## IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA CHARLESTON DIVISION

THE SOUTH CAROLINA STATE : 3: 21-cv-03302-MGL-TJH-RMG CONFERENCE OF THE NAACP.

et al.

: NOVEMBER 29, 2022

Plaintiffs,

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: VOLUME IX

THOMAS C. ALEXANDER, et al., : (PAGES 2039 - 2122)

Defendants. :

TRANSCRIPT OF BENCH TRIAL PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THREE-JUDGE PANEL: HONORABLE MARY GEIGER LEWIS, HONORABLE TOBY J. HEYTENS, HONORABLE RICHARD M. GERGEL, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGES

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(The following bench trial proceedings resumed on Tuesday, November 29th, 2022, at 9:00 a.m.)

JUDGE GERGEL: Please be seated. Good morning, everyone. I hope everyone had a wonder Thanksgiving. It's amazing how much clearer you can think when you're actually out of this courtroom, right.

We were all very impressed with the findings of fact, conclusions of law by both sides and the helpful demonstrative exhibits. All of that was very helpful

As we previously issued an order, plaintiffs go for 45 minutes in their opening of their close; the defendant, 60 minutes; and the plaintiffs have 15 minutes in reply.

Ms. Perry will hold up a sign at five minutes. We don't have the fancy lights here, but I think that will be sufficient.

So, are there any questions, first, from the plaintiffs?

MS. ADEN: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: From the defense?

MR. GORE: Good morning, your Honor.

THE COURT: Good morning, Mr. Gore. Good to see you, sir.

MR. GORE: Good to see you. Thank you.

One housekeeping matter is I believe the record remained open after the testimony of the last witness, Dr. Imai, as we worked with the technical advisor and through

deposition designations.

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JUDGE GERGEL: Correct.

MR. GORE: So, I don't think either party has technically rested. And we haven't had the opportunity to --

THE COURT: Has the plaintiff rested?

MS. ADEN: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Has the defense rested?

MR. GORE: Yes.

JUDGE GERGEL: Thank you, Mr. Gore.

MR. GORE: Thank you. And we would move for a directed verdict and a judgment, as a matter of law, for all the reasons we've stated in our proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, as well as our other briefings in the case.

JUDGE GERGEL: In view of the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there is a sufficient basis for a rational factfinder to find for the plaintiffs. On that basis, the motion for a directed verdict is denied. We'll proceed to the merits.

MR. MOORE: And, your Honor, just for the record, I join in.

MS. ADEN: And for the record, we object.

JUDGE GERGEL: Okay. Plaintiffs, please proceed.

MR. CEPEDA DERIEUX: Good morning, your Honors.

Raphael Cepeda, for the plaintiffs. I am mindful of the time

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we have and I will try to be quick. My colleague, Ms. Aden will follow me.

JUDGE GERGEL: Just be aware, we've read the findings of fact, conclusions of law. We obviously are very familiar with the record, and we have read your demonstrative exhibits, all which help us.

MR. CEPEDA DERIEUX: Understood. Thank you, your Honor.

Your Honor, the General Assembly used race as a predominant factor in the three challenged congressional The evidence at trial now shows that. Plaintiffs districts. have also shown that the enacted plan is a result of intentional discrimination. It assigned a quarter of the state's population to a single district to stifle their voice, which my colleague again, Ms. Aden, will speak more on later. I will address the racial gerrymandering claim.

At opening, your Honor, Judge Gergel, you asked Mr. Gore what are the numbers.

JUDGE GERGEL: I always get worried when someone's quoting me.

MR. CEPEDA DERIEUX: I'll move very quickly through this.

The point is, your Honor, that the evidence at trial answers this question now. The numbers say that race predominated in this plan. And we can start with the big

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1 picture. Defendants concede that the enacted plan moves more 2 than 330,000 people from their old districts into new ones. 3 After the census, District 1 and District 6 needed changes. 4 District 6 was underpopulated by 84,740 people, and District 1 5 was overpopulated by about the same amount, 87,000. But the 6 enacted plan moved 80,689 people out of District 6. Ιt 7 doubled down on that under-population. It then moved 140,000 people out of District 1, which only needed to shed about 8 9 90,000. District 5 was overpopulated and needed to shed 5,000 But the enacted plan removed eight times that number, 10 41,400 people. And District 2 was underpopulated. 11 It needed to pick up 9,000. The enacted plan moved 14,000 out of that 12 district. And that's the big picture on this map. 13 14 defendants moved hundreds of thousands more voters than they 15 needed to have a population-balanced map. 16 This is the type of evidence that has raised flags 17 for courts of traditional principles, especially core 18

This is the type of evidence that has raised flags for courts of traditional principles, especially core retention playing a backseat to racial motives. For example, in Page v. Virginia State Board of Election, the court cited as evidence that the fact that the legislature moved over 180,000 people from one district to the other, when it only needed to move about a third of that number. But the predominance question concerns which voters the legislature decides to choose to move around. And when we look at who this plan moved around, you can't avoid that race predominated

in the challenged districts.

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This is a list of the nine South Carolina counties with the highest BVAP. Of these, seven are split. defendants disproportionately cracked Black communities located along the District 6 boundary, like Richland, Charleston, Orangeburg and Sumter. And what did that cracking accomplish? Well, first, District 6's BVAP drops under 50 percent. South Carolina no longer has a majority Black district. And the obvious question, as Dr. Duchin said, is if the Black voting age population comes down in District 6, well, where does it go? And the answer here is that the difference simply vanishes. No other district changes meaningfully. And that doesn't happen by accident. It takes precision engineering to ensure that the BVAP in every other district stays at around the same place it was before. And as Dr. Duchin testafied, what that means is that there's no meaningful electoral opportunity for Black voters outside of District 6. And more than half of the counties we saw in the previous slide are in the challenged districts. So, let's take a closer look at these districts. And we can start with District 1.

First, the enacted plan drastically reconfigures

Charleston County. In the old map, most of Charleston County
was in District 1. That's not true anymore. The county is
now in District 6. In the old plan, District 6 approached

Charleston from the northeast through Berkeley, which we can see here. It now approaches from the west through Dorchester and West Ashley. You can see that split here before and after redistricting. The lines on the right, which one of my colleagues helpfully pointed out looked like a Triceratops, come in and grab many more Black residents from District 1 and places them in District 6. And that makes a big difference, because the VTDs that this approach moved into District 6 from District 1 are about 60 percent of the Charleston County BVAP that moves around. The net effect is that almost 80 percent of Black adults who live in Charleston County are now in District 6. And that is a huge change from the 50/50 split that the plan used to have.

This is the type of evidence that the district court credited in *Bethune Hill*, evidence that when places are split, most of the portions allocated to the challenged districts had a higher BVAP percentage than the portions allocated to the non-challenged districts -- start splits in the racial composition of populations moved in and out of a district -- the Supreme Court has said in *Bethune-Hill* are significant and relevant evidence. It's also the kind of evidence that was relevant in *Cooper*. And it's the same evidence that was at issue in cases like *Alabama Legislative Black Caucus* and in *Page*. And we discussed several of these in our findings at 733 through 34.

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But that's not all District 1 did. The new District 1 also takes in a different 52,000 people from District 6. And as the Court heard, those migrations were predominately They happened in Jasper, where the plan split the White. county to grab Sun City; in Dorchester, where the map doesn't just split the county, it cracks specific VTDs on racial lines, the parts of Dorchester in District 1 are at least nine points higher in White VAP than the district as a whole; and in Beaufort, which has one of the lowest BVAPs of any county in the state and is now completely in District 1. When the smoke cleared on this movement of almost 200,000 people between Districts 1 and 6, District 1's BVAP stayed within .1 percent of what it was in the previous map. Again, precision engineering. In fact, District 1 ends up with the lowest Black voting age population of all the districts. And that significant movement of people with such a precise net effect matters.

Alabama Legislative Caucus is instructive. In that case, you had mass movement of people from one district to the other, and at the end of the day, just 36 White individuals were added to the district. The Supreme Court called that a remarkable feat. And on remand, the panel explained that the very fact that such a large number of individuals had been moved from one district to the other, both White and Black, was significant and cause for concern. It doesn't happen by

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accident or a coincidence. And the racial splits that we see in these movements are exactly the kind of evidence that the Supreme Court has warned point to significant evidence of racial predominance.

But the Court also looks to whether traditional redistricting criteria were subordinated, And District 1 failed that test handily. First, it splits counties and precincts unnecessarily. The House and Senate held public The record shows that requests to make Charleston hearings. County whole were the main takeaway from those. Beaufort also asked for that county to be fixed, but nobody spoke of wanting Charleston to remain split. And that's important, because maps in the record show that both of these requests could be accommodated; Beaufort and Charleston could be whole in the same district. And that's in evidence most clearly in other maps like Senate Amendment 2A, the League of Women Voters' maps, but also in other maps in the record that defendants developed or received: For example, Senate Amendment 43A, the Sabb Charleston Strong map; 45C, the Charleston/Beaufort whole map; and 46C, the MBM plan. And if defendants didn't like those alternatives, they still knew that Beaufort and Charleston could easily be placed in the same districts. But defendants and their agents downplayed that fact in public.

Here, we have another example. Representative Jordan

knew from staff that it was easy enough to put both Beaufort and Charleston in District 1. Instead, he publicly claimed that it was impossible to put both counties in the same district. And at the end of the day, it was Beaufort, one of the most predominately White counties in the state, that was made whole. The split in Charleston County only deepened. It now follows the Black migration to North Charleston. With those choices, defendants made clear what private talking points already spelled out: County lines are more important in some places than others.

Second, the enacted plan disrespects well-known communities of interest in District 1. There is no doubt that Charleston and North Charleston form a well-defined community of interest. Mr. Roberts testified at trial that African Americans living in Charleston have a very close community of interest with the rest of the county. So, the decision to ignore that community of interest, while crediting calls in Beaufort or Sun City, that matters. That is meaningful.

Third, the enacted District 1 map ignores contiguity in one notable example. But Senate guidelines say contiguity by water is proper only in service of other criteria. But the northern and eastern portion of the District 1 are not connected by land with the southern and western part of the district. This is a new feature. It can't be explained by core retention.

Fourth, expert analysis in the record showed an unavoidable correlation between race and the enacted district's composition. And it shows that the use of race much better explains the movement of voters in these districts than partisan affiliation. Dr. Ragusa, for example, found that Black voters were excluded from District 1 in a statistically and substantively significant fashion. Dr. Liu's findings tracked those findings, and he found that Black Democrats were moved differently than White Democrats, confirming that race is a driving factor, not party. Experts' main findings are summarized in another -- I guess, in one of our -- there we go. But I've neard the Court, you've read the reports, so we'll move along to District 2.

This pattern repeats again in District 2. The verse

This pattern repeats again in District 2. The verse for heavily Black communities, like Richland or Orangeburg, stay split. Meanwhile, predominately White counties, like Lexington County or Barnwell, are left intact. The evidence shows that Columbia and its surrounding areas in Richland County form a prominent community of interest. The enacted plan splits them over options that would have healed the way communities in those counties are and have been cracked. And it's worthwhile here to focus on Richland's tell-tale hook, because it speaks to many themes that repeat time and time again in this case. The hook cuts right through Richland and splits Columbia as it does. It puts a district line between

where people work and where they live, as Dr. Duchin testified. As the image above shows, it's a pretty clear racial divide, and it is key to the drastically different makeup up of the portion of Richland County that is in District 2 from the one in District 6. The hook grabs areas where Black population has exploded since 2010 and puts them in CD 2. It leaves a piece of Richland with higher Black population in District 6 and grabs a piece that is less Black but still far more diverse than the rest of District 2. It's only possible if you subordinate traditional redistricting principles to race. It's not compact.

JUDGE GERGEL: Mr. Cepeda, what are we to make of the fact that this was part of the *Backus* case, and the *Backus* court upheld the hook? Have there been any changes in the hook over the years in terms of the composition of the hook?

MR. CEPEDA DERIEUX: Certainly, your Honor. The hook, as it is in the enacted plan, is not a hundred percent the same hook as it was in the previous --

JUDGE GERGEL: But have there been population changes? I've lived in Richland County a lot of years, and it looks like to me where the hook is, the African-American population has significantly increased since '92, when it was originally adopted. So, what may have been, at one point, a mostly rural area, as it was, it's becoming increasingly suburban and more heavily African American.

MR. CEPEDA DERIEUX: I think that's correct, your Honor. And there is evidence in the record. I believe Dr. Duchin testified to the heavy growth of the Black population in Richland County from the 2011 map till now. Representative Garvin also spoke to how the hook goes through communities that have, in his words, "exploded." So --

Section-2 problem? I mean, if, in fact, Congressman Clyburn supported the hook, continuation of the hook -- it's been there since '92, it was ratified effectively in Backus. Isn't it more -- I mean, proving intent may be hard there, because they seem to be alternative explanations. But doesn't this raise potential Section-2 problems? Because it looks like, just looking at your map, particularly those boxes around Ridge View and Rice Creek, those are all Black suburban communities now, predominately Black suburban communities. And it seems to be very much part of a cohesive block. I mean, I know you haven't raised Section 2, it just struck me that if there's an argument there, it's a Section-2 issue, not so much a 14th-Amendment issue.

MR. CEPEDA DERIEUX: Well, your Honor, I believe I was getting to the fact that I think it goes more to the fact that each plan, each apportionment plan, needs to stand on its own.

JUDGE GERGEL: I agree. But you've got to prove

1 intent.

MR. CEPEDA DERIEUX: Correct.

JUDGE GERGEL: And there hadn't been any -- I mean, obviously Congressman Clyburn did not challenge, if I remember the proposed plan. And that obviously weighs on us. I mean, did he -- it's hard to imagine that he would have racial intent. And it existed before. It just looks like to me that trying to treat this district -- this area as a static is wrong. It's changing very rapidly. And what might have been not a particularly difficult issue under Section 2 may have evolved into one, because it looks like there's a concentration of African-American voters which are cracked right there at the Rice Creek precincts, which, by the way, I don't think existed at one point. I mean, this was a very rural area 30 years ago.

MR. CEPEDA DERIEUX: Maybe so, your Honor. What I will say is that the hook, and the way the enacted plan treats Richland, the way it treats Orangeburg, which I was about to address, only gets to the way that defendants have deployed selective redistricting criteria.

JUDGE GERGEL: I agree. You know, in many of these areas, Congressman Clyburn recommended some of these splits, like in Orangeburg. And Senate Bright Matthews recommended the Sun City split. What are we to make of these African-American legislators, with great records on advocating

equal justice, coming in and recommending -- how do we define racial intent there?

MR. CEPEDA DERIEUX: Well, your Honor, I guess where I was going with this is, defendants have --

And if we can go, Stephen, to slide 57.

This slide depicts the way that the criteria has been used throughout this map. It summarizes what defendants purportedly applied to each county. And what it shows is a hodgepodge. You mentioned Senator Bright Matthews' testimony in Jasper County. It gets credited in Jasper County, it doesn't get credited in Charleston County, which she also represents. Avoiding county splits was important in Beaufort and Berkeley; it wasn't a concern in Charleston, Jasper, Orangeburg, Richland or Sumter.

VTD splits, defendants say they reduced VTD splits in the map. But it's important where those VTD splits are, because, of the 13 that are left in the map, 11 happened along the District-6 boundaries. State legislative districts get cherry-picked. In Dorchester, the enacted plan split two VTDs, Lincoln and Winthrop (phonetic). It follows House District 98's line, according to defendants' findings. But a Senate district line runs around the same precincts without splitting them. That's Senate Districts 41 and 42. And they could have used that line instead with the same benefit to election administration. Public input was important to

defendants in Sun City in Jasper, like I said, but not in Charleston or Richland. And as you mentioned, your Honor, legislator input was important for Jasper and Sumter, but only sometimes. And in Charleston --

JUDGE GERGEL: For instance, in CD 1, the move into St. Andrews was not recommended by Congressman Clyburn. Least changed wasn't followed in Charleston County in CD 1 and CD 6. So, you know, there are differences. But, Mr. Roberts testified that Charleston was different from every other county, right? He said that. And he said that their changes were dramatic --

MR. CEPEDA DERIEUX: Yes.

JUDGE GERGEL: - and there was great disparity.

MR CEPEDA DERTEUX: Yes, he did.

JUDGE GERGEL: He didn't say it about any of these others. But he did acknowledge that. And he's the map drawer. You know, y'all spent a lot of time talking about the House plan. I kept trying to tell Mr. Moore to be quiet, because it was irrelevant. It was immaterial. It was a Senate plan designed by Mr. Roberts. If there's intent, it comes out of that map drawer and the Senate plan, because the House merely ratifies it. I mean, isn't that fair?

MR. CEPEDA DERIEUX: Again, I think, your Honor, it's fair, but in the sense that the hodgepodge criteria that Mr. Roberts mentioned isn't -- there's no organizing principle

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once you look at its --

JUDGE GERGEL: Well, he said it was an organizing principle, but it fell apart in Charleston.

MR. CEPEDA DERIEUX: I'm sorry, your Honor?

JUDGE GERGEL: He said he had an organizing principle, least-changed Clyburn plan. When he got to Charleston, none of that was followed, not least changed, not the Clyburn plan. Mr. Clyburn did not recommend the changes into St. Andrews.

MR. CEPEDA DERIEUX: And I would absolutely agree with that. There's nothing least changed about Charleston or District 1. What follows, however, your Honor, is that the way that the other criteria were applied -- as I said, as I explained with this chart, they don't really track any organizing principle.

JUDGE CERGEL: I got you.

MR. ČEPEDA DERIEUX: Yes. Thank you, your Honor.

I'll move on to District 5.

And if we could go to 38, Stephen.

The split in Sumter separates Sumter City, a majority Black city, as well as communities like east Sumter and Mulberry. It deepened a crack in the county between Districts 5 and 6. The green shading reflects each precinct's BVAP, while the red area approximates Sumter city lines. And as you can see, the yellow congressional line goes straight to the

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center of Sumter, splitting Black communities. And once again, expert analysis shows that race predominated over traditional redistricting principles. According to Dr. Ragusa's local analysis, Black voters were excluded from District 5 in statistically and substantively consequential fashion. Meanwhile, Dr. Imai's 10,000 statewide simulations confirm that the enacted plan is an extreme outlier in this sense too. In fact, only 1.2 percent of Dr. Imai's simulations involve splitting Sumter the way it ends up.

So, let's talk about the use of race in this map, your Honors. Despite using racial data, defendants are adamant that they never conducted or considered any analysis under the Voting Rights Act. We know key legislators were aware of the racial makeup of their districts. We know legislators and staff considered race at various stages of the redistricting process. And we can consider the legislators, including Senator Campsen. Senator Campsen testified that he can't help but know the racial composition of his district. We know racial data was available to any legislator who asked for it and we know that Senator Campsen reviewed racial breakdowns of Charleston area movements. We also know both House and Senate redistricting staff had a realtime view into the racial changes to the maps they drew. For the Senate, Mr. Roberts explained that it was displayed the entire time. And that's corroborated by deposition testimony of key staffers,

like Mr. Fiffick and Mr. Terrine.

Even more damning, we know one thing racial data wasn't used for, compliance with the Voting Rights Act.

Defendants' witnesses agree on this. No Section 2 or racial polarization analysis was done to confirm that the enacted plan didn't dilute Black voter opportunity. And that matters for many reasons. But for purposes of the racial gerrymandering claim, it matters because the defendants admit that all this data that they had, they reviewed, they considered, was not used for non-dilutive purposes.

Plaintiffs have also met their burden to show it was race, not a drive for partisan advantage, that better explains the enacted plan. The evidence de-couples race from partisanship and shows that race predominated in four ways. First, it shows that defendants' argument that the enacted plan advances partisan interest is a post hoc rationale. For starters, key witnesses publicly and contemporaneously rejected partisan motivations. Here, we see Senator Campsen's statement to the full Senate committee in January. Senator Campsen publicly rejected an accusation of partisan gerrymandering.

Now, at trial, Senator Campsen and counsel tried to argue that what he meant here was very formal. It was legalese. He was saying that the plan didn't subordinate redistricting principles. But the Court can look at just the

next few lines in the transcript, which are included here.

Senator Campsen didn't speak of other redistricting

principles, or subordinating them, he was comparing his

amendment's partisan effect to the gap in the previous plan to

point out that this was not a radical change. He was

downplaying the claim that it was partisan driven.

And, here, I would point the Court to cases like Harris v. McCrory, which became Cooper; and Covington, which the Supreme Court also affirmed, where a court considered contemporaneous statements from key defendants and the courts said that those statements were more probative of realtime intent than later attempts to walk them back. And the Harris language I'm thinking about is 159 F.Supp. 3d 620, for example.

Senator Campsen isn't the only witness to disclaim a partisan goal. Various other witnesses, including key senate staffers and Mr. Roberts's own boss did it as well. And at the end of the day, to borrow from the *Covington* district court case, all defendants are able to point to are, quote, "Scattered references in the record to the political nature or redistricting, or the idea that politics has always traditionally played a role." That is not enough to beat contemporaneous statements or actual testimony that political motivations didn't drive redistricting. Second, the plaintiffs have disentangled race from party through their

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expert witnesses, who have reports and testimony in the record that this aggregates party from race.

And at this point, I'd like to address two expert-related points that defendants raised in their findings. First, I'd like to dispel the notion that this Court's decision in Backus sets a baseline that every expert who testifies in a racial gerrymandering case must speak to -that every expert who testifies in a racial gerrymandering case must speak to every single redistricting criteria. Backus says no such thing. Backus specifically explained that Dr. McDonald had failed to consider all race-neutral criteria But the Court's discussion shows that used in South Carolina. "all" in that sense was best read to mean "any." Dr. McDonald failed to account for any of the race-neutral criteria in the guidelines, and that's why his analysis was fundamentally flawed. That is in no way the case here, where plaintiffs' experts collectively address an account for the full range of race-neutral criteria in the guidelines.

Notably, it is defendants' sole expert who fails to address multiple factors and provides misleading incomplete analysis. And it's not surprising that Mr. Trende omitted multiple factors from his analysis, because that only mirrors the shifting explanations that defendants have offered the Court for what drives specific moves in the map. This brings me to the chart that we discussed previously.

Second, I want to address defendants' claim that Dr. Liu's and Dr. Ragusa's use of a county-envelope approach is comparable to a line of analysis that the Supreme Court rejected in *Cromartie II*. The defendants failed to mention that the approach that Dr. Stephen Ansolabehere developed, which is what Dr. Liu and Dr. Ragusa both explained they used, was blessed by the Supreme Court in *Cooper*, as seen here at the top left and as discussed earlier. The approach Drs. Liu and Ragusa followed contrasts with the one Dr. Weber followed in *Cromartie II*, an essential part, because and Dr. Liu and Ragusa controlled for partisan advantage, and Dr. Weber didn't.

Lastly, I'd like to address the last two major post

Lastly, I'd like to address the last two major post hoc arguments that defendants raised. The first is core retention. As I mentioned earlier, it is just wrong to call this a least-changed map. The plan moves more than 300,000 people into new districts and moves 190,000 people between District 1 and District 6 alone. It changes the way District 6 approaches Charleston. It now goes through Dorchester and West Ashley instead of Berkeley.

Second, core retention is largely selectively applied. And to the extent it was, it's probative of racial predominance; it doesn't disprove it. Defendants argue the map tried to preserve district cores when speaking about splits, like the one in Orangeburg, Richland and Sumter, but

claim they proactively sought to heal splits in places like Beaufort and Berkeley. They also drew a brand new county split in Jasper County. In essence, they healed splits that brought together White communities and then leaned on core retention when Black ones were left divided.

Third, as a legal matter, defendants over-rely on core retention. It is a limited rationale that courts, including the Supreme Court, have questioned. Core retention only relates to past maps. It doesn't at all inform the new district inhabitants. That's from Alabama Legislative Black Caucus. And there are tens of thousands of new inhabitants in the challenged districts. Core retention holds a special place in predominance analysis, because it may be used to insulate the original basis for district boundaries. That's from the Bethune-Hill district court opinion.

Second, the Court should reject defendants' characterization of the Milk Plan as a post hoc consideration that merits no credit. Defendants never identified Congressman Clyburn -- or his staff member, Dalton Tresvant -- as people who would have knowledge about drafting of the enacted plan or their defenses against plaintiffs' claims. When Senate staff unveiled its initial plan, Senator Harpootlian directly asked Mr. Roberts on the Senate floor whether members of congress had played a role in that map, and his answer was, "Very little." I see from defendants'

demonstrative that their defense here now is that it was actually Mr. Fiffick who answered that question. I don't see how the fact that Mr. Roberts's boss was the one answering when Mr. Roberts was in the room and didn't correct him -- I don't see how that's a good fact for them.

Several other witnesses, including Senator Campsen in this courtroom, disclaimed the idea that Congressman Clyburn had such an outside's role in the Senate plan. Senator Campsen's testimony that was at the starting point for the enacted plan was the 2011 plan, not Congressman Clyburn's version of it. But more directly, witnesses like Mr. Andy Fiffick, Mr. Terrine, all saic nothing came of the meeting with Mr. Dalton Tresvant. And that's at findings 606 through 607.

And lastly, there are significant and glaring differences between the so-called Milk Plan and the enacted plan, which we have in this slide.

 $\hbox{And I will stop there, your Honor, because Ms. Aden} \\ \hbox{will address the second claim.}$ 

JUDGE GERGEL: Thank you.

MR. CEPEDA: Thank you.

MS. ADEN: Good morning again, your Honors.

Again, I'm Leah Aden with the Legal Defense Fund. I will now speak about plaintiffs' intentional racial vote dilution claim under the 14th and 15th Amendments. I also

plan to briefly touch upon the appropriate remedies for the violations that plaintiffs have established.

As the Supreme Court in *Miller*, and even this Court in *Backus*, have recognized, an intentional vote dilution claim is analytically distinct from a racial gerrymandering claim, involving a different legal framework and potentially different remedies. It also means that this Court can find a violation of racial gerrymander in CD 1, but also find that the map overall points in a direction of intentional racial dilution in places such as Richland and/or Sumter.

The intent claim is so because it asks whether the law as a whole was adopted with a discriminatory purpose designed to harm Black voters because of, and not in spite of, its discriminatory impact. Plaintiffs only need to prove that discrimination was a motive, not that it was the dominant one. By comparison, as Mr. Cepeda detailed, a racial gerrymandering claim asks whether race was the predominant factor in the sorting of voters among districts. In determining whether a legislative enactment was motivated by a discriminatory purpose, Arlington Heights is our guide, and it instructs courts to look at direct and/or circumstantial evidence. Because the Supreme Court, this Circuit and this Court, contrary to defendants' briefing and representations in its demonstrative, simply do not expect in the 21st century for outright admission of impermissible racial motivation.

Arlington Heights' factors includes various factors. They are non-exhaustive. We can show a combination of them. Failing to prove one or more is not dispositive, because the assessment asks: Does the mosaic of evidence on the whole, does it point toward the finding of intentional vote dilution of Black South Carolinians through the enactment of S.865? And as we detailed in our --

JUDGE GERGEL: Let me ask you this. You know this law better than we do. Has *Arlington Heights* been applied in legislative reapportionment -- state legislative reapportionment cases?

MS. ADEN: Absolutely, your Honor.

JUDGE GERGEL: Which ones?

MS. ADEN: Perez v. Abbott, out of Texas, which we cite in our post-trial briefing, a case in the last decade. It had claims of racial gerrymandering. It had claims of intentional racial vote dilution. And if you look in the opinion, the Dallas/Fort Worth area was where the court looked at racial gerrymandering and racial intent claims under the 14 and 15th Amendments. There were various districts challenged. Some districts were challenged for racial gerrymandering, some were challenged for intentional racial vote dilution. Some

JUDGE HEYTENS: Did you just say that was a 15th Amendment claim, not a 14th Amendment claim?

MS. ADEN: The -- I don't think I just said in the context of *Perez*. And I would have to go back and look, but I know that it was at least brought as an intentional vote dilution claim under the 14th Amendment. I'm not sure, the 15th Amendment. Courts are divided under whether redistricting --

JUDGE HEYTENS: Can I just ask you -- I guess the challenge I see is: If that's right, why can't any plaintiff, whose *Shaw* plan fails because they can't make a predominance showing, just repackage their claim as an *Arlington Heights* claim, thus eviscerating this predominance requirement of *Shaw?* 

MS. ADEN: We don't see that happening, your Honor, because *Arlington Heights* is a Supreme Court standard, it's a separate framework. It's a different standard.

JUDGE REYTENS: And maybe the reason it doesn't happen is because people think you can't repackage your claim.

MS. ADEN: Or because it's a vigorous standard, notwithstanding a different standard.

JUDGE HEYTENS: Okay. Give me an example where a person's *Shaw* claim fails -- I'm just trying to -- it just seems like it's a runaround the *Shaw* predominance requirement. So, I guess I need an example of a case where a party whose *Shaw* claim fails because they can't show predominance, also can't make an *Arlington Heights* claim.

MS. ADEN: I think *Perez* is a good example of that because in the Dallas/Fort Worth district at issue there, they could not establish that race was the predominant factor, but the court looked at the evidence, and it showed that in that case, just like here, where minority voters on the verge of exercising power where they're perceived to vote a particular way, where an incumbent is trying to maintain power, the lines are drawn to stop that trend.

JUDGE HEYTENS: Sorry. That's not the example I'm looking for. The example I'm looking for is a situation where a person has a *Shaw* claim but they don't have an *Arlington Heights* claim. What is that example?

MS. ADEN: That's plenty of the cases from last cycle, like the *Cooper* and the *Bethune*. These are all cases, pure racial gerrymandering claims, the weight of the evidence. They do not bring *Arlington Heights* claims because they're not talking necessarily about the historical discrimination. They're not talking about -- which I was going to get to here, which is that the showing of impact is very different for an intentional discrimination claim. As I mentioned in the opening, it doesn't require disproportionality. It doesn't require statistical differences in Black voters being treated one way as compared to other voters. It shows that the overriding evidence shows that Black voters here, individuals like the testifying witnesses -- like Mr. Griffin,

Ms. Kilgore, Mr. Felder -- that these voters are harmed overall by a map that makes no sense, given the natural geography of the state, given the electoral voting patterns that are known to the defendants. There is no way that you would draw a map, given where people live and given the voting pattern that looks like the one that they adopted, unless you deal with the -- what the overall weight of the evidence does is that you set up these principles that you say apply to every one, but when you go down into the dirt, those principles only apply when they help white voters, and they don't apply when they hurt Black voters. And that is what the overwhelming weight of the evidence here is.

So, I think you can look at the entire map, even if -- we think we have persuaded you that the criteria that was

So, I think you can look at the entire map, even if

-- we think we have persuaded you that the criteria that was
established in the redistricting process was not applied
across the board to all communities, but selectively apply -and Mr. Cepeda detailed that. We think it was selectively
applied and there's harm in each of the challenged districts.
But you can also step back and look at the full weight of what
happened with the impact on Black voters in those areas and
across the whole map. You can look at the foreseeability of
that impact that was forewarned during the legislative
process. And it came to pass. You can look at the
legislative sequence of events that shut out minority members
that was secretive, where the explanations were hidden and

they were not borne out by the facts on the ground. And you can look at the fact that minority members do not support this map. You can look at the historical record that every time the State of South Carolina has an opportunity to redistrict, they use Black voters -- they mistreat Black voters because of the perception of how they're going to vote as a way to maintain power. And you can look at the case law, and that points in the favor of an Arlington Heights claim under the 14th and 15th Amendments. The sounds in the case of McCrory, the sounds in other cases that have found vote dilution under the Arlington Heights framework, when all of the factors taken together are shown.

The last factor I did not mention is all of the ways that Mr. Cepeda detailed that partisanship, minimal change, relying upon the lone Black legislature for justifying a map that harms Black communities, even though there's very little corroboration in the record that this map looks like anything like Representative Clyburn suggested. All of that sounds the alarm that this process was designed to take away the growing power of Black voters where they live and the communities where they vote, based on their race, based upon how they vote. All of that was known, or should have been known, to the defendants. And that is the result. It is not a coincidence. It is a designed engineering scheme. And that is what Arlington Heights is meant to uproot.

I think I am at my time. Thank you, your Honors.

MR. GORE: One moment, your Honor.

JUDGE GERGEL: You know, Mr. Gore, there's a theory that the gremlins in the courtroom always get those using technology.

MR. GORE: I'll take that theory today.

JUDGE GERGEL: You take your time.

MR. GORE: Thank you.

Good morning, your Honors. I'm planning to take around 45 minutes. So, if I can ask the timer to show me the five minutes at about 40 minutes on, to leave time for the House Defendants to address some House-specific points.

JUDGE GERGEL: I hink we've pretty much concluded the games where you are.

MR. GORE: Thank you, your Honor.

JUDGE CERGEL: Take all the time you need. I think
Mr. Moore doesn't have -- I'm going to be honest. I think
it's largely immaterial what's going on in the House, because
Will Roberts designed the plan, it was adopted by the Senate,
and then it was, you know, adopted in full by the House
without significant debate. It just struck me that the Senate
-- and this is where you focus your case, is on what happened
in the Senate. So, take as much time of that hour as you
want. You can explain to Mr. Moore later.

MR. GORE: I think you've just explained it for him,

your Honor.

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We first want to thank the Court and our outstanding court reporter, the staff -- the clerks, Mr. Rainwater and his staff -- for their outstanding and diligent work during the trial of this important case.

We go to slide two of our slide deck. This case is very simple. The plaintiffs have failed to carry their demanding burden on both of their claims. If we go to slide three, the plaintiffs' evidence does not show subordination of traditional districting principles to race, it doesn't show that race rather than politics predominated, and it doesn't show intentional discrimination. In fact, the evidence shows precisely to the contrary. Plaintiffs are trying to complicate this case with a lot of expert analysis and talk about numbers. We had statistics and data, we had simulations and ensembles. At thought maybe we'd get a simulation of an But the case is really very simple. It's just about a map. It's about the congressional redistricting map that the General Assembly drew and adopted after the 2020 Census. This is the map.

We go to the next slide. The evidence shows that the reasons the General Assembly adopted this enacted plan were first to comply with traditional districting principles, including preserving cores, repairing county splits, and repairing VTD splits; second, politics and partisan advantage,

particularly in District 1; and third, accommodating requests from Senate and House members, Congressman Wilson and Congressman Clyburn. This was not a plan based upon race.

We brought you the guidelines from the Senate and House. Those are both based on prior case law from this Court and the United States Supreme Court. They identified the race-neutral principles and they specifically authorized the General Assembly to consider political communities and data as well as political beliefs and voting behavior. The enacted plan is the best plan on preservation of cores. It preserves more of the core of every district than every alternative the plaintiffs have pointed to in the record. And as this Court said in *Colleton County*, preserving district cores is the clearest expression of respect for communities of interest.

We go to the next slide. The enacted plan repairs county and VTD splits on the benchmark plan. It outperforms the benchmark plan on both of these metrics. It also outperforms both of the NAACP plans that the plaintiffs proposed during the legislative process and we heard about at trial.

Going to the next slide, we see that the enacted plan respects communities of interest, maintains the communities of interest from the benchmark plan. It respects political communities of interest, including the Republican community in District 1. It respects other communities of interest

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identified in the public testimony or from other sources. It keeps Fort Jackson in District 2. That's the hook in Richland County. It unites the Gullah Geechee Heritage Corridor and the Sea Islands in Beaufort County. It unites Sun City, and it moves the Limestone I and II precincts into District 2 with neighboring Lexington County, based on public testimony. No plan identified by the plaintiffs respects all of these communities of interest.

Next, the enacted plan is contiguous and compact. There seems to be some question about the use of water contiguity in District 1, so let me address that. The Senate guidelines allow the use of water contiguity to achieve other objectives. Here, water contiguity was used to achieve those objectives. One, it was through the use of natural and geographic boundaries in Charleston area to draw the district lines. Mr. Roberts testified to that here at trial. It also allows certain communities of interest to be united. By using water contiguity, all of coastal Charleston is able to be placed in one district in District 1, and all of the Charleston peninsula is placed in another district, in District 6. Drawing the lines this way also achieved the General Assembly's political goal of making District 1 more Republican leaning.

Speaking of that, we've already mentioned that the guidelines allow the General Assembly to consider politics,

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and on slide 12 we see that the enacted plan is the only one that achieves that political goal. It is the only plan of all the alternatives that were proposed by the plaintiffs, either in legislation or litigation, to make District 1 more Republican leaning. All alternatives proposed by the plaintiffs make District 1 a majority Democratic district.

JUDGE HEYTENS: What's your response to the quote that the plaintiffs had from Senate Rankin, where he flat-out said that wasn't the goal of District 1?

MR. GORE: Senator Rankin said it wasn't a goal for him, but that doesn't preclude it having been a goal for others. And it was clearly a goal for Senator Campsen, as he explained. He did deny on the floor of the Senate that it's partisan gerrymander, but as he explained, the reason is that the plan doesn't subordinate traditional districting principles to race. He was very clear that he considered politics at the time he was making instructions and directions about the drawing of the enacted plan. In fact, what he said was he could have made District 1 even more Republican leaning if he had totally disregarded traditional districting principles, but he chose not to do that. So, for example, he said he could have split the Charleston peninsula and included the battery, which is where we're convening today, in District 1 to make it even more Republican, but he didn't do that, because he wanted to respect traditional districting

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principles. And Mr. Roberts testified that he considered politics, and so did Senator Massey.

We go to the next slide. The enacted plan is the best incumbency protection plan. It's the only plan in the record that maintains the 6-1 Republican/Democratic split, and it keeps incumbents with their core constituents better than any other plan. If we go to slide 14, we see that the enacted plan is a product of a robust legislative process. the General Assembly held hearings across the state. established special committees. It adopted redistricting guidelines. It held subcommittee hearings, committee hearings, floor debates, established websites, e-mail addresses, and the Senate staff testified consistently -- and it's been unrebutted - that they would have drawn plans for any senator who requested one. They drew several plans for Democratic senators, including Senator Sabb and Senator Scott. And as part of the Senate's confidentiality policy, they kept those plans confidential from other senators unless they had permission.

Let's look at what Lynn Teague said about the robust legislative process. She said, quote, "I think the Senate did a very fine job of organizing its hearings around the state. I cannot recall anything that received as much process attention, and I commended the Senate staff for their responsible professional work."

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Dr. Bagley, who's the plaintiffs' expert on the legislative process, their putative expert, also agreed that redistricting got more process in the General Assembly than any other legislation and certainly in the mind run (phonetic) of legislation.

Let's go to the next slide, slide 16. Your Honor mentioned that Mr. Roberts came and testified. He said he started with the benchmark plan upheld in *Backus*, because he always starts with a benchmark plan when he draws a new plan. He accommodated these requests from Senator Rankin, from Congressman Wilson, and from Congressman Clyburn. He never used race to draw any districts, and he used political data instead to draw districts. Let's look at what the plaintiffs have to say about this Let's go to their slide 44, which is on page 48. And they say something very interesting here. So, this slide if we scroll up a little bit higher, is Race Considered Overview. Now, Will Roberts, Senator Campsen, Senator Massey, all other witnesses with firsthand knowledge, denied that race was ever used to draw any lines in the enacted plan. And they have no direct evidence that race was used to draw any lines.

And so, they talk about whether race may have been considered. That's an unremarkable proposition for several reasons. Whether or not race was considered is not the standard. The standard is whether race was actually used to

draw lines, and if so, was it used in a way that predominated over traditional districting principles or intentionally discriminated. Mere consideration of race doesn't violate the 14th Amendment or even trigger strict scrutiny. The reason is obvious. If mere consideration of race were enough, every redistricting plan in the country would be a potential racial gerrymander, because the census data always includes racial demographic data, and legislators have some general awareness of the demographics of the areas in which they draw lines.

So, none of these facts that they point to on this slide, or elsewhere in their slide deck, establish that race was actually used, let alone, that it was used in a way to subordinate traditional redistricting --

JUDGE GERGEL: Mr. Gore, let me ask this. Senator

Campsen had testified that he started off wanting to put

Beaufort and Berkeley Counties into CD 1. And he had partisan

purpose for that, that he thought those were strong partisan

counties for his team, and that's what he wanted.

What effect did that have on the BVAP of the district? If you put Beaufort and Berkeley together, what effect does that have on the total population, BVAP, whatever you'd like to use?

MR. GORE: Well, it's interesting you should ask that question, your Honor. We do have a slide on that. But let me just point out --

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JUDGE GERGEL: I saw the slide.

MR. GORE: -- the areas of Berkeley and Beaufort that got moved from 6 to 1 had a higher BVAP percentage than District --

JUDGE GERGEL: Well, I'm just talking about -- see, it strikes me that when -- that by the time Mr. Roberts was presented his task to draw a map -- if I understood the sequence from Senator Campsen's testimony, was that they had made a policy decision to include Beaufort and Berkeley whole. In particular, around the Moncks Corner area, there is a significant African-American population in Berkeley County. And when you put those -- leaving Charleston out for a second -- what you have is a BVAP around 20, 21 percent, okay? Now, that is the task Mr. Roberts had to confront. He had to finish out that plan to create a district that, according to your data, was around 17 percent. It had a certain partisan tilt; if it was 20 percent or higher, it had a different partisan tilt, right? I mean, I think that's what your chart stands for.

So, what does he do in Charleston County to bring his -- to situate his number from 20 to 17, which is where he ends up? And what he does is -- there were 48,000 African Americans in CD 1 in 2011. How many ended up in CD 1?

MR. GORE: I'd be happy to answer those questions, your Honor.

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JUDGE GERGEL: 18,000.

MR. GORE: Right.

reach.

JUDGE GERGEL: He took two-thirds out. Nine of the 10 largest boxes with a thousand or more African Americans got moved out of CD 1, 80 percent. Charleston County was already split racially -- 53, 52, 48 -- really to meet the non-retrogression requirements of Section 5. That no longer exists. But instead of saying, well, we're going to keep the same or backing off, they go to 80 percent -- 80 percent -- in one area and 20 percent in the other. And I studied the precincts that were left. They were all small. One of the plaintiffs' experts talked about look at the size of the precincts. I did that. The 20 percent are scattered: St. Paul's, Awendaw, James Island, in the middle of White neighborhoods. He basically got every Black vote he could

And so, that's the scenario, as I understand it. And I asked Mr. Roberts -- I'd figured it out already. And I asked him. I said, those are dramatic changes in Charleston. Yes. We talked about the Black movement. I said that's a great disparity between 1 and 6. He said yes. He admitted it. So, I think what we're struggling with -- at least, I can speak for myself here -- is the dramatic -- as Roberts described, himself, dramatic changes, abandoning least change, abandoning Clyburn plan. And why does he do that? You know,

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there was talk about, oh, we were moving White Democrats. think you made that argument. If you run the numbers that you provided us, White Democrats -- Whites did not, by a majority, vote for a Biden, according to the numbers you gave. It was the African Americans' 97 percent voting for Biden that created those majorities. And you were actually moving more Republicans into Clyburn's district. You were moving more Trump voters -- I don't want to call them Republicans, they could have crossed over. More Trump voters moved. So, it was only the African-American vote that mattered. I mean, that's the only thing that moved the needle. And we got to the end, we went from 20 percent to 10 percent in CD 1. And that dropped the BVAP from 20, where you didn't want to be, to 17, where you want to be. And that looks like you were using race -- you were using partisanship as a proxy for race. is the tool used. That's the problem.

And I've got to say -- and I was giving the plaintiffs a hard time about this -- I didn't try any of these other districts. There's none of that gamesmanship in these other districts. And I don't doubt that Senator Campsen could design a plan that didn't have these problems, but they didn't do it here. That's the problem here. When he wanted to put Berkeley and Beaufort whole, that is perfectly legitimate under the constitutional standard. Whatever his purpose was, it was perfectly lawful. And I believe when he said it was a

wanted to give you a chance to reply.

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1 partisan purpose. It's obvious looking at it. And all this 2 denial that he didn't really talk about partisanship, they 3 probably didn't want to brag about it, but it's obviously 4 true. 5 But what was the tool, Mr. Gore? What was the tool 6 to accomplish that purpose? And I think that's what Cooper 7 teaches us, is you can't use race in that way to establish a 8 partisan purpose. I wanted to lay that out to you because I

MR. GORE: And I would like to address it. Let me try to unpack it, because there's a lot going on --

JUDGE GERGEL: There is a lot going on.

MR. GORE: -- in what your Honor said.

So, first -- and I'll just complete the point here on plaintiffs' slide 44. Racial predominance and racial discrimination

JUDGÈ GERGEL: How about I agree with you on this point.

MR. GORE: Oh, okay. Thank you.

The analysis isn't exclusively about a -- it's an intent question.

JUDGE GERGEL: It is an intent question.

MR. GORE: Was race actually used and was it used in a way that predominated?

JUDGE GERGEL: And did it predominate?

MR. GORE: And the consistent testimony of every percipient or eyewitness was that race was not used, that it was partisan data that --

JUDGE GERGEL: But they always -- I said this at the beginning of the trial. I've never seen a case where people admitted their racial intent. You've got to get it from circumstantial evidence. And the closest I have seen in a long time in one of these cases is Mr. Roberts's own testimony.

MR. GORE: So, I respectfully disagree, because --

JUDGE GERGEL: I know you do. I figured you would.

MR. GORE: -- in *Cooper*, there was direct testimony that race was used and predominated --

JUDGE GERGEL: Well, you didn't disagree with me about what Mr. Roberts told me.

MR. GORE: Right. I don't agree with that. But I will say that, in *Cooper*, there were statements, and the legislature defended the *Cooper* plan on the basis that it complied with the Voting Rights Act. They admitted that race predominated in the *Cooper* plan. So, there have been recent cases in which there has been an admission of the use of race to predominate --

JUDGE GERGEL: It's rare.

MR. GORE: It may be rare, but it --

JUDGE GERGEL: And I, on the bench, have tried a lot

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of Title 7 and other cases, and no one every admits racial intent. And so, you've got to look to the circumstantial evidence. And the case law gives a lot of guidance about the kinds of things we look for. And one of them is deviating from your plan in a fundamental way, which is what Mr. Roberts told me he did, that Charleston was the outlier different than every other county, and that they had this problem. mentioned the 17 percent in my questioning to him, and he acknowledged: If you had boxes more than 17 percent, that created a problem to getting you to your desired number.

MR. GORE: But it only created a problem if that was the reason the decision was made to include those boxes in and

JUDGE GERGEL: You might tell me that nine out of 10 of the large boxes get moved, and that's just a coincidence. You know, people who are involved in politics know where the African-American vote is. I know Mr. Roberts very well. helped me in a case I tried in this court. I've sat with him at the computer. I know him. He knows these -- he probably knows -- maybe other than Mr. Rainwater, he knows more at the precinct level than any living person in South Carolina.

Well, he testified that he didn't MR. GORE: necessarily know the BVAP --

JUDGE GERGEL: He answered my questions without missing a beat about numbers.

MR. GORE: So, let me go back to our slide deck.

And can we pull slide 32?

We'll just walk through. And I think Districts 1 and 6 is where the real action is potentially in this case. I'll just point out for the record -- and we've had this in our slides in our findings of fact -- they're bringing these allegations about Districts 2 and 5, but all the alternative versions of 2 and 5 perform worse than the enacted plan. So, let's talk about District 1 --

JUDGE GERGEL: Let's talk about District 1. I think that's where you need to focus.

MR. GORE: I agree. So, let's talk about it here. Slide 32, these are the numbers that really matter, because, of course, what really matters is the net effect of all the changes that were made between 1 and 6, not just Charleston, Berkeley and Beaufort. Berkeley and Beaufort, what Senator Campsen said, it wasn't his primary objective to include Berkeley and Beaufort in District 1. I know that they've made that assertion, but that's not what his testimony was.

JUDGE GERGEL: I understood -- I understood that -- there's a text message y'all put in that he announces in December: We're putting Berkeley --

MR. GORE: Sure.

JUDGE GERGEL: -- and Beaufort whole. And, again, I don't want to criticize that. I think that's a policy choice

the legislature can make.

MR. GORE: I was just pointing out, when he came to trial, what he said was doing that wasn't his primary goal for its own sake. That was a mechanism to achieve the political goal, which was making District 1 more Republican leaning.

So, if we look at slide 32, here's what really happened when you add up everything that happened in 1 and 6. These are the most important numbers in the whole case. Republican vote share goes up by 1.36 percent, and the BVAP goes up slightly by .16 percent. So, the political effect of these changes is much greater than the racial effect. The fact that there's a small racial effect is consistent with the notion that this was a least-changed plan and that it was a least-changed plan all across the state. Mr. Cepeda showed the statistics that the BVAPs more or less stayed the same. Well, that's because it was a least-changed plan, only 6.5 percent of the total population.

JUDGE GERGEL: Mr. Gore, once you add Berkeley in -and in particular, Berkeley in, you can't keep your racial
number at 17 percent unless you bleach Charleston. That's the
problem here. Nobody required them to put those counties
whole. But, in particular, Berkeley, which had 54,000 African
Americans, 23.7 percent of the population. That threw off -and in Dorchester, y'all went and split a bunch of precincts
racially. Didn't have a huge number, but it did have some

effect. But when you were left out in Charleston, Mr.

Roberts, who is a good man -- I don't want to criticize him -he is left with a mathematical impossibility. How do you get
where they want to get with this BVAP they want when the rest
of the district is 20.41 percent African American? And if
they keep the same mix, they end up at 20 percent, they have
to go to 10 percent -- from 20 percent to 10 percent to get to
their 17 percent. That's the problem here.

MR. GORE: Let me unpack that a little bit, because there were other changes that were made. I think your Honor recognized there were changes that were made in Dorchester, there were changes that were made in Jasper. And, of course, the BVAP --

JUDGE GERGEL: And, by the way, I'm not talking about Jasper. These are relatively --

MR. GORE: Okay. But Those are --

JUDGÈ GERGEL: Jasper's got 5,000 people, right?

Jasper is a very small number. This is the juice here: They basically send 30,000 African Americans out of CD 1, 30 of the 48,000, nine out of the 10 largest boxes, out. You know, I've kidded with my colleagues, there's an old statement that when you see a turtle on top of a fence post, you know someone put it there. And, you know, this is not an accident.

MR. GORE: I think it is the byproduct of a couple of things: Pursuing the political goal, also following the

natural geographic boundaries. The mapmaker's not responsible for where people live demographically within the district, and when he follows the boundaries, that's what happens in Charleston. But, again, there's movement from other counties into District 1 of higher BVAP areas.

Let's take a look at our slide 33, what got moved from 6 to 1 versus what got moved from 1 to 6. The stuff moved from 6 to 1 has both a higher Republican percentage and a higher BVAP percentage than what was moved from 1 to 6. If what they were trying to do was bleach District 1, why did they move a higher BVAP percentage area into one than they moved out of 1? This is where it starts to break down. If you look at the aggregate numbers of all the shifts, not just Charleston County, but you incorporate Beaufort and Berkeley, what happened in Dorchester, what happened in --

JUDGE CERGEL: Well, why did they take a meat axe to Charleston? Because the other choices they made, which were perfectly proper, left them with no tool, other than race, to eliminate the district -- to create the 17 percent they were seeking. That's the problem here. And you're asking us to say, okay, because they made these other choices, they get a freebie. And --

MR. GORE: No, sir. I'm disputing the premise that they trying to get to 17 percent, or that they used race to draw the district. And these numbers show that they weren't

1 using --

JUDGE GERGEL: If they were using 17 percent, would you agree that's a target that would be --

MR. GORE: Absolutely not. There was no racial target in --

MR. GORE: I think that there is -- there's case law that says using a racial target is a problem. But using a racial target doesn't necessarily mean that race predominated anyway. There are some districts that could be drawn -- you could imagine districts in certain areas of the country that are drawn with a racial target, and it doesn't matter because the traditional districting principles would yield the same district.

JUDGE GERGEL: Do you think the movement of 30 of the 48,000 African Americans out of Charleston, from CD 1 to CD 6, was an accident or coincidence?

MR. GORE: I think it was a byproduct of drawing the district lines based on politics and the moves that were made in other parts of District 1 in order to maintain equal population and achieve the General Assembly's political goal.

Let's look at slide 34. We talked about this already, but just to drive home that the BVAP is higher in the areas moved into 1 and moved out of 1. Look at Beaufort County, the portion that's moved in was 42.66 percent BVAP.

Look now to Berkeley County. Berkeley County is also made whole, and the BVAP, or the portion that's moved in, is far greater than the BVAP in District 1. Why move the Berkeley County African-American voters in if you could just keep the Charleston African-American voters --

Republican Berkeley and Beaufort County in the district, which was perfectly legitimate. But when they did that, coming along are African Americans, and they need to deal with Charleston to fix it. That's the reason you get into trouble. It was a certainly proper initial choice, but then it left the mapmaker with no choice but to bleach Charleston to make it work. That's the problem,

MR. GORE: Let's walk through the rest of these slides, because I think it refutes that notion.

So, Berkeley County, itself, has a higher BVAP overall than Charleston County. One of their main arguments is that the failure to unsplit Charleston County in District 1 somehow shows racial predominance. But they unsplit Berkeley County in District 1, which has an even higher BVAP. Let's go now to what happened in Charleston. Again, what moved from 6 to 1 had a higher BVAP than what moved from 1 to 6.

If we scroll down to slide 37, we see that there's a BVAP disparity. So, if you take each portion of Charleston County, the portion that's in District 1 and the portion

that's in District 6, the BVAP level of each those portions has shrunk over time, and the disparity between the two has shrunk over time. So, for example, in 2010, what was District 6 was almost 50 percent BVAP, almost half of the voting age population was Black, but only 18 percent in the District 1 portion. Under the 2020 data, that disparity had shrunk. Now the portion that was in District 6 had gone down to 41 percent BVAP, and the portion in District 1 had gone down to a little over 14 percent.

Look what happens in the enacted plan. There are demographic changes happening in Charleston. The District 6 portion that's now -- left Charleston that's now in District 6 is only 31 percent BVAP, whereas a decade ago, it was almost 50 percent. Now what's in District 1 has gone down to 10 percent. The disparity between those portions keeps getting smaller as the district lines are redrawn.

So, the Court seems to be focusing on this 80-percent number, but look at what's happening to the relative populations in those areas, the BVAP number keeps shrinking in unequal ways, but in ways that shrinks the disparity between those two populations. And look at what happens here in Charleston portion of CD 1 at the bottom, it becomes more than three percent less Democratic. That's the political goal. The political goal is to shed Democrats from District 1, moved into District 6. And this really boils down to West Ashley

and some other portions of the county. West Ashley is a 57-percent Democrat area, but only 19 percent BVAP. So, when West Ashley is moved out of District 1 into District 6, it makes District 1 significantly more Republican, compared to that population --

JUDGE GERGEL: But you're not arguing that the White voters were predominantly Democratic, are you?

MR. GORE: In a 19-percent BVAP area that has a 57-percent Democratic vote share, there are a lot of White Democrats in that area. There's no question about that.

JUDGE GERGEL: But it's predominantly a Trump vote -- I think you all were using Trump/Biden. And I believe you can discern very easily that, predominantly, the White voters were Trump supporters, but combined with the African-American supporters, that is what makes it Democratic, correct?

MR. GORE: I don't have the numbers on turnout in front of me, so I don't know. But there's certainly a significant number of White Democrats --

JUDGE GERGEL: No. There are, but they're just less than 50 percent. So, you're not going to increase the tilt --getting rid of Democrats doesn't solve the problem, the goal is to get the African-American voters out. That's the one that moves the partisan line.

MR. GORE: But the White Republican vote is also less than 50 percent in West Ashley, because the total Republican

vote in West Ashley is only about 43 percent. If it's a 57-percent Biden area, it's only a 43-percent Trump area. When you move that out of District 1 and bring more heavily Republican areas into District 1, that unbalance makes District 1 a more Republican-leaning district. And that's precisely what happened here. And that was the consistent testimony of Mr. Roberts, of Senator Campsen, and of Senator Massey. Senator Campsen didn't even look at race data while the plan was being drawn. He only looked at it later to defend the plan against challenges of racial gerrymandering, and he discussed the BVAP numbers on the floor of the Senate and in the hearings both on January 19th and on January 20th.

Mr. Traywick, let's go back to our slide number 17 and just drive home yet another flaw in the plaintiffs' theory of the case.

And we've talked about this already. The plaintiffs' claims simply do not add up. They're claiming three sets of district lines, all of which involve District 6. They're challenging the line between 1 and 6, the line between 2 and 6, and the line between 5 and 6, but they don't challenge District 6. So, to the Court's question about what's going on in Charleston, they're not challenging the District 6, half of the equation, they're only challenging Districts 1, 2 and 5. But if District 6 is not the product of a racial gerrymandering intentional discrimination, the mirror image

side of those lines can't be either. Given the claims here, one would think that District 6 is triple infected with racial predominance and discrimination, because it's involved in all three of these sets of lines that they challenge, but they don't challenge that district at all. And they talked a lot about District 6 again today.

JUDGE GERGEL: But wouldn't District 6 be under a voting rights analysis to allow African Americans to elect a candidate of their choice, where race would be permissible to be used that's unlike these other districts?

MR. GORE: But there's ro Section-2 claim or defense in the case. There's no argument that --

JUDGE GERGEL: But -- but I agree to they didn't challenge it, because it was consistent with the Voting Rights Act. They're not obligated to go bring a change -- you know, obviously under the 14th Amendment, you have a compelling state interest to defend it, and one of them would be complying with the Voting Rights Act, right?

MR. GORE: Certainly. But that's not a defense -JUDGE GERGEL: But just because they didn't challenge
District 6 doesn't make other districts that don't have the
protection of the Voting Rights Act legally defensible.

MR. GORE: I want to be careful about what I say here, because District 6 certainly complies with the Voting Rights Act, as we believe the entire plan does, there's no

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Voting Rights Act claim. But we haven't asserted Section 2 as a defense to a predominant use of race, because there was no predominant eyes of race. But my point is --

JUDGE GERGEL: Let me ask you this. You don't claim that there was any compelling state interest -- if race were determined to predominate, have you asserted a compelling state interest for use of race?

MR. GORE: No, we haven't, because we don't believe race did predominate.

JUDGE GERGEL: Okay.

MR. GORE: What I actually think is going on here is something a little bit different. They've challenged the Districts 1, 2 and 5 side of the line, but not the mirror image in District 6. And I think the reason is this case is really a collateral rather than a direct attack on Backus. Ιn Backus, the Court upheld District 6 and all District 6's lines, and haven't come and asked the Court to reverse itself -- or the Supreme Court -- and strike down District 6. Instead, they're trying to backdoor around it. They're trying to challenge 1, 2, and 5, the mirror image side of the lines. But these are the same lines -- at least the benchmark ones that didn't change, those are the same ones that the Court upheld in Backus. And so, their claim simply doesn't make any sense. How can you challenge one side of the line but not the other? They haven't challenged District 6, and they haven't

1 explained why they haven't challenged District 6 either.

We've already talked about slides 18 and 19, so we won't belabor the point. But their versions of District 2 and District 5 performed worse than the enacted plan version, accept for Harpootlian's version of District 5. But that also doesn't create an electoral opportunity for Black voters.

Let's go now to slide 20. And we've talked about this before, too. What they're really seeking is a cross-over district. They want a district where African-American Democrats and White Democrats get together and can elect the candidates of their choice. This really boils down to West Ashley, Ladson and Deer Park and Lincolnville to a lesser extent. But what they really want is to move West Ashley and those areas back into District 1 so that White Democrats and Black Democrats can form a coalition to elect candidates of their choice. There's no constitutional right to that kind of district. There's no constitutional right certainly in the 14th Amendment prohibition on racial discrimination to form political coalitions. And the General Assembly's decision not to place Black Democrats and White Democrats together had nothing do with race, it was politics.

Let's go to slide 21, which may be one of the most important slides of the entire day. There's been a lot of confusion about what happened in *Backus* and what happened with the benchmark plan. The plaintiffs have repeatedly asserted

and represented that the benchmark plan was drawn as a race-conscious plan to comply with Section 2 and Section 5. That's not what the Court held in Backus. What the Court held in Backus was that the plaintiffs in Backus not only failed to prove subordination of traditional districting principles, but, in fact, that the defendants disproved that because they showed that there was compliance with traditional districting principles. So, when Mr. Roberts started drawing the map based on the benchmark plan, he was drawing from a map that had been blessed as compliant with traditional districting principles.

The challenge in *Backus* was to District 6. What this means is that the Court concluded that District 6's lines in the benchmark plan were constitutional and complied with traditional districting principles. Also, all the county splits in District 6, the Court concluded complied with traditional districting principles. All the VTD splits, the core and shape of District 6 under the benchmark plan, the Court concluded that all of that was consistent with traditional districting principles. It never examined whether there was a use of race. It never examined whether District 6 had to be upheld under strict scrutiny, because that wasn't at issue. It's certainly true that the defendants put on that defense in the alternative defense, but what the Court actually held was that there was no predominant use of race,

and that the plan complied with traditional principles.

Now, they've pointed out that there were challenges to other districts that were dismissed for lack of standing in *Backus*. But all the districts they challenged here involved lines with District 6 that were upheld. If they were challenging District 1's line with District 7, *Backus* might not apply -- or District 2's line with District 5, or District 2's line with District 5, or District 2's line with District 6, the district that was judicially blessed in *Backus* as compliant with traditional districting principles. So, their challenges to any of the lines that the enacted plan inherited from the benchmark plan fails under *Backus*.

Let's talk about the changes that --

JUDGE HEYTENS: Can I just ask one question on Backus? I know because the Supreme Court summarily affirmed we're bound by the sort of bottom line, but we are not bound by every word of the Backus opinion, right? That's just -- that's a district court opinion that is not binding on subsequent forms. People have been treating that case like it's a Supreme Court decision, and it's not, right?

MR. GORE: Well, I think it does carry some precedential weight. Of course, it's a decision from this Court, itself.

JUDGE HEYTENS: Sure. And, Mr. Gore, you and I are

both aware that the decision of a district court does not bindthe subsequent district court in any -- at all, right?

MR. GORE: I believe that is correct. But I do think that *Backus* is very persuasive. And on the intent question, I think it's extremely instructive. Because, of course, Mr. Roberts started with the benchmark plan that had been upheld as compliant with traditional districting principles. That certainly indicates that his intention was to continue and perpetuate that compliance rather than to do something racial, which --

JUDGE GERGEL: Mr. Gore, I think at the beginning of the case, I asked you that obviously the legislature in this round had significantly reduced the BVAP in CD 6.

MR. GORE: Sure.

JUDGE GERGEL: And part of that -- when there was no racial polarized voting study, but there was a belief that the district remained effective around 47 percent, correct? And had it come in with a district that was 56 or 57 percent African American, as the previous that existed, without a showing, that would have been subject to a potential packing claim, would it not?

MR. GORE: I completely agree.

JUDGE GERGEL: I mean, I thought you acknowledged -- and I thought it was proper for the legislature to do it -- was not to continue running those. CD 6 did not need that

1 kind of number to be effective, correct?

MR. GORE: That's correct. And I think there's another --

JUDGE GERGEL: So, locking onto *Backus* as the holy grail has a problem, because *Backus*, today, wouldn't be constitutional.

MR. GORE: So, I -- I don't agree with that, because Backus was upheld on the basis that it complied with traditional districting principles. So  $\sim$  --

African-American district with no racial polarized voting analysis, and you couldn't demonstrate you needed that kind of packing, that would be a problem. I don't want to criticize, but the legislature dign't do that in recognition of that.

And that's what I asked you right at the beginning of the trial. I said: Wasn't that change related to a recognition of the impact of *Shelby County* and on the impact of *Cooper?* I mean, you couldn't get away with it today.

MR. GORE: Well, let me unpack that a little bit, because I think your Honor is asking about the second step of the racial predominance analysis, which is strict scrutiny and compliance with the Voting Rights Act. I think that *Backus* didn't ever get to that step. *Backus* upheld the district as complying with traditional districting principles. Let's take an example. If you have a demographic area that was

80-percent African American, if you drew based on traditional districting principles, you'd have a very high BVAP in that district, but you wouldn't have to justify under the Voting Rights Act because it's a natural --

JUDGE GERGEL: This district was far flung. It goes from Columbia to Florence down to Charleston. You know, there's little doubt that what motivated the legislature and was part of y'all's defense was you were trying to comply with the Voting Rights Act. And, frankly, I'm not sure you needed that much vote, but you needed a significant vote to avoid retrogression. But that game was over by 2020, and the legislature recognized that.

So, to me, to come in and say the holy grail is Backus, you know, hold on a minute, the legislature didn't follow Backus literally, and certainly didn't follow it in Charleston County.

MR. GORE: And let me just make one other point about District 6 while we're on that. The other issue to keep in mind is that District 6 was severely underpopulated under the benchmark plan. And so, the reduction in BVAP percentage -- there's actually an increase in the total number of Black individuals of voting age in the active district --

JUDGE GERGEL: The White population grew faster.

MR. GORE: But extra population needed to be added to comply with one person, one vote. So, they keep saying there

was extra BVAP to spread around, and that's simply not the case. BVAP actually had to be added to District 6, not for that purpose, but with the result of the 47-percent district.

So, the changes that were made by the enacted plan also were constitutional and complied with traditional districting principles. We have several slides on that. In the interest of time, I'll just note those for the record. They start on slide 22. And we walked through this with Mr. Roberts during his testimony, as the Court is well aware. But for each of these, Mr. Roberts articulated a race-neutral explanation as to why the changes were made. So, I'll just note that those are slides 22 to 31, and they're also in our proposed findings of fact. And there's been no real reputation of Mr. Roberts's testimony on that particular point.

Let's go to plaintiffs' slide 6, if we can, for just a moment, because this is something Mr. Cepeda talked about today when he was talking about the districts and treatment of districts in the enacted plan. This is his list of high BVAP counties. Now, they note that the data was presented incorrectly on pages 30 and 169 of their proposed findings. But let me just make a couple of points about this list.

There are nine counties listed here. Eight were split in the benchmark plan, only seven are split in the enacted plan. So, the enacted plan actually treats these

counties better than the benchmark plan. Plaintiffs haven't presented any evidence on four of these counties: That's Greenville, Spartanburg, Florence and York. That leaves the other five counties: That's Richland, Charleston, Berkeley, Orangeburg and Sumter. All of those were split in the benchmark plan along the line with District 6. The Backus Court upheld all of those splits as complying with traditional districting principles.

There are two other points to make here. One is that this chart doesn't control for total population size. We've heard testimony in the record that counties with large total population are commonly split to achieve the one-person-one-vote requirement of the Federal Constitution. Greenville, Richland, Charleston and Spartanburg are four of the five largest population counties in South Carolina.

The second point is that they're using, again, total BVAP numbers rather than BVAP percentages. The percentages are more instructive because they travel with the total population of the county as it's moved in and out. There's only one of the top eight BVAP percentage counties in South Carolina that's split, that's Orangeburg County. But Williamsburg, Lee, Bamberg, Marion, Fairfield, Hampton and Marlboro are not split. And those are the other seven of the eight highest BVAP percentage counties in South Carolina.

Let's go to plaintiffs' slide 20. And here in

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plaintiffs' slide 20, there was discussion about some talking points that were prepared by the staff. And it said in these talking points: County lines are more important in some places than others. Well, I just want to cite the Court to Senator Campsen's testimony on the stand on this point. It's on page 118 and 119 of the October 13th afternoon transcript. He said that was not his view. He said that was staff's view, he didn't subscribe to that view and he didn't act upon that The plaintiffs have no evidence that any senator agreed with this view or acted upon it with respect to any action taken on the enacted plan. What we do know is that Senator Harpootlian instructed Mr. Oppermann to prioritize, as his top priority, moving Charleston County into District 1 and unsplitting it there. So, at least for some other individuals involved in the case, county lines were more important in some places than others.

Let's go to slide 34, if we can. Slide 34 is another one about counties. And it talks about the split of Orangeburg County and contrasts that with Edgefield.

JUDGE GERGEL: You're under your 15 minutes. But you're fine. Keep going.

MR. GORE: Thank you. Let me just try to finish up briefly, if I might.

There are a couple of other points that we think are important for the Court to understand. One is we ask the

Court to scrutinize very closely some of the assertions and representations that have been made by the plaintiffs with respect to the evidence at trial and the implications of that evidence.

We found many misrepresentations in many places where the transcript doesn't comport with what is in their proposed findings of fact or in their slide deck today. Let me give a few examples. If we can go to their 45, this is where they talk about Senator Campsen. None of this testimony appears on pages 48 or 104 of the transcript. And it's an incomplete citation of Senator Campsen's testimony. Senator Campsen said, in fact, that he has a general awareness of the demographics of his district, he doesn't know any percentages of any cities or any areas, he doesn't even know the BVAP percentage of his district, and he doesn't know if other senators do either. So, they're saying that he considered race, when what he said is he just has a general understanding of what the demographics are in his particular area.

Let's go to Plaintiffs' 51, where again, there's talk about whether legislators used partisanship or considered politics. We've already talked about Senator Campsen and his explanation on the stand about partisan gerrymandering and how that's a legal term of art. If we go to slide 52, there's this arrow that's alleging that Senator Campsen gave inconsistent and misleading statements. This testimony

largely is not anywhere in the record. Let's start with the first one. They say he falsely claims that Columbia and Charleston had been in the same district since the 90s. That's not what he said. That's not on page 11 of that transcript and it's not anywhere in that transcript. What he said was that one of his objectives was maintaining the district as it had existed since the 1990s.

Let's go to the next one. Falsely claims that CD 6 was least changed and misrepresents the number of Black voters. The enacted plan is a least-changed plan. It changes the lowest number of voters of any plan in the record, including the plan they're now charting out from Dr. Duchin. And he didn't say anything about the number of Black voters that were moved under Senate Amendment 1 in this transcript. It's simply not there.

The next one stated that redistricting principles carry equal weight. He did believe that had and he said that discretionary principles could be treated equally.

The next one, he never denied that this was a least-changed plan. He said that creating a least-changed plan was one of the most important factors that animated Amendment 1. And so, there was no reversing course when he said that Senate Amendment 1 is a minimal-changed plan. He also never said that having Beaufort and Berkeley in Congressional District 1 was a primary goal. He said it

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wasn't a primary goal. He said it was something he did to achieve his political objective.

So, let's go down, if we can, Mr. Traywick, to our slide 99.

And, again, we ask the Court, as we know it will, to scrutinize the record closely, as we were unable to even find in the record some of the assertions that are made in their findings and their slide deck. But to rule for the plaintiffs, the Court would have to do a number of things that would interject error into the case; It would have to ignore the presumption of good faith, ignore the undisputed evidence presented by Mr. Roberts and others of compliance with traditional principles; it d have to jettison Backus twice; it would have to reject the benchmark lines, which comport with traditional principles; it would have to embrace incomplete and unconvincing putative expert analyses; it would have to conclude that Mr. Roberts, Senator Campsen, Representative Bamberg, Senator Massey and others all lied about whether they used race in the plan; it will have to adopt misrepresentations in the record and hold that not drawing lines based on race is racial discrimination.

The 14th Amendment directs the General Assembly to make race-neutral decisions. That's what the General Assembly did. It did not use race to draw lines. It used politics and traditional districting principles, honoring the requests of

others, to draw lines. Plaintiffs are asking the Court to turn the Fourteenth Amendment's prohibition on race-based decision making into a prescription to consider race in exactly the way plaintiffs think it should be considered. The Court should decline that invitation and should enter judgment for the defendants.

JUDGE GERGEL: Thank you, Mr. Gore.

MR. MOORE: May it please the Court. Given the fact

MR. MOORE: May it please the Court. Given the fact that I have a little more than five minutes, I'll ask for you to give me -- actually it's nine minutes.

JUDGE GERGEL: I wouldn't have told you that myself.

MR. MOORE: I'm not going to bore the Court with a dissertation about Representative King, and I'm sure you'll appreciate that.

As your Honor said -- and said very clearly -- this is a Senate plan, okay? It's a Senate plan that the House concurred with. And the House concurred in that Senate plan for one reason and one reason only. And I don't have time to go through all these demonstrative slides. You have them in front of you. And as Mr. Gore said, I know that all of the members of this Panel are going to carefully scrutinize the record in this case.

But, you have clear evidence that the only reason that the House concurred in the Senate plan was for political purposes, political reasons. The text messages themselves,

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which are discussed in this slide deck, contemporaneous with the activities of those House members, conclusively proves that the House goal was the same goal as the Senate goal, which was a political goal.

And sone of the points that I heard your Honor make with respect to circumstantial evidence is obviously circumstantial evidence is helpful and it's appropriate. And as your Honor said, frequently, people don't testify that they took race into account. But one of the things that we do look at when we look at someone's intent is we look at contemporaneous statements of that person, and things like text messages which are exchanged between people who are friendly, who are often unguarded. And when you look at the text messages that have been introduced in this case -- and your Honors may remember we had a large dispute about these text messages and whether we could get into them or not, and whether the plaintiffs would be allowed to collect them from legislators or not -- the plaintiffs were allowed to collect those text messages. And guess what? None of those text messages demonstrated that the evidence that they sought, which was evidence of discriminatory intent. In fact, it demonstrated quite the contrary.

And so, when you look at circumstantial evidence, your Honors, I think you have to first realize -- in this case as a whole -- there is no direct evidence of discriminatory

intent here. And Arlington Heights says -- and other courts have indicated -- that direct evidence is preferable, is stronger than circumstantial evidence. And, here, the circumstantial evidence is not strong, it is belied by the direct evidence. And I want to briefly touch on a point that Mr. Gore made, which is the plaintiffs' proposed findings of fact are replete with errors, okay? We don't have time to go over all of those, because if we did, we'd take hours and hours. Why are those proposed findings replete with error? Because they realize they don't have a strong case. They realize that the evidence in this case does not support their claims, and so they mischaracterize what the evidence is.

I want to talk very briefly about a couple of points, your Honor. If you'll just give me a moment, because I am trying to slash and burn.

The plaintiffs have not presented any alternative plan here, okay? And we haven't heard about that at all from anyone. They haven't presented an alternative plan that would accomplish or allow the legislature to accomplish the same purpose, its political purpose. And as courts have held in Cooper in Cromartie and in other cases, such an alternative plan can provide substantial evidence. We don't see that here. Now, I understand that, in Cooper, the Court did not require, you know, evidence of an alternative plan, but the evidence in Cooper was much stronger on the issue of racial

intent than the evidence in this case. And so, the fact that the plaintiffs have not provided an alternative plan that would show that the legislature could accomplish its same political purposes, and not do what the plaintiffs would have it not do, is glaring and is appropriate.

If you look at slide 10 for just a moment, you see sort of the Trump/Biden votes with respect to House plans, the benchmark plan, and the other alternative plans that have been discussed here. It is clear when you look at that data that the only way for the legislature to accomplish the political purposes that it had, particularly with respect to CD 1, is to do what it did. If you look at the League of Women Voters' Plan, the NAACP ACLU 1 and 2, and the Senate Amendment 2, which is sponsored by Senator Harpootlian, it clearly demonstrates that you would not have the same effect of keeping CD 1 red if you adopted those plans. And I think that is an important thing for your Honors to consider.

You know, there are a couple points where I feel like I have to take up for folks from the House who testified just for a moment. If you look at slide 14, I don't know why the plaintiffs chose to characterize Senator Jordan's testimony as "lying." It seems, to me, to be a bit extreme. And I think that the evidence shows that Chairman Jordan didn't lie at the January 10th, 2022, committee meeting. And any suggestion that he lied is not only insulting but demonstrates that the

plaintiffs, in desperation, are resulting to character assassination. And we have pointed out what Chairman Jordan did and why he did it.

Another point is, again, Chairman Jordan is not the only victim of character assassination here. The worst example of this relates to Representative Justin Bamberg. And while it wasn't covered in their closing, in a footnote to paragraph 627 of their findings of fact, they asked this Court to find that Representative Bamberg, an officer of this Court, is not a credible witness. Why'd they do that? One can only guess. I would suggest here, they chose to make Senator Bamberg a witness in this case because they chose to depose him; they didn't like what he said, and now they've decided to resort to character assassination.

JUDGE GERGEL: Mr. Moore, Representative Bamberg told us he didn't know anything about the Senate plan.

MR. MOORE: Well, that was going to be my next point, your Honor.

JUDGE GERGEL: So, this whole point about all this House stuff just strikes us as odd because it's immaterial. The word is "immaterial" to the case.

MR. MOORE: I would agree with your Honor.

JUDGE GERGEL: I don't want to hear Representative blank -- starts with a K -- again, because we must've heard it 40 times during the trial. It's not material to the case.

MR. MOORE: I agree, your Honor. I mean, if -- since Representative Bamberg's testimony is not material to the case, because he testified under oath he didn't know anything about the senate process, wasn't involved in the senate process as well. Then there's no reason to argue that your Honor should find him not credible.

JUDGE GERGEL: Well, don't you worry about that one.

MR. MOORE: I appreciate that, your Honor. I very much appreciate that. And I'm sure that Representative Bamberg would as well.

I'll close with these remarks, your Honor. Finding for the plaintiff would entail ignoring direct evidence pointing to the fact that these maps were not the product of discriminatory intent. Going back to the text messages that we showed you earlier, all the conversations that are discussed there political data, voter behavior, public input, incumbency considerations, communities of interest and other traditional redistricting principles were all reasons why the House decided to concur with the Senate. The Senate's plan had a realistic shot of passing both chambers of the General Assembly, and it did so. But there is no evidence in this record, we would submit, no probative evidence, that indicates that the Senate plan was the product of discriminatory intent, and no evidence that the House joined in. Thank you.

JUDGE GERGEL: Thank you, Mr. Moore.

Reply by the plaintiffs?

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Thank you, your Honors. I will try to be brief.

Plaintiffs certainly appreciate the focus on CD 1 and the harms in Charleston County, because we agree that nothing about the sorting of voters there is coincidental. It is a racial gerrymander, and it is part of the evidence of intentional discrimination.

What is instructive is for the Court to consider in LULAC vs. Perry, and in the Bartlett v. Strickland case, that, in similar circumstances, the Court indicated that where a community was trending in a direction about to exercise their power, and it was destroyed in the way that it was through the engineering in CD 1, that that bears the mark of intentional discrimination. And we point your Honors in that direction as well.

But we are not in the business of giving up. And while the Court is focused on CD 1, there is similar disregard to the way that Black voters were treated under Districts 2 and 5, and the way that TRPs that were expressly said were important, such as healing political boundaries, were not done in CDs 2 and 5. There may not be a sophisticated movement of voters in those areas, but the city and the county of Sumter were split -- the public, there was a chorus saying, "keep us whole." That county, that is majority Black in both the city

and the county, was disregarded. The decisions in CD 2, and the hook in Richland County, while they may be carryovers of decisionmaking in some regard as last cycle, there were changes made there in the maintenance and the continued disregard of Black communities in breaking up neighborhoods, VTDs that goes against the redistricting principles that were stated publicly. And it did not have to be that way, given all of the proposed alternative plans that were offered by the public.

JUDGE GERGEL: Ms. Aden, what are we to make -- I'm focusing on CDs 2 and 5 for a moment. What are we to make of Mr. Tresvant's map and then the Milk Plan? Are we inferring from that? Because Sumter is split previously, and Congressman Clyburn apparently was asking for a larger part of it into his district, which was honored. And he didn't question the hook.

What are we to make of that? Is it irrelevant? Is it something we should assume Congressman Clyburn had some adverse intent? How are we to address that?

MS. ADEN: I think it's largely irrelevant, your Honor. Representative Clyburn provided a hardcopy map, a partial map, that then was reproduced into a whole Milk Plan by the decision makers. And that map bears striking -- it's not similar to the map that was ultimately adopted in many different regards --

the parts that you're focused on, which is Sumter and -- you know, it's in Sumter, there's a little bit in Orangeburg, there's a little bit in Jasper, there's the hook in Richland, all which, if there wasn't a history, you might say, whoa, what's going on here, they existed and they were supported by an elected -- the state's most prominent African-American elected official. I'm just trying to figure out, how are we to deal with that, when we're not enthusiastic about your Arlington Heights theory, so we're really focusing on racial gerrymandering. How do we get to racial predominance? You know, how do we get there, when all of us admire Congressman Clyburn and have trouble envisioning that he would have a role in a racial gerrymander?

MS. ADEN: I don't think that the record reflects that his opinion, his proposed map, carried the day at all.

It was shared early on in the legislative process as a partial map like --

JUDGE GERGEL: I've studied his map, not the Milk Plan, for the reason you point out, that's it's not identical.

MS. ADEN: And no testimony was given in support of that map. We have no idea how that map fits into the scheme outside of what the defendants produced in the Milk Plan.

JUDGE GERGEL: Don't you have to assume that it just was his view that this was a proper plan? Let's just assume

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that for a minute. What weight should we give it? I mean, he's obviously very knowledgeable about the racial politics of South Carolina. And, I mean, notably in Charleston. They don't follow him in Charleston, right? It's the outlier. But they do -- but the Sumter, and Orangeburg and Sun City are all, you know, seem to be at least endorsed by him. I'm struggling with how we're supposed to deal with that.

MS. ADEN: With all due respect to Representative Clyburn, he was not a decision maker. The decision makers were those that we sued in others. Regardless of the race of the representative, if lines were drawn to harm Black voters in ways that were not justified by the criteria, in ways that they did not have to be because of alternative plans, and in ways that we do not have testimony in the record from Representative Clyburn that that is what he -- of any motivation behind his map, the weight of the evidence, both -the evidence from -- if we can look at slide 4, which is in our PDF 8 -- I mean, the movement of voters in 2 and 5, just like CD 1, it doesn't make any sense. If it was just about repopulating people, why are you moving 41,000 people in CD 5? And why, based upon the evidence of our experts -- whether it's Dr. Ragusa, Dr. Liu, Dr. Duchin, why does the statistical evidence show that the plan would not look the way that the enacted plan looked, that it was race, not party, that more explained what is happening in the lines, not just in CD 1 but in CDs 2 and 5?

And we really cannot put the onus on the way that Sumter and the way that Richland looked on a partial map, hand-delivered by someone from Representative Clyburn's office in the fall, well before Senate Amendment 1, and a map that like the NRRT map that they say we can just throw in the trash because they didn't matter at all, because they were outside of the process, because we didn't look at them, because they didn't matter because they didn't go through the formal channel. If they have no regard for the NRRT map, they should have no regard for Representative Clyburn's map and the way that it was part of the record in the legislative process.

The weight of the evidence, the fact in expert evidence, is that people asked for Sumter County to be made whole, and it was not made whole, unlike majority White communities, and similar in Richland. And the statistical evidence shows that not only was race driving it, but that there is reduced electoral opportunity. If you can look at Dr. Duchin's slide, the 2020 presidential election, we see, in fact, in slides 75 and 76, that there is reduced opportunity. It is not just in CD 6, but if you can see from Senator Harpootlian's map, there was an opportunity to create more electoral opportunity in CD 5. And that was destroyed in the same way that electoral opportunity was taken away, or in a similar way that electoral opportunity was taken away in CD 1.

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And this is not by coincidence. These are important areas of the state where there is a perception, one way or the other, of how Black voters vote. There is a perception that they participate in a certain way. And based upon that perception, like in the *Harris* case, like in the *LULAC v.* Perry case, like in Hunter v. Underwood, like in North Carolina v. McCrory, like in Cooper v. Harris, like in Perez v. Abbott, that an intent to disadvantage minority citizens to gain perceived political or partisan benefits qualifies a discriminatory intent. So, even if we can't show that race was the motivating factor there, the weight of the evidence shows that these Black communities were cracked as a means to minimize their electoral voting power in similar ways as in CD 1. And we cannot leave today without commanding you to look at the evidence that also points in the favor under maybe a different theory, but, nonetheless, the weight of the evidence points in that direction.

Just to follow up very briefly, Judge Heytens, on your question, I just don't think it's as simple as if you lose on racial gerrymandering, you can just repackage the evidence. There were a number of cases, *Cooper*, *Page*, *Bethune*, *ALBC*, from last cycle, racial gerrymandering claims. Other stuff was happening in the legislative process, other stuff was happening with impact, but the decision makers, the plaintiffs there, did not bring an addendum or, apart from

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that, intentional racial discrimination claims under the 14th and 15th Amendments, because the weight of the evidence didn't show itself there. But it did here, just like it did in *Perez v. Abbott*. And it's just simply not an end runaround. We're not trying to get a result one way or the other. This is where the weight of the evidence, we think, points under theories that the Supreme Court has recognized and other courts have recognized in the redistricting context.

If I can briefly say on remedies, the remedies for intentional vote dilution and racial gerrymandering, they may Intentional racial discrimination, we believe, be distinct. taints the entire map and may require the General Assembly to redraw the whole map to remove discrimination, root and branch, instead of the challenged districts and the boundaries bordering those districts. That is likely a different remedy than in a racial gerrymandering context, which will require the legislature to redraw the challenged districts and certain areas bordering it potentially, consistent with traditional redistricting principles, without race being the predominant reason. And as a practical matter, what that means is that you respect your traditional redistricting principles, which in South Carolina means leaving people where they live, where they work, and where the natural geography of the state is. And because of that, because of the voting patterns that are associated with that, that's why they've been cracked. But if

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you simply respect the traditional redistricting principles,
the outcomes will be what they are, and not for someone to toy
with and engineer to try to disrupt.

After an eight-day trial, hundreds of pages of post-trial briefing, and now defendants' closing presentation, there are irrefutable facts that are detailed in plaintiffs' post-trial findings of fact. There are not misrepresentations. If there are any errors, we are happy to correct them. But we don't need to mischaracterize the evidence; the evidence is what it is And the weight of the evidence establishes a violation of either or both the plaintiffs' claims. If one looks at the map that the South Carolina Legislature enacted this cycle, this map does not make sense. It is not a coincidence. And the Black voters who have come today to represent their communities in the courtroom, they should not endure the indignity of these constitutional violations, and there must be a remedy.

We ask that you enter judgment for plaintiffs, and if time permits, allow the legislature the opportunity to correct their errors and to recognize the constitutional rights of our clients and others in the community. And we look forward to having a potentially separate remedial hearing, where we can offer ideas about what that process might look like.

We very much appreciate the patience, and the attention, and the care of this Court, and also its staff,

Thank you

1 over our trial days and today's closing arguments. very much on behalf of the plaintiffs. 2 3 JUDGE GERGEL: Thank you very much. 4 MS. ADEN: Thank you. 5 JUDGE GERGEL: Well, folks, you know, one of the 6 complaints of clerks during the pandemic was they never got 7 trials. Well, my clerks cannot say that, okay? We have just 8 finished a two-and-a-half-week criminal trial, and we've

Thank y'all very much for your efforts. I know my colleagues and I very much appreciate the didigence of the parties.

preceded that with this excellently tried case on both sides.

you've given us the hard job now of having to make a decision.

With that, this Court is adjourned. Thank you.

I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter.

s/Lisa D. Smith,	1/6/2023
Lisa D. Smith, RPR, CRR	Date

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