UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA ATLANTA DIVISION

FAIR FIGHT, INC., JOHN DOE, ) AND JANE DOE
-VS-
TRUE THE VOTE, INC., CATHERINE ENGELBRECHT, DEREK SOMERVILLE, MARK DAVIS, MARK WILLIAMS, RON JOHNSON, JAMES COOPER, AND JOHN DOES 1-10,

DEFENDANTS.

APPEARANCES:
ON BEHALF OF THE PLAINTIFFF:
ALLEGRA J. LAWRENCE-HARDY, ESQ.
CHRISTINA ASHLEY FORD, ESQ.
LESLIE J. BRYAN ESQ.
MARCOS MOCINE MC QUEEN, ESQ.
UZOMA NKWONTA, ESQ.
TINA MENG MORRISON, ESQ.
JACOB SHELLY, ESQ.
MICHELLE L. MC CLAFFERTY, ESQ.

ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENDANTS:
CAMERON POWELL, ESQ.
MICHAEL JOHN WYNNE, ESQ.
JAMES CULLEN EVANS, ESQ.


APPEARANCES (CONTINUED):
ON BEHALF OF INTERVENOR (USA):
DANA PAIKOWSKY, ESQ.
JENNIFER J. YUN, ESQ.
TIM MELLETT, ESQ.
AILEEN BELL HUGHES, ESQ.
JUDY BAO, ESQ.

ON BEHALF OF INTERVENOR (USA):
DANA PAIKOWSKY, ESQ.
TIM MELLETT, ESQ.
AILEEN BELL HUGHES, ESQ. JUDY BAO, ESQ.
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(HELD IN OPEN COURT AT 9 A.M.)
THE COURT: Good morning. You-all can be seated. Okay. I think, Ms. Engelbrecht, you were on the stand and you were doing direct, Mr. Evans.

MR. EVANS: Thank you, Judge Jones.

## CATHERINE ENGELBRECHT,

 having been previously duly sworn, Resumes the stand and testified as follows:DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued)
BY MR. EVANS:
Q. Ms. Engelbrecht, I hope you had a nice evening. I just have a couple of questions to finish your direct.

In making its eligibility inquiry list, did True the Vote seek to create as $\quad$ mited a list as possible?
A. Yes. The mindset was to be exclusive rather than inclusive. Some of the actions that we took to ensure that that was the case -- it's important to note that with -- with NCOA as a sort of primary foundation, unless you have an exact match, it's not going to return anything. So by using middle name, suffix -- of course, full name, full address, but middle name and suffix, those were two additional steps. And if you don't get an exact match, that's not going to return anything. So that's step one, or one way of making sure you're not getting any false positives.

Then going through and reviewing for military addresses, as we've discussed, reviewing for students as best as you can, and deceased, the goal was to create as tight a list as possible.
Q. And why did True the Vote try to create as limited a list as possible?
A. It's, you know, the basis of solid data, that what volunteers would then be presenting to theircounties was trustworthy.
Q. In making its eligibility inquiv list, did True the Vote target any demographic group?
A. No.
Q. Why?
A. It just wasn't not what we do. It was just -- we were just trying to determine the accuracy of the list and providing ineligibility potentials as they, you know, were returned. There was no other motivation there.
Q. In making its eligibility inquiry list, did True the Vote select counties in which to file inquiries?
A. We didn't select counties. We made our dataset for the entire state and then it was dependent upon where volunteers came forward.
Q. In making its eligibility inquiry list, did True the Vote target any minority-majority counties?

1 A. No.
2 Q. I think that's majority-minority counties. Let me ask that again just for a clean record.

In making its eligibility inquiry list, did True the Vote target any majority-minority counties?
A. No.

7 Q. Does True the Vote have a hotine?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Did True the Vote have a hotine in December of 2020 ?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. What was this hotline used for?
12 A. It was a resource for indivicuals to call in and ask
13 questions or report concerns. And we -- we have that ongoing 14 all the time.

15 Q. Were you expressing your voice in facilitating
16 eligibility inquiries in December of 2020?
17 A. Absolutely, yes.
18 Q. What rights were you exercising and working with Georgia
19 citizens in facilitating eligibility inquiries in December 2020?

21 A. First Amendment rights, rights of free speech and assembly and petition.
Q. Approximately, how many middle names were there in True the Vote's eligibility inquiry list?
A. Over 61,000 --

MR. NKWONTA: Objection, Your Honor. This goes to data analysis that we've already determined she's not qualified to --

THE COURT: How many middle names?
MR. NKWONTA: From the entire challenge list.
THE COURT: You response?
MR. EVANS: She's got personal knowledge. I'm asking her, based upon her personal knowledge of generating the list, how many middle names were in the eligibility inquiry list.

THE COURT: Well, she's free to tell you later, but I don't think she, off the top of her head, can remember all the middle names in that list without reading the list. So I sustain the objection.

BY MR. EVANS:
Q. To your knowledgesitting here today, how many middle names are in True the Vote's eligibility inquiry list?

MR. NKWONTA: Same objection, Your Honor. It's $250,000-p 1$ us, or maybe 364,000 list.

THE COURT: I don't know how she can know this without reading this, Mr. Evans. So I'm sustaining the objection.

Hold on, hold on.
BY MR. EVANS:
Q. Did True the Vote's list of eligibility inquiries have suffixes?
A. Yes.
Q. Did True the Vote's list --

THE COURT: Hold on. I have an objection.
MR. NKWONTA: Same objection with respect to the analysis of the list of 364,000 voters.

MR. EVANS: Judge, if I may respond. I'm asking if the list had suffixes. This is not data analysis.

THE COURT: She can answer that question, yeah. It's overruled.
Q. Did True the Vote's eligibility inqliry list have middle names?
A. Yes.
Q. Did True the Vote's master csv file contain any formulas?
A. No.
Q. In your experience, if you were to try to combine 65 files into one file, would that combination causes problems? A. Yes.

MR. NKWONTA: Objection, Your Honor. She's not qualified to give that type of analysis about combining files and conducing data analysis.

THE COURT: In her opinion would it cause trouble. You can ask in her opinion.

MR. EVANS: I'm asking her experience.
MR. NKWONTA: Our position would be that opinion testimony is improper under Rule 702 and 703 as a lay or an

7 A. Yes, it would cause massive problems. And we see these expert witness.

THE COURT: I disagree with you on that. I'll allow that question in her opinion.

MR. EVANS: Thank you, Judge.
BY MR. EVANS:
Q. Go ahead. types of problems in my line of work with CoverMe, in working with healthcare data, when you're trying to integrate disparate datasets, unless you have exact data from -- exact same -- the exact same structure dataset to dataset. And there's many other underpinnings that would determine potential problems, but just the notion that you would take 65 disparate files and merge you're going to get all manner of error.
Q. In your experience, would you ever try to combined 65 files into one file?
A. No. And certainly not in an xm 1 format. That's a recipe for disaster.
Q. Why not?
A. Because in the -- in the merger, there are necessary assumptions that have to be made that, if you don't have -- if you have -- if you don't have a working knowledge of -MR. NKWONTA: Objection, Your Honor. THE COURT: Hold on.

MR. NKWONTA: This is now going to analysis of creating a merged file.

THE COURT: I agree with that, Mr. Evans. I allowed the opinion, but that's going beyond what she has expertise to testify about -- analysis. Sustained.

BY MR. EVANS:
Q. Would you facilitate the submission of eligibility inquiries again?
A. It's been a very trying experience, but ithink what's more important -- what's most important is that citizens have the right to question and have the right to work towards improvements. So, yes, we would.
Q. Has the filing of this lawsuit affected your willingness to facilitate eligibility challenges again?
A. It's been intimidiəting, I'11 use that word. It's affected our ability in that there's been -- it's been a long three years, as I say, with a lot of things that have been said that make it difficult to find partnerships, to -- it's affected our ability in -- in -- it's affected our ability in that the process has been sullied.
Q. Has the filing of this lawsuit affected your willingness to voice your belief in election integrity?
A. It's -- it's not affected my willingness, but, you know, I bear a few more scars. It's been a difficult process, but certainly I believe that my right to free speech in all of

9 the challenge list; correct?
A. No, that's not correct.
Q. So you have conducted analysis of the challenge list?
this has been abridged.
MR. EVANS: Judge, no further questions.
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Evans.
Mr. Nkwonta, your witness.

## CROSS-EXAMINATION

BY MR. NKWONTA:
Q. Ms. Engelbrecht, you've given a lot of testimony about the analysis of the challenge list and what went into creating
A. I'm not -- I've talked about the methodology and the process, yes.
Q. But you didn't conduct any of that analysis yourself; correct?
A. No, I don't know if 'No can use the word "analysis." Is that -- I don't want to overstep.

THE COURT She's paying attention.
BY MR. NKWONTA:
Q. You have not conducted any analysis of the challenge list yourself; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. That's your testimony today?
A. Yes.
Q. You remember that you gave a deposition in this case in

1 January 2022; correct?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. And your counsel was there?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. And a court reporter was there?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. And you were under oath?
A. Yes.
Q. In that deposition on -- starting on page 137, line 9, you were asked, "Did you conduct any of the analyses that went into identifying the voters who appeared on the challenges?
"Answer: I did not, no."
A. I'm sorry, I need to catch-up. I apologize. What's --

THE COURT: Givedier time to read it.
MR. EVANS: judge, just for completeness, I would appreciate --

MR. NKWONTA: Page 137.
MR. EVANS: -- if she could get a copy of the deposition that she's looking at, so it's not zoomed in on any certain phrases and she can review it.

MR. NKWONTA: She's -- if I'm impeaching the witness, the witness is not entitled to review what I'm holding.

THE COURT: She can look at what she's says.
MR. EVANS: She does. Actually --
THE COURT: Hold on, hold on, hold on.

MR. EVANS: -- by what rule?
THE COURT: Hold on, hold on.
Let her look at it. In other words, she can't just do -- say what she wants to say off of it.

MR. NKWONTA: We are pulling it up. In fact, I have copies here.

THE COURT: At least let her look at it, you know. MR. NKWONTA: May I approach the witness, Your Honor? THE COURT: Yes.

BY MR. NKWONTA:
Q. I'11 direct your attention, Ms. Engelbrecht, to page 137, starting on line 9. You were ask@d, "Did you conduct any of the analyses that went into jaentifying the voters who appeared on the challenges?

You responded, "I did not, no."
Next question "And you mentioned that other databases were incorporated in creating matching lists and filtering the matching lists. Were some of those databases or some of those filtering methods outsourced to outside companies?"

Response: "Yes.
"Question: And were they outsourced to companies other than OpSec Group?
"Answer: We outsourced to OpSec and then OpSec followed their process."

Was that your testimony, Ms. Engelbrecht?

1 A. Yes.
Q. But your testimony today is that you did, in fact, conduct this analysis; is that right?
A. Well, I think there's a distinction in the way this question was asked. And if you continue to read in my -through my testimony, I talk very specifically about the databases that were used. I talked about TrueNCOA and SmartyStreets. I described the web-based apps. If you -- in taking these out of context, which has been you know, the theme admittedly here, taking out of context, it's what it says. But if you read the rest of it. clearly I talk about the process and the methodology whith I was responsible for. Q. Okay. Well, let's add some context.
A. Sure.
Q. You just mention $\Leftrightarrow$ SmartyStreets. And is it your testimony today that you used SmartyStreets in your analysis of the challenge list?
A. In the analysis? We used SmartyStreets in the analysis of the TrueNCOA findings to just compare.
Q. And you did that personally, is that your testimony today?
A. No, that's not my testimony.
Q. In fact, you did not do that personally, you did not conduct any analysis using SmartyStreets. Mr. Phillips conducted that; correct?

1 A. Well, if we could, I think it's important to define what 2 you mean by "conduct."

3 Q. Have you used "conduct" in a sentence before?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. And whatever you determine conduct meant when you used it 6 in a sentence, that would apply to this scenario.

7 A. Okay.
8 Q. So --
9 A. So I conducted the authorization of this entire project.
10 I conducted that to happen.
11 Q. So you authorized the project?
12 A. Authorized is another word you can use.
13 Q. But you did not use SmartyStreets like you said you did 14 in the direct examination correct?

15 A. SmartyStreets was part of a process that I authorized. 16 I'm not -- I -- really, I don't mean to be difficult, I just 17 don't understand the distinction.

18 Q. We11, let me return. Because the question $I$ just asked 19 you is the same question $I$ asked in your deposition, so let me return to your January 22nd -- January 2022 deposition. And now I'm looking at lines -- or page 139, lines 3 to 13.

You were asked: "Have you used SmartyStreets before?"
Your response: "Yes."
Next question: "And did you use SmartyStreets to refine NCOA lists?" little muddled.

Your response: "Yes."
"Question: And in what context? For the Georgia election law challenges?"

Your response: "Yes. I should say, I did not personally do that. But that was my understanding as part of what was being used broadly to refine the NCOA list itself."

Was that your testimony, that you did not conduct the A. Well, that is my testimony here. But, again, with context, when you -- when you manage a project and when you outline the requirements for that project and then give that authorization to a vendor, they're following that -- they're putting their fingers on tife keyboard, but it was at my authorization. So I feel like there's -- we're getting this a
Q. So just to clarify, the extent of your personal knowledge is based on you authorizing these activities to occur, not actually conducting the analyses yourself?
A. Well, authorizing and seeing the return results. And these are -- these -- both of these systems, SmartyStreets and TrueNCOA, the output is reports that have been included as exhibits. So it's clear that we used them.
Q. Would it be fair to say that OpSec Group and Gregg Phillips were the ones that actually conducted this analysis

1 that you authorized?
2 A. It -- it would be -- parts of it, yes.
3 Q. And you referenced Social Security databases and some 4 analysis that involved reviewing or applying Social Security 5 databases to the challenge list. Is it your testimony today 6 that True the Vote or yourself applied Social Security 7 databases to refine the challenge list?

8 A. We used the -- TrueNCOA has a -- within it has a filter
9 for -- called TrueDeceased that ties to the Social Security Death Index.
Q. Let me see if I can rephrase your question -- rephrase my question to try to get a direct ariswer.

On direct you made specific reference to using the Social Security database. Is itcjour testimony today that you or True the Vote used the Social Security database to refine the challenge list?

MR. EVANS: Objection, asked and answered.
THE COURT: Overruled. You can answer that question. THE WITNESS: I believe what I said even yesterday was that TrueNCOA has a connection with the Social Security Death Index. The name of it is TrueDeceased. And so we relied upon TrueNCOA's use of TrueDeceased, which is a connection, just as TrueNCOA is a connection to NCOALink.

THE COURT: That's a yes to his question?
THE WITNESS: I think so.

BY MR. NKWONTA:
Q. I want to return again to your January 2022 deposition, which we've established you were testifying under oath. And I direct your attention to page 139, lines 14 to 19.
"Question: And you mentioned other databases like the Social Security database and a few others. Do you know if OpSec conducted all of those -- all of that analyses internally or whether it outsourced some of that analysis?"

Your answer: "I do not know."
Is your testimony today that you do know whether there was some analysis involving a Social Security database?
A. Give me one second. I want to -- it's sort of a compound question. I want to make sure I'm clear.

Well, the way I read the question, you were asking if sort of a -- to my understanding, it was a broad question, all of that analyses internally or whether it outsourced some of the analysis. Fo my understanding, it's not specific to the Social Security database, which is a particular one, because it's part of the overall program of TrueNCOA.

And my response was like, you know, I don't know. But TrueNCOA has TrueDeceased in it, which is what was provided in exhibits with TrueAppend. All of that just comes out together.
Q. I understand. So let me ask a more direct question.

When you spoke of the Social Security Death Index and the
use of the Social Security Death Index during your direct examination, is that something that you did personally or is that something that you authorized OpSec or Gregg Phillips to do?
A. I did not put my fingers on the keyboards to do it, no.
Q. You authorized Gregg Phillips and OpSec to do that; is that right?
A. Correct.
Q. So I'd like to pull up the deposition testimony of Mr.

Gregg Phillips, which has been admitted as Plaintiffs' Exhibit 102. And I'd like to direct you to page 148, lines 13 to 18 , which should appear on thescreen.

Question Mr. Phillips was asked: "Did you use the Social Security Death Index as part of your process?
"Answer: Not in this instance.
"Question: 'This instance' referring to the Georgia challenge list?
"Answer: Yes."
Do you disagree with Mr. Phillips' testimony on the use of the Social Security Death Index?
A. No, no. Because we also have licensure to directly access the Social Security Death Index, and that's not -- he -- I can -- I absolutely see where he would have made a distinction of whether or not we used the licensure from SSDI or to NCOA TrueDeceased and he would have answered it in that

1 way.
2 Q. Now, I recall hearing you testifying about efforts to 3 remove duplicate names in the challenge list.

Do you recall that?
A. Yes.
Q. And would you have done that, engaged in those efforts,

7 or did you authorize Gregg Phillips to do that?
8 A. My fingers were not on the keyboard to do that, no.
9 Q. So you authorized Gregg Phillips to do that?
A. Right, yes.
Q. You also testified during your direct about efforts to

1 remove military voters?
2 A. Yes.
Q. Do you recall that?

And, again, I'11 ask you, were those efforts that you personally engaged in or that you authorized Gregg Phillips and OpSec to complete?
A. Again, my fingers weren't on the keyboard to do it, but I was not only -- not only authorized, but was involved in the conversations about the -- the various levels of effort to remove military addresses.
Q. So I'll direct your attention toPlaintiffs' Exhibit 102, page 131, lines 3 to 16 from Mr. Sililips' deposition.
"Question: If someone suibmitted a permanent change of address to Dover Air Force Base, would you understand that that person was no longer eligible to vote in Georgia?
"Answer: I don't know. It depends. I mean, not really, because military situations are different, because even if their permanent duty station is somewhere, they can still be -- their permanent residence can still be in the state in which they register. So it's much more complicated.
"Question: What further analysis did you perform to identify if military voters who moved to a base can retain their eligibility in Georgia?
"Answer: We didn't."
THE COURT: What's your objection?

MR. EVANS: Judge, I'm not sure why Gregg Phillips' testimony is relevant. He can't use it for impeachment. The deposition says what it says that it says. She can't say whether or not his testimony is -- his knowledge is true or false. So I'm not sure how this is relevant.

MR. NKWONTA: Well, she testified that she conducted these analysis on direct. And now we're hearing that Gregg Phillips conducted these analysis. So I'm asking her if she agrees with Gregg Phillips' assessment.

THE COURT: I'11 allow it in, Mr. Evans. Overruled. BY MR. NKWONTA:
Q. And then I'll direct you to page 136, lines 4 to 13 where Mr. Phillips is talking about UOCAVA voters.
"Question: How would you have researched or sought to identify whether an individual had requested a UOCAVA ballot?
"Answer: Almost impossible, because the counties don't publicize that.
"Question: Okay. When you say 'almost impossible," so was there anything you did to identify whether a voter had requested a UOCAVA ballot?
"Answer: No. I'm not aware of any way to do that effectively."

That conflicts with the testimony you gave on direct. Do you disagree with Mr. Phillips' analysis?
A. Can we -- I do disagree with your translation of this,

1 yes. I mean, he's being -- he's being -- in my opinion, being 2 responsive to the specific question about a UOCAVA ballot.

3 The broad step that was taken was we just removed
4 international addresses.

But UOCAVA, as you know, is a very specific type of ballot -- or not ballot, but status. And it's not denoted in the voter file. So I would say that this was a very literal interpretation of UOCAVA.
Q. So to cut this short, just to make sure we're in agreement, the analyses that you discuss your direct examination, you were referring to analyses that you had authorized Gregg Phillips to condect; is that correct? A. No.
Q. Which analyses did you press the keyboard on yourself, to use your lingo?
A. Well, analyses is -- is -- can be defined as observing data as it's provided back to you or making assessments about the data that is provided. That part of the analysis, if I can use that word, is certainly something that I participated in.

And because I've been doing this for 13 years, my understanding of what outliers might look like, what anomalies might look like is significant. I have -- yeah, I've participated in many of these programs. But I'm not sure if that's even what I'm being asked.

1 Q. So other than reviewing the data, did you conduct any 2 analyses yourself by, as you refer to it, pressing the keys on 3 the keyboard?

4 A. I don't -- I don't think that's how you define analyses.
5 That's how you've, I think, tried to define analyses.
Q. Can you tell me what analyses you conducted yourself as opposed to Mr. Gregg Phillips?
A. First, if we're going to use the word "analysis," I guess I analyzed how to procure the Georgia state voter database. And then I analyzed how to draw up a project plan. And I analyzed who to enlist and help who would have licensure to make sure that all of the necessary elements would be accessible, the right software licensure, the quality of the process. And then I analyzed the output. And I analyzed, much later and over the last three years, the reviews. So that's -- that was my role.
Q. Thank you.

I want to switch over briefly to your discussion of Mr. Joe Martin. I believe I heard you say on direct that you did not know Joe Martin or did not know of Joe Martin outside this process; is that correct?
A. Not outside of this process, no.
Q. So can you clarify what you meant when you say you did not know Joe Martin?
A. Prior to him volunteering to work as a -- or to volunteer

1 for this effort or to -- indicated he wanted to participate, 2 to the best of my knowledge, I did not know Joe Martin.

3 Q. So -- but after he volunteered, then you knew of Joe
4 Martin; correct?
5 A. After he volunteered and there were e-mail exchanges that
6 I read about in this trial, then I knew of Joe Martin.
7 Q. And you saw his e-mails; correct?
8 A. Correct, yes.
9 Q. You also mentioned during the direct examination that

11 lawsuits challenging some of the voting measures or voting
12 procedures that you believe were minlawful in the lead-up to
13 the 2020 election.

15 A. Correct.
16 Q. And was True the Vote a plaintiff in all those lawsuits?
17 A. No.
18 Q. So in some of those lawsuits, you had individual

Do you recall that? plaintiffs and True the Vote covered the fees for those individual plaintiffs; correct?
A. Correct. I'm sorry.

MR. EVANS: Judge, this is -- I don't believe this was brought up on direct. This was asked and answered in his cross in his case-in-chief.

THE COURT: I don't remember it being on direct. The
direct was long yesterday, but I don't think he --
MR. NKWONTA: It was brought up on direct. And if the Court wants to take a two-minute break, we can pull up the exact citation.

THE COURT: I don't have time to do that. I'm trying to move this case along. I'm going to just take him at his word, Mr. Evans, and proceed from there.

MR. NKWONTA: And what was brought up, just for the -- to make sure everyone's on the same page, was the fact that True the Vote filed lawsuits before 2020. We -- I don't believe he went into what those lawsits were about specifically or any of the details about who paid for what and stuff.

MR. EVANS: Okay. So long as it's limited to that, Judge.

## THE COURT Okay.

BY MR. NKWONTA:
Q. And in filing those lawsuits on behalf of individual voters where True the Vote was not named as a plaintiff, who did True the Vote retain to file those lawsuits?
A. Jim Bopp. Well, and local counsel.
Q. And the same person who filed the Georgia lawsuit that we discussed during my cross-examination, which is Plaintiffs' Exhibit $27 ?$
A. I'm not sure what Plaintiffs' Exhibit 27 is.

1 Q. This would be the Brooks v. Mahoney lawsuit in Georgia, 2 seeking to overturn the results of the presidential election 3 in eight Georgia counties.

Do you recal 1 that?
5 A. Yes, Jim Bopp did file that.
6 Q. And True the Vote was not a plaintiff in that case
7 either?
8 A. No.
9 Q. And just now you mentioned that you were talking about the impact of this lawsuit on True the Vote's and your future plans to file challenges and to facilitate challenges in the future.

The IV3 platform that we discussed previously during my cross, that platform is meant to facilitate voter challenges by citizens; correct?
A. It's meant to facilitate the ability for voters to look at their local voter rolls. And then if they are in a state where they have a challenge process, that's part -- that could be part of it, if that's what the citizen chose to do. But that's not what IV3 is --
(Reporter asked for a clarification.)
THE WITNESS: Is the name of it, IV3.
Q. And True the Vote is ready to launch that platform; correct?
A. It's -- yes, it's up.

## REDIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. EVANS:
Q. Ms. Engelbrecht, just a couple of questions.

Were you actively involved in the generation of the
9 eligibility inquiry list?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Do you have to have your fingers pushing keys on a 12 keyboard to be actively involved in the generation of an 13 eligibility challenge list?
A. No.
Q. Why not?

16 A. Because providing the -- the oversight and the direction
17 and the management and the analysis is sufficient.
18 Q. Was it important to you to be actively involved in the 19 generation of the eligibility challenge list?
A. Absolutely, yes.
Q. Why is that?

MR. NKWONTA: Thank you, Your Honor. I pass the witness.

THE COURT: Thank you.
Any redirect?
Q. Why not?
A. Because the data needed to be correct. And this was something that -- that volunteers were entrusting us to represent. And it's an important process and not to be taken lightly. And for all the reasons you do good work.

1 Q. And in your experience as the CEO of True the Vote and at 2 CoverMe, did you generate experience in dealing with datasets 3 1ike --

4 A. I'm sorry.
5 Q. -- like you did in generating the eligibility challenge
6 1ists?
7 A. Every day, yes.

MR. EVANS: No further questions, Judge.
THE COURT: Thank you.

## Recross?

MR. NKWONTA: Nothing further, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Engelbrecht. You can step down. Run while you can.

THE WITNESS: Tharik you. Thank you.
THE COURT: All right. Call your next witness.
THE WITNESS: Leave this --
THE CO'URT: Yes, ma'am. Leave that up there.
MR. WYNNE: Your Honor, the defense does not intend to call any additional witnesses. But there are a number of housekeeping matters that need to be addressed, including the motion for judicial notice and the supplement.

THE COURT: Let me say this: The one -- Mr. Nkwonta, the one they filed this morning dealing with Ben Hill, I've read those cases, those orders. So I don't see a big issue, but I'11 tell you, I've read them at least twice.

MR. NKWONTA: Your Honor, they're --
THE COURT: I know you haven't had a chance to respond.

MR. NKWONTA: Right. And, Your Honor, there generally isn't a big issue with it. I think there's just one quirk about the Ben Hill case which is that the Court entered a TRO shortly after we filed our complaint. That TRO, if you look on the docket, it says the TRO has been withdrawn, which is normal because, you know, after you enterCa TRO, then you schedule a PI hearing.

And so I think the TRO bridges a lot of the gap between what the parties are discuissing. And if there's a way to include the TRO and include the other filings, like the Muscogee County response to the motion for TRO, where they explain what it is that they were doing --

THE COURT Judge Garner issued an order on December 28, 2020; Judge Anand ordered on January 4, 2021. What is missing out of those orders that you think I need to go further on?

MR. NKWONTA: Well, I -- so -- and my apologies if this is included in their motion for judicial notice, I don't remember seeing it, but the TRO opinion I don't believe was included.

THE COURT: All right. Well -- some of my staff can pull up the exact -- I've read her opinion, her orders. But
if there's something missing, we'11 go on the docket. What you're asking is for the Court to see the exact TRO opinion? MR. NKWONTA: Yes, the exact TRO opinion, which I don't believe --

THE COURT: That's no problem.
MR. NKWONTA: I don't believe -- I don't believe it's on the docket anymore because it was withdrawn.

MR. WYNNE: It is, Your Honor. It's docket -it's -- that was the one entered December 28th. There was a hearing December 30th. And it wasn't withdrawn. There was a new one. It's still on the docket. And under Rule 201(d), judicial notice is mandatory wher supplied with the necessary information. We've supplied thie necessary information.

THE COURT: I'vecalready indicated I've read those orders at least twice. I know what's in them. I'm just trying to figure cut what Mr. Nkwonta wants me to read additionally. --

MR. NKWONTA: That was both -- just to ensure that both opinions were included and the Muscogee brief was included. It's more an issue of completeness. We don't object to taking judicial notice.

THE COURT: If there is something in addition to -other that the orders that were entered by Judge Gardner, send it to us again. Or if you can't find it, we can definitely get it, so --

MR. WYNNE: I can give it to you right now.
THE COURT: Well, if you've got it printed out -MR. WYNNE: I've got the whole docket sheet right here. And, in fact, I believe that we have --

THE COURT: Well, I've looked at what you -MR. WYNNE: -- entered the docket sheet.

THE COURT: I looked at what you gave me. I'm familiar with it. Let Mr. Nkwonta look at it and make sure that he's satisfied that the Court has everything.

Because, again, I think I thoroughly read it, but, you know, I admit, you know, we didn't go and pull everything off the docket. We pulled mainl just the orders off the docket.

MR. WYNNE: Will do. It's Exhibit A1 or Exhibit A and 1 . Here is the docket sheet. And we don't object to the inclusion of anything, you know, for optional completeness and because it's mandatory under $201(d)$.

And I'd ask the other items there also be taken into judicial notice.

THE COURT: Again, I don't mind reading everything. I thought I pulled -- you know, I didn't just read the order, we read everything that went along with the order. But if I'm missing something, I have no problem with you-all giving it to me and I'll read it. Judicial notice, but I'm going to allow it.

MR. WYNNE: Yeah. And there were also some websites and I have the authority allowing those to be taken judicial notice of dynamic websites that the Court could go to, media articles and so forth, and these things are --

THE COURT: I don't think the media -- I think the media is one of the best things in America, in the world, but I don't base decisions on media articles.

MR. WYNNE: No, of course not.
THE COURT: Nothing personal.
MR. WYNNE: Of course not. But to counterbalance their references to articles during one of these crosses that I was handling, take a look at the others.

THE COURT: Listen, Tisten, 1isten. If it's not on that docket, I can't base decision on something that's not on the docket. Again, with all due respect to the media, I read it every day, especially in this case I've been trying to keep up with what the media is saying, but I'm not going to base decisions based on that.

MR. WYNNE: No. I was talking about the other attachments, not just Attachment A relating to Ben Hill in Muscogee, but there are other items.

THE COURT: Let's keep it simple.
Mr. Nkwonta, is this anything else that's missing out of the -- what's been filed by defendants or what the Court has already read?

MR. WYNNE: And we have no objection to the items they've listed, obviously. I think there's three of them, including the prior subpoenas that were withdrawn.

THE COURT: Mr. Wynne, are you talking about what you-all filed on Sunday night or Monday?

MR. WYNNE: Yes.
THE COURT: Okay. I think the response -- we got a response back from the plaintiff. I think the plaintiffs only had some objections about some hearsay matters in there. They didn't object to all of it. We can pull again and look at it.

I think we're fine, Mr. Nkwonta, on the Ben Hill part of this, unless you-all have sumething else you want to add that you think I need to Gad that wasn't available to me.

MR. NKWONTA: And we'll identify it, but we're fine with the Ben Hill

THE COURT: We saw your response to the judicial notice regarding the e-mails on Stephanie -- what's her last name?

MR. NKWONTA: Stinetorf.
THE COURT: -- Stinetorf, and you-all had some objections. And I can't remember exactly from when we pulled it, but just tell me: What were your objections to that judicial notice?

MR. NKWONTA: Well, the objection is it's not
appropriate for judicial notice. It's not -- it's not a matter that's not -- that is not reasonably contested. Stephanie Stinetorf testified that that e-mail was mistaken and there were subsequent e-mails that clarified the issue.

So we believe it's not appropriate to take judicial notice of a single e-mail, but I think this can be resolved. What we propose is the Court can take that e-mail into account but also take Ms. Stinetorf's other e-mails with individuals from Muscogee --

THE COURT: Rule of completeness.
MR. NKWONTA: -- under Rule 106.
THE COURT: I have no problem doing that. And Mr. Wynne has noted he has no problem with that, so we will do that.

So it's in, Mr. Wynne. And we're going to add -- you give me the other emails, just to make sure I have them all?

MR. NKWONTA: Yeah, we attached them to our response.
THE COURT: All right. Then I have them right here, then. Thank you.

MR. NKWONTA: Thank you.
MR. WYNNE: Thank you. It's perfectly fair. We're in favor of more information.

THE COURT: Well, since I have to read it all, I can't say I'm totally in agreement with you. But we'll do it that way. Rule of completeness says the law says I have to do
it now. So I'm going to follow the law. What else? Those are the two judicial notices I received from the defendants. And they both are in, and, again, we'll do a rule of completeness. We'11 read all the e-mails that you ask me to read.

MR. NKWONTA: Have you gotten to plaintiffs' requests for judicial --

THE COURT: Not yet. Since the defendant is standing, we'11 deal with his first and thenowe'll get back to yours.

What else?
MR. WYNNE: Yeah. And as to C and D, those government --

THE COURT: $C$ and $D$ on what? $C$ and $D$ on what?
MR. WYNNE: Cand D is the screen print from the Georgia's Secretar of State's website.

THE COURT: Which one are you talking about, Monday's judicial notice or today's judicial notice?

MR. WYNNE: Sunday's.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. WYNNE: And Attachment $C$ is a screenprint taken from the Georgia Secretary of State's website and the fact as illustrated by this attachment, counting absentee ballots files can be accessed by year and by individual and are publicly available. Defendants request the Court take
judicial notice of that fact and all records relating to absentee ballots that can be downloaded --

THE COURT: Mr. Wynne, Mr. Wynne, I'm taking judicial notice of everything you filed Sunday.

MR. WYNNE: Okay. Thank you. That was -- I was just clarifying that. And I got the case law about taking judicial notice of dynamic --

THE COURT: Mr. Wynne, you're winning. You're winning. When you're winning what happens? You quit talking.

MR. WYNNE: All right. Hey, I háven't had a chance to be up here in a couple days.

THE COURT: Well, I miss hearing you, but when you're winning, the way I was taught sit down, leave it alone.

MR. WYNNE: I gotona.
THE COURT: You might say something that changes the judge's mind.

MR. WYiNE: I don't want to do that.
THE COURT: Yeah. All right. Let's take up plaintiffs' judicial notices.

MR. NKWONTA: Just give us one minute, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, Mr. Wynne.
MR. NKWONTA: I'11 start by -- just to avoid any delay while we pull up the motion --

THE COURT: Hold on. Before Mr. Wynne sits down, Mr. Wynne, do you have everything in evidence for the

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defendant you want to put into evidence?
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MR. WYNNE: Could I have just a moment to confer?
THE COURT: You can do that while Mr. Nkwonta is talking.

MR. NKWONTA: Well, we pulled up the motion itself to make sure I don't say anything wrong. I believe what we seek to admit or ask the Court to take judicial notice of is the data from the Secretary of State's -- from Georgia Secretary of State that lists the voting age population by race in each county in Georgia. And we've provided sort of the relevant cite for that.

We also attached, I belice three subpoenas that were issued to Ms. Heredia's apartment buildings and her -- I believe her auto dealership or her auto --

THE COURT: I plan on -- unless defense can tell me something they haven't told me, I plan on allowing everything you requested judicial notice.

MR. NKWONTA: And we specifically request that the Court take judicial notice of the eight counties in Georgia that have the highest Black voting age populations. The counties are listed in our --

THE COURT: I have it listed. Matter of fact, I read them this morning. They are Fulton, DeKalb, Gwinnett, Cobb, Clay, Chatman, and Richmond.

MR. NKWONTA: Yes, that's correct.

THE COURT: I will take judicial notice of everything you've asked me to take judicial notice of.

MR. NKWONTA: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Wynne, do you know exactly whether your exhibit list is complete?

MR. WYNNE: Your Honor, I'm going to have to ask for about five-minutes, it's been a two-week trial, to confer with cocounsel here.

THE COURT: Take five minutes. I'lD sit right here.
Say that out loud, Ms. Wright.
Mr. Wynne, listen up very ciosely. It's Ms. Wright's responsibility to keep up with what's been admitted, and she's going to tell you what has beeri admitted.

THE DEPUTY CLERK. Defendants $38^{\prime}$ and that's it.
THE COURT: And while they're looking at their exhibit list, you dight want to recheck yours.

Mr. Nkwonta, I directed you-all to provide me an updated exhibit list because you-all added 91 through 105. And we need that updated exhibit list before we close this out.

Department of Justice, you're fine.
MS. BOA: Thank you, Your Honor.
MR. NKWONTA: Very quick cleanup, Your Honor, while they sort through their exhibits.

The docket numbers that we wanted to make sure were
added for the Muscogee County case were ECF 12, which is the original TRO order, and ECF 23, which is the Muscogee County brief in opposition to the motion for TRO.

THE COURT: 12 and 23?
MR. NKWONTA: Correct.
THE COURT: Maddie, did you get that?
MR. NKWONTA: And then for our updated exhibit list, i just want to make sure I heard the Court correctly. The version that you have doesn't go to 105? ItCstops at --

THE COURT: It stops at 90.
MR. NKWONTA: Okay. We'11 provide you an updated version. Would you like us to fice them on the docket as well?

THE COURT: Yes. The main -- first, get one to Ms. Wright as quick as possible. The docket one you can do tomorrow, but we need this one ASAP.

MR. NKWONTA: We'11 do that. Thank you.
THE COURT: All right, Mr. Wynne.
MR. WYNNE: Yes, Your Honor. A few things.
According to our list, we'd like to offer 53 and 54. Those are the audio transcripts of the -- of the matters that -- I think they're audio of the alleged SEAL's statement. And then we've got the audio transcript. I may be mistaken if we have actual audio. Do we not have audio? Well, we have just the transcript. Then strike that. I'm trying to be complete
here. Strike that request.
THE COURT: Four transcripts.
MR. NKWONTA: I believe those are already in
evidence. I believe 53 is Plaintiffs' Exhibit 51. And I believe Defendants' Exhibit 54 is Plaintiffs' Exhibit 52.

THE COURT: I don't know.
MR. WYNNE: Well, if they're in, then my point is moot.

THE COURT: As usual, let me talk to the paralegal.
Are those the same and are they in?
MR. WYNNE: They are the samic. Okay.
THE COURT: Then we don' need 53 and 54 .
MR. WYNNE: All right. Just being careful.
Next we'd ask foo No. 64, which Ms. Heredia -- or that Mr. -- Mr. Evans proved up with Ms. Heredia. That was the CARFAX.

MR. NKiONTA: Object on authenticity grounds and hearsay and foundation.

MR. WYNNE: I don't think they preserved those.
MR. NKWONTA: We did preserve those. This is part of the -- this is also disclosed untimely, so...

THE COURT: They did, Mr. Wynne, on the 26th of October.

What's next?
MR. WYNNE: I would just respond to their -- to their
hearsay objection and the Court's ruling under the residual hearsay rule.

THE COURT: Well, your first objection, though -- and I'11 have plaintiffs' counsel repeat it again. The hearsay objection is not your -- it's a problem, but it's not your biggest problem.

MR. NKWONTA: So, Your Honor, actually, I want to retract one of my objections. I believe Exhibit 64, the CARFAX, I believe that was disclosed in May of 2023. So I apologize and I retract that objection.

THE COURT: I think Ms. Heredia testified about it, Mr. Nkwonta, and she -- I think sfie probably verified -- I haven't seen the exhibit, but she probably verified what was in the exhibit, because I didn't see the exhibit. But she -Mr. Evans on direct - on cross questioned her about it.

MR. NKWONTA: She verified one entry that showed where her car got service. So, obviously, that is in evidence that the car got serviced on that date. But the CARFAX report itself is unverified.

THE COURT: Okay. Without seeing the exhibit, I can't -- if he's talking about the whole CARFAX report, you know, it's telling if the car if it's been in an accident and all that, she did not testify to that.

MR. WYNNE: We'd ask to offer it under 807, which is the residual hearsay exception and point out that throughout,
plaintiffs have been criticizing our various -- our various witnesses for not having looked at things like the CARFAX report, which is a concession of some element of reliability putting it in Rule 807.

THE COURT: I almost should ask either Ms. Lawrence-Hardy or Ms. Bryan to stand up here and rule on your objection, because this came up in another case and we spent about, what, an hour and a half on it. And at the end of the day, Ms. Bryan and Ms. Laawrence-Hardy was not happy with the Court. I didn't allow it then and I'm not allowing it now.

MR. WYNNE: Okay. Well
THE COURT: And let me say, anybody reading this record, so the Appellate Court can be really sure, what happened in the case, Ms. Bryan and Ms. Lawrence-Hardy, I just used it to relate it, because they both were looking at me like what the world are you doing.

Totally different matter. But there's a whole different set of procedures you have to follow to get something in on residual and you haven't offered not one of them yet.

MR. WYNNE: I'm ready.
A, the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact. It's a material fact that there was dispute about Ms. Heredia's residence for purpose of Section 230.

The statement is more -- B, the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered, that any other evidence that the public can cure through reasonable efforts and because plaintiffs have put so much effort --

THE COURT: There's your problem right there. I don't find there's been enough reasonable efforts that you could not have gotten this in another way.

Residual is the last resort to get something in where all of the other mechanisms have not been met. But the key is that you have to show this Court that yoused all those other mechanisms and did not work out. Not because of your failure to do it, but because you haven't shown the Court that it couldn't have been done another way. And that's my ruling here.

MR. WYNNE: FOr the record, I would just suggest that the large array of things that were done that they objected to as an intrusion upon Ms. Heredia's personal affairs, that is everything that Mr. Somerville, who is nothing but thorough, did.

THE COURT: I respectfully disagree with you, Mr. Wynne, but I note your objection for the record. I'm not allowing it in.

MR. WYNNE: Okay. Thank you.
Along the same lines and potentially risking the same ruling, I'd offer, again with Ms. Heredia, Exhibits 127
through 129. Those are the NCOA result, the CASS summary report, and the CASS certification, which I believe Mr. Evans, you know, set the foundation through cross.

THE COURT: 127 through what?
MR. WYNNE: 129.
MR. NKWONTA: Your Honor, I don't know who laid the foundation on this. If they are suggesting that Jocelyn laid a foundation a CASS summary report, I would object to that. I'm not sure what a CASS -- I'm still not sure what CASS means after this trial.

MR. WYNNE: Well, I think Ms Engelbrecht explained that admirably. And if you take the testimony of Jocelyn Heredia and combine it with that explanation, there is a sufficient evidentiary fouridation to let these uncontested materials, in terms of whether they're accurate and probative, in.

MR. NKWONTA: Your Honor, 127 is just a screenshot. 128 and 129 are pages that -- it's unclear what it is they are. And I'm -- I don't think you can cobble together testimony from different witnesses to establish foundation. But even if you could, I still -- there still has been no foundation laid for these exhibits.

MR. WYNNE: Of course you can. We did it with the text message exchange. We had to wait until Derek Somerville was on the stand to -- to authenticate his part of that
communication. So of course you can use two witnesses to establish a foundation. That's fundamental.

THE COURT: Well, I agree you can use two witnesses to establish a foundation. I'm just trying to think, did you establish the foundation?

Tell me again your objection, other than the foundation aspect of it.

MR. NKWONTA: Foundation, authenticity. And it's unclear what these -- it's unclear what these pages are.

THE COURT: So what are they? Are they the ones where it's showing Mr. Bowling and them challenging?

MR. WYNNE: We can pull the exact exhibits and show them.

MR. NKWONTA: Nocritness actually explained what these documents are.

THE COURT I need to see them, because I don't remember -- I probably saw them, but just -- I remember one dealing with Ms. Heredia, the other showing -- Representative Bowling and Mr. Gasaway -- Dan Gasaway was challenging her. Is that the one you-all are talking about?

MR. WYNNE: Ms. Martinez has them pulled up on her screen right here. If we want to find a way --

THE COURT: Well, plaintiffs' counsel said he doesn't know what it is. So you've got to show it to him as well. I don't remember seeing this.

MR. WYNNE: It's in voluminous binders, I'm not sure -- but we have them on the screen.

THE COURT: What -- your screen. Is that -- I don't remember seeing that, I've got to be honest with you, Mr. Wynne. I don't agree that the testimony regarding this is extensive enough to establish a foundation. I would think the person would have to establish a foundation, one of the two people would have to at least looked at it to identify it. It was never put up on the screen. So I don't know how you can establish a foundation when the person again, two people can do it, but neither of them was ever shown this.

MR. WYNNE: Fair enough.
THE COURT: Denied.
MR. WYNNE: All cight. 128.
THE COURT: 128. I think you've got the same problem with 128. I don'tremember either one of the two people you're trying to lay a foundation with ever identified this. MR. WYNNE: Well, okay. Could I recall Ms. Engelbrecht?

THE COURT: I already told you your problem. What's your next one? MR. WYNNE: All right. 129.

THE COURT: One more time. If one of the two people had identified it, that's part of laying the foundation. But neither one of these people were shown 129 either. So they
never identified it.

MR. WYNNE: So is that --
THE COURT: That's a no as well. 127, 128, 129 are not allowed. I note Mr. Wynne's exceptions for the record. MR. WYNNE: Okay. Then I go to -- and I think this is in order that they were presented. This is regarding Mr. Turner. We have 278 , which was presented. And that's this one. And he did --

THE COURT: Yeah. On the first day October the 26th, that one was presented.

MR. NKWONTA: Your Honor, this exhibit was disclosed 12 hours before trial.

THE COURT: Okay. Weil, Mr. Wynne, your problem is that it was not timely disiosed, according to plaintiffs' counse1.

MR. WYNNE Well, I still need a ruling for the record, if you will.

THE COURT: It was not timely disclosed and that's the reason why I'm not allowing it in. I think it probably would come in otherwise, but plaintiffs' counsel is saying it was not timely disclosed under the rules. So based on that -that is your objection?

MR. NKWONTA: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: I would have to deny it. I remember this one. Because this one was presented, it was shown to

1 Mr. Turner on the 26th of October, but it was not put in, it was not offered, and it was not timely disclosed. So I'm denying it on that basis, it was not timely disclosed.

MR. WYNNE: And then 276. Again, I would -- I would say that it was fully -- a foundation was laid for this exhibit during Mr. Turner's testimony, and as -- I offer it into evidence.

THE COURT: I think we're going to have the same problem. I remember it also being shown to Mr. Turner. I think the proper foundation was set up. The question is, was it timely disclosed?

MR. NKWONTA: It was not timely disclosed, Your Honor. And just for the record, we would also assert a foundation objection because it was still -- no one has testified as to where that document came from or what it is.

THE COURT Mr. Wynne, if it is not timely disclosed we don't even get to the other part. So, again, I note your exception. I think you'11 probably -- if you had timely disclosed, you probably would have got it in, but...

MR. WYNNE: And for the record as well, I'd also note that new counsel did not get the entire files from former counsel until after the May date, which seriously handicapped our ability to understand the relevance and to supplement that exhibit list, the due date for which had already passed.

That being the same for the witnesses we had hoped to
call, but we were precluded because of prior counsel's neglect and negligence.

THE COURT: I don't quite know how to respond to that, because I don't want to get subpoenaed for an Indiana case.

MR. WYNNE: I just wanted to note it for the record and ask the Court to take judicial notice of my statement.

THE COURT: I take judicial notice of your statement. I'm not saying whether it's true or false, but I take judicial notice of your statement.

MR. WYNNE: And so with that so I don't have to repeat everything again, we offer Exhibit 277.

THE COURT: I think we're in the same situation that it was not timely disclosed. So I'm denying it for that basis.

MR. WYNNE Same offer into evidence, Exhibit 280.
MR. NKWONTA: Yes, Your Honor, same objection.
THE COURT: Denied because it was not timely
disclosed.
MR. WYNNE: And 275.
MR. NKWONTA: Same objection, Your Honor.
THE COURT: It's denied because it was not timely disclosed.

MR. WYNNE: There are a couple more here.
And then Exhibits 297 through 302. Those relate to

Jocelyn Heredia and inquiry into, you know, her residence for purposes of the Section 230 eligibility inquiry.

THE COURT: Now, 297 was shown to her on October the 27th, but it was not admitted.

MR. NKWONTA: Same objection. It was not timely disclosed.

THE COURT: Is that same way for 298 and 299 as well? MR. NKWONTA: Yes, Your Honor.

MR. WYNNE: 299 through 302.
THE COURT: All right. Just for the record, Mr. Wynne, from 297 to 302, the Court is going to deny it because it was not timely disclosed.

MR. WYNNE: Okay. And I believe that's it. And so the defendants --

THE COURT: just for the record, I did allow in 64 over objection. Wart a minute. Yeah, I allowed that one -well, I didn't, excuse me, because the CARFAX included extra information. I think you're going to have to go through it and take out the part -- one part of it is admissible, but not all of it.

MR. WYNNE: Okay.
THE COURT: One part she testified to about going to CARFAX and things like that, but she didn't testify about the entire CARFAX report that talks about accidents in the past and things like that.

MR. WYNNE: Well, we can redact that and reoffer it.
THE COURT: You redact that and show it to
plaintiffs' counsel.
MR. NKWONTA: Your Honor, if the Court is going to admit that exhibit, then we would prefer the entire exhibit be admitted under the rule of completeness. So no need to redact. Our view is just it shouldn't be admitted. If it comes in, we think the entire thing should come in.

THE COURT: All right. Here's what i'll do. To perfect your record, I'm going to allow it in over objection. So that we'll put it all in, but I'11 just say you objected to it. So I allowed it in over objection.

MR. NKWONTA: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: So the whole thing comes in over objection.

So you don t have to redact, Mr. Wynne.
MR. WYiNE: Okay. Then defendants rest.
THE COURT: Okay. Plaintiffs, anything? Have you got all your exhibits in?

Ms. Wright, is the defendants' list up-to-date and is plaintiffs' list up-to-date?

THE DEPUTY CLERK: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Okay. Closing arguments start at 10:30.
I think both sides requested an hour for closing; is that correct, plaintiffs?

MR. NKWONTA: Yes, Your Honor. May I request to reserve 15 minutes for rebuttal?

THE COURT: You can reserve as much time as you want.
MR. WYNNE: Your Honor, we're going to split our part. I'm going to take the first 15 minutes, and then Mr. Evans will take the last 45 minutes.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. That's fine. We'11 start at 10:30. Thank you-all.
(A break was taken. )
THE COURT: You-all can may be seated.
Before we start the closings, one announcement I need to make -- two announcements. Dffendants' counsel filed a motion 52(c) last week. I tofd plaintiffs' counsel they had till noon today to respond

I read defense counsels' brief Sunday night, a very good brief, but based on what I've heard in the argument last week, I'm going to deny the motion to $52(\mathrm{c})$. So I don't need today to brief. But both sides still are required by next Wednesday at 5 p.m. to file findings of facts and conclusions of law. So you probably -- your brief will not be in vein, whoever did the research, you can probably work it into that. Okay?

All right. Yes, sir.
MR. NKWONTA: Sorry, just one last housekeeping item I want to verify with Ms. Wright.

THE COURT: Yeah.
THE DEPUTY CLERK: Yes.
(A discussion is held off the record.)
THE COURT: Okay. Are you ready?
MR. NKWONTA: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Which clock is the plaintiffs' clock, Ms. Wright?

THE DEPUTY CLERK: That would be the left.
THE COURT: Mr. Nkwonta, the clock on the left is yours. The clock on the right is defendants. The one on the far left is the one -- is yours.

MR. NKWONTA: Thank you
THE COURT: All right.
MR. NKWONTA: Good morning, may it please the Court.
THE COURT: Sir.
MR. NKWONTA: When we started this trial, Your Honor, I said that defendants' false accusations and threats would have consequences and that lies have consequences. And now that the evidence is in, I want to put a finer point on that statement.

Because with the evidence that we've seen, Your Honor, we submit that the standard to which we hold defendants and the standard by which we judge their conduct, as we've seen through this trial before the January 2021 runoff, will have serious consequences and serious implications for the
right to vote.
Now we know what the stakes are. And we know what the stakes are because Jocelyn Heredia has not voted since the January 2021 runoff. And you heard her, Your Honor, talk about how excited she was to be voting. How she emerged from the voting booth with an "I Voted" sticker. How she watched her parents become citizens and take part in one of the most cherished Constitutional rights. How she voted in 2016, 2018, 2020, and the 2021 runoff. She was politicaDiy active.

But after her experience being challenged by both True the Vote's volunteer Jerry Bowling, and Mark Davis and Derek Somerville's volunteer, Dar Gasaway, she stayed away in 2022.

Those are the stakes. And it's not just Jocelyn. The Court heard testimy from several voters, all of whom approached the voting process from different stages of life, from different backgrounds, and even from different parts of the world.

You had D'Malio Turner on temporary assignment in California. You had Scott Berson, recent Auburn graduate who came back home to Georgia and voted in the 2021 runoff while he was at home. And you have Stephanie Stinetorf who was in Germany working. And yet the one thing that all of these individuals shared in common, in addition with Jocelyn, the one thing they shared in common is that the challenges made
them fear that they had done something wrong. They were being accused of voting unlawfully. They felt that they were being accused of violating the law. They were fearful. They were intimidated.

So these are the consequences. And we saw the consequences when these individuals, these brave individuals testified.

And so the question is whether these plaintiffs and Georgia voters must bear these consequences aione. Whether they have to fend for themselves or whether the VRA provides some protection when they are falsely and recklessly accused of being unlawful voters.

Now, before I get tan deep into the testimony and the exhibits, I want to recogoize that this case presents some difficult legal questions that the Court has been working through, and to be frank, that I've been wresting with. And, thankfully, the path that was laid out in the Court's summary judgment order, I believe is one that gives us a way out of this legal thicket. And it starts out by explaining how to prove a Section 11(b) violation. And it's grounded in the text of the statute and we can follow it.

It says, "Plaintiffs must show that plaintiffs' actions, directly or through the means of a third party in which they're directed" -- that's the first element -- "caused or could have caused" -- that's the second element -- "any
person to be reasonably intimidated, threatened, or coerced from voting or attempting to vote."

So I'll start with what I think is a threshold question. And it's a question that Your Honor raised during the Rule 52 motion arguments as well. What did these defendants do to end up here? What did each of them do? What are their actions that violated Section 11(b)?

I'm going to start with True the Vote, because True the Vote is the hub of all of this. And there are numerous connections. But starting with True the Vote.

We know that True the Vote ohallenged more than a quarter million voters just weeks Wefore the January 2021 runoff. And by now it's well-established that their challenge lists, consisting of overa quarter million voters, was an unmitigated disaster.

The Court has seen Plaintiffs' Exhibit 91, which we'll pull up briefly. And I don't want to belabor this -the next page, the next page, the next one, next.

I don't want to belabor this, Your Honor, but some of these errors are appalling. To challenge voters that have not even moved, that have the same moved from and moved to address. To challenge over 15,000 voters without even indicating the address they allegedly moved to. To challenge individuals whose addresses reside or reflect a military installation, to challenge students who are both students and
in the military, that is the height of recklessness, Your Honor.

And you heard Dr. Mayer testify credibly that he was in shock. He didn't just disagree, he was in shock by the quality of the challenge list and the errors that he saw. We can take this down.

And you heard no evidence to refute Dr. Mayer's observations. Defendants did not put up an expert. They attempted to have Mr. Davis and Mr. Somerville opine on True the Vote's challenge list even while simaneously claiming they were completely separate from True the Vote and did not know about True the Vote's methodiogy.

Then they tried to have Ms. Engelbrecht testify and give details about how the challenges were constructed, which she did, only to reveal on cross-examination that what she meant by analysis and construction was actually giving the order for somebody else to do the analysis and construction and -- and preparation of the challenge list.

And that other person she gave the instruction to, Gregg Phillips from OpSec. Well, you heard his deposition testimony. You heard experts from the deposition designations of all the things he didn't do. The things that Ms. Engelbrecht said True the Vote did, he said they didn't do. Didn't research how to remove military voters. Didn't research how to remove UOCAVA voters. She said she applied

1 SmartyStreets during the direct examination. On cross-examination, realized she did not. She sent a direct order, I guess, to Mr. Phillips to do it.

Long story short, the Court has heard no credible testimony to refute Mr. Mayer's -- or Dr. Mayer's observations in this case.

And the Court can make a finding just based on that chart alone, even without any further discussion, that the creation of those lists was reckless. And we know it was reckless, not just because of those errors, but because they were never caught.

When there are 15,000 ertiries that do not have a date, that do not have a move date, when you challenge 15,000 voters, that's 15,000 lines on whatever spreadsheets you've constructed where you alleged somebody moved but the address they moved to is blank and you don't see that. That means that you did not exercise the bare minimum diligence required when contesting someone's most sacred Constitutional right.

Now, that's what that statistic indicates, but we actually don't have to guess. Because you heard Ms. Engelbrecht testify and you heard others testify, Mr. Williams included, that they did not review those entries before they submitted the 1ist. They took the list and they passed it off.

In some instances, the challengers themselves never received the list. In many instances, the challengers never received the list. In some instances, the volunteer challengers didn't even know they were submitting challenges on their behalf. You heard Mr. Martin express his shock that the challenges had been submitted in his name by True the Vote.

What Your Honor may not have heard but is in evidence as one of plaintiffs' deposition designations is testimony from Mr. Ron Johnson who also expressed shock that challenges -- or surprise that challenges were submitted in his name by True the Vote.

So obvious errors in the tens of thousands. Nobody reviewed those entries. Atid these are errors that you would see if you reviewed each entry. That is the height of recklessness for True the Vote's challenge list.

But it gets worse. They scrape together the challenge list of over 364,000 voters, they challenged about a quarter million but scraped together a list of over 364,000 voters in approximately 2 weeks, according to Ms. Engelbrecht's testimony. Maybe even less.

Ms. Engelbrecht testified that they started preparing or conducting the data analysis in the second week of December. Then met with Mr. Davis and Mr. Somerville on December 16th. Announced the challenge effort on December

18th, and they were off to the races. That's a fast
turnaround. And it's a fast turnaround considering that there isn't a preordained or predetermined window for filing these types of challenges in Georgia. They had all year. And they had the year before.

They chose to do it in the last two weeks before a hotly contested Senate runoff election. And they chose to overwhelm counties, meanwhile demanding that those counties conduct hearings and force the voters who had been challenged to present evidence of residency. And they did this even after a meeting with the Secretary of State's office.

You've heard a lot of diccussion about that meeting. You've heard about Ms. Engelbrecht's takeaways from that meeting. And you've heard about various interpretations of that meeting. But youve only heard from one witness as to what was said in that meeting. The only witness who has been able to tell you what was said in that meeting reliably with admissible evidence is Ryan Germany.

And you can believe what Ryan Germany says because Ryan Germany does not have, you know, any stake in this fight. Ryan Germany met with True the Vote willingly with the Secretary of State's Office. And he told them, submitting spreadsheets with just names of voters is not going to accomplish what you hope to accomplish. It's not going to establish probable cause. Relying on that alone is not
enough. But they persisted anyway.
Then they heard from one of their challengers, Joe Martin, who told them problems with the challenge list, concerns about the quality. He said some of the folks he challenged were residents, had homes in Toliver County. They didn't revisit their lists, they didn't regroup. They said, fine, we'll find somebody else. James Cooper said I'll find somebody else to submit the same challenges. That's reckless.

And so with Dr. Mayer's unrefuted testimony explaining just how reckless True the Voté was in compiling these challenges, the Court should compare that with the purpose of the challenges. The plirpose of the challenges, as Ms. Engelbrecht has testified and as she stated in her deposition, was to require voters to provide proof of residence, to challenge voters to provide proof of residence. So that means wher a voter who goes to vote in person who can typically use a student ID or who can typically use a government employed ID, would no longer be able to use that ID. They've have to present something with proof of residence or an absentee voter, who at the time, could submit a ballot without additional evidence, would have to provide proof of residence. That was the stated purpose of these challenges.

And there's more even. You heard evidence that True the Vote created a -- we'll call it a whistleblower program, to use their words. To compensate individuals who report

1 fraud. And yet in private conversations, when discussing how to implement this program, Ms. Engelbrecht called it a bounty and revealed that she offered a Georgia whistleblower $\$ 50,000$ in cash.

Now, the e-mail says what it says. It's in
Exhibit 28. When this Court asked Ms. Engelbrecht about that \$50,000 offer, which was, again, contingent upon evidence leading to prosecution, and in addition to securing representation for that -- for that whistleblower, the Court should take note of Ms. Engelbrecht's response. She didn't say that's not true. She didn't say didn't make that statement. What she gave was the equivalent of a word salad that didn't really tell us why a voter was being offered \$50,000 in order to report fraud.

And then that Your Honor, is combined with the increased monitoring of polling places, with the references to -- the reference to Navy SEALs monitoring ballot drop boxes. Those are the activities that brought True the Vote here, and those are the reasons that True the Vote and Ms. Engelbrecht are defendants in this lawsuit.

During last week's argument, the Court asked about Ron Johnson, James Cooper, Mark -- well, they didn't ask about Mark Williams, but I'll address him as well.

So True the Vote and Ms. Engelbrecht, they're not Georgia residents. They don't have the right to file
challenges in any county in Georgia. So that's where these individuals come in. That's where Mr. Johnson, Mr. Cooper, and Mr. Williams come in. And they weren't just bystanders in this process.

Mr. Williams personally challenged more than 32,000 voters in Gwinnett County. And you heard him testify that he didn't review any of those entries before he submitted the challenge. He assumed that -- he claimed to have run NCOA at some point in the past and saw that True the Vote had run NCOA and figured they were both correct and suibmitted the challenge.

And he helped True the Vote print and submit challenges to other counties. Mr. Cooper and Mr. Johnson recruited voter challengecs.

And let me take a step back. Mr. Williams, in addition to challenging 32,000 voters in Gwinnett County, he demanded an investigation of every voter on this list, even though he didn't himself conduct any review of that list.

Mr. Johnson and Mr. Cooper were the head recruiters.
True the Vote admitted that they assisted with recruiting hundreds of voter challengers across the state of Georgia. They admitted this in Plaintiffs' Exhibit 10 in their interrogatory responses.

And as Mr. Cooper testified in his deposition, which we've admitted as Plaintiffs' Exhibit 96, Mr. Johnson took

1 North Georgia, Mr. Cooper took South Georgia. This was a coordinated recruiting effort to ensure that they had enough challengers to carry out True the Vote's plan, carry out Ms. Engelbrecht's plan, carry out a plan that they could not implement themselves in Georgia.

And then the Court saw the e-mails from Mr. Cooper soliciting potential challengers, repeating false statements about the challenge lists, that 99.9 percent of the individuals on the challenge list were unlawtully registered. Well, we know that's false based on Dr. Máyer's analysis. Or stating that these efforts would have kept former President Trump in office if they had startg earlier, if they started before the general election.

So Mr. Johnson and Mr. Cooper are integral to this effort. So is Mr. Williams and his 32,000 voter challenge in Gwinnett County. They're all part of the same enterprise.

And then the next question Your Honor asked is how do Mr. Davis and Mr. Somerville factor into this equation? Well, they collaborated with True the Vote in launching their challenges. They discussed the data, where to get the data, what it looks like. They shared talking points for the challengers. They invited their volunteer challengers to True the Vote strategy calls. Ms. Engelbrecht and Mr. Somerville exchanged more than 60 texts, many of which they failed to disclose during the discovery process, mostly related to their challenge effort.

They even talked about jointly suing counties that did not process their challenges. And Mr. Somerville added his name and Mr. Davis' name to the press release announcing the challenges. And they told their volunteers that they were collaborating with True the Vote.

But putting that aside, even assuming that their challenge effort was entirely separate, the Court doesn't need to find that Mr. Davis and Mr. Somerville were collaborating with True the Vote or were operating in jome joint enterprise with True the Vote in order to find them liable, because their separate challenges create liability under Section 11(b). Their actions in creating the challenge lists of 40,000 voters who they accuse of being uiflawfully registered based on nothing more than NCOA data, that is enough.

And Mr. Davis and Mr. Somerville admit that they collaborated with Dan Gasaway to provide a challenge list for Banks County. And Jocelyn Heredia was challenged by Mr. Dan Gasaway.

So that's why these defendants are here, Your Honor. And moving through the elements of Section 11(b), these defendants cross and check every box for establishing liability.

First, the first question Your Honor posed in his order and the first question I'll address is whether there was

1 direct action toward voters caused by their actions. And the 2 answer is a resounding yes. It was direct action because by creating these challenge lists and soliciting challengers, they sought to act through a third party, the counties, the election officials, to confront these challenge voters and to force them to present evidence of their residence.

Now, you have heard throughout trial, you've heard opposing counsel ask witnesses whether they've ever met the challenge voters, whether they have accosted or caused any harm to the challenged voters, whether they confronted the challenged voters in person. Numerois variations of that question. Those are legally irrefevant questions.

This Court has alreaay recognized that is not the standard. Nothing about Siction $11(\mathrm{~b})$ suggests that the interaction or the acts must be violent or made personally in order to be considered intimidation. In fact, the Court emphasized twice in its order that direct contact need not be made by defendants themselves. A person cannot escape 1iability for doing indirectly through another what he or she would be liable for doing directly themselves.

So conduct through third parties we know can intimidate voters just the same as conduct initiated directly through defendants. And defendants have told us what they intended to do. They intended to use third parties to force voters to prove their residence. That is a direct action.

It's also true of the bounty on fraud. That is another direct action. When True the Vote or Ms. Engelbrecht offers a third party $\$ 50,000$ to report claims of fraud, they're acting through a third party. But they're also directly intimidating voters by making these announcements. Now, given that the Court has rejected the idea that there needs to be some direct contact or some communication or some physical act, I'11 move on to causation and how we establish that defendants' actions caused intimidation, both among Georgia voters in general and among the defendants.

So the first step is what is now I believe settled law in that interpreting Section if (b), defendants are deemed to intend the natural consequence of their acts. And the conduct must generate the iossibility that voters would feel threatened, intimidat $\epsilon \varnothing$, or coerced.

So is intimidation the natural consequence of voter challenges, whe iner individual voter challenges or mass voter challenges?

I believe in prior arguments or prior discussions, counsel and the parties have wrestled with that discussion. And, Your Honor, one of the reasons we've wrestled with that discussion is because there are a number of things that I think we know to be true but have not explicitly put in the record until Mr. -- until Dr. Burton got up there and testified. And that is, we know that voter challenges result

1 in intimidation because that was the motivation behind enacting voter challenge laws to begin with. When the first voter challenge law in Georgia was introduced in the early 20th Century, the 1908 peer registration law, that law, as Dr. Burton testified and as his expert report shows, that law required that "registration 1 ists shall be placed on exhibit in the office of the clerk of the court where all may inspect and may challenge those who are thought not to be worthy of a place." And then it was incorporated into the 1910 code of the state of Georgia.

And that law, as Mr. Burton testified, was designed to disenfranchise Black Georgians, And it was exploited for that very purpose, with devastating effect, particularly in the 1946 gubernatorial elestion.

So the resulting intimidation, coercion, and threats, it's not just a byproduct or something we have to guess may be a product of challenges at this point. It's the entire point. It is the very purpose of the challenge 1 aw.

Now, we're not alleging or seeking to strike down the challenge law, but we are recognizing that sometimes it's important to call these challenges what they are. It started as a tool to disenfranchise. It has evolved into a tool that citizens can use to ensure election integrity. But it can still be a tool to disenfranchise. It can still be a tool to intimidate. And we cannot ignore and pretend that its origins do not exist.

And that historical perspective allows us to sort of dispense with this awkward dance where we try to figure out what types of challenges intimidate voters and what types of challenges don't intimidate voters. Or whether a voter should expect to be challenged, as Mr. Davis suggested, whether a voter who files an NCOA list should expect to be challenged. We know that challenges are intimidating because they were meant to be intimidating.

And we know that these challenges caused our plaintiffs to be intimidated. Jocely Heredia, who was challenged by Jerry Bowling, a True the Vote volunteer, testified that she was intimiaated, that she thought she had violated the law.

Scott Berson gave the same testimony.
Gamaliel Turner, Stephanie Stinetorf. They all testified about the fear they felt when they were challenged. Now, you'11 hear from defendants that some of those individuals were not challenged by them or that there's no causation, but we have to look at exactly what the evidence shows, Your Honor, and differentiate the evidence with attorney statements.

So the first question: Was Jocelyn Heredia challenged by defendants? Did defendants cause her intimidation? Of course they did.

Because Ms. Engelbrecht admitted on the stand that Jerry Bowling was a True the Vote volunteer. And Jerry Bowling, as established in Plaintiffs' Exhibit 49, challenged Ms. Jocelyn Heredia.

Mr. Davis and Mr. Somerville, their challenge list for Banks County was submitted by Mr. Gasaway. They testified that they collaborated or worked with Mr. Gasaway to provide him a challenge list. And Jocelyn was challenged by Mr. Gasaway, again, Plaintiffs' Exhibit 49.

Then we go to the Muscogee County voters. Defendants suggest that the Muscogee County voters were challenged by Alton Russell and not by True the Vote. But the evidence doesn't establish that.

Amy Holsworth testified on the stand that True the Vote kept a list of chəllengers that it was recruiting. And on that list, under Muscogee County, she testified that Alton Russell's name was listed there. So on the list of challengers that True the Vote maintained, challengers that True the Vote maintained that Amy Holsworth testified that were individuals True the Vote was either -- had either recruited to submit challenges or was recruiting or had been referred to True the Vote, Alton Russell's name was listed there.

We know that Alton Russell submitted a challenge for Muscogee County. Defendants, who are in the best position to
refute that inference, have provided nothing other than their own statements that they did not work with Alton Russell. But they why was he on their recruited challenger list?

They've offered no explanation as to why Mr. Russell was on that list, on that list of challengers that they recruited. And even assuming, even assuming that Mr. Russel1 went off and filed his own challenges, even if we accept that, the list still shows that they attempted to recruit him to submit challenges in Muscogee County. And Section 11(b) forecloses both attempts and actual intimedation.

So they can't escape liability by just pointing to Alton Russell without providing ariy explanation or any evidence to explain why Mr. Russell was on their list of challenge recruiters.

THE COURT: Explain to me again. You said it doesn't matter whether thev recruited him or not if he filed the challenges. Go over that again.

MR. NKWONTA: Certainly.
So Section $11(\mathrm{~b})$ prohibits attempts, attempts to intimidate. And if True the Vote attempted to submit a challenge in Muscogee County through Alton Russell, the fact that they were not successful doesn't absolve them from liability under Section $11(b)$.

And the same -- the same issues that plagued the challenge list that they submit, that they submitted, also
plague the challenges that they attempted to submit. The challenges that they attempted to submit were not any more refined than the challenges they submitted. The challenges that they attempted to submit would not have created any less of a burden on voters who would have been forced to show their residence. And the challenges that they attempted to submit were not -- were not supported by any stronger legal argument or law. They were still based on shoddy NCOA data analysis. And so the completion of the act is not necessary to find a Section $11(b)$ violation.

Now, that is the most chariiable interpretation of the evidence when it comes to deffindants. But in terms of what is most likely, what the preponderance of the evidence shows, the preponderance of the evidence shows that Mr. Alton Russell was on their list of recruited challengers and was 1 isted under Muscogee County. And Mr. Alton Russel 1 submitted a challenge in inscogee County. And the only thing they have offered to refute that is to say, no, he didn't.

The next question that the Court may have is whether these challenges or whether the intimidation that resulted from the challenges was objectively reasonable. And here I admit there's not a whole lot of guidance in the statutory text and not a ton of guidance in the case 1 aw as to what objectively reasonable means.

But the Court has sketched out some parameters
through its multifactor test. And using those factors as a guide, the evidence has clearly demonstrated that these -that intimidation is objectively reasonable under these circumstances.

The first factor the Court mentioned was proximity to the runoff election. We've already established these challenges were submitted mere weeks, as little as two weeks, sometimes less, before the runoff election. The frivolity of the challenges. We've established through Dr. Mayer's testimony that these challenges were largely frivolous for multiple reasons.

First, True the Vote's chiallenges were error prone. The lists were sloppy. The lists were rife with errors that were shocking to Dr. Mayeo errors that should have been obvious. As I've mentioned, people warned True the Vote that the challenges thev were submitting were both inaccurate and were not suffic ent to establish probable cause.

So beyond the errors in the list itself, they were also legally baseless, because they relied solely on NCOA data to establish that the challenged voter did not reside in the specific county.

And that's not how Georgia law determines residence. Georgia law determines residence through a set of interrelated factors. There are approximately 15 rules in OCGA 21-2-217. Many of those rules focus on intent. In fact, intent is the
common theme that's woven through pretty much all of those rules.

And then the statute lists a number of factors as well to consider. Factors like financial independence, business pursuits, employment, income sources, residence, income tax purposes, age, marital status, residence of parents, spouse and children, sites of personal and real property, motor vehicle and other property registrations.

And NCOA database doesn't reveal any of that. It does not reveal any information that would tell you much about the factors I just listed. Nor does it reveal anything that will tell you about the highly individualized intent focused rules set forth in Section 21-2-217.

So to rely on NCOif data alone to determine that an individual -- or to allege that an individual is not a proper resident or is not voting correctly in a specific county, is to rely on evidence that is by definition insufficient to establish somebody's residence or to refute somebody's residence.

And how do we know that it's insufficient by definition? I've previously referred to the NVRA in numerous circumstances. And we've talked at length about the NVRA, Your Honor. I'm not suggesting that there's some potential NVRA violation that we're trying to litigate here. That's not the purpose of bringing up the NVRA.

But I think the NVRA provisions can provide a little bit of guidance, some guidance, as to how to view NCOA data within the context of voter registration and voter eligibility. And I'll give you one example.

The NVRA lists a number of sources of data that can be used by election officials to identify and remove ineligible voters. For instance, ineligible voters can be removed for evidence or information showing prior convictions, or eligible voters can be removed under the NVRA for information showing that the individual hád died.

For those reasons, the NVRA allows county officials to remove voters without further examination, without voter notification, without the procedural steps that you see for the NCOA.

When it comes to the NCOA, NVRA does not allow removal for residency-based reasons alone. NVRA does not allow removal based simply on data showing a person changed their address.

Instead, there's a two-step process that the State and election officials must engage in. So while an individual can be removed for prior conviction or because of information indicating that that individual has died; when it comes to residency, when it comes to change of address, when it comes to information that would be revealed by the NCOA, election officials have to confirm with the voter. And if the voter
does not confirm that they have moved, election officials have to wait two election cycles, two general election cycles.

So putting aside what's an NVRA violation and what's not, the treatment of that source of data and the distinction between that source of data and other sources of data that the NVRA contemplates, should tell you something about how reliable the NCOA is in determining whether somebody is a registrant in a specific county or not.

And as the Court recognized in a summary judgment order, if defendants only used NCOA data to make their lists, then such fact might weigh in favor of finding that the challenges were frivolous, becaus a change of address alone is not sufficient to remove 2 yoter from the rolls.

And that's exactiy right. Because it's all defendants have recogrized, or defendants that have testified, Ms. Engelbrecht, Mr. Davis, Mr. Somerville. People change their address for a host of reasons that are unrelated to a change in their permanent residence.

And if we -- next I want to point to the motivations at stake here. Because that's one of the factors that the Court considered, what were defendants' motivations.

Now, Section $11(b)$ does not require proof of intent. But it's notable, the motivations of the defendants, which they've admitted to in filing these challenges, again, it was to force voters who were challenged to provide evidence of
their residence, to do something more, something extra, to learn that they were challenged and to prove that they were entitled to vote.

As Dr. Mayer reliably testified, under the cost of voting framework, the increased legal risk and the additional steps required to establish one's eligibility, that dramatically increases the cost of voting and that burdens voters and discourages them from participating in the elections.

It sounds a lot like Jocelyn Heredia. And defendants have offered nothing to rebut that.

Now, True the Vote's -- that intent analysis or motivation, that applies to a defendants. But True the Vote's intent is even more fraught with improper attempts to reshape the electoratsand nullify votes.

You've heard evidence about the Validate the Vote program and the effort to overturn the result of the 2020 election. And how True the Vote converted the Validate the Vote program for the general election to Validate the Vote Georgia, merely changed the logo, and in Ms. Engelbrecht's own words, used the same resources, applied the same resources to Georgia.

And if we pull up Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1, under the Validate the Vote plan, you'll see that everything listed under that plan, True the Vote did in Georgia. Solicit
whistleblower testimonies of those impacted or involved in election fraud. Ms. Engelbrecht offered $\$ 50,000$ to an individual if his information would lead to prosecution.

Build momentum through broad publicity. We saw True the Vote's press releases and press statements announcing the challenge effort, exaggerating the challenge effort even, announcing the election integrity hotline, announcing partnership with GOP. Galvanized Republican legislative support in key states. You heard about all the legislators that Ms. Engelbrecht met with. You heardit again about the partnership with the Georgia GOP.

Aggregate and analyze data to identify patterns of election subversion. And it Tists OpSec Group. Well, you heard about OpSec Group'scanalysis of the Georgia voter file and NCOA analysis to identify what they consider ineligible voters.

File lawsuits in federal court with capacity to be heard by SCOTUS. That's exactly what True the Vote did. They filed a lawsuit in Plaintiffs' Exhibit 27. They filed a lawsuit where they named eight counties as defendants and sought to overturn the presidential election results in those eight counties. They didn't even have plaintiffs that lived in those eight counties. They didn't even allege fraud occurred in those eight counties. Yet, those eight counties matched up perfectly with the eight counties with the largest

Black voting age populations in Georgia, per the Secretary of State's website.

And then we know about the bounty, which we just discussed, which Ms. Engelbrecht had a lot of difficulty explaining why she was explicitly stating that she was offering someone $\$ 50,000$ to report fraud. You heard statements about medical bills and you heard statements about everything that was going on. But it's still not clear, Your Honor, what that had to do with offering $\$ 50,000$ in exchange for information leading to prosecution of voter fraud.

And then publication. Deferdants knew that these challenge lists could or would become public. They knew that they'd be subject to public records request. And there's strong evidence that True the Vote, or someone affiliated with True the Vote, and Ms. Engelbrecht and Mr. Phillips published a tweet on Twitter the Time For a Hero tweet. The Crusade For Freedom tweet. Threatening to release the list of challenged voters. That's in addition to defendants' knowledge that these lists would become public or that they had become public.

Now, before delving too much and eating too much into my rebuttal time, the last thing I'11 point out for Your Honor, as we established the elements of Section $11(b)$ and the elements of voter intimidation, is that this -- this case and the evidence we've provided and defendants have provided, will
require the Court to make credibility determinations.
For some of these issues, there is conflicting testimony. We acknowledge that. But the Eleventh Circuit does provide some guidance as to what factors this Court should take into account when making credibility determination, when deciding who to believe and what it can believe.

For instance, variations in a witness's testimony and any failure of memory throughout the course of discovery create an issue of credibility. The Eleventh Circuit said that in Tippens v. Celotex, 805 F.2d 949, Insight 954.

And you've seen some of that already. You saw some of that today, where Ms. Engelbrecht claimed that she conducted all this analysis yesterday on the challenge list, and today testified that she actually did not punch the button, she authorized the analysis for someone else -- for Mr. Phillips to conduct. And Mr. Phillips conducted the analysis and he said he actually did not do some of the things that Ms. Engelbrecht said that he did.

Another factor that the Court can take into account when assessing credibility. The directness in answering -- or lack thereof in answering questions. The recall of events, noteworthy events. Contradictions between testimony and other evidence and self-interest.

And this comes from a Southern District of Florida

1 case, Bernal v. All American Investment Realty, Inc., 479 F.
2 Supp. 2d 1291. And, again, we saw some of this. We saw 3 defendants' responses to direct questions. We saw

4 Ms. Engelbrecht's responses to direct questions about the 5 \$50,000 offer. We saw Ms. Engelbrecht's responses to direct

Also, another factor the Court can take into account is litigation or discovery conduct. Courts have found that a party's failure to abide by discovery a party's failure to provide documents, responsive dociments, despite repeated requests for documents, despite knowing the documents were pertinent, that that is somiething to take into account when considering credibility. And that's Fernandez v. Havana Gardens, LLC, 562 下. App'x 854.

And as we mentioned, you -- this Court has seen numerous instances in which defendants have withheld material from discovery. That 60 -- those 60 text messages that I mentioned earlier between Ms. Enge1brecht and Mr. Somervilie, those text messages, the majority of them were not produced. We received them shortly before this trial.

And then, Your Honor, as you saw in my cross-examination of Ms. Engelbrecht, you saw the embellishments in the December 14th press release or the blog
post claiming that True the Vote had partnered with the GOP, with the Georgia GOP and had reached out to the Democratic Party in Georgia, only to reveal that they did not reach out until at least a week later.

Or December 18th blog post claiming that True the Vote challenges 364,000 voters in all 159 counties. They did not do that.

Or when analyzing the Validate the Vote document, Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1. When Ms. Engelbrechtowas asked whether True the Vote had evidence of illegal votes in Democratic counties, as they stated in their proposal. And her response in her deposition was "No, it's jist promotional."

So a finder of fact can take these elements into account and can assess that against the testimony that this Court heard from plairtiffs, who credibly testified about their experience. Fheir experience being intimidated comports with everything we know about how challenges have been used in Georgia's history, about how bounties have been used in Georgia's history, and confirms for this Court that defendants accomplished exactly what they set out to do. And which is, to threaten, coerce, and intimidate these voters into believing that they were not eligible to vote or that they had to provide evidence that the law would not otherwise have required of them to vote.

And these actions have consequences, Your Honor. And
we ask the Court to provide plaintiffs the protection that they need so they can participate in our electoral process.

I reserve the reminder of my time for rebuttal.
Thank you.
THE COURT: How much time does he have left, Ms. Wright?

THE DEPUTY CLERK: Ten minutes.
THE COURT: Al1 right. Thank you, Counsel.
Counsel?
MR. EVANS: We're ready to go, out I'm just -- I'11 go now.

THE COURT: I've got time. I'm going to deal with DOJ. You-all go ahead and start.

I have not forgotien you.
MR. WYNNE: There may be a case where mass challenge, lacking rhyme or reason, would be actionable under Section 11(b). This is not that case.

We're ailing in this country, as we've seen with imprecision, our choice of words, exacerbated by social media, 24-hour news cycle.

What we're talking about here is eligibility inquiries. A finding of massive voter fraud, whatever that is, is not a prerequisite to the exercise of one's right to free speech, freedom of assembly, freedom of association, even with people from Texas. Loaded phrases like "voter fraud,"
"voter challenge" have become and have taken on ill-starred meaning in our common parlance.

Voter fraud is one of the things I was trying to bring out the meaning of in the cross of Dr. Burton, pointing out in what I hope was an artful way, I wasn't trying to be cute, a lie is a lie. When you tell someone who's manning a voting location that you live somewhere where you don't, that's a lie. It is a lie told by someone who is in the act of voting, that -- that is voter fraud.

The phrase has been turned on its head by the mass media, and I dare to say by the plaintiffs in this courtroom. And it's divided us. But, ironicaily, this is the exact state of affairs that True the Vote has been trying to address in multiple projects for yeacs and years. Voter Latino, the Prairie View A\&M initiЭtive, training people, encouraging them to work the polls precincts where you can't get three people or can't find them, encouraging people to embrace their democracy, Tocqueville style.

Now, it just so happens that at this time Georgia was at the center, making manifest this tension. And it was, perhaps, a potential tinder box. So you've got to insert a fuse to identify and let those interested know about a middle lane for citizen participation, informing Georgians in this instance that their Legislature had codified, had codified in 230 a First Amendment right and put bounds on it, a right to
petition, assembly, speak, association.
And, again, people in Texas, people in Georgia can associate. When you get up, oh, maybe a mile, you can see there aren't lines between states and you don't see different pastel colors. We're all Americans. And we associate with one another. And, watch out, Texas is coming to the SEC.

Now --
THE COURT: They're in trouble.
MR. WYNNE: Yeah, I think so. A\&M has already shown that.

This is a lawful, measured, and an important thing in our civic life.

Now, 230, like all legislation, might be understood as the product of an argument between and among multiple interests that took place in the legislature.

Now, ideadiy when that happens, we, through our elected representatives, we search ourselves and our souls and we see if we can identify some type of shared principles. This one, I'll submit, is relatively easy to find, hard to disagree with.

Voter rolls should be kept up-to-date. People should vote in the right place. This sustains confidence that elections reflect the people who actually live there and that citizens elect the people that will be representing them and they vote for or against the propositions that will impact
them and the taxes, increases, that they actually have to pay. This is democracy.

It is an alternative to the Kraken or taking to the streets. Now, this is important. The concern underlying all of this is strikingly nonpartisan. It's about addressing, in this instance, the introduction of vulnerabilities and uncertainty, as our society evolves, which Ms. Engelbrecht chronicled in her response to the Court's question.

And on a microscale, the consequences of voting in the wrong place, or a couple of people doing that, is sustainable. On a much larger scale it is not. And it undermines confidence in our system.

Now, plaintiffs' self-righteous exertation is to the contrary. Finding massive voter fraud, again, is not a prerequisite to exercising one's rights as codified in Georgia by Section 230.

THE COURT: Let me ask you a question.
MR. WYNNE: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: If this Court found that some of the defendants were reckless in putting together this challenge, could that lead to a finding of attempted intimidation?

MR. WYNNE: This is not that case.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. WYNNE: That is not that case.
THE COURT: Tell me.

MR. WYNNE: Because the kind of case you're talking about -- you've got to remember, the average citizen does not have access to the NCOA. You've got to go through a licensee. That licensee is regulated. They don't have access to -- you can't subpoena bank records, all these other things. We cannot lower ourselves to society where not being reckless means you've got to spy on your neighbor. You've got to search their social media. That's not what the Legislature intended.

I think the standard is, for recklessness in this context, is not that you have, you know, some sort of surety measured in probable cause, you don't have to have the resources to hire a Derek Somerville or a Mark Davis or even Catherine Engelbrecht and statistical technician with a Ph.D. in order to do what this law says you can do. And as counsel was -- my co-counsel will say, you know, there is some type of firewali. You can't call the NCOA garbage. Who said that is the standard?

Look, for the reasonable person, the reasonable Georgian, the reasonable Texan, I look at it and I say, okay, somebody expressed an intent, a permanent intent to move. Now, I'm no busybody, if going into that, I have to try to figure out, well, you know, do I go to college thinking I'm going to come back, this, that or the other? You can't get into subjective intent.

What you're asking is what a reasonable person, reasonable person, has an opportunity, as the law reads, and it doesn't give a limit on it, says you know what, NCOA, you know, I'd say that's sufficient to send it on to the people who are supposed to know what they're doing to tailor it to their communities. All right? They're the ones. Some of these counties have 1700 people. And your neighbor is the one who is sitting at that table. All right. And some people, some people are going to say, well, thank you, sir. You know, I appreciate it. I forgot to update it wien I moved. I did driver's license, I did my magazine subscription, this, that, or the other, but forgot that. Thianks for telling me. And, in fact, what I'm going to do is go across the expressway and vote for the guy who's --quy or woman who's going to represent me, or the bond issue I've got to pay.

I mean, that is -- as I've tried to say, that's a public good. And the average person, average person who doesn't have all of the statistical knowledge, and there are some down on the street I was talking to last night who have been sitting in this courtroom. And those people are concerned. They're concerned about the integrity of our system.

This case is not about Donald Trump. It's not about January 6. And I'11 submit to you that -- that Catherine Engelbrecht, in the midst of what could have become a tinder

1 box and finally did, not because of her, that could have 2 happened here. But these people are mad. And instead of yelling at their TVs, or Lord knows what, you know, because like it or not, they listen to one side. All right. You watch Sean Hannity every night, or whoever does; right? You get that perspective and you get that, let's create a fuse. A lawful system for that person to feel like they are an American exercising their right. Okay.

So you -- shoot, I would have thought NCOA, that's regulated. There's nothing wrong with the U.S. Postal System. But leaving a roll unchecked for two years? I mean, that ain't fair. That ain't right.

And we got someone who is stepping in, trying to solve the problem. And mayide, maybe that'll leave us in better status we otherwise hurdle. We hurdle towards a tumultuous 2024. What this Court says will really, really matter.

As Benjamin Franklin reportedly said in response to a question he was asked emerging from the Constitutional Convention about the form of a government, "The new States now have found themselves bound together to form a union of any sort, a more perfect one." Not a perfect one. A more perfect one. A democracy, if you can keep it.

And you know when we're all reading that back when in high school, middle school, I didn't imagine, you know, and I

1 was watching the convention when Jimmy Carter was nominated. 2 I couldn't imagine a world in which we -- our democracy would 3 be threatened. But that's happening.

I ain't seeing -- I'm not saying either side is right. But both sides have to feel that they have a way to participate other than some of the crazy things we've all been seeing.

And Ms. Engelbrecht is not part of that. And I hope, I pray that she showed you that during the course of her testimony. She is a precise person, articulate, studied. All right. Maybe she didn't have her hands on the keyboard, but she's the one who is the project fianager. She's the one who had to know, you don't tell somebody or ask somebody to do something and observe the cesults and study the results and be in -- I mean, you know my wife's a contractor. She hires people to, you know, frame the house and put in the plumbing, electrician stuff. Does she actually put in the plumbing? No. But she sure better know how it works when the building inspector comes around. Sure better.

This is not intimidation or coercion. It may be inconvenient. It may be at the poll you've got to reboot your phone. Maybe you've got to dig into your pocket. Maybe you've got to go out to your car in the glove compartment and get something. Maybe it's inconvenient.

I'11 tell you, I think those are necessary sacrifices

1 to maintain our democracy and its manifest and things we do 2 every day. I had to take out all my electronics and stuff 3 going through security here. I lost my key -- card key for the hotel there, I don't know how many times in the past three weeks. I couldn't just go up to the desk and say, hey, you know, I'm in 619, give me another. No. Show your ID, or maybe show two forms of ID. My credit card, something, too. You know, that's not coercion. And the person across the desk may be a different race than me, a different background. Shoot, you know, they may have three earrings in their nose and face and ears and red hair; right? Okay. Maybe I'm -- it's just simple. CRay. If you got to -- sorry it's inconvenient, but you've yot to follow the -- we've got to have some rules.

No one is challenging anyone's right to vote. Ms. Engelbrecht deesn't want to remove anybody from any voter rol 1.

Thanks to your question, I skipped a lot of this. Was enacting Section 223 a good policy choice? That's an issue to be brought up before the Legislature, frankly.

Does the lawfulness of setting in motion the procedural the Legislature has outlined in Section 230 change when the exercise is supported or even encouraged systematically? No. There's a statutory basis for doing it.

True the Vote -- let me say something else. Deadwood should not be thrown around so cavalierly. Shouldn't it be laudable, if not consistent, with Democratic principles, to minimize deadwood -- as plaintiffs' expert used that term.

The choice of word by whatever academic has chosen it is telling. Deadwood doesn't sound like something you want to have around littering your yard, your beach, your public space.

I'm done just about. One more paragraph.
Okay. Plaintiffs' complaint at its core is not about -- not the True the Vote or anvone else honed in on African Americans or anyone else. It's not true. Evidence doesn't support it. Plaintiff didn't even try to make the case in a serious manner.

Mr. Turner, Dr. Burton, raised some serious points, we should never farget. I commend them for raising it. This is not that case. This is not a civil rights case. Any suggestion to the contrary does not hold up.

I know Your Honor sees that. I know Your Honor would never take that kind of thing into account and would weigh this case differently. But others out there surely will.

I'm just telling it like it is. Let's acknowledge it. And let's acknowledge our past and instead look at the -but then look at the evidence and whether plaintiffs have met their burden under Section 11(b).

This case is not about anything else that was going on in the aftermath of 2020. You know -- and, again, it's really not about control of the Senate. What happened here will have aftereffects. People will be involved. They'11 know about the system. It's not a core about that Senate runoff.

This is about a moment where election integrity finally came to the forefront. Issues that have long interested Catherine Engelbrecht, Derek Somerville, Mark Davis. Issues which perhaps only they and a select few were passionate. Those issues were now front and center. It could have been anywhere.

That's why they chose to engage in this election in Georgia at this time through this lawful vehicle. It has nothing to do with threats, intimidation, or coercion. Again, there may be a case out there some day, there may be a case where some random mass challenges, I'm going to challenge everybody, I don't know, over 50 or some type of group. All right? Every Georgia Tech fan, throw that out. Whatever it is, this is not that case. This is not that case.

MR. EVANS: All right, Judge. I'm going to reference a PowerPoint. I've got a courtesy copy if I could approach real quickly.

THE COURT: All right.
MR. EVANS: May it please the Court, my name's Jake

Evans. I represent the defendants in this case, and I'm going to present our closing argument.

I think -- and I'11 do this whenever -- I'm ready. Next slide.

I think to begin, we have to look at this case for what it is. What this case is, is it's a partisan manipulated fact set to support a narrative which simply does not exist.

Mr. Berson testified the only reason why he filed this case was because Fair Fight told him to do it. They have tried to concoct a bunch of arbitrary uncelated facts to support something which simply does not exist.

So as we look at the evidence in the case, and I'll go through, Judge, very quick 1y, each of the voters. I know you have heard their testimiony, you've heard argument on it from plaintiffs' counsel, now you'll hear from me.

What the Restimony showed is, in my opinion, and what the evidence showed, is Fair Fight trying to find many, many voters to come forward and testify about something which did not happen.

Scott Berson is the first one. Scott Berson, if anything, is someone that shows the reason why NCOA is accurate. The reason why the voter lists were 100 percent accurate. You have an individual who lived in Muscogee, who moved to Auburn, Alabama, who then moved back to Muscogee, who then moved to North Carolina and who now lives in

Pennsylvania.
He admitted, when he was on the stand, it would be very difficult, if you didn't know who he was, where he really lived. And, in fact, if a full eligibility hearing went forward on him, who knows what an impartial county Board of Election would ultimately determine in where he really resided. We don't know.

But what we do know is this was not someone who had lived in the same place for 30 years and never moved and there was no dispute over whether or not they fally lived in Muscogee County. That was not in anysuggestion, shape, or form a frivolous challenge.

And even more, Scott Serson did not know any of the defendants in this case, colldn't name one defendant in the case, had never talked to a defendant in the case, and knew nothing about True the Vote. Didn't mention their name.

Next, Judge, we have Gamaliel Turner. Mr. Turner was someone who moved to California four years ago at this point, had a year-to-year contract that he continued to renew, looked at his Facebook page, which said he lived in California. Looked at his ancestry page, which said he lived in California. Looked at his LinkedIn page, which said he lived in California.

He said he may go back at some point to Georgia. Right now he hasn't. And, in fact, he's another example,

1 Judge Jones, of someone who, if they had an eligibility
2 challenge, your intent can change over time. You may initially move somewhere and intend to go back to Georgia, but at some point the facts show that maybe you're not going back. So if an eligibility challenge went forward on him, who knows what an impartial county Board of Elections would find. But what they wouldn't find was that was a wholly frivolous challenge because the facts show that it wasn't.

The other additional point is Mr. Turner didn't know any of the defendants, couldn't name any of the defendants, and had no way of connecting his alleged challenge to any of the defendants.

Lastly, Mr. Turner said the only way he found out about any alleged challenge was because he was calling to find out why he didn't get his ballot. And he didn't get his ballot, not because of a challenge, but because the U.S. Postal Service doesn't forward official ballots. And when he gave them the address, they sent it to him, he got it, his vote was counted.

Ms. Stinetorf is next. Ms. Stinetorf was a voter in Muscogee County. She was in Germany, didn't know anything about the environment here in the U.S., but what's most notable about her is the e-mail that the Court has judicially noticed, is when she had sent the e-mails, her vote had already been counted ten days before.

Nobody called Ms. Stinetorf and said listen, you've been challenged, your vote's not going to be counted. She's the one that made the proactive means to do it, and she testified on the stand the only way that she had any discomfort was because she logged on and when she logged on it said, allegedly, challenged.

This is a challenge that what happened, likely, was even if she was challenged, the county Board of Elections shows she was a military person. They immediately resolved that challenge. It never took one step fórward further than that because she was, in fact, a military person overseas.

Ms. Heredia. Ms. Heredig is another one that if you look at the record, she left Banks County, she moved to Decatur. She lived in Decatur for a period of time then she moved to Midtown Apartment 1. She lived there for a period of time, and then she ived in Midtown Apartment 2. She stayed there for a period of time, and now she lives in Athens, Georgia.

I would believe that if there was an eligibility hearing on determining where she resided and it endeavored to do the full analysis, that there is a more than likely probability that she was not a Banks County voter.

Now, that's not what is before this Court. This is not an eligibility case. This is a Section $11(\mathrm{~b})$ voter intimidation case.

But the reason why that's important is because that shows not only in this case was it not frivolous, in this case it may have been meritorious.

And taking it further, she didn't know any of the defendants. She hadn't talked to any of the defendants. She hasn't updated, even though she testified voting is very important to me, I would never miss the opportunity to vote, she took directly contrary actions in that she didn't take the initiative to in any way ensure her voter registration was active.

And, likely, all she had to co was fill out a form that said, under oath, under penaliy of perjury, I still live in Banks County. Why would she not do that? Maybe because she didn't want to purger ierself and not say she lived somewhere she didn't.

I don't know what happened. You're the trier of fact. I will say actions often speak louder than words. And in this case, it's pretty clear she didn't take actions. And plaintiffs' counsel began their argument on the fact she didn't vote. The fact, in my opinion, she didn't vote, is she didn't want to purger herself and she didn't take the actions to do that. I'11 let the judge make that determination.

Next we heard from Dr. Mayer. Dr. Mayer we heard about a decent amount. There's a lot of problems with Dr. Mayer's analysis, some -- many of which the Court can make the determination based upon reading his testimony.

He has no knowledge of NCOA. He doesn't know the error rate of NCOA and its predictive value. The database that he evaluates says it doesn't have any middle initials, yet every defendant that in any way submitted eligibility inquiries in this case had middle initials.

He had clear combination issues because he said he had formula -- there was formulas in his database. There was no formulas in any of the eligibility inquiry data that was submitted in this case.

In his analysis he includes every address that's in a military town or a college town, Suggesting that everyone that lives in those towns were improperly included in any eligibility challenge list.

I will tell you, I went to the University of Georgia. There are people there that are called the locals. And the locals oftentimes don't like the students, and a lot of times the locals hang out at different bars than the students did, and restaurants. I remember that very well.

I think if I went to the locals and I said, hey, just because you're a local here, we're going to assume you're a student and you go to the University of Georgia and you deal with all this mess over here, I don't think that they would appreciate that too much. That's exactly what Dr. Mayer did. And it underscores the lack of legitimacy in his analysis.

Dr. Burton. Dr. Burton, quite frankly, offered completely and totally irrelevant testimony in this case. He attempted to offer testimony about whether these voters would be intimidated.

Dr. Burton is not a behavioral psychologist. He's not a psychiatrist. He has no expertise in determining the way stimuli creates emotion in human beings. He knows history, and he knows history in a very unfortunate time in our country's history.

But in any way extrapolating upon the history way back when into creating this voter inthis moment felt this way, is not testimony that is profative on the issue that is before this Court. He admitted on the stand he's not trying to offer any testimony aboiit any motivation of any of the defendants. He's not trying to say any of the defendants wanted to burn crosses or races, et cetera, et cetera. He limited his own testimony to testifying about people feeling a certain way based upon historical references, taking history, what happened many, many years ago, can't be extrapolated until today.

Any psychologist would tell you the way people feel depends on a number of subjective life experiences, subjective value sets that they accumulate over the course of their life. We didn't hear testimony about how people feel the way that they do in certain life situations. That would have been
probative. Talking about history way back when is not probative and, quite frankly, inflammatory, in my opinion.

Going to the defendants' case. The defendants' case was short, sweet, to the point, and completely and totally debunked, a strung together smoke and mirrors case presented by plaintiffs.

First we have Mr. Somerville. Mr. Somerville is a military veteran. He's a former Marine. As Your Honor saw him on the stand, very methodical. Takes tremendous pride in what he does, what he stands for. And hé worked meticulously in generating these lists.

Mr. Somerville, in my opirion, is every instance of what the word "active and admable citizen" is. This is a guy that went after the former Speaker of the House, David Ralston, for a number factors that he testified about. And in this instance, he found and felt public sentiment was at an all-time low. And the way that we get away from the crazy is we focus on getting people engaged and focusing on projects that truly can make a difference.

And in this case what could make a difference is voters rolls that were outdated for a long period of time. Voter rolls that were frozen by NC -- NVRA for at least 90 days.

He did a multilevel funnel, which the Court heard at great lengths. He went through NCOA. He went through

1 military. He went through Social Security Death Index. I'm not even going to try to go through all the stuff because I'm not an expert on it. The record reflects he was extremely methodical. He was extremely diligent. He was extremely exclusive, trying to get a list that, at the end of the day, only folks that at an incredible level could be challenged is exactly what he did.

Next we heard Mark Davis. Mark Davis is a friend of mine. He's a man that's been doing this for a very, very, very long time. His record spoke for itself. He has been experts in cases. He has been talking about the importance and necessity of ensuring voter roils are maintained, updated.

He is someone that didn't jump into this game recently. He is someone tiliat took exactly what he did extremely seriously. He did the NCOA search. He removed folks to the maximur extent he could, like Mr. Somerville, from college towns, from military bases.

He made sure that the Court would know this is something that is not a recent phenomenon. It was something that was extenuated in the 2020 election, and it was something that for a long time the majority of the public had wholly neglected but had came to the forefront.

So people like Mr. Davis, Ms. Engelbrecht, this is something that they have created, is their life's work. But a lot of times people don't appreciate the importance of your

1 life's work until it really, really is in the forefront. And that presents an opportunity to engage the citizens, to bring the issue to the table, to make sure that everybody can appreciate the importance of it so you can make positive change.

Mark Williams is the next witness we heard. Mark Williams may not be the most articulate man in the world, I probably am not either, but he did a good job explaining exactly what he is and what he stands for.

He created a printing company. Many years ago there was a family printing company. In this printing company they send out thousands upon thousands of mail on a daily basis. He understands the importance of NCOA, the value that it has, the underlying issues that $N C O A$ highlights.

And in this instance exactly what it highlighted was that many, many, many people moved out of the area in which they lived at the point at which December 2020 occurred. Many folks were absolutely and totally surprised and shocked. He was one of those.

Before he ever spoke to True the Vote, he did his own analysis, created his own list. And he saw that list and was taken aback. And at that point, being someone that had been in this business for decades, being someone that is active in his community, understanding the importance of voter rolls, understanding the importance of voicing his voice for election

1 integrity, he took at his own initiatives to say this needs to 2 be fixed. Around that time he was introduced to True the Vote 3 who was looking at getting engaged as well and that is how the pair happened.

But he didn't just take, his own testimony says -confirms, he didn't just take the list and run with it. He took the list, compared it to what he had already done, ensured that he was comfortable, he was confident the match was sufficient, and he went for it and did it.

He testified he didn't know any of the voters in this case. He testified he didn't know who Alton Russell was. He submitted a challenge in one courtiy, in one county only, which is Gwinnett County. There is no voter in this case who is a plaintiff or who is a fact witness who has anything to do with Gwinnett County.

Next we have Ms. Engelbrecht. Ms. Engelbrecht, as the Court noted, we had a long direct, but it was an important direct for the Court to know where Ms. Engelbrecht came from, who she is as a person, what she stands for, how she got involved, and why that she is here today.

She grew up in a small town in Texas. She was an early home provider for her family. She started a company, a family company. Her ex-husband was involved with it, her husband was involved with it, which forced her to generate very significant skill sets early on for managing, handling
datasets, handling adversity, overcoming adversity.
Around 2009, she had -- she felt -- found a calling in many respects where she gave up a high paying job helping run her family company to pursuing a passion of fighting for election integrity.

2009 is a long time ago. Back in 2009, no one talked about safe and secure elections. Election integrity wasn't something that was a mainstream issue. It wasn't something you do to get on TV or get publicity or get sued or get involved in anything like that. It was something that she did because she felt she could make an impact and a difference.

For the next ten years, she continued that fight. She engaged in multiple numerous public empowerment initiatives getting people involved. Prairie View A\&M, as Mr. Wynne referred to, is one of them. But, ultimately, how it all culminated in many respects is looking at Georgia in 2020.

And we tried -- she went back to where we were in 2020. 2020 was not a typical year. I don't think anyone can disagree with that statement. We were hit with a once-in-century global pandemic. No one knew how to respond, no one knew how to react. That includes Secretaries of State throughout the U.S.

Many mail-in ballots were sent out. Most objective nonpartisan people would agree the least secure way to vote is mail-in voting. You can't verify identification. And, as a result, we had a presidential election, the election was close, and public sentiment hit an all-time low.

Georgia, as all of us here know, saw the commercials. Was ground zero. Not only did we have one Senate runoff, because of Senator Isakson's passing we had two. They would both be decided on the same days. And not only two Senate races on the same day, but they would decide control of the U.S. Senate.

A lot of focus is sealed (phonetic) down to Georgia. And that's how Ms. Engelbrecht first got involved. But she didn't willy-nilly jump in to the Georgia arena. She did diligence. She met with the Georgia Secretary of State. She asked them what they thoughit. She ensured that if she didn't have the assurances that she needed she would not have went forward.

But she didn't stop there. She talked to not one, not two, three attorneys. She talked to folks in the Department of Justice. She talked to folks in election administration. She did significant diligence that took time. And it took time, which delayed her ability to move forward and ultimately take any action here in Georgia.

Whenever she testified, she testified to her involvement with generating and making these lists. She took great pains and lengths to make sure that she could utilize
the experience she got running True the Vote, the experience she got running CoverMe, to ensure these lists were very targeted -- or not targeted -- very diligent, methodical, and well done. And she did multiple layers in generating and making each and every one of the lists. And that's the testimony.

So now let's get to the law. And the Judge and the Court is well aware of the law in this case. So this is a case that is under Section 11(b) of the Voting Rights Act. The Court, I think the parties can apprectate, took a major endeavor in articulating a standard which controls this case. And this standard is highly, highiy, highly important to the ultimate determination the Court will make, the way that I'm going to generate my remaitiing remarks, and the ultimate inevitable conclusion that must be brought about.

As the Court is well aware, the law -- case law in this is somewhat nebulous, but it does underscore each of these factors. And each of these factors hit on a question that the Court asked earlier about recklessness and I will get to that in one moment.

The first factor is the defendants must directly, or through means of a third party, direct some type of action. In this case, not only did no defendant direct any action, either directly or through someone else, but it, quite frankly, would not have been possible if they act within the

1 confines of Georgia law, Section 230, which is exactly what

No one -- there is no evidence in the record, in fact all of the evidence in the record says, no defendant communicated with any of the four folks that testified. And that is a very important point. Because plaintiffs have alleged there's been tens of thousands Georgia, or quabillions of zillions of challenges and so many before people testified. I would not -- we can say a lot of things about the plaintiffs in this case, I wouldn't say they're not well staffed. They have many folks that can get, call, reach out to, like they called Mr. Berson, to find peopls and they had four. And those are the four that the Court must consider as we evaluate the record.

Mr. Berson n€ver talked to, never heard of a defendant. Every defendant that I called testified, never talked to him, never heard of him, never directed any communication at him.

Mr. Turner, Ms. Stinetorf, Ms. Heredia, the facts are the same. They don't know any defendants. They never talked to any defendant. No defendant talked to them. There is no, either directly or through a third party directed by the defendants, to talk to them.

To show the weakness in plaintiffs' case they have suggested that the defendants directed a county Board of

Elections to talk to them.
I will tell you many things, any time I try to tell a judge or whoever or an impartial arbitrator what to do, they don't always listen to me and they're definitely not forced to 1isten to what I have to say. I think the Judge and the Court can agree with me.

When these are submitted, the record is -- the law and the record in this case is very clear. You submit an eligibility challenge. That goes to, what ICregard and what the facts regard, is an inevitable firewall. And it's not just a firewall, Judge. This is a firewall that must be, by the letter of the law, impartial, inonpartisan.

Each county elects and selects who is on their firewall Board of Elections. There must be two Democrats, two Republicans, and then the chairman can be appointed by typically someone on the county board of -- the Board of Commissioners. These folks are created by design to be an impartial, nonpartisan body that will decide eligibility challenges.

No -- there is no evidence in this record that any defendant talked to any county Board of Elections and said, hey, I want you to talk to this person. In fact, the county Board of Elections takes an oath of office when they are sworn in that they must uphold the letter of the law. That is exactly what they did. If they don't find probable cause,
they go no further. There is no dispute on that. Mr. Germany testified to that when he was on the stand.

So here the only direct connection by plaintiffs counsels' own admission is telling county Board of Elections, who were -- take an oath of office, must uphold the letter of the law, by design must be nonpartisan, that, hey, you need to take action to ensure this person is talked to. The case really ends there.

But I'm not going to stop. I'm going to continue going. The direct element is not met. It's not met through any of the four, despite the quabillions of people that were alleged challenged, testified no Gefendant talked to them.

Next let's get to causation. The Court in its order very well articulates that there has to be a casual link between the parties. Here there's no casual link. There's no causal link because Mr. Berson, Mr. Turner, Ms. Stinetorf are Muscogee County. There is nothing that connects any defendant in this case to Muscogee County.

The only allegation that plaintiffs admit is a spreadsheet that was not admitted into the record. And Ms. Amy testified that, well, white means that we didn't reach out to them; yellow means they are -- may be; green means that they've submitted. So we have a hearsay statement, which is not corroborated by witness testimony, somehow having a guy's name on a list trying to outweigh every other witness
testifying I have no idea who that was, he never submitted it.
Plaintiffs have to prove their case by a preponderance of the evidence. That's not a close call. That is completely and totally insufficient to show by a preponderance of the evidence that there is any connection.

And that is still assuming you can get passed prong one, which is direct communication, which cannot happen in this instance. There is nothing in the record that says.

Ms. Heredia, same -- same issue. Ms. Heredia -- it is impossible to know how many people madé challenges. It is impossible to know how those challenges resulted in any activity because of the necessarymechanism that is at play in this case. Unlike any case ever under 11(b), you have a necessary firewall, an impartial, sworn by the letter of the law firewall, to stop $\exists$ ny direction communication with voters. Let me see how long I've got? Is that a 15 ? 15 minutes.

THE DEPUTY CLERK: About 14.
MR. EVANS: So getting to the last section is reasonable -- or the intimidation. It's very difficult to do intimidation, so the Court admirably put together each of these factors.

Proximity. Proximity is 100 percent explained here, given the tight timeline between when the general took place and when January 5th runoff happened.

Frivolity. There is no frivolity here. I mean, each of the four -- I mean, we can't -- we're not talking about pontificating maybe some voters somewhere someplace. They are well-resourced. They had an opportunity to present their case. They presented four. And the four were not frivolous, in fact could be meritorious.

Defendants motivation in making the case. Each of the defendants that we called, testified they did this 100 percent credible reasons. The only contrary evidence is a historian that said he's not actually testifying about motivations.

The bounty. That's unspiported by evidence. That is a one liner and underscores the weakness of plaintiffs' case that they have to bring forward completely unrelated, in my opinion, grossly inflammatory statements to try to make facts exist which don't exist.

The mention of Navy SEALs. Same way. That was a small speech -- that was a small statement unsupported by any evidence.

Publication of challenged voters. It never happened in this case. There is no evidence in this case at any point saying here's the list of voters.

And to accentuate greatly the weakness of the case, plaintiffs have went on to say, well, somebody could submit an open records request and request this and, therefore, the
causation tenuousness highlighted by the fact that you have to make that argument shows there is no causation.

Proximity. I just want -- we'll skirt through these.
Proximity was close.
Go ahead. Keep going. Right here.
So when you look at the six factors taken conclusively.

First, there is no direct contact. We really should stop this. The analysis stops at that pointoin time. There's a nonpartisan firewall. Bam. Over.

Causation. Muscogee voters. We've got nothing in the record, an exhibit's not in the record. Even if it was, it still be -- would not be enough to controvert the overwhelming testimony nobody knows who Alton Russell is. Nobody has connected them. No witness has. No document.

They didn meet the burden on causation as Muscogee.
Heredia. It's really impossible to know who submitted what eligibility challenge. We have a nonpartisan, bound by the letter of the law, firewall which stops any communication.

So, bam, case is over.
Let's go to three. Three here, you've got to show the reasonableness of intimidation. If you look at these factors collectively.

Proximity. 100 percent explained.

Motivation. You've heard it. There was no testimony offered as to what the motivation was. Trying to pull together random facts said and one-off text messages or e-mails at one point to extrapolate a motivation is highly, highly problematic, unfair, and in no way a credible use of evidence.

I can't imagine what I've said about the Florida Gators at some point in my life. Does that mean I'm a bad person? I don't know. Maybe, maybe not.

The reality is that that's not enough.
Bounty. Not enough. Because that's nothing there. Navy SEALs. Nothing there.

No publication of names.
Okay. Next.
What the plaintiffs -- this is a very, very significant point Notwithstanding the overwhelming factual weakness in this case, if you look at the case law, what the plaintiffs are asking for is a wholesale departure of existing jurisprudence on 11(b).

The first case we've got the National Coalition of Black Civic Participation. That was a case about robocalls. And if you take a look at this robocall, I would agree, voter intimidation -- voter mail-in sounds great. But did you know that if you vote by mail, your personal information will be part of a public database that will be used by the police
department to track down --
(The reporter asks for clarification.)
MR. EVANS: Sorry. I'm trying to get through it. I only have so much time.

THE COURT REPORTER: You've got to repeat that.
THE COURT: Hold on, hold on. She has to record it, though.

MR. EVANS: I've got it.
THE COURT: Why don't you say, Judge, I refer you to reading this.

MR. EVANS: I refer you to eading that section.
Point being that is a robocall, direct communication. You read it. If someone was going to -- if I was going to be contacted by the police department, I agree.

Let's go to the next one. Following -- I'm sorry. Stay on that slide?

Following Native Americans at polling places. Taking notes. Tracking license plates. Having loud conversations in polling places.

You've got direct communication. Right there. Or act. Go to the -- don't -- stay on the slide.

Next case here. Willingham. Going to voters' homes, disseminating false information. Direct contact. Talking to people.

The next one. Arizona Democratic Party. Coordinate
poll watchers. Acting improperly over polls where people are voting.

It's the same thing. This is what $11(b)$ is about.
11(b) is not about operating within the confines of the law, submitting an eligibility challenge to a non-partial im -- nonpartisan a county Board of Elections to determine whether or not you will take any further action.

And if you want to go to a motivation here, if the defendants in this case really wanted to intimidate a voter, would they have done what they did? Or would they have sent out a mass text? Or made a robocall? Or sent people to the polls? Or did a big post about here are the people.

If they really wantea to intimidate a voter, they would have done what these people did. They would have done what courts throughout the United States have found to be intimidating to pctential voters.

But that's not what they did. What they did was they operated within the letter of the law. They exercised great diligence in getting there to ensure voter rolls were important.

But before we go to the next factor, Judge, what's really, really important in the law is that that is where the analysis should stop. We should not get into recklessness if all of these three requisites and elements are not met. And they weren't met.

The recklessness element came out relatively recently in a U.S. Supreme Court case.

Now, I also agree that they weren't reckless, and we will get to that quickly in one moment. But the Court's analysis only gets to recklessness if 11(b) elements, pursuant to the summary judgment order is found, we cannot get there. It's not possible with the record before the Court.

Okay. So we have First Amendment rights. And one of the balances the Court will make is if we find those elements were met, which they were, then you have to weigh that with the First Amendment.

Okay. Next.
First Amendment apples, the Johnson case. When you have an intent to convey a particularized message. Here the Court has already found that. Whether the likelihood was great that the message would be understood to those who viewed it.

Next.
Here, courts concluded, element one is met.
Next.
And then element two is also met.
You have communications. I've asked her on the stand, did you voice your opinion, is this important in voicing your opinion. Yes, it is. Yes, it is. They did that -- True the Vote did it publicly. They didn't name many people, but they did voice it. Undoubtedly First Amendment here is met.

Next.
So if the Court gets through all of the first three elements, which I would highly argue there is no way that's possible, it would require a complete departure with jurisprudence and would set a very, very dangerous precedent to almost eviscerate Section 230.

If it gets there, then we say, okay we also have a First Amendment right here. This recklessness, we really don't even need to think about it uniess we get to these other ones, but let's do it just for the heck of it.

Here recklessness is not negligence. Recklessness is you're acting with disregard of your actions. You're not operating methodically You're not operating with diligence. You're not operating and spending significant sums and times and efforts to make eligibility inquiries to the best way that you know how.

Because we have to remember, to submit an eligibility inquiry, you don't have to be a genius, you don't have to be an expert, you just have to be a citizen of that county. Because we want citizens to be engaged.

It's just like a leadership class I took years ago, what is the best way to make people engaged and feel a part of the process? You empower them. You bring them in. That's
what we want to do with the citizens of Georgia. That's the whole purpose of Section 230.

There is no limit on how many you can submit. There is no limit on what you can submit. And why? Because there is a nonpartisan sworn by the letter of law firewall that stops any frivolous, negligent inquiries from going forward.

So here, plaintiffs provided no error rate as the NCOA. They needed an expert. And really they found just about whoever they could get. But notwithstanding all of that, Judge, it doesn't matter, because the law was complied with.

Go ahead.
So this is important. These are a number of quotes from Brad Raffensperger. I'm not going to read them. I will encourage them -- maybe I'll read one, but I'll encourage the Court to read them
"The e ection integrity of free and fair, secure is two of the things American is founded on. We must protect vigorously and prosecute people who undermine them just as vigorously."

Each of these quotes are pretty strong quotes. That if you few break the law, that if you don't do what you're supposed to do, there are going to be consequences. We are a society based upon the rule of law.

But is that intimidation? No. Is that reckless?

No. Is that free speech? Yes
That is -- I would argue the defendants did far less than this in this case. They didn't scream out on a blow horn I will vigorously prosecute you. Voting -- one of these is kind of cut off on mine. One of these is, "Felony is not enough."

That's pretty strong words there. A reasonable person, maybe somewhere, I don't know if they read that, could feel intimidated. But you know what? The First Amendment protects that. That's not reckless. I méan, maybe someone could argue it is, I don't think it is.

But what is for sure is that is less than operating within the confines of the lew. Submitting an eligibility inquiry that a firewall will stop any further action from coming forward.

This one 11 hit briefly. Diverted funds, Fair Fight, they lack standing in the case. They haven't shown any quantifiable claim of any sort. But given that they -- they can't prevail on $11(\mathrm{~b})$ or getting by the First Amendment, it doesn't really matter. The case should be dismissed in totality.

So at the end of the day, Judge, what this case is about. This case is about a plaintiff pursuing a narrative. Trying to string together not only fake facts out of context, but unfortunately people. And getting them here to testify to
things that simply aren't supported by the law.
The law is clear. Under 11(b), as the Court has pointed out, you have to meet those three factors. Those incontrovertibly cannot be met here. Only then, only then does the First Amendment come into play. And only then do we have to meet recklessness, which is a high threshold to meet. It must be disregarded for actions -- am I out of time?

THE COURT: Thank you.
MR. EVANS: The case should be dismissed. Thank you. THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Evans.

Counsel, you have ten minutes for rebuttal.
MR. NKWONTA: Your Honor I'd like to address a few points that defendants made and reiterate a few points that we made that I believe have been distorted.

First, based on the evidence that has come in in this trial, the First Anendment really just has no application here, because we are talking about baseless challenges. We're talking about challenges that are based solely on NCOA data that we know is not enough to determine whether someone is a resident. And that's why it's baseless, Your Honor.

The definition of a baseless challenge, Your Honor, is one in which the proponent of that challenge has no reason -- or has no reasonable expectation of success on the merits. And they didn't have a reasonable expectation of success on the merits.

The Secretary of State's Office, Ryan Germany told them that their challenges were going to fail. True the Vote's challenger told them that their challenges were inaccurate.

Mr. Davis and Mr. Somerville, they knew that what they were putting out there was going to be a burden on the counties. And nobody was surprised when their challenges did not achieve any success because it was a baseless petition. It was a baseless challenge.

Another reason why you can tell was a baseless challenge is that when you compare it to the residency law that I mentioned earlier, you compare it to the 15-factor test and you compare it to all the other enumerated factors like income, where the individual pays their taxes, where their car is registered, et cetcra, when you compare it to all those factors and intent the NCOA list sheds light on none of that. It sheds light on none of that.

So to suggest that -- that these challenges are somehow protected by the First Amendment is to reinvent the standard for determining eligibility and residence in Georgia. No reasonable litigant could realistically expect success on the merits. That is the definition of a baseless challenge. That's the definition the Court used in its summary judgment order. And that definition applied here.

There was no reasonable chance of success. No
reasonable chance that a list of 250,000 voters would be vetted and would be somehow investigated such that those voters would all be forced to show proof of residence before the election. They were frivolous from the get-go.

Second, we know that the allegations in the challenges were false. They were defamatory. They were false because they alleged that individuals were unlawfully voting or that were not registered in their counties. We know that's not true. One voter after another has had the courage to step up and testify to that effect.

But we also know it's not tue because even True the Vote's own challenger, Joe Martip has recognized that's not true and told True the Vote that's not true.

We also know it's not true because it's based on a faultily premise, that you can determine one's residence based solety on NCOA data. So because it's defamatory, it doesn't matter whether they put it in a petition. It doesn't matter where they put it in a filing.

And I'll direct the Court to McDonald v. Smith, a U.S. Supreme Court case, 472 U.S. 479. In that case, the Court recognized that defamatory material does not receive protection because it's placed in a petition. You cannot defame someone, you cannot falsely accuse someone of being an unlawful voter and receive protection for that statement because it's in a petition.

And then recklessness. Their conduct was reckless. The definition of recklessness is when a person consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the conduct will cause harm to another.

This case and the evidence we've presented is filled with alarm bells of unjustifiable risks of harm. That entire chart that Dr . Mayer presented, that is a red flag, unjustifiable risk after unjustifiable risk. Statements from the Secretary of State's Office in a meetingowith Ryan Germany. Statements from True the Vote'sonly challenger. Unjustifiable risk that True the Vote navigated, disregarded and trampled over in order to make a big slash to challenge 250,000-plus voters

THE COURT: Are the voter election's firewalls in this case -- not only this case, any case -- challenged?

MR. NKWONTA: The Board of Elections are not firewalls, Your Honor. And for two reasons.

One, we saw in this case that the Board of Elections in some select counties did, in fact, process the challenges and held hearings.

Two, Jocelyn Heredia's name was published on the website. It was publicized. And she saw her name on the website as being challenged.

Suggesting that the Board of Elections is like a -is a firewall is equivalent of individuals calling the cops on
people who are voting and suggesting that it's not voter intimidation because the cops get to decide whether they actually enforce the law or whether they prosecute.

Yes, the Board of Elections gets to decide, but defendants advocated for the outcome that would result in intimidation. They pushed the Board of Elections to accept those challenges. And they even considered filing a lawsuit against Board of Elections that did not accept those challenges and did not approach voters and require voters to show their proof of residence.

And I also want to talk about the funnel approach that you've heard, which has beer used to suggest that perhaps NCOA data was not the only defa that Mr. Davis and Mr. Somerville used to identify the 39,000 list of challenged voters.

That is not true. That's a lot of smoke and mirrors there. But as you saw in the cross-examination, that, yes, Mr. Davis and Mr. Somerville relied on military data to exclude some military voters. Yes, they may have relied on data to exclude some UOCAVA voters. But once they excluded voters, excluded military voters, UOCAVA voters, and whittled it down to 40,000 , at the end of the day, the only information they had about that 40,000 list of challenged voters is that they filed an NCOA change of address request. That was the only information.

And because they relied on that solely, what they filed and what they submitted was a baseless petition.

And, lastly, in terms of petitions, True the Vote and Catherine Engelbrecht have no right to petition to challenge any voter in Georgia. So whatever right to petition individuals -- individuals on this side of the v . may claim, or defendants may claim, that does not apply to True the Vote. That does not apply to Ms. Engelbrecht.

And any petition they would file wouid be baseless on their own. So they don't have First Amenáment rights implicated there.

And then, with my remaining few minutes, Your Honor, I want to talk about the plaintiffs. I want to bring this back to the plaintiffs who-- whose testimony has been unfairly mischaracterised.

Mr. Gamaliél Turner. His return date to Georgia is not uncertain. He testified that he is returning to Georgia. He testified that his contract is ending and he's returning to the home that he currently owns and has always owned in Muscogee County.

Ms. Stephanie Stinetorf. She looked up her voting record on the My Voter page. And, yes, she saw on the My Voter page that she had been challenged. But that's not a surprise.

Voters determine and check whether their ballots have
been counted. Voters show up in person, like Scott Berson did, and try to vote. And that's when they learn that they have been challenged.

In other words, these voters were all confronted with the idea that they had been challenged.

And Ms. Jocelyn Heredia. Like I mentioned, she was challenged -- the list, the challenge list was published online, on the Internet, for her to see, for anyone to see. And on that challenge list that was Plaintiffs' Exhibit 46 it showed that she was challenged by two individuals, Mr. Jerry Bowling, associated with True the Vote, and Mr. Don Gasaway, associated with Mr. Davis and Mr.Somerville.

They have presented no evidence of any other individual who challenged focelyn, but yet they want to suggest there was some mystery challenge that may have broken causation. There no such thing. There was no mystery challenge to have broken causation.

And Fair Fight here clearly diverted resources in response to these challenges. And the suggestion that Fair Fight has not calculated the amount of resources, that transgresses Eleventh Circuit case law, specifically Florida NAACP v. Browning, which recognizes it's the act of diverting resources, not the amount.

And, lastly, defendants have pointed to all of the different moves that Jocelyn has made, moving to Decatur,
moving to Atlanta, renewing her lease, and all of these things that occurred after January 2021, which has no bearing on what her residence was in January 2021, where she was a resident of Banks County where she took care of her little brother and was a staple in her household, even though she had an apartment that would get her closer to work. She was a resident of Banks County.

But even if -- putting aside -- putting that aside, yes, Jocelyn had an apartment in Decatur. Yes, she eventually moved to a different apartment closer to atlanta. So what?

The challenge law does not allow you to challenge an individual for bases that are not covered under the grounds set forth in -- under Georgia law. Georgia's residency law sets forth the grounds of ownich one can establish residency. And intent is what's required. Jocelyn's intent has not been show.

THE COURT: Thank you, sir.
MR. NKWONTA: Can I just make one more point, Your Honor?

THE COURT: No. I stopped Mr. Evans mid sentence. I have to stop you there. Thank you.

MR. NKWONTA: Thank you.
THE COURT: At this point in time, I have a question for the plaintiffs and I have a question for the defendants. In this case the Department of Justice, representing the

1 United States of America, intervened on a protection of Section $11(\mathrm{~b})$ of the Civil Rights Act.

I have not heard anything during the course of this trial where I've came to the conclusion that the plaintiffs are challenging $11(\mathrm{~b})$; is that correct?

MR. NKWONTA: Sorry, can you repeat that, Your Honor?
THE COURT: I have not heard any evidence or argument during the course of this trial where the plaintiffs are challenging the constitutionality of Section i1(b) of the Civil Rights Act; is that correct?

MR. NKWONTA: That's correct Your Honor.
THE COURT: Through the course of this trial, I have not heard any evidence or argument from the defendants that indicate that you are chadienging the constitutionality of Section $11(\mathrm{~b})$ of the Civil Rights Act.

MR. WYNNE That is correct, Your Honor.
THE COURT: That's correct?
If you-all would 1 ike to be heard, but at this point in time, $I$-- my findings is that Section $11(b)$ of the Civil Rights Act is Constitutional. But if you-all want to be heard on that before I close out for the day, I will.

MS. PAIKOWSKY: Your Honor.
THE COURT: Yeah, yeah.
MS. PAIKOWSKY: Thank you, Your Honor. We just want to clarify for the record that
defendants are not challenging the constitutionality of Section 11(b) with their -- the Constitutional defenses that they have discussed. The constitutionality of $11(\mathrm{~b})$ as applied here. If they are, we would like to be heard and we would be happy to present argument on the Constitutional issues.

MR. WYNNE: No, we are not challenging the constitutionality of Section 11(b). Something, in fact, we're very proud of and we honor. We're not challenging it in any respect.

MS. PAIKOWSKY: Okay, Your tionor. As long as we're all clear that if the Court finds a violation here, then it can properly impose a remedy consistent with the First Amendment. Thank you.

THE COURT: GKay. Thank you.
I want to commend all the lawyers and the parties in this case. You all have done an excellent job preparing for this case. You have given me a lot of information I need to try to make a decision. I would agree, I think everybody agrees that voting is very important. And the Court is going to try to get you an answer on this matter as soon as possible.

Also I need, by 5 p.m. next Wednesday, the 14th, your findings of fact and conclusions of law. Whatever you send to me, obviously, send to the other side. And then as soon as I
get that, we'11 go through the information.
I wish I could give you an exact date for a ruling to be coming out. There's a lot of information, a lot of facts. And I agree to both sides it's a very important decision the Court has to make. So we will be very thorough as possible in rendering a verdict or a decision in this case.

Anything else from the plaintiffs?
MR. NKWONTA: Nothing further, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Yeah. I thank you the piaintiffs for your effort and everything you-all presented.

Anything else from the defericants?
MR. WYNNE: No, Your Horior.
THE COURT: I thank the defendants for everything you-all presented and youo efforts as well. Everybody have a great week. And it's been a pleasure working with you-all.

MR. SHELL $\%$ I'm sorry, Your Honor, to get in the last word.

I think you said it's due on Tuesday -- on Wednesday the 14th? I think that Tuesday is the 14th. Would you like it on Wednesday?

THE COURT: That's right. Wednesday the 15th. Yeah. So you've eight days rather than seven.

I don't think we mind, do we, Ms. Conkel? No.
Thank you-all. Have a great week.
(The hearing concluded at 12:40 p.m.)

| \$ | 15TH ${ }_{[1]}$ - 2017:21 | $298{ }_{[1]}$ - 1936:7 |
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| $\begin{aligned} & \text { \$50,000 [8] - 1948:3, 1948:7, 1948:14, } \\ & \text { 1953:3, 1964:2, 1965:6, 1965:9, } \\ & \text { 1967:5 } \end{aligned}$ | 16 [1] - 1906:12 | 299 [2] - 1936:7, 1936:9 |
|  | 16TH [1] - 1945:25 | 2:20-CV-0302-SCJ [1] - 1886:4 |
|  | 17 [1] - 1905:12 | 2D [1] - 1967:2 |
|  | 1700 [1]-1974:7 |  |
| ' | 18[1]-1904:12 | 3 |
|  | 1889 [1]-1888:3 | 3[2] - 1900:21, 1906:12 |
| $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { 'ALMOST }_{[1]}-1907: 18 \\ & \text { 'THIS }{ }_{[1]}-1904: 16 \end{aligned}$ | $1896{ }_{[1]}$ - 1888:3 | $30_{[1]}-1981: 9$ |
|  | 18TH [2] - 1946:1, 1968:5 | $302[3]-1935: 25,1936: 9,1936: 11$ |
|  | 19 [1]-1903:4 | 30TH [1] - 1916:10 |
| / | 1908[1]-1954:4 | 32,000 [3]-1949:5, 1949:16, 1950:15 |
| /S/VIOLA ${ }_{[1]}$ - 2018:12 | $1910[1]-1954: 9$ $1913{ }^{[1]}$ - 1888:3 | 364,000[5] - 1892:18, 1893:5, 1945:18, 1945:19. 1968:6 |
| 1 | 1939[1] - 1888:5 | 38 [1] - 1924:14 |
| $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { [4]-1917:15, 1963:23, 1968:9, } \\ & 1983: 15 \end{aligned}$ | $1946[1]-1954: 14$ 1969 [1] - 88886 | 39,000 [1] - 2011:14 |
|  | 1979 [1] - 1888:6 | 4 |
| 1-10 [1]-1886:8 |  | 4 |
| $\begin{aligned} & 10[1]-1949: 22 \\ & 100[4]-1980: 22,1997: 23,1998: 9, \\ & 1999: 25 \end{aligned}$ | 2 | 4 [2] - 1907:12, 1915:17 |
|  | $2[2]-1945: 20,1983: 16$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 40,000 [3]-1951:13, 2011:22, 2011:23 } \\ & \mathbf{4 0 4}-2: 5-1479[1]-1887: 23 \end{aligned}$ |
| 102[3]-1904:11, 1905:12, 1906:11 | 2007 [1] - 1888:7 | 45[1] - 1938:6 |
| 105[2]-1924:18, 1925:9 | 2009[3]-1991:2, 1991:6 | 46 [1] - 2013:9 |
| $\begin{aligned} & 106[1]-1920: 11 \\ & 10: 30_{[2]}-1937: 23,1938: 8 \end{aligned}$ | 201(D [1] - 1916:11 | $472{ }_{[1]}$ - 2009:20 |
|  | 201(D) [1]-1917:17 | 479 [2] - 1967:1, 2009:20 |
| 11(B[25] - 1941:20, 1942:7, 1951:21, | $\begin{aligned} & 2016[1]-1940: 8 \\ & 2018[1]-1940: 8 \end{aligned}$ | 49 [2] - 1956:3, 1956:9 |
| 1958:10, 1962:22, 1965:23, 1983:24, | 2020 [15]-1891:9, 1891:16, 12c1:20, 1910:10, 1910:13, 1911:0, 1915:17, | 5 |
| 1993:9, 1997:13, 2002:3, 2002:4, 2003:5, 2006:19, 2007:2, 2015:2, 2015:5, 2015:9, 2015:15, 2015:19, 2016:2, 2016:3 | $\begin{gathered} \text { 1940:9, 1963:17, 1975:2, 1988:20, } \\ \text { 1989:17, 1991:17, i991:19 } \\ 2021 \text { [8]-1915:1: } 1939: 24,1940: 4, \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \mathbf{5}_{[3]}-1905: 12,1938: 19,2016: 23 \\ & 50[1]-1979: 18 \\ & 51[1]-1926: 4 \end{aligned}$ |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { 11(B) }[6]-1951: 12,1957: 23,1969: 17, \\ & \text { 1978:25, 2000:19, 2016:8 } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 1940:9, 1940:21, 1942:12, 2014:2, } \\ & \text { 2014:3 } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 52[2]-1926: 5,1942: 5 \\ & \text { 52(C } \mathbf{C}_{[1]}-1938: 13 \end{aligned}$ |
| $12[3]-1925: 1,1925: 4,1933: 12$ | 2022 (4)-i897:1, 1900:20, 1903:2, | 52(C) [1] - 1938:17 |
| 122 [1] - 1905:12 | 1510:13 | 53[3]-1925:20, 1926:4, 1926:12 |
| 123 [1] - 1905:12 | C.023 [3]-1886:11, 1927:9, 2018:7 | 54 [3]-1925:20, 1926:5, 1926:12 |
| $\begin{aligned} & 127[4]-1929: 25,1930: 4,1930: 17, \\ & 1933: 3 \end{aligned}$ | 2024[1]-1975:16 | 562 [1]-1967:16 |
|  | 20TH ${ }_{[1]}$ - 1954:4 | 5TH [1] - 1997:25 |
| $\begin{aligned} & 128[5]-1930: 18,1932: 14,1932: 15, \\ & 1932: 16,1933: 3 \end{aligned}$ | 21-2-217 [2]-1959:24, 1960:13 |  |
|  | 223 [1]-1977:19 | 6 |
| 129 [6]-1930:1, 1930:5, 1930:18, | 22ND [1] - 1900:20 | 6 [1] - 1974:24 |
| 1932:22, 1932:25, 1933:3 | 23 [2] - 1925:2, 1925:4 | 60 [3] - 1950:24, 1967:19 |
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