quo; it instead seeks additional demands not provided for under Nevada
22 law and not required by any law. Stated differently, as set forth above, "Plaintiffs statutory
23 right" does not include what they demand as a mandatory injunction here. App. at 19:19-
24 20.

25 Further, Plaintiffs do not establish that they would suffer any harm from
26 observation associated with Clark County's 2022 observation plan. Plaintiffs give no
27 consideration to Nevada's new statutes, regulations, and Clark County's 2022 observation
28 plan. Instead, they rely on debunked, false allegations from the 2020 election.

1 Under such circumstances, Plaintiffs cannot establish any harm justifying a
2 mandatory injunction against Defendants.

3 **C. The Balance of Equities and the Public Interest Favor Defendants**

4 The balance of equities and the public interest favor Defendants. Here, Plaintiffs
5 seek a mandatory injunction to interfere with Nevada law ensuring the right to observe
6 ballot processing without interference, without any evidence of harm. The public has the
7 right to secure elections, with ballots kept secret, with observation and auditing provided
8 throughout the process for every type of vote. The public interest favors upholding Nevada
9 election law and rejecting false, unproven allegations made without any evidence.

10 **V. Conclusion**

11 There is no constitutional right to observe the processing and counting of mail-in
12 ballots. Although Nevada statutes recognize a limited public right to observe the counting
13 of ballots, they do not authorize, let alone mandate, the kind of access that Plaintiffs
14 demand. Plaintiffs' mandatory injunction must be denied.

15 DATED this 6th day of May, 2022.

16 AARON D. FORD
17 Attorney General

18 By: /s/ Craig Newby
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20 Deputy Solicitor General
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28

1 **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

2 I certify that I am an employee of the State of Nevada, Office of the Attorney General,
3 and that on May 6, 2022, I electronically filed the foregoing document via this Court's
4 electronic filing system. Parties that are registered with this Court's electronic filing
5 system will be served electronically.

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11 /s/ Lucas Combs
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13 Office of the Attorney General
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EXHIBIT A

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2020 WL 8340238 (Nev.Dist.Ct.) (Trial Order)

District Court of Nevada,
First Judicial District.
Carson City

Fred KRAUS, an individual registered to vote in Clark County, Nevada, Donald
J. Trump for President, Inc., and the Nevada Republican Party, Petitioners,

v.

Barbara CEGAVSKE, in her official capacity as Nevada Secretary of State, Joseph P. Gloria,
in his official capacity as Registrar of Voters for Clark County, Nevada, Respondents.

No. 20 OC 00142 1B.

October 29, 2020.

*1 DEPT. 2

Order Denying Emergency Petition for Writ of Mandamus, or in the Alternative, Writ of Prohibition

James E. Wilson, Jr., District Judge.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Before the Court is the Emergency Petition for Writ of Mandamus, or in the Alternative, Writ of Prohibition. The Court held an evidentiary hearing on October 28, 2020.

ISSUES

Do Petitioners have standing to bring these claims?

Has Registrar Joseph P. Gloria failed to meet his statutory duty under NRS 2936.353(1) to allow members of the general public to observe the counting of ballots?

Has Registrar Gloria unlawfully precluded Petitioners from the use and enjoyment of a right to which Petitioners are entitled?

Has Registrar Gloria exercised discretion arbitrarily or through mere caprice?

Has Registrar Gloria acted without or in excess of authorized powers?

Has Secretary of State Barbara Cegavske failed to meet any statutory duty under NRS 2936.353(1) to allow members of the general public to observe the counting of ballots?

Has Secretary of State Barbara Cegavske unlawfully precluded Petitioners from the use and enjoyment of a right to which Petitioners are entitled?

Has Secretary Cegavske exercised discretion arbitrarily or through mere caprice? Has Secretary Cegavske acted without or in excess of authorized powers?

Has Secretary of State Cegavske unlawfully precluded Petitioners the use and/or enjoyment of a right to which Petitioners are entitled?

Have Petitioners proved they are entitled to a writ of mandamus on their equal protection claims?

FACTS

It is important to note the factual context in which this case arose. All of the states in the United States are attempting to hold elections under the health, political, social, and economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevada's state and county election officials had relatively little time to assess, plan, modify, and implement procedures that are quite different from the established election procedures in an effort to provide safe, open elections that would not result in long waiting lines. The modification of procedures includes fewer polling places, a very large increase in mail-in voting, and long lines as a result of social distancing.

A second important context is that this lawsuit was filed October 23, 2020-11 days before the general election.

Every Nevada county is required to submit to the Secretary of State, by April 15, 2020, the county's plan for accommodation of members of the general public who observe the processing of ballots. NRS 2936.354(1). Registrar Gloria did not submit a plan by April 15, 2020.

Registrar Gloria submitted a plan to the Secretary of State on October 20, 2020. A copy of the plan is attached as Exhibit 1.

Historically, the Secretary of State has not sent letters or other notification to the counties approving the counties' plans.

The Secretary of State's office reviewed Registrar Gloria's plan, concluded it complied with the law, and Secretary Cegavske issued a letter to Registrar Gloria on October 22, 2020. The letter is attached as Exhibit 2. The Secretary did not write that Registrar Gloria's plan was "approved," but it is clear from the letter that the plan was approved with a suggestion to that the Registrar consider providing additional seating in public viewing areas for observers to view the signature verification process to the extentt feasible while ensuring that no personally identifiable information is observable by the public.

***2** A copy of all 17 county plans were admitted as exhibits. Clark County's plan is not substantially different from the plan of any of the other 16 counties, and none of the plans is substantially different from the plans of previous years.

Clark County uses an electronic ballot sorting system, Agilis. No other Nevada county uses Agilis. Some major metropolitan areas including Cook County, Illinois, Salt Lake City, Utah, and Houston, Texas use Agilis. Some Nevada counties use other brands of ballot sorting systems.

Registrar Gloria decided to purchase Agilis because of the pandemic and the need to more efficiently process ballot signatures.

One of Petitioners' attorneys questioned Registrar Gloria about Agilis in earlier case, *Corona v. Cegavske*, but never asked Registrar Gloria to stop using Agilis.

Clark County election staff tested Agilis by manually matching signatures. Clark County election staff receives yearly training on signature matching from the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The last training was in August of this year.

For this general election Clark County is using the same they used for the June primary election. No evidence was presented that the setting used by Clark County causes or has resulted in any fraudulent ballot being validated or any valid ballot invalidated.

No evidence was presented of any Agilis errors or inaccuracies. No evidence was presented that there is any indication of any error in Clark County's Agilis signature match rate.

Registrar Gloria opined that if Clark County could not continue using Agilis the county could not meet the canvass deadline which is November 15, 2020. The Court finds that if Clark County is not allowed to continue using Agilis the county will not meet the canvass deadline.

When the envelope containing mail-in ballots are opened the ballot and envelope are separated and not kept in sequential order. Because they are not kept in sequential order it would be difficult to identify a voter by matching a ballot with its envelope.

This is the first election in Registrar Gloria's 28 years of election experience in Clark County that there are large numbers of persons wanting to observe the ballot process.

Persons that observe the ballot process sign an acknowledgment and a memo containing instructions to the observer. A copy of an acknowledgment and memo are attached as Exhibit 3.

People hired by the Registrar to manage the people wanting to observe the ballot process are called ambassadors. The observer acknowledgment states observers are prohibited from talking to staff. The memo explains the role of ambassadors and invites observers to inform their ambassador they have a question for election officials or the observer may pose a question directly to an election official.

Registrar Gloria is not aware of any observer complaints.

Several witnesses supporting Petitioners and called by Petitioners testified: they saw ballots that had been removed from the envelope left alone; runners handle ballots in different ways, including taking the ballots into an office, taking ballots into "the vault" and/or otherwise failing to follow procedure, but no procedure was identified; inability to see some tables from the observation area; inability to see into some rooms; inability to see all election staff monitors; inability to see names on monitors; saw a signatures she thought did not match but admitted she had no signature comparison training; and/or trouble getting to where they were supposed to go to observe and trouble being admitted to act as observer at the scheduled time.

***3** No evidence was presented that any party or witness wanted to challenge a vote or voter, or had his or her vote challenged.

No evidence was presented that there was an error in matching a ballot signature, that any election staff did anything that adversely affected a valid ballot or failed to take appropriate action on an invalid ballot.

No evidence was presented that any election staff were biased or prejudiced for or against any party or candidate.

One Petitioner witness did not raise issues regarding things she observed with an ambassador but instead went to the Trump Campaign. No issue was ever raised as a result of her observations or report to the Trump Campaign.

Washoe County is using cameras to photograph or videotape the ballot process.


No Nevada county hand-counts ballots.

LEGAL PRINCIPLES

Standing

Nevada law requires an actual justiciable controversy as a predicate to judicial relief. *Doe v. Bryan*, 102 Nev. 523, 525, 728 P.2d 443, 444 (1986). For a controversy to exist the petitioner must have suffered a personal injury and not merely a general interest that is common to all members of the public. *Schwarz v. Lopez*, 132 Nev. 732, 743, 382 P.3d 886, 894 (2016).

Mandamus and Prohibition

A court may issue a writ of mandamus “to compel the performance of an act which the law especially enjoins as a duty resulting from an office ...; or to compel the admission of a party to the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which the party is entitled and from which the party is unlawfully precluded by such ... person.” NRS 34.160. A court may issue a writ of mandamus “when the respondent has a clear, present legal duty to act.” *Round Hill Gen. Imp. Dist. v. Newman*, 97 Nev. 601, 603, 637 P.2d 534 (1981). The flip side of that proposition is that a court cannot mandate a person take action if the person has no clear, present legal duty to act. Generally, mandamus will lie to enforce ministerial acts or duties and to require the exercise of discretion, but it will not serve to control the discretion.”  *Gratson v. Toco*, 90 Nev. 131, 133 (1974). There is an exception to the general rule: when discretion “is exercised arbitrarily or through mere caprice.” *Id.*

“Petitioners carry the burden of demonstrating that extraordinary relief is warranted.” *Pan v. Dist. Cf.*, 120 Nev. 222, 228 (2004).

The writ of prohibition is the counterpart of the writ of mandate. It arrests the proceedings of any tribunal... or person exercising judicial functions, when such proceedings are without or in excess of the jurisdiction of such tribunal ... or person. NRS 34.320.

A writ of prohibition “may be issued... to a person, in all cases where there is not a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.” NRS 34.330.

Voting Statutes

 NRS 293B.353 provides in relevant part:

1. The county... shall allow members of the general public to observe the counting of the ballots at the central counting place if those members do not interfere with the counting of the ballots.
2. The county... may photograph or record or cause to be photographed or recorded on audiotape or any other means of sound or video reproduction the counting of the ballots at the central counting place.
- *4 3. A registered voter may submit a written request to the county ... clerk for any photograph or recording of the counting of the ballots prepared pursuant to subsection 2. The county... clerk shall, upon receipt of the request, provide the photograph or recording to the registered voter at no charge.

 NRS 293B.354 provides in relevant part:

1. The county clerk shall, not later than April 15 of each year in which a general election is held, submit to the Secretary of State for approval a written plan for the accommodation of members of the general public who observe the delivery, counting, handling and processing of ballots at a polling place, receiving center or central counting place.

...

3. Each plan must include:

- (a) The location of the central counting place and of each polling place and receiving center;
- (b) A procedure for the establishment of areas within each polling place and receiving center and the central counting place from which members of the general public may observe the activities set forth in subsections 1 and 2;
- (c) The requirements concerning the conduct of the members of the general public who observe the activities set forth in subsections 1 and 2; and
- (d) Any other provisions relating to the accommodation of members of the general public who observe the activities set forth in subsections 1 and 2 which the county... considers appropriate.

AB 4 section 22 provides in relevant part:

- 1. For any affected election, the county... clerk, shall establish procedures for the processing and counting of mail ballots.
- 2. The procedures established pursuant to subsection 1:
 - (a) May authorize mail ballots to be processed and counted by electronic means; and
 - (b) Must not conflict with the provisions of sections 2 to 27, inclusive, of this act.

AB 4 section 23 provides in relevant part:

- 1. ... for any affected election, when a mail ballot is returned by or on behalf of a voter to the county... clerk... and a record of its return is made in the mail ballot record for the election, the clerk or an employee in the office of the clerk shall check the signature used for the mail ballot in accordance with the following procedure:
 - a. The clerk or employee shall check the signature used for the mail ballot against all signatures of the voter available in the records of the clerk.

AB 4 section 25 provides in relevant part:

- 1. The counting procedures must be public.

ANALYSIS

Petitioners failed to prove they have standing to bring their Agilis, observation, ballot handling or secrecy claims.

As set forth above for a justiciable controversy to exist the petitioner must have suffered a personal injury and not merely a general interest that is common to all members of the public. Petitioners provided no evidence of any injury, direct or indirect, to themselves or any other person or organization. The evidence produced by Petitioners shows concern over certain things these observers observed. There is no evidence that any vote that should lawfully be counted has or will not be counted. There is no evidence that any vote that should lawfully not be counted has been or will be counted. There is no evidence that any election


worker did anything outside of the law, policy, or procedures. Petitioners do not have standing to maintain their mandamus claims.

Likewise, Petitioners provided no evidence of a personal injury and not merely a general interest that is common to all members of the public regarding the differences between the in-person and mail-in procedures. Petitioners provided no evidence of any injury, direct or indirect, to themselves or any other person or organization as a result of the different procedures. All Nevada voters have the right to choose to vote in-person or by mail-in. Voting in person and voting by mailing in the ballot are different and so the procedures differ. There is no evidence that anything the State or Clark County have done or not done creates two different classes of voters. There is no evidence that anything the State or Clark County has done values one voter's vote over another's.

*5 There is no evidence of any debasement or dilution of any citizen's vote. Petitioners do not have standing to bring their equal protection claims.

Petitioners failed to prove Registrar Gloria failed to meet his statutory duty under NRS 2936.353(1) to allow members of the general public to observe the counting of ballots?

Petitioners argued they have a right to observers having meaningful observation under NRS 2936.353(1) and AB 4 sec. 25. NRS 2936.353(1) provides in relevant part, “[t]he county... shall allow members of the general public to observe the counting of the ballots....” AB 4 sec. 25 provides in relevant part “[t]he counting procedure must be public.” The statutes do not use the modifier “meaningful.”

The Nevada Legislature codified the right of the public to observe the ballot counting procedure in  [NRS 293B.353](#) and 2936.354, and AB 4 section 25(1). NRS 2936.354(1) requires each county to annually submit a plan to the Secretary of State. NRS 293B. 354(3) states the requirements of the plan. The statutory requirements of the plan are very general. The legislature left to the election professionals, the Secretary of State and the county elections officials, wide discretion in establishing the specifics of the plan. Petitioners failed to prove either Secretary Cegavske or Registrar Gloria exercised their discretion arbitrarily or through mere caprice.


The fact that Registrar failed to timely submit a plan was remedied by submitting the plan late and the Secretary of State approving the plan.

Petitioners seem to request unlimited access to all areas of the ballot counting area and observation of all information involved in the ballot counting process so they can verify the validity of the ballot, creating in effect a second tier of ballot counters and/or concurrent auditors of the ballot counting election workers. Petitioners failed to cite any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or case that supports such a request. The above-cited statutes created observers not counters, validators, or auditors. Allowing such access creates a host of problems. Ballots and verification tools contain confidential voter information that observers have not right to know. Creating a second tier of counters, validators, or auditors would slow a process the Petitioners failed to prove is flawed. The request if granted would result in an increase in the number of persons in the ballot processing areas at a time when social distancing is so important because of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Petitioners have failed to prove Registrar Gloria has interfered with any right they or anyone else has as an observer.

Petitioners claim a right to have mail-in ballots and the envelopes the ballots are mailed in to be kept in sequential order. Petitioners failed to cite Constitutional provision, statute, rule, or case that creates a duty for Nevada registrars to keep ballots and envelopes in sequential order. Because they failed to show a duty they cannot prevail on a mandamus claim that requires proof a duty resulting from office. Because there is no duty or right to sequential stacking the Court cannot mandate Registrar Gloria to stack ballots and envelopes sequentially.

*6 Because there is not right to sequential stacking the Court cannot mandate the use and enjoyment of that “right.”

Plaintiffs want the Court to mandate Registrar Gloria allow Petitioners to photograph of videotape the ballot counting process. The legislature provided in  [NRS 293B.353\(2\)](#) the Procedure for photographing or videotaping the counting of ballots. The county may photograph or videotape the counting and upon request provide a copy of the photographs or videotapes.

Petitioners failed to cite any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or case that gives the public the right to photograph or videotape ballot counting.

Petitioners failed to prove Secretary Cegavske or Registrar Gloria exercised her or his discretion arbitrarily or through mere caprice in any manner. Therefore, the Court cannot mandate Registrar Gloria to require sequential stacking of ballots and envelopes.

Petitioners requested the Court mandate Registrar Gloria provide additional precautions to ensure the secrecy of ballots. Petitioners failed to prove that the secrecy of any ballot was violated by anyone at any time. Petitioners failed to prove that the procedures in place are inadequate to protect the secrecy of every ballot.

Petitioners also request the Court mandate Registrar Gloria stop using the Agilis system. Petitioners failed to show any error or flaw in the Agilis results or any other reason for such a mandate. Petitioners failed to show the use of Agilis caused or resulted in any harm to any party, any voter, or any other person or organization. Petitioners failed Registrar Gloria has a duty to stop using Agilis.


AB 4 passed by the legislature in August 2020 specifically authorized county officials to process and count ballots by electronic means. AB 4, Sec. 22(2)(a). Petitioners' argument that AB 4, Sec. 23(a) requires a clerk or employee check the signature on a returned ballot means the check can only be done manually is meritless. The ballot must certainly be checked but the statute does not prohibit the use of electronic means to check the signature.

Equal Protection

There is no evidence that in-person voters are treated differently than mail-in voters. All Nevada voters have the right to choose to vote in-person or by mail-in. Voting in person and voting by mailing in the ballot are different and so the procedures differ. Nothing the State or Clark County have done creates two different classes of voters. Nothing the State or Clark County has done values one voter's vote over another's. There is no evidence of debasement or dilution of a citizen's vote.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Petitioners do not have standing to bring these claims.

Registrar Joseph P. Gloria has not failed to meet his statutory duty under  [NRS 293B.353\(1\)](#) to allow members of the general public to observe the counting of ballots.

Registrar Gloria has not precluded Petitioners from the use and enjoyment of a right to which Petitioners are entitled.

Registrar Gloria has not exercised discretion arbitrarily or through mere caprice.

Registrar Gloria has not acted without or in excess of authorized powers.

Secretary of State Barbara Cegavske has not failed to meet any statutory duty under NRS 2936.353(1) to allow members of the general public to observe the counting of ballots.

*7 Secretary of State Barbara Cegavske has not unlawfully precluded Petitioners from the use and enjoyment of a right to which Petitioners are entitled.

Secretary Cegavske has not exercised discretion arbitrarily or through mere caprice.

Secretary Cegavske has not acted without or in excess of authorized powers.

Secretary of State Cegavske has not precluded Petitioners the use and/or enjoyment of a right to which Petitioners are entitled.

Petitioners failed to prove they are entitled to a writ of mandamus on any of their claims.

ORDER

The Petition for Writ of Mandamus or in the Alternative for Writ of Prohibition is denied.

October 29, 2020.

<<signature>>

James E. Wilson, Jr.

District Judge

End of Document

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EXHIBIT B

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**OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF STATE**

April 21, 2021

NevadaGOP.org
press@nevadagop.org

via Email

Re: Elections Integrity Violation Reports

On March 4, 2021, members of the Nevada GOP ("NVGOP") delivered four boxes to the Capitol building in Carson City. After applying security protocols, the Capitol Police delivered the four boxes to the Office of the Secretary of State. Over the following weeks, the elections staff inventoried and labeled the boxes and their contents and investigated the accompanying allegations of voter fraud. This consumed more than 125 hours of staff time.

Although the NVGOP's initial reports indicated that there were 122,918 records to support the accompanying allegations, the agency inventory identified 3,963 unique Elections Integrity Violation Reports (EIVRs). The larger figure provided by the NVGOP encompasses the individual line items on the spreadsheets that accompanied each of the EIVRs. Ultimately 3,963 unique EIVRs were counted along with 3 business cards and 1 USB drive. Our investigation into these documents revealed that some incidents were already under investigation. These involved discrete, readily verifiable events. However, most of the complaints related to voter registration records that the NVGOP deemed to be inaccurate or suspicious for a variety of reasons.

For example, the EIVRs contained the following allegations among others: 1) that 16,953 voters were registered at commercial addresses or fictitious addresses; 2) that 2,479 voters apparently relocated to another state or foreign country during the 30-day period preceding the November 3 election; 3) that 42,284 voters cast more than one ballot in the November 3 election; and 4) that 1,506 votes were cast in the names of persons who are deceased. Our investigation revealed that these allegations and others are based largely upon an incomplete assessment of voter registration records and lack of information concerning the processes by which these records are compiled and maintained.

And while the NVGOP raises policy concerns about the integrity of mail-in voting, automatic voter registration, and same-day voter registration, these concerns do not amount to evidentiary support for the contention that the 2020 general election was plagued by widespread voter fraud. The details of that investigation are explained in the attachment to this letter.

If you have any questions, please contact the Elections Division at (775) 684-5705 or NVElect@sos.nv.gov.

Regards,


Barbara K. Cegavske
Secretary of State

By: Mark Wlaschin
Mark Wlaschin, Deputy Secretary for Elections

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Detailed Summary:

Upon receipt of the four boxes of information on March 4, 2021, the contents were first inventoried and labeled in order to ensure that each received appropriate attention. The following labeling system was employed for every Elections Integrity Violation Report (EIVR):



Once labeled, the EIVRs were investigated according to the nature of the allegation. Some EIVRs alleged issues with voter list maintenance; others alleged voter fraud or non-compliance with federal or state laws. Each EIVR was researched individually which involved coordination between employees of the Office of the Secretary of State, county elections officials, and applicable law enforcement agencies. The allegations in each EIVR were addressed as follows:

B1-21-MAR 4-001: This EIVR identified 16 individuals on the Statewide Voter Registration List (SVRL) that have no first name listed and a last name identified as the word: 'Resident'. We ran a separate set of queries on the Statewide Voter Registration List (SVRL) to identify any additional individuals with a similar set of values including, for example, a first name of 'Resident'. A total of 57 registered voters were identified that had either no first name and a last name of 'Resident' or that lacked a first name in the SVRL. Of the 57 individuals, 22 had vote history from the 2020 general election. The investigation revealed that these symbols and the use of the name 'Resident' were placeholders used by county officials when the handwritten documents provided by registering voters were illegible. These placeholders enabled the clerks to rapidly identify the voters who needed to be contacted so that they could follow up and request additional information. This information was provided to the county clerks in order to facilitate further list maintenance and to affect the correction of the records. The individuals with vote history whose records were identified as lacking a first or last name in the Statewide Voter Registration List (SVRL) had complete records on the applicable county voter registration list.

B1-21-MAR 4-002: This EIVR alleged that members of the Nevada Native Vote Project violated 18 U.S.C. § 597 and NRS 293.700. This alleged violation is currently under investigation by law enforcement.

B1-21-MAR 4-003: This EIVR alleged that 3,987 individuals who may not be citizens cast a ballot during the 2020 general election. This concern was originally communicated to the office on December 1, 2020 and, even though the NVGOP did not provide data or evidence until March 4, 2021, the Secretary of State took the following actions:

The Elections Deputy requested from the Nevada Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) a spreadsheet of individuals who presented an immigration document while obtaining a drivers' license over the last 5 years, specifically including 'Date of Birth', 'Last 4 SSN', and 'Drivers' License numbers' along with all other publicly available information for all individuals in an encrypted email or spreadsheet. The requested information was provided to the Office of the Secretary of State by the DMV via an encrypted server on December 2, 2020. The list included a total of 110,163 individuals. Of that total, 5,320 were identified as active registered voters. This represents less than 5% of all documented immigrants who obtained drivers' licenses and identification cards from the DMV. Based on the Statewide Voter Registration List, we determined that 4,057 of those active registered voters had a vote history from the 2020 general election.

Public records show that 40,676 documented immigrants were naturalized between 2015 and 2019. On average, almost three years had passed between the date of each registered voter's DMV transaction and the November 3 election. Given the large number of naturalizations that occur on an annual basis in Nevada, the data suggests that many voters were likely naturalized between the date of the DMV transaction and the election. Alternatively, it is possible that some voters had already been naturalized as the date of the DMV transaction but were still in possession of their immigration documents. Regardless, there is no federal data base that can be accessed for the purpose of evaluating bulk data relative to current immigration status. Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court, as well as U.S. Courts of Appeal in the Ninth Circuit and elsewhere, have ruled that election officials cannot lawfully require documentary proof of citizenship as a condition of voter registration. Nevada law is consistent with federal law in this regard.

Therefore, as federal and state law currently stands, a person's affirmation is sufficient to establish U.S. citizenship for purposes of voter registration. Without specific evidence to establish that identified individuals were foreign nationals when they voted in the November 3 election, there is nothing further that can be investigated. In summary, the generalized information acquired from DMV cannot serve as a basis for an investigation into alleged voter fraud.

B1-21-MAR 4-004: This EIVR alleged voter fraud from 2,479 Nevada voters. The allegation relates to individuals who filed permanent change of address notifications with the US Post Office (USPS), but were still shown as being mailed ballots during the 2020 election. The EIVR alleged that all 2,479 of these voters requested a change of address more than the 30-day days before the election, suggesting that they did not meet the voter residency requirement identified in NRS 293.485:

NRS 293.485 Qualifications to vote: Citizenship; age; residence; registration.

1. Every citizen of the United States, 18 years of age or over, who has continuously resided in this State and in the county 30 days and in the precinct 10 days next preceding the day of the next succeeding:
 - (a) Primary election;
 - (b) Primary city election;
 - (c) General election; or
 - (d) General city election,➤ and who has registered in the manner provided in this chapter, is entitled to vote at that election.
2. This section does not exclude the registration of eligible persons whose 18th birthday or the date of whose completion of the required residence occurs on or before the next succeeding:
 - (a) Primary election;

- (b) Primary city election;
- (c) General election;
- (d) General city election; or
- (e) Any other election.

(Added to NRS by [1960, 271](#); A [1961, 295](#); [1967, 851](#); [1971, 1267](#); [1973, 27](#); [1987, 355](#); [1995, 2630](#))

There are several reasons that an individual may have requested a change of address through the USPS while retaining their original Nevada voter registration address. An individual may have moved out of state temporarily, purchased a second home or apartment, or simply chosen to have their non-elections mail forwarded to a different location. Many of the individuals on this list moved to cities and towns adjacent to military bases, likely on military orders, or to “college towns” potentially to continue their education. While 1,892 of the 2,479 individuals on the list do have vote history from the 2020 general election, it is probable that many of these voters were Nevada residents during the 30-day period preceding the election. In fact, it is equally probable that many of these voters continue to claim Nevada as their permanent residence even though they are temporarily located outside of the state. Additionally, pursuant to 52 U.S.C. § 10502 and NRS 298.250, a voter need not meet a durational residency requirement of state law when voting for the office of the President and Vice President. Given these considerations, it is not cost-effective to expend additional resources to verify the Nevada-residency status of each of the 1,892 voters in question who cast their votes by mail. Although this particular complaint highlights the ways in which mail-in voting can make it easier for people to skirt durational residency requirements, it does not warrant further investigation absent particularized allegations and detailed evidence of voter fraud.

B1-21-MAR 4-005: This EIVR identified 1,506 Nevada voters who allegedly voted by mail in the 2020 general election, but who were also allegedly listed as deceased by the Social Security Administration (SSA) Master Death File, Consumer Data Vendors, Public Obituary Data Matches, and Credit Bureau Deceased Data Information. We contacted the Office of Vital Statistics on March 18, 2021 to validate that the alleged dates of death were accurate to see if the individuals were deceased. The Office of Vital Statistics reported that only 10 of the 1,506 records were identified as being deceased according to their records. This immediately raised questions about the quality of the information that spurred this allegation. The Office of Vital Statistics receives their information directly from sources who have first-hand knowledge of an individual dying. When a person dies, a funeral home will create the record. Once the record is created they work with a medical certifier, physician, coroner, etc. to ensure the information is accurate. When the record is completed, Vital Statistics Registrars review it for completeness and accuracy. If it is in order, they register the record and a death certificate can be provided relating to that record. Vital Statistics then sends data to the Social Security Administration, National Center for Health Statistics (Part of the CDC), and other various state agencies including the Office of the Secretary of State. The Office of Vital Statistics does not work with the Credit Bureau and the only consumer agency they liaise with is Consumer Product Safety. Of the 1,506 individuals identified, 1,473 of them did have vote history from the 2020 general election, but only 10 appeared questionable. The cases regarding these 10 individuals were referred for investigation by appropriate law enforcement.

B1-21-MAR 4-006: This EIVR claimed to provide a list of 42,284 individuals who allegedly voted twice during the 2020 general election. More accurately, this list alleges that 21,142 individuals may have voted twice during the 2020 general election (21,142 x 2 votes each = 42,284 allegations). First, we compared the list to our Statewide Voter Registration List to confirm how many had actually cast a ballot during the 2020 general election. Through this process we identified that 2,828 of the “double voters” cast one ballot during the 2020 general election. This indicates that the issue may have merely been a duplicate registration or other data entry error. The information on these 2,828 individuals has been provided to the county clerks in order to confirm that the error has been addressed.

For the remaining 18,314 alleged double voters, we started by comparing them to the Multiple Votes Cast report. The Multiple Votes Cast report is a special query that is conducted after each election. This query examines all Nevada voter histories to determine who has cast more than one ballot during an election. This report is possible because every single ballot that is counted is attributed to an individual in their voter history, thus eliminating the possibility of “ballot box stuffing” where additional registered voters are improperly created and then illegal ballots are cast. The Multiple Votes Cast report identifies those records of voters whose vote history needed to be reconciled by the county clerks. Immediately following the 2020 general election, the office identified 1,778 voter records that required reconciliation by the clerks and registrars. Of these 1,778 voter records, only 10 were identified as warranting further investigation and have been already referred to appropriate law enforcement.

To confirm the validity of the allegations of this EIVR, we compared the 1,778 voter records and determined that none of these voters were listed on the spreadsheet delivered to the Office of the Secretary of State on March 4, 2021. This is due to the high level of detail in the Personally Identifiable Information that the Office of the Secretary of State uses (and that is not publicly accessible) to identify duplicates and the immediate nature of their reconciliation.

Regarding the remainder of the alleged “double voters,” there is a significantly lower chance that the alleged violation occurred due to the nature of the data comparison. While the first lines of data identified individuals who had matching birthdates, addresses, and similar names (e.g., Edward vs. Edwin), the remaining 18,314 pairs of individuals have distinct differences in their names, addresses, birthdates, and other information suggesting that they are not the same person. For example, many of the individuals seem to have been matched on such minimal information as “birth year” and “street address” so there are a number of alleged “double voters” who merely live on the same street as someone else born in the same year. As such, these additional 18,314 allegations did not warrant further investigation.

B2-21-MAR 4-001: This EIVR called into question the legitimacy of registrations updated by Federal Post Card Applications (FPCA). The [FPCA form](#) is intended for use by absent Uniformed Service members, their families, and citizens residing outside the United States. It is used to register to vote, request an absentee ballot, and update voter contact information. This EIVR attempts to call into question all 352 individual records in Clark County that were created or updated using an FPCA form. Of note, 345 of the 352 individuals listed have vote history from the 2020 general election. This EIVR states:

During post-election investigation [sic], a number of Nevada voters used the Federal Post Card system to update their voter registration. While the vast majority of these are likely legitimate military changes, some were flagged **as their age put them in a group that could not be active-duty military** [emphasis added]. Given these flagged issues, it calls all registrants via this method into question. It is requested that the Secretary of State investigate this list, determine which voters used this for intra/inter county registration changes (which should not be FPC updates), and why these were processed at all if they were not an active-duty military/overseas change of address.

While the EIVR states that some of the individuals on this list were of “...an age that could not be active duty military”, there is no age limitation on citizens who chose to live overseas. Additionally, as the form itself states [here](#), the FPCA is intended for contact information adjustments. This would include an update from a service member whose spouse moves from one Nevada county to another while their loved one is forward deployed as part of our nation’s defense. As such, there is no discernable information in this complaint nor the accompanying spreadsheet that identifies an improper use of the FPCA form or indicated anything worthy of investigation.

B2-21-MAR 4-002: This EIVR alleged that 8,842 Nevada voters have a commercial address on file as their registration address. The information provided in the attached spreadsheet did not have a specific date indicating when it was captured. This is important because of the continuous nature of voter list maintenance. Many of the records on this sheet could have been corrected or removed by county clerks after this document was created. Of note, 8,356 of the 8,842 voters identified on the spreadsheet have a confirmed vote history from the 2020 general election. More importantly, under NRS 293.507, a voter may register to vote using a commercial address if the applicant resides there:

NRS 293.507 Applications: Forms; distribution; contents; requirements regarding identification and residence; use of affidavits and identification numbers under certain circumstances; regulations.

1. The Secretary of State shall prescribe:
 - (a) Standard forms for applications to preregister or register to vote;
 - (b) Special forms for preregistration and registration to be used in a county where registrations are performed and records of registration are kept by computer; and
 - (c) A standard form for the affidavit described in subsection 5.
2. The county clerks shall provide forms for applications to preregister or register to vote to field registrars in the form and number prescribed by the Secretary of State.
3. Each form for an application to preregister or register to vote must include a:
 - (a) Unique control number assigned by the Secretary of State; and
 - (b) Receipt which:
 - (1) Includes a space for a person assisting an applicant in completing the form to enter the person’s name; and
 - (2) May be retained by the applicant upon completion of the form.
4. The form for an application to preregister or register to vote must include:
 - (a) A line for use by the applicant to enter:
 - (1) The number indicated on the applicant’s current and valid driver’s license issued by the Department of Motor Vehicles, if the applicant has such a driver’s license;
 - (2) The last four digits of the applicant’s social security number, if the applicant does not have a driver’s license issued by the Department of Motor Vehicles and does have a social security number; or
 - (3) The number issued to the applicant pursuant to subsection 5, if the applicant does not have a current and valid driver’s license issued by the Department of Motor Vehicles or a social security number.
 - (b) A line on which to enter the address at which the applicant actually resides, as set forth in [NRS 293.486](#).

(c) A notice that the applicant may not list a business as the address required pursuant to paragraph (b) unless the applicant actually resides there.

(d) A line on which to enter an address at which the applicant may receive mail, including, without limitation, a post office box or general delivery.

5. If an applicant does not have the identification set forth in subparagraph (1) or (2) of paragraph (a) of subsection 4, the applicant shall sign an affidavit stating that he or she does not have a current and valid driver's license issued by the Department of Motor Vehicles or a social security number. Upon receipt of the affidavit, the county clerk shall issue an identification number to the applicant which must be the same number as the unique identifier assigned to the applicant for purposes of the statewide voter registration list.

6. The Secretary of State shall adopt regulations to carry out the provisions of subsections 3, 4 and 5.

(Added to NRS by [1960, 273](#); A [1975, 942](#); [1985, 561](#); [1993, 2191](#); [1995, 2271](#); [1999, 947](#); [2001, 2596](#), [2952](#); [2003, 2179](#); [2005, 1437](#); [2007, 2602](#); [2017, 3854](#))

Additionally, while it is not legal to use a commercial address when registering to vote, this alone is not indicative of fraud, but more often reflects a lack of awareness of the qualified prohibition against using a commercial address. It may also reflect a "key punch" error by the voter. In these cases, the respective clerk or registrar would contact the voter, explain NRS 293.507, and would allow the voter to correct or update their voter registration.

To investigate this allegation against the 8,842 registered voters, we conducted a statistical analysis of the information provided, as the office is not staffed to conduct in-person investigations of 8,842 individual addresses spread across Nevada. The statistical sampling was designed to achieve a 95% certainly level $\pm 5\%$ and reviewed every 24th record for a total of 369 records. Of the 369 records reviewed, each address was entered into an internet search engine and the location reviewed producing the following results:

- 137 are apartment complexes (37%),
- 75 are RV or mobile home parks (20%),
- 36 are hotels with long term rental options (10%),
- 34 are commercial addresses with an attached living space or home-based businesses (9%),
- 18 are houses (5%),
- 11 are rehabilitation facilities (3%),
- 11 are student dorms (3%),
- 11 are retirement communities (3%),
- 9 are assisted living facilities (2%),
- 8 are shelters for women or families (2%),
- 4 are veterans homes (1%),
- 4 are a church or monastery (1%), and
- 2 are medical facilities (<1%).

There were 9 addresses that are possible commercial addresses without an attached living space (2%). This information has been provided to the appropriate clerks and registrars for reconciliation.

B2-21-MAR 4-003: This EIVR alleged that 8,111 Nevada voters registered to vote using a non-existent address. This allegation cites a report by Mr. Jesse Kamzol. Judge Russell of the First Judicial Court of Nevada commented on the information provided by Mr. Kamzol in his 'Order Granting Motion To Dismiss Statement Of Contest' dated December 4, 2020, in which he said:

ii. **Jesse Kamzol**

62. Contestants offered Mr. Kamzol to opine that significant illegal voting occurred in Nevada during the 2020 General Election, based on his analysis of various commercially available databases of voters.

63. The Court questions Mr. Kamzol's methodology because he had little to no information about or supervision over the origins of his data, the manner in which it had been matched, and what the rate of false positives would be. Additionally, there was little or no verification of his numbers. Kamzol Dep. 58:6-11 , 58:15-17, 59:22-24.

Mr. Kamzol's report includes the following accusation:

I reviewed the Washoe County and Clark County voter database files and found 8,111 voters who voted in Nevada but whose registered addresses are physically non-existent, as in, these are vacant lots, apartment numbers that do not exist, and house address numbers that do not exist.

I found 8,111 voters who did not have a Nevada mailing address meeting the postal requirements of a zip+4 location. Of those, 3,262 voted in Nevada by mail, and 4,849 voted in person.

Using CASS (Coding Accuracy Support System) standard marketing software, and utilizing standard address hygiene processing, primarily CASS (Coding Accuracy Support System) marketing software, I was able to identify voters that voted from addresses that the US Postal Service deems mail not reaching its intended recipient because the address is: incorrect, incomplete, illegible, or undeliverable.

4,287 people registered to vote at a non-existent Nevada address voted by mail in Nevada. I believe the correct universe may be larger than what I reviewed given the fact that Clark County refuses to produce its complete list of addresses where ballots were mailed this election cycle.

Regarding the last paragraph, we have confirmed that the Office of the Clark County Registrar will provide the complete list of addresses where mail-in ballots were sent during every election cycle upon request and that it also posts it on its website. The Office of the Secretary of State is now also in possession of this list and can provide it upon request.

The overall nature of this complaint relates to the CASS program used by the USPS. The CASS system does not include every residence across Nevada because it includes only those addresses that have street delivery by the USPS. The CASS system is so limited because **its purpose is to ensure successful street delivery**. According to <https://postalpro.usps.com/certifications/cass>:

The CASS™ certification process is designed in cooperation with the mailing industry to improve the accuracy of postal codes, i.e., Five-Digit ZIP Code®, ZIP + 4®, delivery point (DPCs), and carrier route codes that appear on mailpieces.

Nevada residences that only have PO Box delivery are never included in the CASS system. As new housing proliferates in Nevada, the builders coordinate directly with the USPS to identify whether a given residence will receive mail through street delivery. If it will, then the parties work together to ensure that the house is entered in the CASS system. As of April 2021, of the approximately 3.1 million residents in Nevada, the USPS only provides street delivery to 1,276,894 million locations.

UDSF (All Routes) District "890 NEVADA SIERRA" - active/delivery (>=3) SUMMARY															
Fiscal Year: 2021 - Period: Week ending Apr 9															
Delivery Routes (inc auxiliary)		Residential						Business						Total PDs	
Type	Count	Other	SDWK	Curb	CBU	CENT	Total	Other	SDWK	Curb	CBU	CENT	Total		
City	1320	177720	6795	55896	416320	218287	875018	34478	64	1010	19195	3986	58733	933751	
Rural	381	6229	122	46192	169491	28622	250656	4016	3	803	3529	1095	9446	260102	
HCR	219	161	2	18318	58361	4775	81617	210	0	505	556	153	1424	83041	
Carrier Total	1920	184110	6919	120406	644172	251684	1207291	38704	67	2318	23280	5234	69603	1276894	
PO Box Routes		Residential						Business						Total	
Count		Facility	Contract	Detached	NPU	Total		Facility	Contract	Detached	NPU	Total			
2790		101306	927	0	0	102233		20945	51	0	0	20996			
Other Boxes		Residential						Business						Total	
		Caller Service	Remittance	Contest	Other	Total		Caller Service	Remittance	Contest	Other	Total			
		2	0	0	0	2		472	0	0	0	472			
Phantom/Auxiliary Routes		City				Rural				HCR				Total	
Type	Count	Deliveries		Count	Deliveries		Count	Deliveries		Count	Deliveries		Count	Deliveries	
Phantom	0	0		0	0		0	0		0	0		0	0	
Auxiliary	38	20772		39	19516		0	0		0	0		77	40288	

As for the 8,111 residences that are "...physically non-existent, as in, these are vacant lots, apartment numbers that do not exist, and house address numbers that do not exist", we conducted a statistical analysis of the information provided, as the office is not staffed to conduct in-person investigations of 8,111 individual addresses spread across Nevada. The statistical sampling was designed to achieve a 95% certainly level $\pm 5\%$ and reviewed every 22nd record for a total of 369 records. Of the 369 records reviewed, each address was entered into an internet search engine and the location reviewed. Of the 369 addresses researched by staff, approximately 95% were quickly identified as being valid residences, although they do not receive street delivery from the USPS. Based upon this information, and given the role and limitations of the CASS system as explained by USPS, there is nothing further to investigate.

B2-21-MAR 4-004: This EIVR alleged that the Clark County Registrar deliberately caused an error in the conduct of maintaining accurate voter rolls. Specifically, this EIVR alleges that:

There were 81,971 voters in Clark County who were undeliverable [sic] in the Primary, and had been Active voters. Due to Joe Gloria's malfeasance in maintaining accurate voter rolls, despite Clark County normally providing extremely timely updates to the voter rolls, these voters had a delay of 7 weeks, and ran up against the 90-day deadline to modify voter rolls as required by the National Voter Registration Act. The full 81,971 list is provided as an attachment to this, but of concern are the 8,529 voters in the previously undeliverable universe who cast mail in ballots from previously undeliverable addresses.

This EIVR was discussed and addressed previously. On July 8 and 9, 2020, the Clark County Registrar's office received an Electronic Registration Information Center (ERIC) report from the Office of the

Secretary of State. In response to the report, the Clark County Registrar's office sent a mail verification to the voters listed in that report. If the voters did not respond within 33 days (allowing 3 days for mailing and 30 days for a response), then the voters' registrations were changed from "active" to "inactive". On August 5, 2020, the Clark County Registrar's office inactivated the 81,971 voters who did not respond to the mail verification. On August 6, 2020, the Elections Deputy and staff realized that the 90 day "blackout period" (where voter registration list maintenance was prohibited pursuant to the National Voter Registration Act) had begun on August 5, 2020. Recognizing that the voters were inactivated after the blackout period began, and that AB4 prescribed that all active registered voters be sent a mail-in ballot, the Elections Deputy coordinated with the Clark County Registrar of Voters to reactivate all 81,971 voters to ensure they received a mail-in ballot.

It is important to note that the 81,971 voters were not going to be removed from the voter rolls by the intended list maintenance action. Instead, their status was changed from "active" to "inactive" and then returned to active status after the timeline error was discovered. All the voters who were affected by this error were mailed a ballot as prescribed by AB4. Of the 81,971 voters who were changed back to "active," 8,462 have vote history from the 2020 general election. There are any number of reasons why these persons may have a vote history despite having previously been flagged for address verification. For example, they may have updated their addresses via internet or same-day registration, or their addresses may have been correct all along. Further, those persons with a vote history represent a mere 10% of the total. This is consistent with ordinary experience: inactive voters are legally eligible to vote and approximately 32,000 inactive voters cast a ballot in the 2018 primary or general election; a total of approximately 13 percent of all "inactive voters." Because the percentage of persons with vote history is not a statistically significant deviation from the norm, this allegation does not warrant further investigation.

B2-21-MAR 4-005: This EIVR alleged that some Clark County election workers were directed to accept out-of-state drivers' licenses and identification cards when processing ballots with a "ID required" flags. The EIVR lists 31,643 Nevadans and states that it lists:

...the entire flagged list of ID required voters that voted by mail and requests the Secretary of State verify if Nevada identification documents were used to satisfy the requirement for ballots cast by mail. While this may seem excessive, the information revealed by whistleblowers reveals that the potential contamination by at least 1 vote which was counted despite not meeting Nevada legal requirements.

The crux of this concern, that the Clark County Registrar's office allowed out-of-state ID to be used to complete the voter registration process, is not indicative of voter fraud given the circumstances surrounding the November 3 election. In this regard, the Department of Motor Vehicles did not offer the normal range of services in the months and weeks before the election due to the pandemic. Consequently, many new Nevada residents were unable to obtain Nevada drivers' licenses and identification cards prior to November 3. When similar claims were raised during the 2020 general election, the issues were discussed with the Registrar who discussed these and other concerns with his staff and ensured that the poll workers and others understood the proper procedures for ID verification.

Further, pursuant to NRS 298.259, a new resident to Nevada is not required to meet Nevada's 30-day durational residency requirement to vote in Nevada for the office of President and Vice President. Additionally, the redacted affidavits included with this EIVR were some of the many that Judge Russell reviewed and described in his 'Order Granting Motion To Dismiss Statement Of Contest' dated December 4, 2020 in which he said:

57. Much of Contestants' evidence consists of non-deposition evidence in the form of witness declarations. These declarations fall outside the scope of the contest statute, which provides that election contests "shall be tried and submitted so far as may be possible upon depositions and written or oral argument as the court may order." NRS 293.415. The reason for this is to allow for the cross-examination of the deponent under oath.

58. *These declarations also constitute hearsay, as they are out-of-court statements offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matters asserted. See NRS 51.035, 51.065; Cramer v. State, 126 Nev. 388,392,240 P.3d 8, 11 (2010) ("An affidavit is generally inadmissible hearsay.").* *Most of these declarations were self-serving statements of little or no evidentiary value.* [emphasis added]

59. The Court nonetheless considers the totality of the evidence provided by Contestants in reaching and ruling upon the merits of their claims.

This EIVR does not merit further investigation because the allegations are not indicative of voter fraud.

B2-21-MAR 4-006: This complaint is a standalone and redacted affidavit. This redacted affidavit was written by an individual claiming to be a licensed attorney in Pennsylvania who served as an election observer from the early voting period through Election Day. This anonymous person alleged malfeasance by the Clark County Registrar of Voters and his staff. The complaints in this affidavit relate to such issues as "ineffective meaningful observation" and procedural issues that have all been discussed with the Clark County Registrar and other clerks. This affidavit was one of the many that Judge Russell reviewed and described in his 'Order Granting Motion To Dismiss Statement Of Contest' dated December 4, 2020 (referenced above). Although they were previously reviewed in a judicial setting, the issues identified in this and other affidavits were closely reviewed for their prospective value. In fact, these and similar issues were raised and discussed during the month of November 2020. Some of the subjects covered will be incorporated into future discussions about possible amendments to regulations and procedures. The goal is to alleviate concerns about process, procedure, and public observation in future elections cycles.

B3-21-MAR 4-001 through B3-21-MAR 4-2116 and B4-21-MAR 4-001 through B4-21-MAR 4-1834 :

These 3,950 EIVRs were the same complaint, but each document had a different voter record printed on it. Further research revealed that these 3,950 EIVRs were all related to a single spreadsheet provided on the USB drive. The USB drive that was included with the four boxes on March 4, 2021 contained a full list which identified 15,170 individuals, but only 3,950 had a printed EIVR associated with it.

Every document claimed that it identified an individual who had an out of state mailing address. Specifically, every one of the EIVRs alleged:

...this complaint addresses a Nevada voter that has an out of state address on file as their mailing address, but has a Nevada registration address. These are voters that returned a mail in ballot in the 2020 election. These were raised in the attached complaints. Please investigate to confirm residency and if each of this [sic] is, in fact, a valid Nevada voter.

Of the full list of 15,170 individuals listed on the spreadsheet, 14,771 had vote history from the 2020 general election. As discussed above, there are reasons why a Nevada-registered voter may permanently or temporarily live out of state, including to attend college or to satisfy military orders. This request to verify the Nevada residency of more than 15,000 individuals is unreasonable, as it is not likely to lead to the discovery of evidence of a crime or a violation of Nevada election law.

B4-21-MAR 4-1835: This complaint is not an EIVR, but is simply the print-out of the full report and allegations by Mr. Kamzol. Mr. Kamzol's report was described earlier in 'B2-21-MAR_4-003. His allegations have been addressed in the paragraphs above.

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EXHIBIT C

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Election Department

965 Trade Dr • Ste A • North Las Vegas NV 89030
Voter Registration (702) 455-8683 • Fax (702) 455-2793

Joseph Paul Gloria, Registrar of Voters
Lorena Portillo, Assistant Registrar of Voters

April 15, 2022

The Honorable Barbara K. Cegavske
Secretary of State
State of Nevada
101 N. Carson St., Suite 3
Carson City, Nevada 89701-4786

Attention: Mark Wlaschin
Deputy Secretary of Elections

RE: Accommodation of Members of the General Public at Polling Places, Mail Ballot Processing, and at the Central Counting Place

Dear Secretary Cegavske:

In accordance with NRS 293B.354, I am forwarding to you the following guidelines which are provided to our polling place team leaders and our election staff to ensure we accommodate members of the general public who wish to observe activities within a polling place, the mail ballot processing areas, and/or at the central counting facilities.

Polling Places (Early Voting and Election Day)

Designated public viewing areas are established in each polling place (for both early voting and Election Day vote centers) where individuals may quietly sit or stand and observe the activities within the polling place.

Observation guidelines:

- Observers may not wear or display political campaign items
- Observers may not photograph, or record by any other means, any activity at any early voting or Election Day polling place
- Use of cell phones is prohibited in the polling place
- Observers may not disrupt the voting process
- If observers have questions, they must direct them to the polling place team leader

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Mail Ballot Processing (965 Trade Dr., NLV, NV 89030)

The general public is allowed to observe the counting of mail ballots. In addition, as a courtesy, members of the general public are also being allowed to observe our mail ballot processing procedures, which occur prior to tabulation.

Our mail ballot processing is taking place at 965 Trade Dr., North Las Vegas, NV 89030, and includes the following activities:

- AGILIS mail ballot processing
- Signature audit team
- Counting board work
- Ballot duplication
- Tabulation of votes

Observation guidelines:

- Observers may not wear or display political campaign items
- Observers may not photograph, or record by any other means, any activity in the mail processing areas
- Use of cell phones is prohibited in the polling place and mail processing areas
- Observers may not disrupt the processing of mail ballots
- If observers have questions, they must direct them to the Observation Liaison assigned to the area

Election Night (Warehouse Tabulating)

In front of our tabulation room, an area is provided for any observer who wishes to observe our counting activity. Reports are provided after each update to the general public and are also available on our website for review. The general public may access the website through our free county wi-fi on their personal devices should they choose to do so.

The public viewing area allows the general public to view the tabulation room, where the processing of election night results may be observed through windows that provide a full view of all counting activity.

The Registrar of Voters is available to answer questions from members of the general public upon request.

In accordance with NRS 293B.354, I am providing a listing of vote center polling locations for the June 14, 2022 Primary Election. The website listed here provides access

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to the same listing,

<https://files.clarkcountynv.gov/clarknv/Election%20Department/2022/VC-SamBal-WEB-22P.pdf?t=1649175535561&t=1649175535561>.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Joseph P. Gloria". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a prominent "J" and "G".


Joseph P. Gloria
Registrar of Voters

Enclosures


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CLARK COUNTY ELECTION WAREHOUSE

965 TRADE DR. SUITE A - F



CLARK COUNTY ELECTION WAREHOUSE
2022 PRIMARY LAYOUT
965 TRADE DR. SUITE F



200 FEET