1 The Honorable Robert S. Lasnik 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 8 AT SEATTLE 9 SUSAN SOTO PALMER et al., 10 Case No.: 3:22-ev-5035-RSL Plaintiffs, 11 v. INTERVENOR-DEFENDANTS' AND 12 CROSS-PLAINTIFFS' RENEWED STEVEN HOBBS, in his official capacity MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS 13 as Secretary of State of Washington, et al., 14 Defendants, NOTE ON MOTION CALENDAR: 15 and Proposed Expedited Date: January 13, 2023 16 JOSE TREVINO et al., Normal Course Date: January 20, 2023 17 Intervenor-Defendants. 18 19 Ī. RELIEF REQUESTED 20 Pursuant to the Court's inherent power "to control the disposition of the causes on its 21 docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for the litigants," Landis v N. 22 Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936), Fed. R. Civ. P. 26, 33 and 34, and in accordance with this 23 Court's invitation when denying Intervenor-Defendants' original Motion to Stay to "refile[] after 24 discovery has been completed" (Dkt. # 101 at 2), Intervenor-Defendants and Cross-Plaintiffs Jose 25 A. Trevino, Ismael G. Campos, and Alex Ybarra respectfully renew the request to stay all

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proceedings pending resolution of *Merrill v. Milligan*, No. 21-1086, 2022 U.S. LEXIS 1626 (U.S.

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INTERVENOR-DEFENDANTS' AND

this Renewed Motion to Stay Proceedings ("Renewed Motion").1

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

argued Oct. 4, 2022) by the Supreme Court of the United States and request expedited review of

On October 5, 2022, Intervenor-Defendants filed a Motion to Stay Proceedings ("Original Motion") pending the U.S. Supreme Court's resolution of the Alabama redistricting case Merrill v. Milligan, No. 21-1086. (See generally Dkt. # 97.) Intervenor-Defendants argued there, as they do here, that *Merrill* implicates important questions concerning the proper application of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 that will be dispositive in this case, just as they were dispositive in two redistricting cases arising out of Louisiana that were stayed pending a decision in Merrill. See Ardoin v. Robinson, No. 21-1596, 2022 WL 2312680, at *1 (U.S. stay granted June 28, 2022)² and Nairne v. Ardoin, No. 22-178-SDD-SDJ, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155706, at *7 (M.D. La. stay granted Aug. 30, 2022). Similar to the two consolidated cases before the U.S. Supreme Court and the two stayed Louisiana matters, Plaintiffs in this action seek relief under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 52 U.S.C. § 10301, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (See, e.g., Dkt. #70.) Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that the Washington State Redistricting Commission's enacted state legislative map was adopted with the intent to discriminate on the basis of race, national origin, and/or language minority status, and that the plan has the effect of denying Latino voters in Central Washington an equal opportunity to participate in the political process and elect their candidates of choice. (See id.) Because Plaintiffs here have brought both discriminatory intent and effects-based claims under Section 2, the legal questions presented here are substantially similar to those in *Merrill*.

Nevertheless, on October 26, 2022, the Court denied Intervenor-Defendants' Original Motion. (*See* Dkt. # 101.) Although the Court did not specifically identify the reason for its denial, it indicated there was "a fair possibility that the stay for which [Intervenor-Defendants] pray[ed] w[ould] work damage to someone else"—namely, the Plaintiffs who at that time were seeking to

¹ Through their respective counsel, Plaintiffs and Defendant/Cross-Defendant State of Washington have indicated they oppose this motion; Defendant/Cross-Defendant Secretary of State Steve Hobbs takes no position on this motion.

² In this case, the Supreme Court actually issued a rare grant of a "petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment," bypassing the Fifth Circuit, staying the case, and holding it in abeyance pending the outcome of *Merrill*.

conduct discovery. (*Id.* at 2.) However, the Court denied the Motion without prejudice, and explicitly left the door open for Intervenor-Defendants to "refile[] after discovery has been completed." (*Id.*)

As of January 3, 2023, discovery in this matter is now complete³ and so Intervenor-Defendants and Cross-Plaintiffs bring this Renewed Motion to Stay Proceedings. Because the Supreme Court has clearly indicated that it intends to reconsider binding precedent in a pending case that has already been argued and that will be decided within the next six months, and because the interests of judicial economy favor a stay while the controlling law awaits settlement and there will be no harm to Plaintiffs now that discovery is complete, Intervenor-Defendants and Cross-Plaintiffs move this Court to stay these proceedings pending the resolution of *Merrill v. Milligan*.

III. ARGUMENT

The power and discretion to stay a case "is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the cases on its docker with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for the litigants." *Landis v. N. Am. Co.*, 299 U.S. at 254. "How this can best be done calls for the exercise of judgment, which must weigh competing interests and maintain an even balance." *Id.* at 254-55. Courts have the inherent power to stay proceedings while awaiting the outcome of another matter that may have a substantial or dispositive effect. *Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Stewart*, 300 U.S. 203, 215 (1937). A court is within its discretion to grant a stay when an independent case pending before another court presents substantially similar issues that "bear upon" the instant case. *See Leyva v. Certified Grocers of California, Ltd.*, 593 F.2d 857, 863-64 (9th Cir. 1997); *see also Robledo v. Randstad US, L.P.*, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 181353, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2017). Furthermore, "it is within the district court's discretion to grant or deny [lengthy or indefinite] stays, after weighing the proper factors." *Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala. v. Unity Outpatient Surgery Ctr., Inc.*, 490 F.3d 718, 723-24 (9th Cir. 2007).

³ On December 30, 2022, the Court granted the Parties' Stipulated Motion to Allow Depositions Out of Time and Extension of Written Discovery Responses. (*See* Dkt. # 122.) Notwithstanding this Renewed Motion, Intervenor-Defendants and Cross-Plaintiffs request that the very limited extensions discussed in the Order be allowed to take place, the last of which is a third-party deposition set to occur on January 23, 2023.

"District courts often stay proceedings where resolution of an appeal in another matter is likely to provide guidance to the court in deciding issues before it." *Washington v. Trump*, No. C17-0141JLR, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75426, at *8 (W.D. Wash. May 17, 2017). And "[w]here a stay is considered pending the resolution of another action, the court need not find that the two cases involve *identical* issues; a finding that the issues are *substantially similar* is sufficient to support a stay." *Id.* (emphasis added); *see also Leyva*, 593 F.2d at 863-64 (indicating that a stay pending resolution of independent proceedings that bear on the case "does not require that the issues in such proceedings are necessarily controlling of the action before the court").

When considering whether to stay a matter pending resolution of a separate related action, the Ninth Circuit has instructed that district courts consider the following factors and competing interests: (1) "the possible damage which may result from the granting of a stay;" (2) "the hardship or inequity which a party may suffer in being required to go forward;" and (3) "the orderly course of justice measured in terms of the simplifying or complicating of issues, proof, and questions of law which could be expected to result from a stay." *Lockyer v. Mirant Corp.*, 398 F.3d 1098, 1110 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting *CMAX*, *Inc. v. Hait*, 300 F.2d 265 (9th Cir. 1962)); *see also* Dkt. # 101 at 2 (applying *Lockyer* factors).

Here, because each factor weighs decisively in favor of a stay in the wake of the completion of discovery in this case, the Court should grant Intervenor-Defendants' Renewed Motion to Stay Proceedings.

A. No Damage to Plaintiffs Will Result from Granting a Stay.

Plaintiffs will not suffer any harm or prejudice from the grant of a stay pending resolution of *Merrill*. The next scheduled state legislative election in Washington is in 2024, but a decision from the U.S. Supreme Court in *Merrill* is expected no later than June 2023. Therefore, no additional elections will be conducted under the enacted state legislative map before *Merrill* is decided, or before Washington's next top-two primary election scheduled for August 6, 2024. This means that this Court and the litigants will have more than a year post-*Merrill* to litigate this case in light of that decision. That is more than enough time to resolve this dispute, and Plaintiffs'

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voting rights cannot be harmed in the interim when no elections will be held in which they would have the opportunity to vote for state legislative candidates under the enacted map.

Plaintiffs also raised concerns regarding the potential spoliation of evidence in the event of a stay, noting that some witnesses were already struggling to recall relevant details in depositions conducted in the autumn of 2021. (*See* Dkt. # 98 at 4-5.) This concern is no longer relevant to the stay inquiry because discovery is complete; all fact witnesses have been deposed.⁴ There is no danger that evidence will be allowed to "go stale" when all evidence has already been collected. (*Id.* at 4.) Once *Merrill* has been decided, the Parties can immediately commence dispositive briefing in the interest of expeditiously resolving this matter before Central Washington voters cast ballots for legislative races again in August 2024. None of the evidence that Plaintiffs have collected through discovery will deteriorate between now and then.

Moreover, in the event that no stay is granted, there is a significant danger for Plaintiffs and the other Parties that they will conduct dispositive briefing only for the relevant legal standard to materially change after they have expended substantial time and resources arguing their position under caselaw that has become incomplete or inapplicable. Wasting the resources of the Parties and the Court litigating in reliance upon a standard that could change in a matter of months, ⁵ during a period when no election will be held in the challenged district for *more than eighteen months*, benefits no one and harms everyone.

B. All Parties Will Be Harmed If This Case is Allowed to Proceed Before *Merrill* Is Decided.

As explained above, there is a substantial risk that this case will have to be litigated twice if the requested stay is not granted now. While all legal standards are potentially subject to

⁴ In the event that the Supreme Court announces a new standard governing Section 2 claims in *Merrill*, Intervenor-Defendants acknowledge that some limited amount of additional discovery could be needed. However, such discovery, if necessary, would only be focused on any changes to the governing legal standard since the factual record will soon be complete. (*See* Dkt. # 122 (granting limited extensions of discovery deadlines).)

⁵ As Chief Justice Roberts indicated in his dissenting opinion opposing the stay granted in *Merrill*, the Supreme Court in his view does need to resolve some of the challenges and uncertainties in current Section 2 jurisprudence. *See* 142 S. Ct. at 883 ("In order to resolve the wide range of uncertainties arising under *Gingles*, I would note probable jurisdiction in *Merrill* and grant certiorari before judgment in *Caster*, setting the cases for argument next Term."). Relatedly, the Chief Justice did not note a dissent when the stay and grant of certiorari before judgment was granted in *Robinson*.

alteration at some indeterminate future date, here the Supreme Court has clearly signaled that it is reconsidering its analysis of effects claims under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act by granting Appellants' petition for certiorari in *Merrill*. Furthermore, because oral argument was already conducted in *Merrill* in October 2022, this Court can be reasonably certain of when the applicable standard will change, if indeed it does—no later than the end of the Supreme Court's current term in June 2023. Hence, the Court already knows *what* the Supreme Court is considering, that the Supreme Court this term has granted cert before judgment and stayed a similar case, as well as the latest possible date *when* it will render a decision; the only question remaining for this Court is *how* it will respond to those signals in a manner that protects its interests and those of the Parties before it.

Section 2 claims are always fact- and resource-intensive inquiries. *See, e.g., NAACP v. Fordice*, 252 F.3d 361, 367 (5th Cir. 2001) (explaining that Section 2 cases require "an intensely local appraisal of the design and impact of the contested electoral mechanisms, a searching practical evaluation of the past and present reality and a functional view of political life"). By denying Intervenor-Defendants' initial Motion for Stay, this Court ensured that Plaintiffs could complete discovery and prevent the spoliation of evidence. (*See* Dkt. # 101.) If the Court now denies this Renewed Motion, however, it runs the risk of placing the Parties in a position where they would be forced to relitigate the dispute following the disposition of *Merrill*, without achieving any simultaneous gains in the form of reducing potential harm to the Parties. Issuing a final order in this case that is immediately obviated by a Supreme Court decision to the contrary will achieve nothing more than duplication of effort.

If a revised Section 2 standard is announced by the Court in *Merrill*, the Parties can utilize that new standard in their dispositive briefing and avoid unnecessarily briefing the same issues twice. Moreover, if in fact the applicable test is revised in a significant, outcome-determinative way, granting a stay avoids the uncomfortable scenario in which this case is fully litigated under one standard, and then relitigated under another with a decision in favor of a different party.

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C. The Interests of Judicial Economy Favor a Stay So as To Avoid Relitigating Issues.

Finally, the interest of the Court itself favors the grant of a stay pending resolution of *Merrill*. As this Court has recognized, the "orderly course of justice" factor from *Lockyer* is synonymous with the interests of "judicial economy." *Naini v. King Cnty. Pub. Hosp. Dist. No. 2*, No. C19-0886-JCC, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15015, at *7 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 29, 2020). This factor is satisfied in cases like this one that "will be easier to decide at some later date." *Sarkar v. Garland*, 39 F.4th 611, 619 (9th Cir. 2022). "[E]ven if a stay is not necessary to avoid hardship, a stay can be appropriate if it serves the interests of judicial economy." *Naini*, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15015, at *7.

Here, the interests of judicial economy would be served by the grant of a stay. The Court has already successfully addressed any concerns about the potential spoliation of evidence by ordering that discovery proceed; now that discovery is complete and all deponents' recollections have been preserved for the record, there is no longer any danger that such evidence will go stale. There remains, however, a substantial danger that an obsolete legal standard will be applied to those facts only to be altered shortly thereafter, thereby requiring duplication of effort from this Court and from the Parties.

Now that discovery is complete, the next step in this litigation is dispositive motions, which are currently due on January 31, 2023. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, this Court must grant summary judgment if it determines "that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." There is no way that the Court can effectively address the second half of the summary judgment inquiry if there is any uncertainty as to what law it should apply. This case must be stayed *now*, after discovery is complete but before summary judgment motions are filed, to avoid rendering a decision using a legal standard that the Supreme Court is actively reconsidering as this case proceeds. A final decision in *Merrill* will resolve those questions and allow the Parties to conduct dispositive briefing under a definite standard.

Furthermore, the Court can be confident that it will not have to wait long before the legal uncertainty currently surrounding Section 2 claims is dispersed; a decision in *Merrill* will be

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announced within the next six months. This gives the Parties a clear timeline, and permits the Court an ample opportunity to conduct dispositive briefing and trial and announce a decision in this case before 15th Legislative District voters participate in their next primary election for state legislative races in August 2024. Factual evidence will still be preserved if a stay is granted now, but the Court will avoid the danger of announcing a dispositive decision that will be vacated and remanded in only a few months.

IV. **CONCLUSION**

As demonstrated, the issues before the Supreme Court in *Merrill* will likely be dispositive of this litigation. See Merrill, 142 S. Ct. at 881; Ardoin, 2022 WL 2312680, at *1. At the very least, the Supreme Court's disposition of that case will be informative to the parties' claims and defenses in the instant case. By contrast, the risk of wasting party and judicial resources is significant where, as here, some if not all of summary judgment and trial may need to be relitigated in their entirety in light of new controlling law. Forcing both the parties and the Court to undertake this endeavor when in all likelihood it will prove fruitless would directly undermine judicial economy and cause significant hardship and prejudice to the parties.

For these reasons, the Court should stay this case pending the resolution of *Merrill*. Furthermore, for the reasons described in the accompanying Motion to Expedite Consideration of Renewed Motion to Stay Proceedings (see Dkt. # 124), this Renewed Motion should be considered on an expedited basis.

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1	DATED this 5 th day of January, 2023.	
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on this day I electronically filed the foregoing document with the Clerk of the Court of the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington through the Court's CM/ECF System, which will serve a copy of this document upon all counsel of record. DATED this 5th day of January, 2023. Respectfully submitted, s/ Andrew R. Stokesbary Andrew R. Stokesbary, WSBA No. 46097 Counsel for Intervenor-Defendants and