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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA MISSOULA DIVISION

MONTANA DEMOCRATIC PARTY, MONTANANS FOR TESTER, MACEE PATRITTI

Plaintiffs,

v.

CHRISTI JACOBSEN, in her official capacity as the Montana Secretary of State, JEFFREY MANGAN, in his official capacity as Montana Commissioner of Political Practices,

CV-21-119-M-DWM

Defendants.

JOINT MOTION FOR STAY OF PROCEEDINGS

Plaintiffs and Defendants jointly move this Court for an order staying this matter until May 20, 2022 and continuing all current deadlines pending certain ongoing proceedings in the matter of *Forward Montana v. Montana*, Case No. ADV-2021-611, in Montana First Judicial District Lewis and Clark County. On February 3, 2022 that court granted plaintiffs' partial motion for summary judgment enjoining, among other things, Section 21 of SB 319, the provision of law at issue here (*see* Ex. A). In that matter, the State Defendants have made an unopposed motion to certify that partial judgement as final under Montana Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 54(b). That motion is pending in the district court. Defendants have now informed Plaintiffs that the State Defendants do not intend to appeal that ruling once it becomes final, leaving in place a permanent injunction of the law at issue here.

Accordingly, the parties jointly request this stay to allow the Montana First Judicial District Court to consider the motion making the summary judgment determination in that matter final. Should it grant the motion, making the permanent injunction of the law at issue here final, the parties are engaged in discussions about an appropriate agreement for a potential resolution of this matter.

Given these events, a stay in this matter and a continuation of the current

deadlines is in the interest of conserving the resources of this Court and the parties. The parties would intend to provide this Court with an update on the current status of the proceedings in state court and their discussions on or before May 20, 2022. A proposed Order reflecting this is attached hereto as Exhibit B.

Dated: May 5, 2022 Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Peter Michael Meloy

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on May 5, 2022, I electronically served the foregoing via the CM/ECF system which will generate a Notice of Electronic Filing on all counsel of record.

/s/ Peter Michael Melov

Exhibit A

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FILED

FEB 3 2022

ANGIE SPARKS, Clerk of District Court

By

MARY M GOYINPS

Puty Clerk

MONTANA FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT LEWIS AND CLARK COUNTY

FORWARD MONTANA, LEO GALLAGHER, MONTANA ASSOCIATION OF CRIMINLAL DEFENSE LAWYERS, and GARY ZADICK,

Plaintiffs,

v.

THE STATE OF MONTANA, by and through GREG GIANFORTE, Governor,

Defendant.

Cause No. ADV-2021-611

ORDER ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs Forward Montana, Leo Gallagher, Montana Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and Gary Zadick's motion for summary judgment on count one (violation of the single subject rule) and count two (violation of the rule on amendments) of their amended complaint. Defendant State of Montana, by and through Governor Greg Gianforte, opposes. Raphael Graybill, Rylee Sommers-Flanagan and

Constance Van Kley represent the Plaintiffs. Brent Mead, Assistant Solicitor General and Patrick M. Risken, Assistant Attorney General represent the State.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Senator Greg Hertz introduced Senate Bill 319 (SB 319) during the 67th Regular Session of the Montana Legislature on February 16, 2021. The bill as introduced would revise Montana's campaign finance laws by establishing and regulating joint fundraising committees. The bill's original title contained the following:

An Act generally revising campaign finance laws; creating joint fundraising committees; providing for certain reporting; and amending sections [listing sections].

2021, Mont. Laws SB 319.

SB 319 passed the Senate and House with minor changes. Because the Senate and House passed slightly different versions of the bill, reconciliation was necessary. When bills require reconciliation, the introducing chamber may seek appointment of a conference committee to resolve the differences. Members of a conference committee are confined to "discussing an amendment on which the two houses cannot agree." Rule 30-30(1), Joint Rules of the 67th Montana Legislature (2021). If one chamber requests a free conference committee and the other concurs, a free conference committee "may discuss and pose amendments to a bill in its entirety and is not confined to a particular amendment. However, a free conference committee is limited to consideration of amendments that are within the scope of the title of the introduced bill." Joint Rule 30-30(3)(a)(1).

Here, both Senate and House proceeded directly by appointing three of their members to a free conference committee. The free conference committee met on April 27, 2021, for sixteen minutes. There was no public

participation and/or public testimony, which are not permitted during a conference committee or free conference committee. During these sixteen minutes, the committee adopted several amendments, two of which are at issue in this case and will be discussed below.

The final version of SB 319 was titled as follows, with original underlines highlighting the amendments:

An Act generally revising campaign finance laws; creating joint fundraising committees; providing for certain reporting; establishing that if student organizations that are required to register as political committees are funded through additional optional student fees, those fees must be opt-in; prohibiting certain political activities in certain places operated by a public postsecondary institution; providing for judicial recusals under certain circumstances; providing penalties; and amending sections [listing sections]; and providing an effective date.

2021, Mont. Laws SB 319.

The following day, on April 28, 2021, both Senate and House passed SB 319. Governor Gianforte signed SB 319 into law on May 12, 2021.

Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on June 4, 2021, alleging SB 319 violates the single subject rule, Montana Constitution, Art. V, § 11(3) and the rule on amendments, Montana Constitution Art. V, §11(1).

PRINCIPLES OF LAW

Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is proper when no genuine issues of material fact exist, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Mont. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). Since the controlling issue before this Court is strictly a legal question, summary judgment is appropriate at this juncture as a matter of law. See *Lingscheit v. Cascade County*, 249 Mont. 526, 531, 817 P.2d 682 (1991).

Constitutional Issue

"Statutes are presumed to be constitutional, and it is the duty of this Court to avoid an unconstitutional interpretation if possible." Hernandez, ¶ 15 (citing Montanans for the Responsible Use of the School Trust v. State ex rel. Bd. of Land Comm'rs, 1999 MT 263, ¶ 11, 296 Mont. 402, 989 P.2d 800; State v. Nye, 283 Mont. 505, 510, 943 P.2d 96, 99 (1997)). The party challenging a statute's constitutionality bears the heavy burden of proving the statute is unconstitutional "beyond a reasonable doubt." Molnar v. Fox, 2013 MT 132, ¶ 49, 370 Mont. 238, 301 P.3d 824.

When interpreting constitutional provisions, we apply the same rules as those used in construing statutes. *Nelson v City of Billings*, 2018 MT 36, ¶ 14, 390 Mont. 290, 412 P.3d 1058. But just as with statutory interpretation, constitutional construction should not "lead to absurd results, if reasonable construction will avoid it." *Nelson*, ¶ 16 (citing *Grossman v. Mont. Dep't of Natural Res.*, 209 Mont. 427, 451, 682 P.2d 1319, 1332 (1984)). "The principle of reasonable construction 'allows courts to fulfill their adjudicatory mandate and preserve the [Framers'] objective." *Nelson*, ¶ 16 (citation omitted). Thus:

Even in the context of clear and unambiguous language . . . we have long held that we must determine constitutional intent not only from the plain meaning of the language used, but also in light of the historical and surrounding circumstances under which the Framers drafted the Constitution, the nature of the subject matter they faced, and the objective they sought to achieve.

Brown v. Gianforte, 2021 MT 149, $\P\P$ 32-33, 404 Mont. 269, 488 P.3d. 548 (citing authority).

Moreover, statutes conflicting with the Montana Constitution are subordinate to the constitution but, if possible, must be interpreted to harmonize with it. See *Pengra v. State*, 2000 MT 291, ¶ 14, 302 Mont. 276, 14 P.3d 499. In addition, a

statute's constitutionality "is prima facie presumed, and every intendment in its favor will be made unless its unconstitutionality appears beyond a reasonable doubt." *Judge*, 168 Mont. at 444 (citing authority). Notwithstanding, however, statutory application that is contrary to a "constitutional directive" is unconstitutional "under any level of scrutiny." *City of Missoula v. Mountain Water Co.*, 2018 MT 139, ¶ 31, 419 P.3d 685. Whether a statute is constitutional is a legal question. *Id*.

ANALYSIS

Through the Montana Constitution, the people of Montana have authorized the Montana Legislature to pass laws by bill. In adopting the Constitution, the people of Montana have also imposed limitations on legislative power. Two such limitations are at issue in this case. First, the Legislature may not alter or amend a bill during the legislative process so as to change its original purpose. Second, each bill shall contain only one subject, clearly expressed it its title.

Article V, Section 11 of the Montana Constitution provides, in relevant part:

- (1) A law shall be passed by bill which shall not be so altered or amended on its passage through the legislature as to change its original purpose.
- (3) Each bill, except general appropriation bills and bills for the codification and general revision of the laws, shall contain only one subject, clearly expressed in its title. If any subject is embraced in any act and is not expressed in the title, only so much of the act not so expressed is void.
- (6) A law may be challenged on the ground of noncompliance with this section only within two years after its effective date.

 Mont. Const. art. V, ¶ 11.

The Montana Supreme Court has explained the purpose of this restriction on legislative power:

Stated briefly, those purposes are to restrict the Legislature to the enactment of laws the subjects of which are made known to the lawmakers and to the public, to the end that anyone interested may follow intelligently the course of pending bills to prevent the legislators and the people generally being misled by false or deceptive titles, and to guard against the fraud which might result from incorporating in the body of a bill provisions foreign to its general purpose and concerning which no information is given by the title.

Johnson v. Meagher Cty., 116 Mont. 565, 570, 155 P.2d 750, 752 (1945) (quoting State ex rel. Foot v. Burr, 73 Mont. 586, 588, 238 P. 585, 585 (1925)).

The final version of SB 319 contains 27 sections, 21 of which directly relate to the establishment and regulation of joint fundraising committees. Section 1 provides for the creation of joint fundraising committees. Sections 3 through 20 amend statutes in Title 13, which incorporate references to joint fundraising committees. Sections 24 and 26 are contingent coordinating clauses also related to joint fundraising committees. Three of the sections in SB 319 are procedural. Section 23 is a codification instruction. Section 25 is a severability clause. Section 27 provides an effective date. Of the three remaining sections, two are at issue in this case.

Section 2 establishes that student fees to fund student political committees must be opt-in. Section 2 has not been challenged in this case.

Section 21 prohibits political committees from engaging in various political activities in specific locations on college campuses. Section 21 states, in primary part:

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A political committee may not direct, coordinate, manage, or conduct any voter identification efforts, voter registration drives, signature collection efforts, ballot collection efforts, or voter turnout efforts for a federal, state, local, or school election inside a residence hall, dining facility, or athletic facility operated by a public postsecondary institution.

2021, Mont. Laws, SB 319, § 21.

Section 22 requires judges to recuse themselves in any case in which any party or attorney has made more than 50% of the allowable campaign contribution to that judge's campaign.

Plaintiffs challenge Sections 21 and 22 of SB 319, claiming these provisions violate the single-subject rule expressed in Article V, Section 11(3) of the Montana Constitution. Plaintiffs contend SB 319 contains at least three subjects. In their complaint, Plaintiffs contend "[1] he creation of joint fundraising committees, standards for judicial conflicts of interest, and political speech on campus are independent and incongruous subjects. They are plainly unrelated."

Plaintiffs also challenge Sections 21 and 22 of SB 319, claiming these provisions violate the prohibition against amending a bill so as to change its original purpose. According to Plaintiffs, the legislative history of SB 319 clearly demonstrates the bill passed both the Senate and House without Sections 21 and 22. Those sections were only incorporated in the bill during a free conference committee—without public notice one day before the Legislature adjourned. Plaintiffs argue the Legislature violated Montana Constitution Art. V, § 11 by passing SB 319 by altering or amending the bill in such a manner it changed the bill's original purpose.

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The State argues SB 319 satisfies Article V, Section 11 because the titular purpose of the bill, "generally revise campaign finance laws," is a single subject description encompassing all sections of the bill. According to the State, the bill's "unitary, clear, topic" is "campaign and election practices" and Sections 21 and 22 of SB 319 "deal with campaign and election practices." Section 21, which prohibits political committees from conducting certain activities inside specific areas of public postsecondary institutions, is a campaign finance regulation "because section 21 plainly governs political committee expenditures and contributions."

Nonetheless, Section 21 bans select campaign activities and has no effect on campaign contributions, spending or disclosures. It does not regulate money in political activities. Rather, it places conditions on those who may participate in campaign activities like "voter identification" in on-campus residential, dining, and athletic facilities according to the identity of the person or organization engaged in the conduct. Section 21 regulates campaign activities. It does not regulate campaign finance.

The State argues Section 22 is properly a campaign finance provision because it requires recusal of a judge, based upon a contribution to the judge's campaign. According to the State, "[r]ecusal standards based on campaign contributions falls within the umbrella of 'campaign finance.'" In support of its argument, the State cites *Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co.*, 556 U.S. 868, 889, 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2266 (2009) and *Boland v. Boland (In re Estate of Boland)*, 2019 MT 236, ¶ 64, 397 Mont. 319, 450 P.3d 849, for the proposition that rules governing judicial recusal, if they relate to campaign contributions, are in fact campaign finance rules. While these cases relate to judicial recusal and

campaign contributions, they don't support the State's argument that rules regulating judicial recusal based upon campaign contributions *are* campaign finance rules.

Section 22 regulates judicial recusal—not campaign finance. Its purpose is to establish and define a judicial conflict of interest and to regulate when judges may preside over cases in which they've received certain campaign contributions. Section 22 does not change Montana's campaign finance law. It does not place limits on campaign contributions or alter campaign reporting requirements. Similarly, it does not change disclosure requirements or otherwise modify the regulatory framework which governs campaign financing.

Accordingly, the Court concludes SB 319 contains two subjects not related to campaign finance, in violation of the single subject rule embodied in the Montana Constitution, Article V, § 11(3). The Court further concludes SB 319 was amended during its passage through the legislature to an extent the bill's original purpose was changed in violation of the Montana Constitution, Article V, § 11(1). Prior to its final amendment during a free conference committee, SB 319's entire purpose was to revise campaign finance laws regarding the establishment and regulation of joint fundraising committees. By amending the bill to include provisions regarding political activities on college campuses and judicial recusal requirements, the Legislature altered the original purpose of the bill.

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Severability

Plaintiffs ask the Court to declare the entirety of SB 319 void. The State argues that in the event the Court invalidates part of SB 319, the remainder of law should remain. The Court agrees. SB 319 contains a severability clause which provides:

If a part of [this Act] is invalid all parts that are severable from the invalid part remain in effect. If a part of [this Act] is invalid in one or more of its applications, the part remains in effect in all valid applications that are severable from the invalid applications.

2021, Mont. Laws, SB 319.

The presence of a severability clause operates as affirmative evidence the Legislature intended the courts apply judicial severability to "strike only those provisions of the statute that are unconstitutional" to preserve the remaining objectives and purposes of the statute. *Williams v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs*, 2013 MT 243, ¶ 64, 371 Mont. 356, 308 P.3d 88.

Though "the presumption is against the mutilation of a statute," [] if removing the offending provisions will not frustrate the purpose or disrupt the integrity of the law, we will strike only those provisions of the statute that are unconstitutional.

Williams, ¶ 64 (citations omitted).

Because SB 319 contains a severability clause, the Legislature clearly demonstrated its intent the courts should strike only those provisions which are unconstitutional.

Accordingly,

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ORDER

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED Forward Montana's motion for summary judgment is **GRANTED**. Sections 21 and 22 of SB 319 are unconstitutional in that they violate the Montana Constitution, Article V, §§ 11(1) and (3).

IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED the July 1, 2021 Preliminary Injunction is converted to a Permanent Injunction.

DATED this 3^{*} day of February 2022.

MIKE MENAHAN
District Court Judge

Raph Graybill, (via email to: rgraybill@silverstatelaw.net Ryle Sommers-Flanagan, via email to: rylee@uppersevenlaw.com Kristin N. Hansen, via email to: kris.hansen@mt.gov Brent Mead, via email to: Brent.mead@mt.gov David M.S. Dewhirst, via email to: david.dewhirst@mt.gov Patrick M. Risken, via email to: prisken@mt.gov

MFM/sm/ADV-2021-611 Forward Montana, et al. v. State of Montana - Order on Motion for Summ Judgment

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MONTANA MISSOULA DIVISION

Montana Democratic Party, Montanans for Tester, Macee Patritti,

Plaintiffs.

v.

Christi Jacobsen, in her official capacity as Montana Secretary of State, Jeffrey Mangan, in his official capacity as Montana Commissioner of Political Practices,

Defendants.

Case No. CV-21-119-M-DWM

ORDER ON JOINT MOTION FOR STAY OF PROCEEDINGS

The parties jointly move the Court for a stay of this matter until May 20, 2022 and a continuation of all current deadlines in this matter given certain ongoing proceedings in the matter of *Forward Montana et al. v. Montana et al.*, Case No. ADV-2021-611 (Mont. Dist. Ct.). Finding a stay in this matter in the interest of conserving the resources of the parties and this Court, the requested stay is GRANTED.

IT IS ORDERED:

That all current proceedings in this matter are stayed and all ongoing deadlines ordered in this Court's Scheduling Order, ECF No. 25, are continued pending further update from the parties on the status of the matter in *Forward Montana* and their ongoing discussions regarding a potential resolution of this matter.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED:

The parties shall file, on or before May 20, 2022, a joint status update with this Court on the status of the proceedings in *Forward Montana* and their discussions regarding a potential resolution of this matter.

DATED this day of May, 2022.

United States District Court Judge

RELIBIENED FROM DEING CRACYDOCKET, COM