UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SAN ANTONIO DIVISION

LA UNIÓN DEL PUEBLO ENTERO, <i>et al.</i> , <i>Plaintiffs</i> , v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, <i>et al.</i> , <i>Defendants</i> .	S S S S S	Case No. 5:21-cv-844-XR [Lead Case]
LULAC TEXAS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. JOHN SCOTT, et al., Defendants.	S S S S S	Case No. 1:21-cv-786-XR [Consolidated Case]

MOTION TO DISMISS THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT OF LULAC TEXAS, ET AL.

A TEXA

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of Contentsii
Introduction1
Argument2
I. Plaintiffs Cannot Satisfy Ex parte Young
A. Plaintiffs Have Not Alleged that the Secretary of State Enforces the Challenged Provisions of SB1
B. Plaintiffs Have Not Alleged that the Attorney General Enforces the Challenged Provisions of SB1
C. Plaintiffs Do Not Plead an Alternative Exception to Sovereign Immunity9
II. Plaintiffs Lack Standing10
A. Plaintiffs Bear the Burden of Establishing Standing on a Claim-by-Claim Basis
B. Plaintiffs Have Not Plausibly Alleged Traceability or Redressability11
C. No Plaintiff Has Associational Standing12
D. None of the Plaintiffs Plausibly Allege a Cognizable Injury15
E. Plaintiffs Violate the Bar on Third-Party Standing18
III. Plaintiffs' Claims Fail as a Matter of Law
E. Plaintiffs Violate the Bar on Third-Party Standing

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases

<i>In re Abbott</i> , 956 F.3d at 709	7
Ala. State Conference of the NAACP v. Alabama, 949 F.3d 647 (11th Cir. 2020) (Branch, J., dissenting)	9
Ass'n for Retarded Citizens of Dall. v. Dall. Cnty. Mental Health & Retardation Ctr. Bd. o Trs.,	·
19 F.3d 241 (5th Cir. 1994)	
Ass'n of Cmty. Organizations for Reform Now v. Fowler, 178 F.3d 350 (5th Cir. 1999)	
Barker v. Halliburton Co., 645 F.3d 297 (5th Cir. 2011)	
Becker v. FEC, 230 F.3d 381 (1st Cir. 2000)	
Ass'n of Cmty. Organizations for Reform Now v. Fowler, 178 F.3d 350 (5th Cir. 1999) Barker v. Halliburton Co., 645 F.3d 297 (5th Cir. 2011) Becker v. FEC, 230 F.3d 381 (1st Cir. 2000) Berg v. Obama, 586 F.3d 234 (3d Cir. 2009) City of Austin v. Paxton, 943 F.3d 993 (5th Cir. 2019)	
<i>City of Austin v. Paxton</i> , 943 F.3d 993 (5th Cir. 2019)	passim
Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 568 U.S. 398 (2013)	15
Coon v. Ledbetter, 780 F.2d 1158 (5th Cir. 1986)	
Cornerstone Christian Sch. v. Univ. Interscholastic League, 563 F.3d 127 (5th Cir. 2009)	14
Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. EPA, 937 F.3d 533 (5th Cir. 2019)	
Ctr. for Law & Educ. v. Dep't of Educ., 396 F.3d 1152 (D.C. Cir. 2005)	
Danos v. Jones, 652 F.3d 577 (5th Cir. 2011)	

Case 5:21-cv-00844-XR Document 177 Filed 01/05/22 Page 4 of 28

Davis v. United States, 597 F.3d 646 (5th Cir. 2009)	2
<i>Def. Distributed v. U.S. Dep't of State</i> , No. 1:15-CV-372-RP, 2018 WL 3614221 (W.D. Tex. July 27, 2018)	17
Disability Rights Wis., Inc. v. Walworth Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 522 F.3d 796 (7th Cir. 2008)	14
Draper v. Healey, 827 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2017) (Souter, J.)	14
Duncan v. Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. Ctr. at Hous., 469 F. App'x 364 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam)	15
Fair Elections Obio v. Husted, 770 F.3d 456 (6th Cir. 2014)	
<i>FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas,</i> 493 U.S. 215 (1990)	
17 F. Supp. 3d 599 (S.D. Tex. 2014) (Costa, J.)	
In re Gee, 041 F 3d 153 (5th Cir. 2010) (per queiam)	11 15
<i>Gill v. Whitford</i> , 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018)	
Hancock Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors v. Rubr, 487 F. App'x 189 (5th Cir. 2012)	
Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250 (2006)	9
Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977)	
Jacobson v. Fla. Sec'y of State, 957 F.3d 1193 (11th Cir. 2020)	
La Asociacion de Trabajadores de Lake Forest v. City of Lake Forest, 624 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 2010)	16
Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118 (2014)	

Case 5:21-cv-00844-XR Document 177 Filed 01/05/22 Page 5 of 28

Louisiana ACORN Fair Hous. v. LeBlanc, 211 F.3d 298 (5th Cir. 2000)	17
<i>Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife</i> , 504 U.S. 555 (1992)	
Mi Familia Vota v. Abbott, 977 F.3d 461 (5th Cir. 2020)	2, 4
Morris v. Livingston, 739 F.3d 740 (5th Cir. 2014)	
NAACP v. City of Kyle, 626 F.3d 233 (5th Cir. 2010)	10, 13, 15, 17
Nat'l Taxpayers Union v. United States, 68 F.3d 1428 (D.C. Cir. 1995)	
Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union v. United States, 101 F.3d 1423, 1429 (D.C. Cir. 1996)	16
Ne. Ohio Coal. for Homeless v. Blackwell, 467 F.3d 999 (6th Cir. 2006)	
<i>OCA-Greater Houston v. Texas</i> , 867 F.3d 604 (2017)	9
Physician Hosps. of Am. v. Sebelius, 691 F.3d 649 (5th Cir. 2012)	2
 Ne. Ohio Coal. for Homeless v. Blackwell, 467 F.3d 999 (6th Cir. 2006) OCA-Greater Houston v. Texas, 867 F.3d 604 (2017) Physician Hosps. of Am. v. Sebelius, 691 F.3d 649 (5th Cir. 2012) Prison Justice League v. Bailey, 697 F. App'x 362 (5th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) 	
R <i>aj v. LSU</i> , 714 F.3d 322 (5th Cir. 2013)	
Ray v. Texas, No. 2-06-CV-385, 2008 WL 3457021 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 7, 2008)	
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robbins, 578 U.S. 330 (2016)	
Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488 (2009)	
Tex. Democratic Party v. Abbott, 961 F.3d 389 (5th Cir. 2020)	

Case 5:21-cv-00844-XR Document 177 Filed 01/05/22 Page 6 of 28

<i>Tex. Democratic Party v. Abbott</i> , 978 F.3d 168 (5th Cir. 2020)
<i>Tex. Democratic Party v. Hughs</i> , F. App'x, 2021 WL 2310010 (5th Cir. June 4, 2021) (per curiam)
<i>Texas Indigenous Council v. Simpkins</i> , No. 5:11-cv-315, 2014 WL 252024 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 22, 2014) (Rodriguez, J.)13
United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996)
<i>Zimmerman v. City of Austin,</i> 881 F.3d 378 (5th Cir. 2018)15
Constitutional Provisions
U.S. Const. art. III, § 2
Legislative Materials
An Act Relating to Election Integrity and Security, S.B. 1, 87th Leg., 2d Spec. Sess. (2021)
All Act Relating to Election Integrity and Security, S.B. 1, Scal Leg., 2d Spec. Sess. (2021) Statutes and Rules 42 U.S.C. § 1983
42 U.S.C. § 1983
52 U.S.C. § 10508

Tex. Elec. Code		
§ 15.028		7
6		3
§ 31.005		3
§ 31.006		7
5		7
		7
		6
§ 33.001(a)		3
•		
		4
5		4
\$ 33.0015		6
§§ 43.002–43.004		5
		5
§64.0322		5
§ 64.0322(a)		5
§ 64.0322(b)		5
§§ 83.001–83.0012		5
§ 86.001(c)	<u> </u>	6
§ 86.002(g)–(i)		6
§ 87.041		6
§ 87.0271	<u>e</u> t	6
§ 87.0411		6
	Ref Reference Content of the second s	

INTRODUCTION

LULAC Texas and their co-plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint (ECF 136) suffers from the same deficiencies as their original complaint. First, rather than address sovereign immunity claim-byclaim and provision-by-provision, as Fifth Circuit precedent requires, the LULAC Plaintiffs seem to take it for granted that the Secretary of State and the Attorney General (here, the "State Defendants") enforce all of Senate Bill 1 ("SB1"). Tex. Leg., *An Act Relating to Election Integrity and Security*, S.B. 1, 87th Leg., 2d Spec. Sess. (2021). In that regard, they appear to have sued the State Defendants just because they are the State's top election and legal officials. The LULAC Plaintiffs fail to identify specific provisions of SB1 that these defendants enforce and how that enforcement causes their alleged injuries.

The same is true with respect to standing. Fifth Circuit precedent instructs the LULAC Plaintiffs to plead standing claim-by-claim and provision-by-provision. But the LULAC Plaintiffs do not attempt to comply with this pleading requirement. Moreover, the LULAC Plaintiffs disregard well-established Fifth Circuit standards on associational and organizational standing. As to associational standing, the LULAC Plaintiffs provide only cursory information on their members and membership structure, making it impossible to tell if their members have actually been injured and (even if they have) if the LULAC Plaintiffs have standing based on those injuries. And as to organizational standing, the LULAC Plaintiffs fail to identify concrete interests that, if injured, would support Article III standing. Instead, they point to general social interests like increasing voter turnout or educating the public on SB1. But Fifth Circuit law rejects standing based on such interests.

The LULAC Plaintiffs cannot delay the resolution of threshold legal questions or avoid giving the State Defendants fair notice of their claims by keeping their allegations vague. The State Defendants respectfully request that the Court dismiss the claims against them.

ARGUMENT

I. Plaintiffs Cannot Satisfy Ex parte Young

Sovereign immunity "prohibits suits against state officials or agencies that are effectively suits against a state." *City of Austin v. Paxton*, 943 F.3d 993, 997 (5th Cir. 2019). Although "*Ex parte Young* allows injunctive or declaratory relief against a state official in her official capacity," it applies only when "the official has a sufficient 'connection' with the enforcement of the allegedly unconstitutional law." *Mi Familia Vota v. Abbott*, 977 F.3d 461, 467 (5th Cir. 2020).

Fifth Circuit "precedents distill three rules": (1) "it is not enough that the state official was merely the but-for cause of the problem that is at issue in the lawsuit"; (2) "where a statute is being challenged, ... a provision-by-provision analysis is required"; and (3) "in the particular context of Texas elections ... the Secretary's role varies, so [the plaintifs] must identify the Secretary's specific duties within the particular statutory provision." *Tex. Democratic Party v. Hughs*, 860 F. App'x 847, 877–78 (5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (citing *Tex. Democratic Party v. Abbott*, 978 F.3d 168, 175, 179–81 (5th Cir. 2020)).

At the pleading stage, "the plaintiffs' burden is to allege a plausible set of facts establishing jurisdiction." *Physician Hosps. of Am. v. Sebelius*, 691 F.3d 649, 652 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing *Davis v. United States*, 597 F.3d 646, 649–50 (5th Cir. 2009)). During the status conference, the parties discussed this issue. The State Defendants argued that "the plaintiffs haven't met their burden of specific allegations about what conduct from the defendants they are complaining of." Ex. A at 16. The Court sent "clear signals to all the plaintiff groups, you need to further amend your complaints here to address these challenges." *Id.* But the LULAC Plaintiffs did not address this problem in their amended complaint. They still fail to allege relevant enforcement roles for the Secretary of State and Attorney General on a claim-by-claim and provision-by-provision basis.

A. Plaintiffs Have Not Alleged that the Secretary of State Enforces the Challenged Provisions of SB1

Sovereign immunity precludes the LULAC Plaintiffs' claims against the Secretary of State because he does not have a sufficient connection with enforcement of SB1's challenged provisions. The LULAC Plaintiffs are required to identify which SB1 provisions they challenge and explain how the Secretary enforces those provisions. But they do no such thing.

As a preliminary matter, the LULAC Plaintiffs appear to cite the Secretary's status as the State's top election official as a reason why he is a proper defendant. Citing the Secretary's general authority under Texas Election Code §§ 33.001(a) and 31.003, they allege: "The Secretary is the State's chief elections officer and must 'obtain and maintain uniformity in the application, operation, and interpretation' of the State's election laws." ECF 136 ¶ 26. They further note the Secretary's authority under Texas Election Code § 31.005: "The Secretary has authority to 'take appropriate action to protect the voting rights' of Texans, including by ordering officials to correct offending conduct that 'impedes the free exercise of a citizen's voting rights." *Id.*

These allegations do not satisfy *Ex parte Young* because they do not "identify the Secretary's specific duties within the particular statutory provision" being challenged. *Tex. Democratic Party*, 860 F. App'x at 877–78 (citing *Tex. Democratic Party*, 978 F.3d at 179–80). "[I]t is not enough that the official have a 'general duty to see that the laws of the state are implemented." *Tex. Democratic Party v. Abbott*, 961 F.3d 389, 400–01 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing *Morris v. Livingston*, 739 F.3d 740, 746 (5th Cir. 2014)). But a general duty is all that the LULAC Plaintiffs allege. These provisions contain no specific enforcement obligation, let alone a specific obligation related to SB1. *See Tex. Democratic Party*, 860 F. App'x at 877–78 ("[I]n the particular context of Texas elections, . . . the Secretary's role varies, so" the LULAC Plaintiffs must "identify the Secretary's specific duties within the particular statutory provision" at issue.) (citing *Tex. Democratic Party*, 978 F.3d at 179–80). Citing those general statutes does not suffice.

The LULAC Plaintiffs' other allegations fare no better. They challenge numerous provisions

Case 5:21-cv-00844-XR Document 177 Filed 01/05/22 Page 11 of 28

of SB1, but only include allegations regarding the Secretary's duties in connection with two—§§ 4.04 and 6.03. ECF 136 ¶ 26. Indeed, the LULAC Plaintiffs make no mention at all of the Secretary's alleged role in enforcing SB1 except in their paragraph introducing that party. Thus, as an initial matter, the LULAC Plaintiffs' claims against the Secretary regarding every other provision of SB1 should be dismissed. Without a "provision-by-provision analysis," the LULAC Plaintiffs cannot carry their burden. *Tex. Democratic Party*, 860 F. App'x at 877.

The LULAC Plaintiffs' allegations regarding §§ 4.04 and 6.03 do not establish the requisite connection to enforcement. The LULAC Plaintiffs do not explain how enforcement by the Secretary results in the harms they allege. The Secretary is not a proper defendant because "[d]irecting the Secretary not to enforce [the challenged provisions] would not afford the Plaintiffs the relief that they seek." *Mi Familia Vota*, 977 F.3d at 468.

The Secretary's role under SB1 § 4.04 is not related to Plaintiffs' alleged injuries. That provision simply requires the Secretary to establish a training program for poll watchers, *see* Tex. Elec. Code § 33.008, that the training be publicly available, *id.* § 33.008(1), and that the system provide people who complete the training with a certificate, *id.* § 33.008(2). The LULAC Plaintiffs do not allege that the training program violates their rights. Indeed, their amended complaint does not mention the training program or § 4.04, except when describing the Secretary. *See* ECF 136 ¶ 26. Instead, the LULAC Plaintiffs complain about the potential future behavior of poll watchers, *see, e.g., id.* ¶¶ 179–83, but they do not allege that behavior is connected to the Secretary. The LULAC Plaintiffs seem to admit that local election officials, not the Secretary, will implement the poll-watching provisions they challenge. *See, e.g., id.* ¶ 180 (describing SB1's limitations on what election officials can do at polling places). *See Tex. Democratic Party*, 860 F. App'x at 878 (Secretary of State did not enforce voter registration law because the "county registrars are the ones who review voter registration applications.").

Case 5:21-cv-00844-XR Document 177 Filed 01/05/22 Page 12 of 28

Nor is the Secretary's role under SB1 § 6.03 related to the LULAC Plaintiffs' alleged injuries. That provision requires a person who assists a voter to submit a form certifying the assistor's name, relationship to the voter, and whether he or she received compensation from a political entity for assisting the voter. Tex. Elec. Code § 64.0322(a). The Secretary is responsible only for designing the form. *Id.* § 64.0322(b). SB1 does not delegate authority to the Secretary to enforce compliance should an individual fail to provide the information or oath required by these provisions. *See id.* §§ 64.0322, 64.034. Indeed, the forms are not even submitted to the Secretary. They are submitted to local election officers, who are responsible for ensuring assistors comply with the rules.

Even if the LULAC Plaintiffs had tried to connect the other SB1 provisions they challenge to the Secretary, they would have failed. They assert Counts I and IV against the Secretary. ECF 136 at 50, 58. In Count I, the LULAC Plaintiffs challenge SB1 §§ 3.04, 3.09, 3.10, 3.12, 3.13, 4.01, 4.02, 4.06, 4.07, 4.09, 4.12, 5.01–5.03, 5.07, 5.08, 6.03, 6.04, and 7.04. *Id.* ¶ 246. But the LULAC Plaintiffs fail to allege the Secretary's connection to enforcement of these provisions. The Secretary in fact does not enforce them.

For example, SB1 §§ 3.09, 3.40 and 3.12 amend Texas Election Code §§ 85.005, 85.006(b) and (e), and 85.061(a), respectively, and the early voting clerk enforces these provisions. *See* Tex. Elec. Code §§ 83.001–83.0012 (identifying whom is the early voting clerk and specifying that "[t]he early voting clerk shall conduct the early voting in each election"); *see also id.* at §§ 85.005, 85.006(b), 85.006(c), 85.0061(a) (specifying how the early voting clerk shall conduct early voting in certain elections). SB1 §§ 3.04 and 3.13 include amendments relating to the location of polling places, but the Secretary does not designate polling locations. *See Tex. Democratic Party v. Hughs*, 997 F.3d 288, 291 (5th Cir. 2021) (finding that "[t]he Secretary plays no role"); *see also* Tex. Elec. Code §§ 43.002–43.004 (assigning this responsibility to local officials).

The Secretary also does not enforce the challenged provisions relating to watchers, that is, SB1

Case 5:21-cv-00844-XR Document 177 Filed 01/05/22 Page 13 of 28

§§ 4.01, 4.02, 4.06, 4.07, 4.09, and 4.12. Section 4.02, at most, imposes obligations on poll watchers, not the Secretary. Tex. Elec. Code § 33.0015. The others specify no enforcement role for the Secretary. *See id.* §§ 32.075 (amended by § 4.01); 33.051 (amended by § 4.06); 33.056 (amended by § 4.07); 33.061 (amended by § 4.09); 86.006 (amended by § 4.12). As to §§ 5.01–5.03, and 5.07, the early voting clerk, not the Secretary, enforces the ballot-application requirements. Tex. Elec. Code § 86.001(c). SB1 § 5.08 requires that the carrier envelope include spaces for voters to include information, *id.* § 86.002(g)–(i), but the signature verification committee and early voting ballot board are responsible for verifying that individuals provide the required information. *See id.* §§ 87.0271, 87.041, 87.0411.

The Secretary does not enforce SB1 §§ 6.03 and 6.04 either. Section 6.03 is discussed above. Section 6.04 requires a person providing assistance to a voter that is not an election officer to take an oath administered by an election officer before providing assistance. *Id.* § 64.034. It is "an election officer at the polling place," not the Secretary, who administers and enforces the oath requirement. *Id.*; *see also id.* §§ 32.071 ("The presiding judge is in charge of and responsible for the management and conduct of the election at the polling place....); 32.074 ("An election judge or clerk may administer any oath required or authorized to be made at the polling place.").

Section 7.04 is both the final provision of SB1 challenged in Count I and the only provision challenged in Count IV. ECF 136 ¶¶ 246, 285. SB1 § 7.04 adds §§ 276.015–.019 to the Election Code. These provisions assign no enforcement role to the Secretary, and the LULAC Plaintiffs have not alleged that he enforces them.

B. Plaintiffs Have Not Alleged that the Attorney General Enforces the Challenged Provisions of SB1

Sovereign immunity also bars the LULAC Plaintiffs' claims against the Attorney General. Again, allegations that the Attorney General has a general duty to enforce state laws, ECF 136 ¶ 27, are not enough to satisfy *Ex parte Young. See Tex. Democratic Party*, 961 F.3d at 401–02. A "provision-by-provision analysis is required" to show that a state official has the requisite connection to each

Case 5:21-cv-00844-XR Document 177 Filed 01/05/22 Page 14 of 28

challenged provision. *Tex. Democratic Party*, 860 F. App'x at 877. Though they challenge numerous SB1 provisions, the LULAC Plaintiffs only discuss the Attorney General in relation to five—§§ 2.04, 2.08, 6.03, 6.04, and 7.04. ECF 136 ¶ 27. For this reason, the LULAC Plaintiffs have not satisfied their burden to show that the Attorney General is a proper defendant for challenges to any other provision.

The LULAC Plaintiffs' allegations are also insufficient even for the provisions they mention: \S 2.04, 2.08, 6.03, 6.04, and 7.04. The LULAC Plaintiffs observe that § 2.04 "requires the Attorney General to be informed of all instances of unlawful voting or registration" and contend that it "empowers the Attorney General to use that information to prosecute such crimes." ECF 136 ¶ 27. But the Attorney General does not *enforce* § 2.04. Under that provision, he merely receives information. *See* SB1 § 2.04 (amending Tex. Elec. Code § 15.028). Enforcement is defined by "compulsion or constraint," *City of Austin*, 943 F.3d at 1000, but § 2.04 does not empower the Attorney General to compel or constrain anyone. Because "the requisite connection is absent," the *Ex parte Young* analysis ends there. *In re Abbott*, 956 F.3d 696, 709 (5th Gir. 2020) (citing *City of Austin*, 943 F.3d at 998), *vacated as moot sub nom. Planned Parentbood Ctr. for Choice v. Abbott*, 141 S. Ct. 1261 (2021). In any event, the LULAC Plaintiffs do not contend that the Attorney General would violate federal law by merely receiving information.

Nor does the Attorney General enforce § 2.08. Under that provision, just like under § 2.04, the Attorney General receives information indicating that a criminal violation of the State's election laws may have occurred. In fact, the provision's primary effect is to establish that such information is not public information until after the investigation is completed. Tex. Elec. Code § 31.006(b). Nothing in Texas Election Code § 31.006 compels the Attorney General to take an enforcement action. Indeed, it expressly contemplates that he has discretion to determine that "the information referred does not warrant an investigation." *Id.* § 31.006(b)(2).

As for SB1 §§ 6.03, 6.04, and 7.04, the LULAC Plaintiffs allege that the "Attorney General

Case 5:21-cv-00844-XR Document 177 Filed 01/05/22 Page 15 of 28

has... made clear that he plans to enforce" provisions of SB1, including "violations of voter assistance laws, like SB1 6.03–6.04, and so-called vote harvesting laws, like 7.04," based on the Attorney General's announcement "that he would be forming the Texas Election Integrity Unit." ECF 136 ¶ 27. The LULAC Plaintiffs allege that "[t]he Attorney General is empowered to 'prosecute a criminal offense prescribed by the election laws of [the] state,' Tex. Elec. Code § 273.021(a), including the new criminal provisions of SB 1." Id. However, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals recently held that Texas Election Code § 273.021 "is unconstitutional" and the Attorney General "cannot initiate prosecution [of election cases] unilaterally." State v. Stephens, No. PD-1032-20, 2021 WL 5917198, at *1, 8 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 15, 2021). As a result, "the authority of the Attorney General is limited to assisting the district or county attorney upon request." Id. at *9. This Court must "take the word of the highest court on criminal matters of Texas as to the interpretation of its law." Arnold v. Cockrell, 306 F.3d 277, 279 (5th Cir. 2002) (per curiam). "Speculation that [the Attorney General] might be asked by a local prosecutor to 'assist' in enforcing' SB1 'is inadequate to support an Ex parte Young action against the Attorney General." In a Abbott, 956 F.3d at 709 (citing City of Austin, 943 F.3d at 1000). Accordingly, these and other allegations relating to the Attorney General's authority to prosecute violations of Texas's election laws are also insufficient to establish the Attorney General as a proper defendant.

Because the LULAC Plaintiffs have not alleged, on a provision-by-provision basis, "that the Attorney General *has* the authority to enforce" the particular provisions at issue, *City of Austin*, 943 F.3d at 1001, there is no need to proceed to the next step in the analysis. Their claims fail out of the gate.

But if the Court reaches the second step, it must consider whether the LULAC Plaintiffs have

¹ The State of Texas and the Attorney General believe that *Stephens* was wrongly decided. The State has filed a motion asking the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals to reconsider its decision.

Case 5:21-cv-00844-XR Document 177 Filed 01/05/22 Page 16 of 28

plausibly alleged "that [the Attorney General] is likely to" enforce the particular provisions at issue in the way Plaintiffs claim. *Id.* at 1002. The decision of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals discussed above holds that the Attorney General cannot do so unilaterally. *See Stephens*, 2021 WL 5917198, at *1, 8. Moreover, to the extent the LULAC Plaintiffs rely on the Attorney General's prior investigations and prosecutions, "that he has chosen to" enforce "*different* statutes under *different* circumstances does not show that he is likely to" enforce the provisions Plaintiffs challenge in the manner they allege. *City of Austin*, 943 F.3d at 1002. The LULAC Plaintiffs do not and cannot plausibly allege that the Attorney General will bring suits that violate federal law. That is especially true in light of the "presumption of regularity" afforded "prosecutorial decisions." *United States v. Armstrong*, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996); *see also Hartman v. Moore*, 547 U.S. 250, 263 (2006).

C. Plaintiffs Do Not Plead an Alternative Exception to Sovereign Immunity

Sovereign immunity bars the LULAC Plaintiffs' claims unless they show that sovereign immunity has been "waived by the state, abrogated by Congress, or an exception applies." *Tex*. *Democratic Party*, 978 F.3d at 179 (citing *City of Austin*, 943 F.3d at 997). The *Ex parte Young* exception does not apply for the reasons above, and the LULAC Plaintiffs have not pleaded waiver or abrogation by Congress that would permit their claims to proceed. And if they had tried, they would have been wrong.

The LULAC Plaintiffs do not assert Count II against the State Defendants. ECF 136 at 52. For Count III, "Congress has not abrogated state sovereign immunity . . . under § 1983." *Raj v. LSU*, 714 F.3d 322, 328 (5th Cir. 2013). As to Counts I and IV, although *OCA-Greater Houston v. Texas* holds, without analysis, that the Voting Rights Act abrogates sovereign immunity, 867 F.3d 604, 614 (5th Cir. 2017), that case was wrongly decided. "Congress did not unequivocally abrogate state sovereign immunity under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act." *Ala. State Conference of the NAACP v. Alabama*, 949 F.3d 647, 655 (11th Cir. 2020) (Branch, J., dissenting). Nor did it do so in Section 208. When the

Case 5:21-cv-00844-XR Document 177 Filed 01/05/22 Page 17 of 28

VRA authorizes relief against States, it does so through suits brought by the Attorney General, *see, e.g.*, 52 U.S.C. § 10308(d), which the Supreme Court has held are not subject to sovereign immunity. *See West Virginia v. United States*, 479 U.S. 305, 312 n.4 (1987); *United States v. Mississippi*, 380 U.S. 128, 140 (1965). Although this Court is bound by *OCA-Greater Houston*, the State Defendants preserve this argument for appeal.

II. Plaintiffs Lack Standing

A. Plaintiffs Bear the Burden of Establishing Standing on a Claim-by-Claim Basis

"[S]tanding is perhaps the most important of the jurisdictional doctrines." *FW/PBS, Inc. v. City* of *Dallas*, 493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990) (quotation omitted). At the pleading stage, the LULAC Plaintiffs must "clearly... allege facts demonstrating each element" of standing. *Spokeo, Inc. v. Robbins*, 578 U.S. 330, 339 (2016) (quotation omitted). A plaintiff must show (1) an actual or imminent, concrete and particularized "injury-in-fact"; (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. *Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife*, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992).

Artificial entities have two options for trying to establish standing: (1) associational standing and (2) organizational standing. *See NAACP v. City of Kyle*, 626 F.3d 233, 237–38 (5th Cir. 2010). For associational standing, the entity must show that (1) its members would independently have standing; (2) the interests the organization is protecting are germane to the purpose of the organization; and (3) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires participation of individual members. *Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. EPA*, 937 F.3d 533, 536 (5th Cir. 2019). For organizational standing, the plaintiff must establish, in its own right, an injury in fact, causation, and redressability. *Id*.

Because the LULAC Plaintiffs are "invoking federal jurisdiction," they "bear[] the burden of establishing these elements." *Lujan*, 504 U.S. at 561. Additionally, because "[s]tanding is not dispensed in gross," the LULAC Plaintiffs must plausibly allege "standing to challenge *each provision* of law at

Case 5:21-cv-00844-XR Document 177 Filed 01/05/22 Page 18 of 28

issue." *In re Gee*, 941 F.3d 153, 161–62 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (emphasis added). But rather than proceed "provision-by-provision" and "claim-by-claim," *id.* at 165, 170, the LULAC Plaintiffs' standing allegations often treat SB1 as an undifferentiated whole. That does not suffice.

B. Plaintiffs Have Not Plausibly Alleged Traceability or Redressability

As an initial matter, the LULAC Plaintiffs lack standing because their alleged harms are neither traceable to the State Defendants nor redressable by this Court. By and large, the LULAC Plaintiffs challenge SB1 as an undifferentiated whole, without tying their alleged injuries to particular enforcement actions by any of the State Defendants. But as explained in Part I, none of the State Defendants have broad power to enforce all of SB1. The *Ex parte Young* analysis above "significantly overlap[s]" with the traceability and redressability analysis. *City of Austin*, 943 F.3d at 1002. However, traceability and redressability are still required even when sovereign immunity is inapplicable. *See* U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. The LULAC Plaintiffs fail to address these requirements. Their claims against the State Defendants cannot proceed because they do not connect their alleged injuries to the Secretary's or the Attorney General's actions, or explain how enjoining them will redress those injuries.

To be sure, *OCA-Greater Houston* wrongly found standing satisfied in an earlier suit against the Secretary of State because the Secretary "serves as the 'chief election officer of the state." 867 F.3d at 613. But *OCA* "involved a *facial* challenge under the Voting Rights Act," not "an as-applied challenge to a law enforced by local officials." *Tex. Democratic Party v. Hughs*, 974 F.3d 570, 571 (5th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (distinguishing *OCA*). Its reasoning is limited, at least, to cases considering "[t]he facial validity of a Texas election statute." *OCA*, 867 F.3d at 613.

In any event, *OCA* is inconsistent with Texas authorities, which control on the underlying question of Texas law: Does being the "chief election officer" empower the Secretary to enforce Section 6.04? No, because the "Secretary's title chief election officer is not a delegation of authority to care for any breakdown in the election process." *In re Hotze*, 627 S.W.3d 642, 649 (Tex. 2020)

Case 5:21-cv-00844-XR Document 177 Filed 01/05/22 Page 19 of 28

(Blacklock, J., concurring) (describing *Bullock v. Calvert*, 480 S.W.2d 367 (Tex. 1972)) (quotation marks omitted). *OCA* did not consider these precedents, or any other opinions from Texas courts. Justice Blacklock's *In re Hotze* concurrence post-dated *OCA*, so the *OCA* court did not have a chance to consider that opinion. And the *OCA* court appears to have been unaware of *Calvert*, which was not cited in the parties' briefs. Because *OCA* did not "squarely address[]" Texas cases interpreting the Secretary's role as chief election officer, it is not binding "by way of stare decisis." *Brecht v. Abrahamson*, 507 U.S. 619, 631 (1993); *see Wilson v. Taylor*, 658 F.2d 1021, 1034–35 (5th Cir. 1981) (refusing to follow a Fifth Circuit opinion that conflicted with a previous Supreme Court opinion that "was not called to the attention of the [first Fifth Circuit] panel").

C. No Plaintiff Has Associational Standing

The amended complaint does not plausibly allege facts establishing associational standing. A plaintiff cannot have associational standing unless one of its members independently satisfies the Article III standing requirements. *Ctr. for Biological Diversity*, 937 F.3d at 536. The plaintiff must therefore make two threshold showings: (1) that it has "members" within the meaning of the associational standing test from *Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm'n*, 432 U.S. 333, 344 (1997) (requiring "indicia of membership"), and (2) that identified members have "suffered the requisite harm," *Summers v. Earth Island Inst.*, 555 U.S. 488, 499 (2009). The LULAC Plaintiffs here have done neither.

The LULAC Plaintiffs have failed to establish they have "members" within the meaning of the *Hunt* test. Voto Latino does not even describe itself as having members. Indeed, the most recent financial disclosure form on its website told the IRS that it did not "have members," much less "members . . . who had the power to elect or appoint one or more members of the governing body." *See* ECF 54-2 (answering "No" to questions 6 and 7a in Part VI.A of IRS Form 990). Voto Latino instead claims to act on behalf of various Texas communities, *id.*, but the beneficiaries of a plaintiff's

Case 5:21-cv-00844-XR Document 177 Filed 01/05/22 Page 20 of 28

services do not qualify as members for purposes of associational standing. *See Ne. Ohio Coal. for Homeless v. Blackwell*, 467 F.3d 999, 1010 n.4 (6th Cir. 2006) ("[T]he Northeast Ohio Coalition for the Homeless apparently seeks to assert a form of representational standing never recognized by any court—standing on behalf of the group served by the organization."). Not having members is fatal to associational standing.

The remaining Plaintiffs claim to have members in the colloquial sense, but they fail to allege that each of those individuals "possess all of the indicia of membership": that "[t]hey alone elect the members of the [governing board]; they alone may serve on the [governing board]; they alone finance its activities, including the costs of this lawsuit, through assessments levied upon them." *Hunt*, 432 U.S. at 344–45. Generally, members must "participate in and guide the organization's efforts." *Ass'n for Retarded Citizens of Dall. v. Dall. Cnty. Mental Health &* Retardation Ctr. Bd. of Trs., 19 F.3d 241, 244 (5th Cir. 1994). More specifically, the members must "elect leadership, serve as the organization's leadership, and finance the organization's activities, including the case's litigation costs." *Texas Indigenous Council v. Simpkins*, No. 5:11-cv 315, 2014 WL 252024, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 22, 2014) (Rodriguez, J.). The LULAC Plaintiffs assert no facts to this end.

Second, even assuming Plaintiffs have members, they fail to "identify members who have suffered the requisite harm" to establish injuries in fact. *Summers*, 555 U.S. at 499. This requires, among other things, allegations of a "specific member" and specific facts establishing how that member will suffer an injury in fact. *City of Kyle*, 626 F.3d at 237. As this Court recognized at the status conference, the LULAC Plaintiffs' original complaint did not "identify[] specific members of those associations who would themselves have standing to sue." Ex. A at 18. The Court advised the plaintiffs "to flush that out because I don't see where many of you have articulated those individuals sufficient to withstand any challenge." *Id.* But the LULAC Plaintiffs did not follow that advice.

This defect is independently sufficient to warrant dismissal of the LULAC Plaintiffs' claims.

Case 5:21-cv-00844-XR Document 177 Filed 01/05/22 Page 21 of 28

See Draper v. Healey, 827 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2017) (Souter, J.) (dismissing claim for lack of standing where entity plaintiff failed to identify a member who was affected by the challenged regulation); *Disability Rights Wis., Inc. v. Walworth Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors*, 522 F.3d 796, 804 (7th Cir. 2008) (dismissing claim for lack of standing where entity plaintiff failed to identify a member who was affected by the disability policy).²

Finally, even if the LULAC Plaintiffs otherwise had associational standing (they do not), they would not be able to rely on associational standing for their disability-based claim: Count IV under § 208 of the VRA. The third element of associational standing demands that "neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires participation of individual members." *Ctr. for Biological Diversity*, 937 F.3d at 536. "To determine whether" a "claim require[s] individual participation," courts "examine[] the claim's substance." *Cornerstone Christian Sch. J. Univ. Interscholastic League*, 563 F.3d 127, 134 (5th Cir. 2009). If the claim has an "individualized element," then "[t]he involvement of" individual members "is essential to the resolution of the" claim. *Id.*

Here, the LULAC Plaintiffs' disability claim requires the participation of individual members, both because it has individualized elements and because of the relief requested. First, a plaintiff must identify which aspect of § 208 has been violated. That statute applies to several different categories of impairments: "blindness, disability, or inability to read or write." 52 U.S.C. § 10508. And as with all impairments, these vary in degree and effect. For these reasons, a voter's entitlement to assistance under § 208 is based on a specific voter's disability and the assistance necessary to accommodate that voter. *See, e.g., Ray v. Texas*, No. 2-06-CV-385, 2008 WL 3457021, at *1–3, 6–7 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 7, 2008) (considering the specific effect of Texas early voting law on group of elderly plaintiffs). This

² Although an unpublished opinion of the Fifth Circuit once noted that the panel was "aware of no precedent holding that an association must set forth the name of a particular member in its complaint," *Hancock Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors v. Ruhr*, 487 F. App'x 189, 198 (5th Cir. 2012), the precedent cited above holds exactly that.

Case 5:21-cv-00844-XR Document 177 Filed 01/05/22 Page 22 of 28

requires a "case-by-case analysis" of plaintiff-specific facts and circumstances. *Duncan v. Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. Ctr. at Hous.*, 469 F. App'x 364, 369 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam). The LULAC Plaintiffs' "complaint alleges no facts suggesting" that disabled voters will face "uniform" issues across Texas's 254 counties and despite variation in individual disabilities. *Prison Justice League v. Bailey*, 697 F. App'x 362, 363 (5th Cir. 2017) (per curiam). In the absence of such uniformity, individual participation is crucial for understanding the merits of a disability claim.

D. None of the Plaintiffs Plausibly Allege a Cognizable Injury

The LULAC Plaintiffs do not have organizational standing because they have not plausibly alleged that they, as organizations, will suffer injuries in-fact. The LULAC Plaintiffs do not claim to be "the object of the government action or inaction [they] challenge[]," so standing is "substantially more difficult to establish." *Lujan*, 504 U.S. at 562 (quotation omitted). Instead, all four Plaintiffs claim that SB1's effects on third parties force them to divert resources from other programs and activities. ECF 136 ¶¶ 20, 22, 24–25, 248, 279. As an initial matter, the LULAC Plaintiffs' allegations are insufficient because they treat SB1 as an undifferentiated whole rather than address "each provision of law at issue." *In re Gee*, 941 F.3d at 161–62. This Court must "decide [standing] on a provision-by-provision basis." *Id.* at 165.

In any event, although the diversion of resources can constitute a requisite injury under certain circumstances, "[n]ot every diversion of resources to counteract [a] defendant's conduct... establishes an injury in fact." *City of Kyle*, 626 F.3d at 238. First, an organization's decision to divert resources cannot itself be speculative. "The change in plans must still be in response to a reasonably certain injury imposed by the challenged law." *Zimmerman v. City of Austin*, 881 F.3d 378, 390 (5th Cir. 2018). Plaintiffs "cannot manufacture standing merely by inflicting harm on themselves based on their fears of hypothetical future harm that is not certainly impending." *Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA*, 568 U.S. 398, 402 (2013). Rather, the organization must act in response to an impending injury. That is, a

Case 5:21-cv-00844-XR Document 177 Filed 01/05/22 Page 23 of 28

diversion of resources is cognizable only if the plaintiff "would have suffered some other injury if it had not diverted resources to counteracting the problem." *La Asociacion de Trabajadores de Lake Forest v. City of Lake Forest*, 624 F.3d 1083, 1088 (9th Cir. 2010).

The alleged underlying injury must also be concrete. "Frustration of an organization's objectives is the type of abstract concern that does not impart standing." *Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union v. United States*, 101 F.3d 1423, 1429 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quotation omitted). Allegations of impaired "issue-advocacy" do not suffice. *Ctr. for Law & Educ. v. Dep't of Educ.*, 396 F.3d 1152, 1162 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Thus, "a showing that an organization's mission is in direct conflict with a defendant's conduct is insufficient, in and of itself, to confer standing on the organization to sue on its own behalf." *Ass'n of Cmty. Organizations for Reform Now v. Fowler*, 178 F.3d 350, 361 n.7 (5th Cir. 1999).

In this case, none of the LULAC Plaintiffs identify a cognizable injury they would suffer if they did not divert their resources. LULAC claims that it "must divert resources . . . to address the adverse impacts of SB1." ECF 136 ¶ 20. LULAC does not claim that these "adverse impacts" affect *its* activities. Instead, it casts its objection as a concern over the burden SB1 allegedly imposes on LULAC's members. *Id.; see also id.* ¶ 248, 279. The most LULAC implies is a relationship between SB1 and voter turnout among Latino communities, which, it contends, is "critical" to its mission. *Id.* ¶ 20. But the "abstract social interest in maximizing voter turnout . . . cannot confer Article III standing." *Fair Elections Ohio v. Husted*, 770 F.3d 456, 461 (6th Cir. 2014). And an interest in increasing turnout for particular groups is akin to a "generalized partisan preference[]," which the Supreme Court held insufficient to establish Article III standing. *Gill v. Whitford*, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1933 (2018). Regardless, "a stated interest in an issue is not enough unless there is a concrete showing of how the allegedly discriminatory . . . practice is going to impair the organization's activities." *Galveston Open Gov't Project v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev.*, 17 F. Supp. 3d 599, 613 (S.D. Tex. 2014) (Costa, J.). That is missing here.

Case 5:21-cv-00844-XR Document 177 Filed 01/05/22 Page 24 of 28

The harms alleged by Voto Latino fall flat for similar reasons. Voto Latino claims that it "will need to divert funds . . . , as well as the time and energy of its staff and volunteers in Texas, to educate its constituents" about SB1. ECF 136 ¶ 22. As an initial matter, an organization's "self-serving observation that it has expended resources to educate its members and others regarding [the challenged law] does not present an injury in fact." *Nat'l Taxpayers Union v. United States*, 68 F.3d 1428, 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Voto Latino characterizes the diversion of resources as being directed towards "combat[ing] SB 1's effects on its core constituency" and "Texans that Voto Latino works to support" rather than SB1's impact on its own activities. ECF 136 ¶ 22; *see also id.* ¶¶ 248, 279. Voto Latino claims that SB1 "frustrates its mission of enfranchising and turning out Latinx voters in Texas." *Id.* ¶ 22. But again, maximizing voter turnout is not a concrete interest. *Fair Elections Ohio*, 770 F.3d at 461; *see also Gill*, 138 S. Ct. at 1933.

TARA and Texas AFT, meanwhile, argue that the diversion of resources is necessary to educate members on the new law, ECF 136 ¶¶ 24–25, but educating voters, on its own, is not an injury in-fact. *Nat'l Taxpayers Union*, 68 F.3d at 1434. In addition, to establish standing, "an organizational plaintiff must explain how the activities it undertakes in response to the defendant's conduct differ from its 'routine [] activities." *Def. Distributed v. U.S. Dep't of State*, No. 1:15-CV-372-RP, 2018 WL 3614221, at *4 (W.D. Tex. July 27, 2018) (quoting *City of Kyle*, 626 F.3d at 238). And it must "identify 'specific projects that [it] had to put on hold or otherwise curtail in order to respond to' the defendant's conduct." *Id.* (quoting *Louisiana ACORN Fair Hous. v. LeBlanc*, 211 F.3d 298, 305 (5th Cir. 2000)). TARA and Texas AFT allege none of this.

Finally, both TARA and Texas AFT contend that SB1 "threaten[s] the electoral prospects" of their "endorsed candidates," ECF 136 ¶ 23, impairing their ability "to help [their] membership select leaders" who support their memberships' interests. *Id.* ¶ 25. The argument fails, however, because not only have Plaintiffs not alleged that SB1 disproportionately affects the candidates TARA and Texas

Case 5:21-cv-00844-XR Document 177 Filed 01/05/22 Page 25 of 28

AFT prefer, but "[a]n organization's general interest in its preferred candidates winning as many elections as possible is still a 'generalized partisan preference[]' that federal courts are 'not responsible for vindicating." *Jacobson v. Fla. Sec'y of State*, 957 F.3d 1193, 1206 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting *Gill*, 138 S. Ct. at 1933). Thus, even though TARA claims that SB1 frustrates its mission, ECF 136 ¶ 23, none of the consequences that TARA attributes to SB1 constitute a legal harm. *See Berg v. Obama*, 586 F.3d 234, 240 (3d Cir. 2009) (explaining that a plaintiff's "wish that . . . voters had chosen a different presidential candidate" is not "a legal harm"); *see also Becker v. FEC*, 230 F.3d 381, 390 (1st Cir. 2000). TARA also appears to assert an interest in general voter turnout. ECF 136 ¶ 24 (alleging that TARA "spends resources on voter registration, phone banking, and GOTV [get-out-the-vote] activities"). But as explained above, that interest does not support Article III standing.

OCA-Greater Houston, about which the Court asked at the status conference, is not to the contrary. In that case, the Fifth Circuit considered whether a plaintiff's alleged diversion of resources was an injury in fact. The court analyzed a "critical distinction": whether the expenses "were related to litigation" or "unrelated to litigation." OCA, 867 F.3d at 612. That is an important limitation on organizational standing, but it is not at issue in this case.

In this case, one key question is whether the LULAC Plaintiffs' alleged diversions of resources are self-inflicted injuries or necessary responses to cognizable injuries they otherwise would have suffered. *OCA* did not analyze that question, seemingly because the parties did not brief it. The court there simply did not consider whether the plaintiff's "change in plans" was "in response to a reasonably certain injury imposed by the challenged law," as other precedent requires the Court to address here. *Zimmerman*, 881 F.3d at 390.

E. Plaintiffs Violate the Bar on Third-Party Standing

Finally, the LULAC Plaintiffs lack standing for another reason: the bar on third-party standing. The LULAC Plaintiffs' Count III is based on § 1983, but that statute provides a cause of action only

Case 5:21-cv-00844-XR Document 177 Filed 01/05/22 Page 26 of 28

when *the plaintiff* suffers "the deprivation of any rights" at issue. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The same is true for the LULAC Plaintiffs' other causes of action. A "third party may not assert a civil rights claim based on the civil rights violations of another individual." *Barker v. Halliburton Co.*, 645 F.3d 297, 300 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing *Coon v. Ledbetter*, 780 F.2d 1158, 1160–61 (5th Cir. 1986)). Thus, where the "alleged rights at issue" belong to a third party, the plaintiff lacks statutory standing, regardless of whether the plaintiff has suffered his own injury. *Danos v. Jones*, 652 F.3d 577, 582 (5th Cir. 2011); *see also Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.*, 572 U.S. 118, 127–28 nn.3–4 (2014). Here, the LULAC Plaintiffs rely on the rights of third parties because they do not possess the relevant rights (*e.g.*, the right to vote, the right to assistance with voting if you have a disability). The LULAC Plaintiffs have not alleged any exception to the general prohibition on third-party standing.

III. Plaintiffs' Claims Fail as a Matter of Law

Finally, the LULAC Plaintiffs' claims under § 2 and 208 of the Voting Rights Act must be dismissed because those statutes do not create a private cause of action. State Defendants will not burden the Court with further briefing on these issues that they raised in their previous Motion to Dismiss, ECF 54 at 16–21, because of the Court's denial of these arguments during the November 16, 2021 status conference. State Defendants respectfully disagree with that ruling and raise these arguments to preserve them for further review.

CONCLUSION

State Defendants respectfully request that the Court dismiss the claims against them.

Case 5:21-cv-00844-XR Document 177 Filed 01/05/22 Page 27 of 28

Date: January 5, 2022

KEN PAXTON Attorney General of Texas

BRENT WEBSTER First Assistant Attorney General

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL P.O. Box 12548 (MC-009) Austin, Texas 78711-2548 Tel.: (512) 463-2100 Fax: (512) 457-4410 Respectfully submitted.

/s/ Patrick K. Sweeten

PATRICK K. SWEETEN Deputy Attorney General for Special Litigation patrick.sweeten@oag.texas.gov Tex. State Bar No. 00798537

WILLIAM T. THOMPSON Deputy Chief, Special Litigation Unit will.thompson@oag.texas.gov Tex. State Bar No. 24088531

ERIC A. HUDSON Senior Special Counsel eric.hudson@oag.texas.gov Tex. Bar No. 24059977

KATHLEEN T. HUNKER Special Counsel kathleen.hunker@oag.texas.gov Tex. State Bar No. 24118415 *Application for Admission Pending

LEIF A. OLSON Special Counsel leif.olson@oag.texas.gov Tex. State Bar No. 24032801

JEFFREY M. WHITE Special Counsel jeff.white@oag.texas.gov Tex. State Bar No. 24064380

JACK B. DISORBO Assistant Attorney General jack.disorbo@oag.texas.gov Tex. State Bar No. 24120804

COUNSEL FOR STATE DEFENDANTS

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a true and accurate copy of the foregoing document was filed electronically (via CM/ECF) on January 5, 2022, and that all counsel of record were served by CM/ECF.


/s/ Patrick K. Sweeten PATRICK K. SWEETEN

RETRIEVED FROM DEMOCRACYDOCKET.COM


UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS SAN ANTONIO DIVISION

LA UNIÓN DEL PUEBLO ENTERO, <i>et al.</i> , <i>Plaintiffs</i> , v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, <i>et al.</i> , <i>Defendants</i> .	S Case No. 5:21-cv-844-XR [Lead Case] S
LULAC TEXAS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. JOHN SCOTT, et al., Defendants. EXH	S Case No. 1:21-cv-786-XR [Consolidated Case] S IBIT A
A.C.	

Case 5:21-cv-00844-XR Document 177-1 Filed 01/05/22 Page 2 of 55



1		
1		JENNIFER HOLMES, ESQUIRE NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUCATIONAL
2		FUND INC
3		40 RECTOR STREET, FIFTH FLOOR NEW YORK NY 10006
4		
5		RYAN V. COX, ESQUIRE
6		TEXAS CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT 2911 N. MAIN AVENUE
7		SAN ANTONIO TX 78212
8		WENDY J. OLSON, ESQUIRE
9		STOEL RIVES LLP 101 S. CAPITOL BLVD, SUITE 1900
10		BOISE ID 83702
11		DANIEL JOSHUA FREEMAN, ESQUIRE U.S. DEPARIMENT OF JUSTICE
12		950 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE 4CON 8.143
13		WASHINGTON DC 20530
14		
15	RETRIEVED FR	LIA SIFUENTES DAVIS, ESQUIRE DISABILITY RIGHTS TEXAS
16	E RIFE	2222 WEST BRAKER LANE AUSTIN TX 78758
17	Q ² /	AUSILIN IA 10130
18	FOR THE DEFENDANTS:	
19	FOR THE DEFENDANTS.	PATRICK SWEETEN, ESQUIRE WILLIAM THOMAS THOMPSON, ESQUIRE TEXAS ATTORNEY GENERAL
20		P.O. BOX 12548 MC 009
21		AUSTIN TX 78711
22		
23		CHAD ENNIS, ESQUIRE TEXAS PUBLIC POLICY FOUNDATION
24		901 CONGRESS AVENUE AUSTIN TX 78701
25		LUIOI AI MILIGUA



1	(San Antonio, Texas; November 16, 2021, at 1:30 p.m., in
2	open court.)
3	THE COURT: With that, let's turn to the civil case.
4	21-844, La Union Del Pueblo versus Gregg Abbott and
5	others.
6	Let's take a roll call here.
7	For La Union, or LUPE, who do we have?
8	MR. MORALES DOYLE: Good afternoon, Your Honor.
9	Shawn Morales Doyle from the Brennan Center for
10	Justice on behalf of La Union Del Pueblo Entero. I have with
11	me a number of attorneys. I'm not sure if I can run through
12	the list, or you want to get
13	THE COURT: No, that's all right. One per party will
14	do for now, and if I have to recognize anybody else who
15	speaks, let's just cry to be clear for the court reporter.
16	The other case was LULAC. Who do we have for LULAC?
17	MR. NKWONTA: Good afternoon, Your Honor.
18	Uzoma Nkwonta on behalf of LULAC. And I'll also
19	introduce my colleagues, Kassie Yukevich and Graham White.
20	THE COURT: Thank you.
21	For Houston Justice?
22	MS. HOLMES: Good afternoon, Your Honor.
23	Jennifer Holmes on behalf of the Houston Justice
24	plaintiffs, and I also have a number of colleagues joining us
25	today.

Case 5:21-cv-00844-XR Document 177-1 Filed 01/05/22 Page 6 of 55

THE COURT: Thank you. 1 2 For OCA-Greater Houston? 3 MR. COX: Hi, Judge. Ryan Cox on behalf of the 4 OCA-Greater Houston plaintiff group, along with several other 5 cocounsel as well. 6 THE COURT: Thank you. 7 Mi Familia Vota? 8 MS. OLSON: Good afternoon, Your Honor. 9 Wendy Olson with Stoel Rives in Boise, for the Mi 10 Familia Vota plaintiffs. We have several counsel -- cocounsel 11 on the line, including Sean Lyons, who is our local counsel 12 from Lyons & Lyons. 13 THE COURT: Thank you. And for the State defendants? 14 15 MR. SWEETEN: Your Honor, Patrick Sweeten and Will Thompson on behalf of the State defendants. 16 17 THE COURT: Thank you. 18 And for the United States? 19 MR. FREEMAN: Good afternoon, Your Honor. 20 Dan Freeman on behalf of the United States. With me 21 on the line are Richard Dellheim, Dana Paikowsky, Mike 22 Stewart, and Jennifer Yun. 23 THE COURT: Thank you. 24 So I apologize for the criminal docket. I don't know 25 how that got snuck into the calendar, but it did. So I

6

1	apologize for that.
2	Let's work through some of the issues here in this
3	case. First, let's take care of housekeeping.
4	We have a motion for leave to file an amicus brief by
5	Donna G. Davidson. That's Docket Number 78. That's opposed
6	by Mi Familia Vota.
7	It's just an amicus brief. I'm just going to
8	that's going to be granted. I'll read and consider the
9	arguments made in there, but the foundation for government
10	accountability, just because of the sheer number of the
11	lawyers I have in this, will be denied speaking time.
12	Number 2. Motion to appear pro hac vice by Stewart
13	Whitson. Docket Number 76. That's granted.
14	Motion to appear pro hac vice for Chase Martin.
15	Docket Number 77. That's granted.
16	Motion to appear pro hac vice Stewart Whitson.
17	Mr. Whitson, I think you wanted to pay us twice.
18	I'll take your money, but that's moot. So that's denied.
19	Next. Public Interest Legal Foundation's motion to
20	intervene. Docket Number 43.
21	Let me turn to you, Mr. Sweeten. What's the State of
22	Texas' position on that?
23	MR. SWEETEN: Your Honor, can you read that again,
24	please?
25	THE COURT: Yeah. This is a motion to intervene

7

1	filed by the Public Interest Legal Foundation.
2	MR. SWEETEN: Your Honor, the State does not object
3	to the intervention.
4	THE COURT: So now, that's kind of interesting to me,
5	because if that's your position how does Public Interest Legal
6	Foundation have standing when you're contending that the other
7	defendants don't have standing?
8	MR. SWEETEN: Well, Your Honor, I'm not conceding
9	that they have standing or not. I'm just suggesting that the
10	State's position is that, you know, we're not actively
11	objecting to the request.
12	I feel like that's up to those parties to make the
13	case for their intervention. I'm certainly not, you know,
14	suggesting that they have it or don't. We're just not
15	objecting to that request.
16	And we haven't objected to amicus requests that we've
17	seen also.
18	THE COURT: Well, that's not the same as
19	intervention.
20	MR. SWEETEN: No, that's true.
21	THE COURT: So that's denied.
22	Public Interest Legal Foundation, to the extent that
23	you want to file any amicus briefs, I'll consider that
24	whenever you decide you want to do that. But with regard to
25	intervention, the State is ably defended and they can argue

any positions they feel they need to argue on their own. 1 2 Next. Motion to intervene by Dallas County 3 Republican Party and others. Docket Number 57. 4 What's the State of Texas' position on that, 5 Mr. Sweeten? 6 MR. SWEETEN: Same position, Your Honor. 7 No objection. 8 THE COURT: Same ruling. Denied. 9 So again, the Dallas County Republican Party can file any amicus briefs it wishes to file in this case. But again, 10 11 the State is more than ably represented and their positions 12 are ably represented by the Attorney General's Office. Motion to appear pro hac vice by E. Stewart Crosland. 13 14 That's denied since I denied the intervention. 15 That was Docket 71. Docket 72. A motion to appear by Stephen Kenny. 16 17 That's denied because I denied the intervention. 18 So I think that takes care of housekeeping. 19 Let's move to the motions to dismiss, and I quess let 20 me start with asking a background question. And I'm not sure 21 who wants to speak to this here from the plaintiffs' groups. 22 Why are you opposing filing an omnibus complaint? I'll start with LUPE first. 23 24 MR. MORALES DOYLE: Sure, Your Honor. Sean Morales 25 again.

We are opposing to filing this omnibus complaint I think for a few reasons. One of them is that we don't have all the same interests or claims represented, i.e., the various plaintiffs to this case.

5 Our complaint, for instance, is bringing not only 6 different theories and different claims than some of the other 7 plaintiffs' groups, but on behalf of different interests we 8 represent a number of organizational plaintiffs in addition to 9 an election judge and an election administrator, and so I think that we are, while our interests are aligned with all of 10 them, we have different theories and different claims that 11 12 we're bringing.

And though I can understand the potential expediency of having one omnibus complaint, there's also a whole lot of work that will go into coming up with omnibus pleadings for all these various groups and interests, and I do not believe that the resources that will go into figuring out a way to coordinate all of those pleadings actually provide --- are worth the benefit that is provided by an omnibus complaint.

THE COURT: So I can't force you-all to do that. I believe you're making a mistake by doing that. And I think you're also putting a lot more work on the State by having to respond to these individual complaints, and a lot more work on the Court.

But again, technically and procedurally I can't

25

1 require this. I would highly advise you-all to reconsider 2 that position in the future because this doesn't make much 3 sense to me. But that's where we're at apparently. 4 So on the motion to dismiss, some of the plaintiffs 5 have failed to allege which specific provisions of SB 1 they 6 are complaining of. So why doesn't this failure require a 7 dismissal and an amended complaint? 8 So for example, on 21-844, no specific provisions of 9 SB 1 are cited for your Fourteenth equal protection claim, your Fifteenth Amendment right to vote claim, your Section 2 10 11 Voting Rights Act claim, your Section 208 Voting Rights Act 12 claim, and your ADA claim. In 21-848, there were no specific provisions of SB 1 13 cited regarding the Fifteenth Amendment right to vote claim. 14 15 In 21-920, no specific provisions of SB 1 are cited 16 regarding the First and Fourteenth Amendment right to vote 17 claims, the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claims, the 18 Fifteenth Amendment right to vote claims, and the Section 2 19 Voting Rights Act claim. 20 So why shouldn't I grant the motion to dismiss 21 regarding those failures and require an amended complaint? 22 LUPE. 23 MR. MORALES DOYLE: Your Honor, I think we did 24 specify the provisions of SB 1, but I understand you may be 25 saying that in the actual language of the count it is not made

1	clear. I think that in our response to the motions to dismiss
2	it will be — we will make very clear which of the provisions
3	we are challenging and each of our theories.
4	I think in the body of the facts of the complaint we
5	tried to make that clear. I apologize if in the language of
6	the count itself we haven't done again, specified each of
7	those things.
8	We will address that in our response to the motions
9	to dismiss. And I don't think filing an amended pleading is
10	the best way to handle that.
11	THE COURT: Well, I'm not sure responding to your
12	motion to dismiss is going to necessarily cure that.
13	I was hoping in the initial order that I sent out $$
14	I was trying to avoid the motions fights that I knew was
15	coming, and so I tried to advise you-all to limit the burden
16	on you-all, the burden on the State, and the burden on the
17	Court on having to litigate over items that we shouldn't have
18	to litigate. And so I'm real disappointed my advice was not
19	taken.
20	I'll, of course, wait for your response on that, but
21	I can I'm already warning you guys. I don't see how if
22	it's not in the complaint in the body of the causes of action
23	how doing a response is going to cure that.
24	So be forewarned. If you don't file an amended
25	complaint, you sort of know which way this is headed.

1	So regarding those plaintiffs alleging a violation of
2	the ADA, these entity plaintiffs haven't specifically alleged
3	what disabilities the members have, or how the disability
4	limits any major life activity. Doesn't this require an
5	amended complaint?
6	Who wants to tackle that one from the plaintiffs'
7	group? Whoever has got the ADA claims.
8	Don't everybody speak at once.
9	MS. DAVIS: Your Honor, this is Lia Sifuentes Davis
10	with the OCA plaintiffs.
11	We have included ADA claims in our pleadings, and at
12	this stage of the pleading we just have an organizational
13	plaintiff. And our motions to dismiss will address how the
14	organizational plaintiff has standing to bring these claims.
15	THE COURT: Yeah. Again, just you-all can waste time
16	drafting responses to motions to dismiss, but I don't think
17	you-all are hearing me. So you know, it's a whole lot easier
18	just to forego the response to dismiss and file an amended
19	complaint to cure these deficiencies, but, you know, you-all
20	do what you think is best.
21	The State is arguing that all claims are barred by
22	sovereign immunity and so what exception is going to apply?
23	And here, with regard to the State defendants, the Governor,
24	the Secretary of State, and the Attorney General, and I guess
25	I'm more curious about the claims against the Governor.

1	For those plaintiff groups who have claims against
2	the Governor, how does the Governor have any enforcement
3	authority in this legislation?
4	I'll start with LUPE.
5	MR. MORALES DOYLE: Thank you, Your Honor.
6	I'm trying to make sure I give my colleagues an
7	opportunity as well here.
8	We think that the Governor plays a practical role in
9	the enforcement of the election code in reality, but we
10	understand the argument that the State is making with regard
11	to the way that the ex-parte en doctrine has been interpreted
12	in the Fifth Circuit and we are taking seriously those
13	arguments, but we do think that the and contemplating, as
14	we are with all these things, that the possibility of whether
15	an amended complaint would make sense, or whether adjusting
16	our claims makes sense, but I do want to say that we do
17	believe that the Governor in the State of Texas, as a
18	practical matter, does play a role in both shaking hand and
19	enforcing the election code, whether or not that is made clear
20	in every instance in the language of the election code itself.
21	But I don't mean to speak on behalf of any of the
22	plaintiff groups besides the LUPE group.
23	THE COURT: So I'm not making any rulings, but in
24	light of the Fifth Circuit's requirements about how I'm
25	supposed to look at the Governor's role in enforcement on a

1	specific provision by provision basis, this is not a ruling,
2	but I don't see it, and so you-all might as well start looking
3	at doing amended complaints here because I don't think you're
4	going to pass muster.
5	Now, Mr. Sweeten, before I do all your work for you,
6	the Secretary of State and the Attorney General, I mean, how
7	is it that you are arguing they have no enforcement? I mean,
8	if you look at all these sections of SB 1 their names are
9	everywhere.
10	MR. SWEETEN: Your Honor, I'm going to let
11	Mr. Thompson address the motion to dismiss, if I may.
12	MR. THOMPSON: Thank you, Your Honor. Will Thompson
13	for the State defendants.
14	We think that the main point referring to the
15	Secretary of State and Attorney General that although they may
16	have some roles in some circumstances, this is as Your Honor
17	pointed out, a provision by provision question.
18	And so what we have in a lot of these complaints are
19	kind of general allegations that the secretary does something
20	with regard to SB 1, which isn't really sufficient.
21	What we need to know is what do the plaintiffs think
22	that the secretary does with regard to each provision that's
23	being challenged. How allegedly does the secretary cause the
24	injury that's at issue in each claim?
25	And that's what we're missing in these complaints.

1	It's what we tried to confer about before we filed
2	motions to dismiss. And we think that if we were to go
3	provision by provision with more specific allegations, we
4	would find out that many of the individual claims truly have
5	no connection to the secretary and are, instead, probably, at
6	best, connected to the local election codes.
7	THE COURT: So you anticipated my question,
8	Mr. Thompson. So if not the Governor, and not the Secretary
9	of State, and not the Attorney General, well, then, who is the
10	proper defendant in this case?
11	MR. THOMPSON: Your Honor, it's a difficult question
12	to answer in the abstract because the Fifth Circuit requires a
13	provision by provision and claim by claim analysis. So it is
14	possible that the proper defendant will differ based on which
15	claim is at issue, but for some things it will certainly be
16	local election officials.
17	THE COURT: But let me press you on the Secretary of
18	State and the Attorney General. I mean, you're not arguing
19	that they have no role whatsoever in investigation and
20	enforcement, are you?
21	MR. THOMPSON: Your Honor, we are not saying that
22	they have no role under SB 1 at all. They certainly have some
23	role and I didn't mean to suggest the opposite.
24	What I am saying is that we can't really analyze
25	whether they're a proper defendant for any case under SB 1.

It really just depends on what injury is at issue. And for
 some of these plaintiffs at the very least we don't think it's
 met.

It's not clear whether it's met with regard to any of
them because the plaintiffs haven't met their burden of
specific allegations about what conduct from the defendants
they are complaining of.

8 THE COURT: Again, I'm not making any rulings here 9 but this ought to be clear signals to all the plaintiff 10 groups, you need to further amend your complaints here to 11 address these challenges because otherwise you're just wasting 12 everybody's time with responses to motions to dismiss, making 13 me rule on the motions, in all likelihood giving you adverse 14 rulings, and then forcing you to amend.

15I don't understand why we just can't go to amending16now. This makes no sense to me whatsoever.

Okay. Now, with regard to what the plaintiffs are
alleging, I want to understand this. Are plaintiffs asserting
only organizational standing, or are any plaintiffs asserting
associational standing?

Is there any plaintiff asserting associational
standing? Please speak up now or forever hold your peace.
MR. COX: Judge, for the OCA plaintiffs all of our
individual clients allege both associational and
organizational standing. All five.

1	
1	THE COURT: Okay. The OCA.
2	Anyone else besides OCA?
3	MR. NKWONTA: Your Honor
4	MS. HOLMES: Your Honor, the Houston Justice
5	plaintiffs, two of our clients, the Delta Sigma Theta Sorority
6	and The Arc of Texas are asserting associational standing.
7	THE COURT: Remind me again who the frat/sorority
8	group is.
9	MS. HOLMES: The Delta Sigma Theta Sorority.
10	THE COURT: Thank you.
11	I'm sorry. I cut someone else off.
12	MR. NKWONTA: Your Honor, for the LULAC plaintiffs,
13	three of our organizational plaintiffs are asserting
14	associational standing. That would be LULAC Texas, the Texas
15	Alliance for Retired Americans, and Texas AFT.
16	THE COURT: Thank you.
17	Anyone else?
18	MR. MORALES DOYLE: Yes, Your Honor.
19	On behalf of LUPE plaintiffs, a number of our members
20	or a number of our plaintiffs are members of organizations
21	asserting associational standing, but not all of them.
22	And one of our plaintiff organizations, Texas Impact,
23	is, in fact, an organization of other organizations, and so in
24	some sense its members may be a little bit more complicated,
25	in other words, Your Honor, but we are alleging both

1	associational and organizational standing.
2	THE COURT: So did I cut off anybody? Anybody else?
3	Okay. So for all those groups who are asserting
4	associational standing, I haven't seen where you are
5	identifying specific members of those associations who would
6	themselves have standing to sue.
7	Again, on the amended complaint here, that I hope is
8	forthcoming, or amended complaints, plural, you-all need to
9	flush that out because I don't see where many of you have
10	articulated those individuals sufficient to withstand any
11	challenge.
12	Next one. Regarding WCVI and ADL. I'm unsure by
13	reading the complaints currently how these organizations
14	establish an injury.
15	MR. MORALES DOYLE: I just want to make sure I got it
16	right. ADL, and what was the other group you named, Your
17	Honor?
18	THE COURT: WCVI.
19	MR. MORALES DOYLE: Yes. Okay. Those are not I
20	want to make sure I'm getting our groups correct here, but
21	those are not groups for which we are making associational
22	standing claims. We are making organizational standing claims
23	in terms of diversion of resources and the impact on the
24	mission of those organizations to do their work to educate and
25	engage voters in Texas.

1	THE COURT: So let me stop you there, Mr. Morales.
2	So there I thought you argued check me on the
3	complaint language, because my notes may very well be wrong
4	but I thought you said those entities were really research
5	organizations.
6	And so when you said "research organizations," I
7	thought, well, I mean, how is their research being how are
8	they being injured in their research capacities? But when you
9	file these amended complaints, which again I hope are
10	forthcoming, I hope you articulate with more clarity how
11	there's injury to those two organizations.
12	MR. MORALES DOYLE: Understood, Your Honor.
13	I will just say I don't think that ADL is primarily a
14	research organization. WCVI is, in part, a research
15	organization.
16	But I think both of these organizations are do
17	certain educational functions and work with constituent and
18	community members, and that is where the standing comes from.
19	But I understand your point about the specificity of
20	allegations there.
21	THE COURT: Thank you.
22	So now, Mr. Sweeten, the organizational standing.
23	Is the State arguing on association pardon me. I
24	just said it wrong. On organizational standing, haven't the
25	plaintiffs sufficiently alleged injuries to establish

organizational standing? Why is that deficient there?
MR. SWEETEN: Mr. Thompson will address that.
THE COURT: You're ducking all the hard questions to
Mr. Thompson.
MR. SWEETEN: I am, Your Honor. I've got a really
good help here today, so I know to lean on it when I need it.
Thank you.
THE COURT: Mr. Thompson.
MR. THOMPSON: Thank you, Your Honor.
We do think that the organizational standing
allegations are deficient. One large reason, I think, cuts
across many of the plaintiffs groups is that they want a
diversion of resources theory.
A diversion of resources can be a sufficient injury
but it is not a sufficient injury in and of itself. It has to
be a diversion that is used to avoid some other underlying
injury in fact.
THE COURT: So, I mean, have you read OCA-Greater
Houston, Fifth Circuit, 2017, 867 F.3d, 604?
MR. THOMPSON: It's been probably a few weeks, but
I've read it, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Yeah, because you didn't cite it when you
were briefing your standing.
MR. THOMPSON: I don't think that this issue was
raised properly in OCA-Greater Houston. The Court decided a

number of things in that case without kind of briefing on the
topic, and our position would be that the Court did not fully
consider and therefore did not rule upon, by virtue of stare
decisis, a number of issues that we've raised.
THE COURT: Well, I'm bound whether you think the
Fifth Circuit was well-informed or not, I'm bound by what they
said.
MR. THOMPSON: I think that's almost right, Your
Honor. When an issue is not briefed before the Court, we
therefore often don't understand the court to be implicitly
deciding it.
If the court had said you know, "Despite the lack of
briefing, we have independently researched the question and
concluded the following," that would be one thing. We think
we're not in that situation, Your Honor.
I suppose we could read OCA-Greater Houston to create
a circuit split, but as a general rule we try to avoid reading
Fifth Circuit precedent to split with the D.C. Circuit and
things like that.
THE COURT: So I'm trying to get this case to the
merits. So how do you think the plaintiffs, in their amended
complaint, fix the deficiencies for the injury?
MR. THOMPSON: Sure, Your Honor.
I think what we need are allegations that explain
what this law does to them in the absence of a diversion of

1	resources. Does it injure them as groups in some way that
2	they then try to avoid through the diversion of resources.
3	I'll give an example, Your Honor. If, for example, a
4	plaintiff in a hypothetical case said, you know, what I like
5	to do on the weekend is I hand out pamphlets. And, you know,
6	the city government has enacted some kind of ordinance that
7	requires me to go get a license in order to hand out
8	pamphlets, and if I don't get the license I'll be prosecuted.
9	Well, what that individual could do is allege that
10	either he has paid the fee to get the license, and that is an
11	injury in fact, that caused an injury or he would have broken
12	the law, or that he's not going to pay the fee and he faces a
13	threat of prosecution for trying to hand out pamphlets without
14	a license.
15	So kind of flip side to the same point. You're
16	either injured because when you don't comply the law is going
17	to do something to you, or you incur some kind of cost to
18	avoid that underlying injury.
19	That's not what we have here. What we have here are
20	a lot of organizations that seem to be relying on kind of
21	general allegations that they don't like the consequences of
22	this law for third parties. And because they don't like the
23	social consequences, the alleged social consequences of the
24	law, they spend money to try and change those consequences. I
25	don't think that's a sufficient injury in fact.

1	THE COURT: So all the plaintiffs have heard that,
2	whether you want to try to amend in light of that. I'm not
3	saying you have to, but again, I'm trying to get us to the
4	merits without more motion to dismiss diversions.
5	And so if you want to rely just on your existing
6	allegations, that may or may not meet the Fifth Circuit. I'll
7	hear the State's or I'll see whether or not the State's
8	arguments about how the Fifth Circuit was not well-informed,
9	but this is easily curable by you-all just adding more
10	sentences to your amended complaint is what I'm trying to
11	emphasize.
12	Next one. In the motion to dismiss the defense are
13	asserting that there's no private cause of action under
14	Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.
15	So I'm assuming this is another hard one for
16	Mr. Thompson?
17	MR. SWEETEN: Your Honor, anything on the motions to
18	dismiss is Mr. Thompson today. Thank you.
19	THE COURT: So, Mr. Thompson, so in Shelby County the
20	chief justice talked about injunctive relief is available in
21	appropriate places to block voting laws from going into
22	effect. And the chief justice said both the federal
23	government and individuals have sued to enforce Section 2.
24	It sure appears that the chief justice believes
25	there's a private cause of action.

1	MR. THOMPSON: I have to respectfully disagree, Your
2	Honor. I think the chief justice was actually very careful to
3	say that they "have" sued, not that it was "proper" for them
4	to have sued.
5	Just a few months ago Justice Gorsuch flagged
6	THE COURT: We're not talking about Justice Gorsuch
7	and his that's all we're not going there.
8	We're talking about what a majority opinion held.
9	MR. THOMPSON: Well, then, Your Honor, I'll point out
10	that in the majority opinion from the Supreme Court they have
11	consistently said things like, "We assume without deciding
12	that Section 2 creates a private cause of action," which they
13	are able to do because it's not a jurisdictional requirement.
14	There is no holding from the majority of the United
15	States Supreme Court saying that there is, in fact, a private
16	cause of action under Section 2.
17	THE COURT: I disagree. That part of the motion to
18	dismiss is denied.
19	With regard to defendants asserting there's no
20	private cause of action under Section 208 of the Voting Rights
21	Act. So, Mr. Thompson, 52 U.S.C., Section 10302 says,
22	"Whenever the Attorney General or an aggrieved person
23	institutes a proceeding," so how is there no private cause of
24	action?
25	MR. THOMPSON: Sure.

Г

The provision Your Honor quoted does not actually
create a cause of action. It recognizes that causes of
actions exist under other sources of law. It is of course not
limited to Section 2 or Section 208.
So we believe that it refers to, for example, 1983
suits regarding constitutional claims, but certainly included
within that even we if sought VRA claims were themselves
included in that provision, it would presumably be the implied
cause of action under Section 5 of the Supreme Court
recognizing Allen. That was the explanation that Justice
Thomas gave in <i>Morris</i> .
THE COURT: That part of the motion to dismiss is
denied. The statute is clear about an aggrieved person is
able to institute a proceeding.
Next one. No private cause of action under the
materiality provision of the Civil Rights Act. So now that
the United States has joined this case, does this make this
issue all moot or not?
MR. THOMPSON: I don't think so, Your Honor. It may
reduce its practical import. We will of course address the
United States' claims in our pleadings regarding their claim
which has not yet been filed.
But it is certainly true that if, for example, Your
Honor held that the United States had the cause of action but
the private plaintiffs do not, it would then be improper to

1	grant any relief to the private plaintiffs. They wouldn't be
2	prevailing parties that represent attorneys fees. They are
3	not going to affect this kind of ruling even if the Court is
4	able to reach the merits under a different party's claim.
5	THE COURT: So, well then, OCA plaintiffs, I mean, do
6	you want to amend your complaint and drop this or not? The
7	government is saying even if the United States is successful
8	then you're getting zero.
9	MR. COX: It may have that kind of practical impact,
10	but I think to get the relief of our client, that our clients
11	are seeking, we plan to continue to seek that relief and we
12	believe that there is a private cause of private right of
13	action under 208 generally and we'll be expect to be
14	briefing that for the Court on Thursday.
15	THE COURT: Okay. I won't make any ruling on that.
16	Where are we at?
17	Help me understand this. In your motion to dismiss
18	LUPE's complaint, the defendants seem to assert that SB $$
19	well, I can't even make your argument. I don't seem to
20	understand it.
21	What are you arguing with regard to LUPE's complaint
22	and the Supremacy Clause?
23	MR. MORALES DOYLE: I'm sorry, Your Honor.
24	I'm trying to refresh my recollection. I believe
25	you're referring to Count 10 of the complaint, and we said

1 that Count 10 is redundant and therefore should be dismissed 2 or stricken because Count 10 just says that SB 1 violates the 3 Supremacy Clause. That's not really a claim. I'm not sure 4 how else to put it. 5 The Supremacy Clause is a rule of decision for when there is a conflict of federal and state law. So if the 6 7 plaintiffs had established some other violation of federal 8 law, then the Supremacy Clause would tell us that federal law 9 trumps state law. But there is no independent cause of action 10 that says you have somehow violated the Supremacy Clause 11 standing alone. THE COURT: Okay. Now I understand it. 12 13 So again, in the mended complaints that are coming 14 down you may want to clear that language up as to whether or 15 not you are trying to assert an independent cause of action, 16 or are you just throwing surplusage in there about the Supremacy Clause. 17 18 Okay. Let's try to figure out now where do we go 19 forward on discovery, a scheduling order, and a trial date. 20 So you-all were good enough to send me the initial disclosures this morning. My law clerks quickly tabulated 21 22 The plaintiffs have identified 165 individuals. And this. 23 the defendants have identified 132. That's ridiculous. 24 So what appears to have happened is that I think one 25 or both sides, or I quess there's multiple sides here, some of

1	you included like every member of the Texas legislature who
2	voted in favor of SB 1, is what it looks like.
3	Now, we all know most of these legislators didn't
4	have anything to do with the drafting. They probably didn't
5	even know what they were voting on, except what they were told
6	by leadership to vote on. A lot of them probably didn't even
7	read it. So how they become persons with knowledge of
8	relevant facts perplexes me.
9	Mr. Thompson, since you get all the hard questions,
10	how do you respond?
11	MR. THOMPSON: I'll be happy to respond, Your Honor.
12	I think I can safely say on behalf of all the parties
13	that we didn't mean to suggest all of those people would be
14	witnesses or anything like that.
15	Under the Supreme Court's latest opinion in <i>Brnovich</i>
16	which addressed an intentional discrimination claim and Voting
17	Rights Act, it rejected the Cat's Paw Theory, which Your Honor
18	may be familiar with from employment cases for determining
19	kind of the intent of the legislature.
20	And so at least from my personal perspective, I think
21	what we were trying to say there is to the extent there are
22	intentional discrimination claims one can't just establish it
23	by the alleged intent of a bill sponsor or a leader, or
24	something like that.
25	THE COURT: So we need to get reasonable about how

1 many people need to be deposed. So you-all are to file
2 amended initial disclosures and clearly delineate the Tier 1,
3 Tier 2 individuals, for lack of a better phrase, and Tier 2
4 being just mere legislators who voted who didn't have anything
5 to do with the drafting of this bill or any amendments, or
6 anything like that.
7 And so those people need to be listed, if you want to

8 list them, as a Tier 2 group so we have a better understanding
9 of who the Tier 1 group is, because by listing everybody, and
10 I'm not saying anybody is doing this, but somebody could be
11 hiding a person with great knowledge of relevant facts in this
12 laundry list of 165 or 132. So we'll have none of that.

13 So let's file amended initial disclosures within ten 14 days. Exchange with each other. And then I want to see also, 15 so file those with the court. And so —

16 MR. ENNIS: Your Honor, may I add one thing on that?17 This is Chad Ennis for Medina County.

Another thing, your clerks may have missed it in the big pile of initial disclosures they received, but there are several designations for things like "All of the witnesses that testified at the hearings for these bills."

And that is literally hundreds of people without any designation of who they are. You know, if there are specific people who testified that they are interested in calling as witnesses, I think they should just identify the people. And

1	we'd ask that that go into the exchange in ten days as well.
2	THE COURT: So, thank you, Mr. Ennis.
3	So let's figure out for Rule 26(a)(1) disclosure
4	purposes the mere public speakers who attempted or did
5	actually speak at any committee hearings for this legislation,
6	to the extent that they are aggrieved individuals, or
7	individuals injured by any, and who are claiming to be part of
8	the associational standing, I could see where those have
9	knowledge of relevant facts.
10	So Mr. Ennis raises a good point. Asterisk who those
11	people are. But, yeah, a broad designation like that is
12	let's even put those like into the third tier group. Put Tier
13	1 Tier 1, what I'm really interested in, is who really
14	needs to be deposed first, because we're going to have to
15	phase discovery here, given the large amount of folks at issue
16	here.
17	And so if — to the extent you are relying on some
18	broad categories like that, let's put names and then better
19	descriptors as Mr. Ennis is suggesting.
20	Anybody else with a good suggestion on that?
21	MR. MORALES DOYLE: Your Honor, I would just this
22	is Sean Morales Doyle on behalf of LUPE plaintiffs.
23	I would just say that we did not make a broad
24	disclosure like that, but that there are, we believe, folks
25	who offered testimony in committee hearings on Senate Bill 1

1 outside of our clients and folks who would be apprieved by the 2 law that have relevant information, especially to the extent 3 that the legislators, who are proponents of Senate Bill 1 4 relied upon or cited to facts that were put to them by folks 5 in committee hearings in justifying their passage of this bill. 6 7 I think -- so I just want to say that I don't 8 think -- I think that there are folks who testified at those 9 hearings who have information relevant to the claims in our 10 case outside of the type of information that you mentioned 11 there. And that's fair. And so those are -- you 12 THE COURT: 13 know, properly should be disclosed as 26(a)(1), but let's at 14 least put some descriptors here so we know who we are talking 15 about and what they said and where they said it, so we all know why they are there. 16 17 Okay. Now ---MS. OLSON: Your Honor, this is Wendy Olson on behalf 18 19 of Mi Familia Vota plaintiffs. 20 Your direction was to do this in ten days. I'm 21 wondering if we could have until that Monday, November 29th, 22 because ten days is Friday, the 26th, which is the day after 23 Thanksgiving and I know people have travel plans, but I would 24 just make that request. 25 THE COURT: That's fair. The 29th it is.

1	Okay. With that said, I guess I was initially under
2	the impression that we were going to be under a much more
3	expedited schedule, but it seems that the plaintiffs are going
4	to want to have the March primary come and go with no
5	injunctive relief requested from this Court.
6	Am I correct in that understanding?
7	MR. SWEETEN: Your Honor, this is Patrick Sweeten
8	with the State defendants.
9	I want to just say that that was an assumption upon
10	which this schedule that we outlined, which I think is a
11	compressed final trial schedule that we based it on, and we
12	had discussions both we had two discussions I believe with
13	all of the plaintiffs and they said as much.
14	And we had a discussion with the Department of
15	Justice and they indicated it was not their intention to bring
16	forward a preliminary injunction.
17	So, you know, the negotiations that took place back
18	and forth on those issues are predicated upon that assumption.
19	So I think I can answer that for the group because that's
20	certainly what we were told and what we affirmed.
21	THE COURT: And so that's why I want to confirm this.
22	So again, some plaintiff groups speak up. Is that
23	the understanding or not?
24	MR. MORALES DOYLE: On behalf of LUPE plaintiffs, it
25	is correct that we are not planning to pursue preliminary

1	injunctive relief prior to the March primary.
2	I do just want to say that it is not that we would
3	like to see the March primary come and go without relief in
4	this case, but for a variety of reasons we think it's
5	important that the Court have a full trial record before it is
6	deciding these claims, and given the time frame that we're
7	working on in this case and the amount of evidence that we've
8	already discussed we're going to need to be compiling, that's
9	the decision that we've made at this point.
10	THE COURT: So then in terms of a scheduling order,
11	if the plaintiff groups want to develop facts about what takes
12	place in the March primary and what issues take place with
13	regard to the ability of your constituents to vote, I mean,
14	that's going to be yet another round of discovery that the
15	State defendants are going to be entitled to discover on.
16	And so now is it that you see a March primary, fact
17	discovery now on the March primary, dispositive motions being
18	filed, and then a trial date, as you're suggesting in July.
19	How does all that happen?
20	MR. MORALES DOYLE: Well, Your Honor, I think it will
21	be a whole lot of work. I think all of us have we have set
22	the we have proposed a discovery close deadline that is
23	after the March primary in order to allow for discovery to
24	continue, but we have also proposed an expert discovery time
25	line that contemplates the majority of expert discovery

happening prior to that March primary in order to not have all
 of this happening at the very end of the case.

I think the evidence that comes out of the March primary, of course none of us knows what it's going to be at this point, but I think we also know that how — the evidence that comes out of the March primary is not going to be all the evidence in this case.

8 There's going to be probative on some points, 9 certainly not on others, as primaries are, you know, different 10 than general elections, so we are trying to build a plan that 11 allows for a great deal of hopefully the majority of discovery 12 to happen early in this case but also allows for the parties 13 to take into account what does in fact happen in the first set 14 of elections under SB 1 in March.

We understand that will make things very difficult for all of us, including Your Honor, after the March primary, but we think it is incredibly important that the final resolution of this case before Your Honor happens with enough time for any appeal and any further proceedings after the trial to be resolved in time for the November primary.

And in light of Supreme Court precedent about changes to elections in advance of an election — excuse me — the November general election, we think it is crucial that the trial happen earlier in the year so that we have time to sort everything out and come to a final resolution of this case

1	before November to make sure that voters in the State of Texas
2	have their rights protected and that it's a fair election.
3	THE COURT: Does any other plaintiff group wish to
4	speak in addition to the comments Mr. Morales already made?
5	Mr. Sweeten.
6	MR. SWEETEN: Yes, Your Honor.
7	THE COURT: So I mean, the plaintiffs are asking me
8	to do a heck of a and everybody, to do a heck of a lot of
9	work in a short period of time. I'm willing to put the effort
10	in.
11	I mean, is there any dispositive motions you see that
12	could be filed without the benefit of discovery that's just a
13	strictly legal issue that at least we don't have everything
14	having to be decided, argued, briefed, and ruled upon at the
15	end?
16	MR. SWEETEN: Your Honor, I think so.
17	I think there could be some motions for summary
18	judgment.
19	Let me address the overall schedule which is, you
20	know, they have indicated and we have indicated to the Court,
21	and this is the very reason why we don't agree to set a trial
22	date on July 5th at this point, which is that we have agreed
23	to a very truncated discovery process.
24	We think that, you know, we're going to give it our
25	best shot. We you know, if we start getting a bunch of

late disclosures of fact witnesses, you know, that could
 change that.

I can tell you, and this is likely an issue that you're going to want to — you know, you may want to talk to us about later, but certainly my recent discussions with the DOJ have certainly brought to question, you know, whether or not we are going to be able to make this schedule go. But that's the very reason.

9 We are planning to -- there is an awful lot of work. 10 The first step is the motions to dismiss. And as the Court is 11 saying, you know, get these complaints. Tell us what is the 12 complaint. Well, what is the specific statutory problem? 13 They're apparently not going to agree to a uniformed complaint, which I think would really, you know, make this, 14 15 you know, be a lot easier and increase the potential to meet 16 this schedule.

But we think that, you know, we're hopeful we can meet this schedule. We do think that there will be some issues that may be subject to judgment as this goes along. But that's, you know, one of the reasons that we think that maybe we wait until, you know, we wait to set the trial date to see if we're actually going to be able to work through this schedule.

24 But you know, we're giving our best shot, based on 25 their, you know, representation to us. There's not a

1	preliminary injunction, you know, proceeding. We're trying to
2	make this work. And I think this Court is doing I think
3	this is great — a great service.
4	As the Court knows in our redistricting challenges,
5	when you have multiple
6	THE COURT: Let's not bring that up.
7	MR. SWEETEN: I was just thinking, it's been four
8	years, I think, since I've seen you, Your Honor.
9	Anyway, I think strictures. I think making them
10	plead what is their claim. Tell us what that is. And then I
11	think, you know, following the orderly process of this case.
12	We'll attempt to, you know, give best efforts to that
13	discovery schedule that we have laid out, but we do think that
14	we may want to see how that's going to make a determination as
15	to whether the trial date is you know, when that should be
16	set.
17	THE COURT: Does the U.S. want to chime in on this?
18	MR. FREEMAN: Yes, Your Honor. Dan Freeman for the
19	United States.
20	The United States agrees that this is an extremely
21	aggressive schedule. In particular, the schedule anticipates
22	that experts would be disclosed at the beginning of February.
23	Now, we stand ready to work to meet this schedule,
24	however, this schedule is only possible if the parties agree
25	to participate in discovery and not engage in dilatory

1	tactics.
2	And Mr. Sweeten has advised the Court, and we advised
3	the Court in our 26(f) report that we filed last night, that
4	the United States has already issued a request for production
5	to the State. The State informed us at our 26(f) conference
6	that it did not intend to produce any documents in response to
7	that request or database extracts as the case may be.
8	But they at the same time refused to stipulate to an
9	early written formal response to that request and would allow
10	the United States to get them out of the court and to bring a
11	motion to compel.
12	And those type of delays are going to prevent the
13	parties from being able to meet the schedule and are going to
14	prevent the parties from being able to vindicate the rights of
15	Texas voters, as Mr. Morales Doyle represented before.
16	We believe this is a separate issue that is best
17	addressed at the toward the conclusion of this pretrial
18	conference, but I'm happy to address it now.
19	MR. SWEETEN: Well, Your Honor, if the DOJ is going
20	to accuse me of dilatory tactics, I'd like to address that
21	right now. May I, Your Honor?
22	THE COURT: No. One sec.
23	I think most people on the screen know me. I don't
24	want to dwell on fights. I want to move the thing forward.
25	So I know you don't like the moniker, and I would

1	take offense if someone said that to me too, but let's just
2	move forward.
3	So just like I'm trying to tell the plaintiffs, file
4	an amended complaint, and I'm telling them, and I'm telling
5	everybody, file amended 26(a)(1) disclosures, motions to
6	compel, none of us have time to fight over motions to compel.
7	Now, if the government is going to assert the
8	government the State defendants are going to assert
9	legislative privilege or some other privilege, let's talk
10	privilege logs. Have you-all talked about how you're going to
11	do a privilege log?
12	MR. SWEETEN: Your Honor, to my knowledge, there's
13	been no discussion about a privilege log with any of the
14	parties, that I know of
15	THE COURT: Is that the basis of where you think
16	you're not going to be able to cooperate on the U.S.'s request
17	for documents? Is that
18	MR. SWEETEN: Your Honor, I thought you didn't want
19	me to address that, but I think I need to because counsel, you
20	know, seems to be indicating that we're saying, "We're not
21	giving you any documents." That's not what we're saying.
22	What happened, Your Honor, is that on
23	November 4th the DOJ filed a lawsuit. We received last Friday
24	a request, not for just documents, we received a request for
25	an entire database from the DPS, which has 29 million people

1	that are on there. They also asked for the
2	THE COURT: One second.
3	The DPS, Texas Department of Public Safety?
4	MR. SWEETEN: Yeah. They asked for the entirety
5	well, I shouldn't say the entirety. They asked for a number
6	of data fields from DPS. They asked for the 17 million entry
7	TEAM's database from SOS.
8	They have asked for two databases because and
9	we're still we're going to have a lot of discussions about
10	this with opposing counsel because this is a breathtaking
11	request. The only time in the history of DPS that they have
12	given this up was when Mr. Freeman and DOJ sued us under
13	Section 5, which would have been the spring of 2012, and then
14	the carryover litigation was the Section 2 litigation.
15	So what we're going to address, Mr. Freeman's
16	request, which he sent last Friday, we've basically had all
17	of — you know, it was Friday evening. We've had all of two
18	business days.
19	We've been trying to get information about those
20	databases but it is a sweeping request made in the eleventh
21	you know, after we have had multiple discussions with these
22	plaintiffs to get a large amount of data, including data from
23	senators, you know, politicians, federal judges, state judges.
24	That's all on the DPS voter databases.
25	So we have got a lot of issues to work through, but

1	this was sprung upon us in a call last week when he said,
2	"We're going to ask for the databases." And I said "No."
3	And, you know, we're looking and evaluating the
4	request that we got on Friday. It is going to take experts
5	from both of those agencies to come in and explain what would
6	be, you know, possible, what would be, you know, a really hard
7	lift, but that by itself, asking for database extracts, which
8	has a long process, which I can go through
9	THE COURT: No. That's okay. One second. One
10	second.
11	So let me go back to the United States. What's the
12	relevance of the data?
13	MR. FREEMAN: Sure, Your Honor.
14	SB 1 requires individuals who wish to cast a mail
15	ballot to list their identification number on their mail
16	ballot request, as well as their mail ballot carrier envelope.
17	And SB 1 requires that early voting clerks shall
18	reject any mail ballot application that doesn't include an
19	identification number, if that individual has been issued an
20	identification number that does not identify the same voter
21	identified in the applicant's application for voter
22	registration.
23	Now, the problem with this is that TEAM does not
24	necessarily contain every voter's up-to-date driver's license
25	number. There are voters who

42

1 THE COURT: Let's ---2 MR. FREEMAN: TEAM. Excuse me, Your Honor. TEAM is 3 the state's voter registration database. 4 THE COURT: Thank you. 5 MR. FREEMAN: Now, the problem, Your Honor, is that in some cases the voter may have registered to vote soon after 6 7 moving to Texas while they still had an out-of-state driver's 8 license and listed a social security number on their voter 9 registration application. 10 They then obtain a Texas driver's license. They list 11 their Texas driver's license number on their mail ballot 12 application as instructed, and then their application for a mail ballot will be rejected because it doesn't match what was 13 on their voter registration application. 14 15 Now, what the United States seeks to -- and that 16 rejection violates Section 101 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the materiality provision. 17 18 Now, what the United States intends to do is quite 19 similar to what the United States did in Texas v Holder when 20 the State of Texas sued the United States under Section 5 of 21 the Voting Rights Act, and in Veasey v Abbott, where United 22 States, among several private plaintiff groups sued the State 23 under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. 24 The State has produced these database extracts twice 25 before, in terms of DPS. In terms of voter registration

1 database, the State has produced that database to the United 2 States previously outside of litigation, as it's subject to 3 production upon demand by the Attorney General under Title 3 4 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 5 The State has also produced voter registration database to the United States in both of those cases. 6 7 Experts are then able to compare those two databases 8 to determine where there are voters on the voter registration 9 database who do not have their proper driver's license listed. 10 It is my understanding that there are also voters in the DPS databases who have multiple driver's license numbers 11 12 listed, because it's possible to have an identification card and a driver's license over the course of your life. 13 They will not know which one of those numbers is in the voter 14 15 registration database and will be disenfranchised as a result. 16 It is possible that individuals who have surrendered their driver's license and no longer have that document to be 17 18 able to provide that number as SB 1 requires, and they will be 19 disenfranchised as a result. 20 And so the United States is asking the State to do 21 exactly what it did twice before in litigation, once where it 22 sued the United States, and once where the United States sued 23 the State. Both times where the State enacted legislation 24 that put these driver's license numbers at issue in a 25 restriction on the right to vote.

Г

1	THE COURT: So let me suggest this here.
2	Let me can the government achieve what it's
3	attempting to achieve by merely sending out requests for
4	admission, asking the State to admit that there are these
5	following discrepancies that you just identified, and then
6	sending out an interrogatory by asking them to identify how
7	many times these kind of occurrences have occurred?
8	And then in the event that they refuse to do so or
9	claim it's unduly burdensome or whatever, then you come back
10	and asking to do to get the databases and do the work
11	yourself. Go ahead.
12	Go ahead.
13	MR. FREEMAN: Your Honor, I'm not certain that the
14	State would be willing or able to conduct this analysis with
15	the sort of degree of accuracy and expertise that the experts
16	that the United States has retained have been able to do in
17	the past.
18	Courts have relied on experts retained by the United
19	States when conducting this sort of match during a Veasey
20	litigation, a voter right litigation. The State opposed an
21	alternative algorithm for matching the voter file to DPS
22	files. The State ultimately abandoned that algorithm, as it
23	determined — well, I won't speak for the State.
24	The State abandoned the algorithm that it had
25	proposed, and the United States, and ultimately the court

1 moved forward with the analysis that the United States was 2 able to provide. 3 The various claims that the State has made about the 4 burden of this production, in fact, the State has done this 5 The code has been written before. before. 6 I personally at the State's request flew down to 7 Texas to pick up a copy of the database extract in the Texas v8 Holder litigation so that we could address security concerns 9 the State had. The United States is happy to agree to the 10 same types of protective orders to address the State's 11 concerns. We see this as critical to the United States' claims 12 under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and we believe that the 13 14 State's immediate assertion, the burden of the request 15 outweighs the benefit. One, it's contrary to the spirit of Rule 26, and the 16 17 committee notes to the 2015 amendment specifically said that 18 these type of default assertions -- I mean, immediate 19 assertions that no discovery in response to a particular 20 request is possible because of the burden should not be 21 allowed. 22 THE COURT: Okay. 23 MR. FREEMAN: And we're not asking the State to 24 produce immediately. We're simply asking them to allow us to 25 tee this up.

1 THE COURT: Thank you. 2 So at this point there's not a motion to compel 3 before me to rule on. You-all continue to meet and confer. 4 I will say this, Mr. Sweeten, in light of the 5 representations that are being made that this has happened 6 before, any arguments of unduly burdensomeness, you're going 7 to have a steep hill to climb to overcome that, but I'm not 8 making any rulings. 9 And so, again, to the extent that you can enter into 10 protective orders to protect the sensitivity of this 11 information, but again this is premature for me to make any 12 rulings. I'm not making any rulings. MR. SWEETEN: Your Honor, let me just say. I won't 13 argue the motion because I hear the Court. 14 15 5 think right now what's happening is this I agree. 16 issue, we're jumping the gun on this. We will have 17 discussions with DOJ regarding this issue. I wanted to raise 18 these concerns to the extent that they impact scheduling. 19 But, you know, we also just -- I want the Court to 20 know that there is going to be a lot of interfacing with our 21 team and experts at both of these agencies about, you know --22 about these issues, and these things take time. 23 So we will address their discovery requests. We'll 24 be happy to talk to DOJ about this. But overall, I think, you 25 know, I think this is something we can deal with as this goes

1	along, but I wanted to flag this issue to the Court.
2	THE COURT: No, thank you.
3	So now, we still we walked away from privilege.
4	To the extent that the State is not is going to
5	claim privilege to any documents, I want a privilege log. And
6	so it's going to have to articulate clearly the authors,
7	author, or authors, plural, the recipient, or recipients,
8	plural.
9	And if the author or the recipient wasn't a
10	legislative a legislator, or a legislative aid, it seems
11	highly improbable that you can in good faith articulate
12	legislative privilege in those kind of scenarios.
13	To the extent that you think you can in good faith
14	articulate legislative privilege, I want a log, and the Bates
15	stamp, and I will review, in camera if need be, any documents
16	subject to any privilege.
17	Okay. We've covered a lot today. Hopefully we're
18	going to move things along. I'll be very disappointed if I
19	don't get amended complaints, folks. I don't know how to make
20	that point anymore clear.
21	MR. MORALES DOYLE: Your Honor.
22	THE COURT: Yes.
23	MR. MORALES DOYLE: I do not want to necessarily
24	represent that I'm speaking on behalf of all the plaintiffs
25	here, although I think I may be. We hear you. We are dealing

1	right now with a response deadline on the motions to dismiss
2	of this Thursday.
3	And so
4	THE COURT: That deadline is extended for 15 days.
5	Hopefully that deadline will never be met and we see
6	amended complaints well before that.
7	MR. MORALES DOYLE: Thank you, Your Honor.
8	MR. SWEETEN: Your Honor, may I get a reciprocal
9	extension on any replies?
10	THE COURT: Yes.
11	MR. SWEETEN: Thank you, Your Honor.
12	I do think there was one issue that I don't know that
13	we addressed to the Court, and that is the order with the
14	deposition limitations, I don't know if the Court wants to
15	entertain that at this point.
16	THE COURT: Let me backtrack here because I didn't
17	finish off on trial now.
18	What I'm contemplating is setting the trial date for
19	July right now, just so for purposes of my calendaring I can
20	hold something as a placeholder that we can all try to aspire
21	to.
22	But I will tell everybody that, you know, I will be
23	reasonable to all parties in the event that circumstances
24	don't allow us to meet that. But for a placeholder, that's
25	what I'm going to set for now.

1	Now, with regard to numbers of depositions, until I
2	see the amended initial disclosures I really can't say right
3	now what I think is an appropriate first tier of discovery
4	depositions. So once I get the initial disclosures, the
5	amended initial disclosures then I will set a first round of
6	deposition number of depositions to be had for the first
7	tier of discovery.
8	MR. SWEETEN: Thank you, Your Honor.
9	And Your Honor, if I may just say, the one issue I
10	think that we are you know, we want to be you know,
11	alert the Court to, is the number of plaintiffs that are in
12	this case.
13	There are I think the count it's in our filing,
14	but there's something like 30 organizational plaintiffs and
15	six individual plaintiffs. I think that's right.
16	We don't need you know, some are making ADA
17	claims. Some are making others. We don't need a full seven
18	hours for those folks, but we need the number that might be
19	necessary to take those plaintiffs.
20	And so that was our concern with, you know, just
21	picking a fixed number, because I think that judicial economy,
22	you know, can be increased by, you know, taking a shorter
23	deposition but not being constrained by, you know, this hard
24	number, particularly when we're faced, you know, with
25	basically the number of plaintiffs that they are asking to

1	limit us to. So we're more for hours than limitations but we
2	can certainly address that down the road if the Court prefers.
3	THE COURT: Yeah. Continue to meet and confer on
4	this.
5	I mean, I'll tell you this, plaintiff groups, I've
6	just completed a very difficult trial on the Sutherland
7	Springs mass shooting case. It was at least four dozen, five
8	dozen plaintiffs with at least two dozen plaintiffs'
9	attorneys, and they all managed to have a unified front, and
10	so I don't understand your reluctance to an amended complaint
11	and you-all going forward on that basis.
12	Mr. Morales was very articulate about why he thought
13	that was not feasible. It sounded real great.
14	But honestly, Mr. Morales, as I heard it, I mean, it
15	sounded great, you delivered it great, but it really wasn't
16	persuasive to me about why you-all can't join together.
17	I think an amended omnibus complaint will make this
18	case go much smoother for everyone involved. And so I highly
19	recommend that after this call you-all try to get together and
20	try to figure that out.
21	MR. FREEMAN: Your Honor, may I
22	MR. MORALES DOYLE: Excuse me.
23	THE COURT: Mr. Freeman.
24	MR. FREEMAN: Your Honor, I was just going to ask, do
25	you include the United States in that request, because it

1 would be exceedingly difficult for us to be able to confer 2 with private plaintiffs. 3 THE COURT: I see that. You have a different 4 representation to this. So I exclude the U.S. from that 5 discussion. 6 Thank you, Your Honor. MR. FREEMAN: 7 THE COURT: Who else wanted to chime in? 8 MR. COX: Judge, it also implicates the issue that we 9 do have one party, Isabel Longoria, who is both a plaintiff and a defendant in the case, and how we would manage to have a 10 11 unified omnibus complaint in that respect; I'm not sure. 12 THE COURT: Yeah. Soul'm not making any rulings. I can't force you to do that You-all continue to talk among 13 14 yourselves and see what is best. 15 Even if you don't do an omnibus complaint, you-all 16 really need to treat this almost as an MDL. You need to have 17 one or two of your group serve as the lead lawyer to speak on 18 behalf of discovery issues and so forth. We've got to make 19 this case more manageable, and an MDL analogy makes most sense 20 to me. 21 MR. MORALES DOYLE: We will absolutely discuss with 22 one another. I want to assure you, Your Honor, that all of 23 plaintiffs' counsel have been in touch with one another. We 24 are not trying to make this more complicated than it needs to 25 be and we will discuss what you proposed.

1 THE COURT: Okay. What have I forgotten? Anybody 2 want to speak up? 3 MR. SWEETEN: Nothing from the State, Your Honor. 4 MR. FREEMAN: Nothing from the United States, Your 5 Honor. 6 THE COURT: So I didn't give a deadline for amended 7 complaints. 8 So I quess the deadline needs to be whatever date I 9 gave you to file the response to motion to dismiss. So you either file a response to a motion to dismiss, or you file an 10 amended complaint, by the --11 Did I say the 29th? Did I give you a date or not? 12 Ι 13 don't remember. 14 MR. MORALES DOMLE: You said 15 days, Your Honor, 15 which I believe would put us at December 1st. Unless that is 15 days from today, or 15 days from the deadline. 16 17 THE COURT: Let's just make this simple. 18 Amended initial disclosures by everybody due by 19 December 1. 20 Responses to motion to dismiss or amended complaints due by December 1st. 21 If there's responses to motions to dismiss, then the 22 23 State has 14 days thereafter to file any reply briefs. 24 Was that clear enough? 25 MR. MORALES DOYLE: Yes, Your Honor.

1	MR. ENNIS: May I raise one more thing, from Medina
2	County? This is Chad Ennis.
3	THE COURT: Yes.
4	MR. ENNIS: You mentioned, and I think we got
5	sidetracked, was, is there a way to get rid of some of these
6	claims, or at least deal with some of these claims that are
7	purely legal claims?
8	And I think it may make sense for Your Honor to order
9	us or get us to meet and confer on are there any of these
10	claims that present purely legal issues that we can agree that
11	we can brief early and get them to Your Honor and get them
12	disposed of without the need for discovery or back and forth,
13	and really kind of focus the case.
14	Obviously, we think omnibus pleadings would help a
15	ton, but if we don't get that, at least we could try to focus
16	this down on what are factual issues that we have to fight
17	about and how do we get this thing ready for trial in July.
18	THE COURT: So I already ordered you-all to do that
19	in my first order. It was in there in the laundry list.
20	Meet and confers are not a one-time occasion, so they
21	can be continuing. And so continue to meet and confer on that
22	and all the other issues. It would benefit us all, if we're
23	going to be in this push to July, if we can take up some
24	strictly legal matter.
25	Now, Mr. Sweeten, I'm not saying your side is being

1	unreasonable, but if you start arguing that, you know,
2	everything can be disposed of by summary judgment, well, you
3	know, that's not going to help me either.
4	And so, I mean, for example intentional
5	discrimination. You can't tee that up by summary judgment
6	without discovery, just as an example.
7	And so you-all continue to meet and confer to figure
8	out what, if any, discrete issues are solely legal issues and
9	that I can take up earlier rather than later.
10	MR. SWEETEN: Yes, Your Honor.
11	THE COURT: Anybody else?
12	Okay. We'll meet again.
13	Thank you.
14	(Concludes proceedings.)
15	-000-
16	I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from
17	the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter. I
18	further certify that the transcript fees and format comply
19	with those prescribed by the Court and the Judicial Conference
20	of the United States.
21	
22	Date: 11/19/2021 /s/ Gigi Simcox United States Court Reporter
23	655 East Cesar E. Chavez Boulevard San Antonio TX 78206
24	Telephone: (210)244-5037
25	