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19	DONALD J. TRUMP FOR PRESIDENT,	Case No.: CV2020-014248
20	INC., et al.,	
21	Plaintiffs,	INTERVENOR-DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS'
22	V.	COMPLAINT
23	KATIE HOBBS, et al., Defendants,	
24	and	
25	ARIZONA DEMOCRATIC PARTY,	
26	Intervenor-	
27	Defendant.	
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Intervenor-Defendant the Arizona Democratic Party moves to dismiss Plaintiffs' Verified Complaint. This motion is based upon the Memorandum of Points & Authorities below, all pleadings, paper, and exhibits on file in this matter, and oral argument.

INTRODUCTION

The people have spoken. After careful and cautious analysis of the ballot counts in states across the nation, every major news outlet has declared Joe Biden the President-elect of the United States. Just hours after these calls were made, Plaintiffs Donald J. Trump for President, Inc. (the "Trump Campaign"), the Republican National Committee, and the Arizona Republican Party (collectively, "Plaintiffs")—apparently dissatisfied with the outcome—filed their Complaint, seeking to halt the certification of votes in Arizona and inject uncertainty and confusion into the democratic process. This lawsuit should be seen for what it is: a last-ditch effort by an unsuccessful presidential campaign to sow doubt and mistrust in a legitimately conducted election. Nearly a dozen other state and federal courts across the nation have resoundingly rejected similar unsubstantiated claims of voting irregularities and fraud made by the Trump Campaign and various Republican entities, and the same result should follow here.

Plaintiffs' evidence in support of their claims is thin. In their Complaint, Plaintiffs plead their theory of systematic mistabultion by Maricopa County's voting machines "upon information and belief" nearly 20 times. Put simply, their allegations of disenfranchisement are premised on speculation, not fact. Even accepting the truth of their allegations, the number of overvotes from in-person Election Day voting in Maricopa County falls well short of any figure that would change the outcome of Arizona's presidential contest or any other race. Because Plaintiffs' grievances cannot be redressed through this lawsuit, their claims fail for lack of standing. And because Plaintiffs sat on their rights for nearly a week during a time-sensitive vote tabulation process instead of seeking to correct alleged issues with ballots as they arose, their claims are barred by the equitable doctrine of laches. For these reasons and those that follow, this Court should promptly dismiss this case.

BACKGROUND

At bottom, Plaintiffs' grievance is based on Maricopa County voters' use of Sharpie pens to mark their ballots. This Complaint follows a similar lawsuit that a right-wing organization, the Public Interest Legal Foundation, spearheaded but then quickly voluntarily dismissed. *See Aguilera v. Fontes*, Case No. 2020-014083 (Maricopa Cnty. Super. Ct. Nov. 4, 2020). Just hours later, Plaintiffs—all of whom intervened in the original lawsuit—announced online that they would seek another bite at the apple.

Plaintiffs' suit alleges that some ink from Sharpies might have bled through ballots and thereby created apparent "overvotes," which occur when a voter selects more than one candidate in a particular race. Plaintiffs claim that some indeterminable number of in-person voters on Election Day initially had their ballots rejected by a tabulation device due to apparent overvotes. Plaintiffs claim that poll workers manually overrode that determination (or instructed voters to do so) by pressing a green button on the tabulation machine. In their telling, the "green button" override will count the ballot for all races other than the apparently overvoted race. As evidence for this theory, Plaintiffs include a declaration from one voter who believes her vote was not counted due to this chain of events. Her belief stems only from the fact that she or a poll worker pressed the green manual override button. (The second voter whose declaration Plaintiffs attach alleges only that she believes here vote did not count because she did not see a "checkmark" after the tabulator accepted her ballot.) Plaintiffs also attach declarations from poll observers alleging that poll workers informed voters to press the green button when the tabulation devices flagged potential irregularities. One such declarant noted that following poll workers' attempts to scan ballots at the end of the day, any "non-accepted ballots were placed into a sealed, clear plastic pouch." Garre Decl. ¶ 11. Plaintiffs offer no more than that.

ARGUMENT

I. Plaintiffs lack standing to bring their claims.

The Arizona Supreme Court "has, as a matter of sound judicial policy, required persons seeking redress in the courts first to establish standing, especially in actions in which constitutional

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relief is sought against the government." Bennett v. Napolitano, 206 Ariz. 520, 524 (2003). Although Arizona courts are not strictly bound by federal standing doctrine, the Arizona standing standard is a "rigorous" one, and federal case law on standing is "instructive" to Arizona courts. Fernandez v. Takata Seat Belts, Inc., 210 Ariz. 138, 140-41 (2005) (quoting Bennett, 206 Ariz. at 525). To demonstrate standing on a claim, parties must "allege a distinct and palpable injury" rather than an "allegation of generalized harm that is shared alike by all or a large class of citizens." Sears v. Hull, 192 Ariz. 65, 69 (1998) (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499, 501 (1975)); Harris Bank, N.A., No. 1 CA-CV 15-0368, 2016 WL 7368612, at *3 (Ariz. Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2016) ("the injury must be distinct and palpable so that the plaintiff has a personal stake in the outcome."). They must also seek relief that is likely to redress their alleged greivances. See Bennett, 206 Ariz. at 525 (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)); see also Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) ("[I]t must be 'likely,' as opposed to merely 'speculative,' that the injury will be 'redressed by a favorable decision.'") (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 43 (1976)). "[A]t the pleading stage, the plaintiff must 'clearly . . . allege facts demonstrating' each element [of standing]," ThermoLife Int'l LLC v. Sparta Nutrition LLC, No. CV-19-01715-PHX-SMB, 2020 WL 248164, at * (D. Ariz. Jan. 16, 2020) (alterations in original) (quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S.Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016)), and must demonstrate standing for each form of relief sought. Friends of Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env't

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While the Arizona Supreme Court has recently observed that Arizona courts "apply a more relaxed standard for standing in mandamus actions," *Ariz. Pub. Integrity All. v. Fontes*, No. CV-20-0253-AP/EL, 2020 WL 6495178 ¶ 11 (Ariz. Nov. 5, 2020), this is not a true mandamus action in which Plaintiffs may be "beneficially interested." A.R.S. § 12-2021. That is because Plaintiffs do not seek to compel Arizona election officials to address election-day ballots as specifically prescribed by law in elections going forward but rather to *retrospectively* address ballots *that have already been cast*, and by a procedure of sifting through and identifying already-cast ballots that is nowhere specified in statute or the Election Procedures Manual. *See Sears*, 192 Ariz. at 68 ¶ 11 (observing that "[m]andamus does not lie if the public officer is not *specifically* required by law to perform the act" and that "the requested relief in a mandamus action must be the performance of an act and such act must be non-discretionary" (internal quotation marks omitted, emphasis added)).

Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 185 (2000).

Here, Plaintiffs lack standing because they cannot establish how their alleged injury will be remedied by their requested relief. In each of their four claims, Plaintiffs request that this Court issue declaratory and injunctive "remedies requiring the Recorder and the Board of Supervisors to provide for the review and adjudication by the Ballot Duplication Board of all ballots generated and cast at voting centers on Election Day that have not been tabulated because [of] ostensible overvotes." Compl. ¶ 54, 62, 72, 81. This review, Plaintiffs allege, will, "upon information and belief . . . yield up to *thousands* of additional votes for President Trump." *Id.* ¶ 50, 58, 68, 77 (emphasis added). But, according to Maricopa County, the number of overvotes from in-person Election Day voting in the County totaled just *180*. *See Election Day Overvotes*, Maricopa County Ex. 30. Even if every one of these votes were cast for President Trump—a highly unlikely scenario given the allocation of votes for the two candidates across Maricopa County as a whole—it would still leave him well short of prevailing in the contest for Arizona's 11 electoral votes. *See Featured Races*, Ariz. Sec'y of State, https://results.arizona.vote/#/featured/18/0 (last visited Nov. 10, 2020).

Plaintiffs also allude to races for "other contested offices in Maricopa County" that might be affected by the alleged overvotes. Compl. ¶ 4; see also, e.g., id. ¶ 41 ("[T]abulation of these ballots would yield up to thousands of additional votes for President Trump and other Republican candidates in the November 3, 2020 general election."). But they fail to identify who these other candidates are, let alone whether their races would be decided by the overvotes at issue. Indeed, Maricopa County's Exhibit 30 data demonstrates that the number of overvotes for every other closely contested race in the county is nowhere near the level of being electorally dispositive. For example, in the hotly contested Legislative District 28 (where Democrat Christine Marsh currently leads by only 631 votes), the number of overvotes totals three. Maricopa County Ex. 30.

² For example, current vote totals indicate that U.S. Senator-elect Mark Kelly bested incumbent Martha McSally by more than 80,000 votes. *See Featured Races*, Ariz. Sec'y of State, https://results.arizona.vote/#/featured/18/0 (last visited Nov. 10, 2020).

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Accordingly, Plaintiffs have fallen far short of "clearly alleging" a redressable injury needed to confer standing. Because a complete victory in this lawsuit would not redress Plaintiffs' alleged grievances, they lack standing to bring their claims, and their Complaint should be dismissed. At the very least, the "Trump Campaign—which "is the principal campaign committee of President Donald J. Trump," *id.* ¶ 7, and represents no other candidate—lacks standing to assert these claims and their Complaint should be dismissed.

II. Plaintiffs' claims are barred by laches.

Even if Plaintiffs had standing, the equitable doctrine of laches bars their claims. Laches prevents a lawsuit from proceeding when plaintiffs' delay in filing suit is unreasonable and prejudices other parties. *Sotomayor v. Burns*, 199 Ariz. 81, 82–83 (2000). In considering whether laches bars a late lawsuit, courts (1) "examine the justification for delay, including the extent of plaintiff's advance knowledge of the basis for challenge", (2) analyze "whether the delay by the challenging party was unreasonable"; and (3) consider whether "the delay resulted in actual prejudice to the adverse parties." *Harris v. Purcell*, 193 Ariz. 409, 412 (1998) (citing *Mathieu v. Mahoney*, 174 Ariz. 456, 459 (1993)). Arizona courts consider not only the prejudice the plaintiffs' delay causes to other parties, but also whether the delay "places an unreasonable burden on the court." *Id.* Timeliness is particularly critical in lawsuits challenging the electoral process. "In election matters, time is of the essence" because the results of election litigation can affect other deadlines. *Id.* As the Supreme Court of Arizona has recognized, "[t]o wait until the last moment places the court in a position of having to steamroll through the delicate legal issues in order to meet" election deadlines. *Mathieu*, 174 Ariz. at 459.

Despite this urgency, Plaintiffs waited *nearly a full week* to file a lawsuit seeking extraordinary injunctive and mandamus relief. This unreasonable and unexplained delay, if their requested relief were granted, would prejudice diligent election officials who—on top of their regular duties—would have to identify apparent overvotes or ballots with "other putative defects or irregularities" out of *millions* cast; provide these for review, adjudication, and duplication by the Ballot Duplication Board; and then tabulate and canvass all the adjudicated votes. Compl. 15—

16. This undertaking would have to occur while election officials are facing looming deadlines of their own. Importantly, officials must verify all provisional ballots by November 13—this Friday. A.R.S. § 16-135(D). They must then finish canvassing all returns from the general election no later than November 23, which is less than two weeks away. A.R.S. § 16-642(A).

These imminent deadlines, combined with Plaintiffs' unreasonable and inexplicable delay, will prejudice officials who are working tirelessly to ensure that every ballot is properly verified, every valid vote is tabulated, and all other processes that take place prior to the canvass are completed within specific statutory timeframes. Plaintiffs' requested remedies will also prejudice this Court, which would have to "wait until the last moment" to "steamroll through the delicate legal issues" so that election officials can meet these statutory deadlines. *Mathieu*, 174 Ariz. at 459 (quoting *Fidanque*, 297 Or. at 718).

There was nothing preventing Plaintiffs from filing this action on or immediately after Election Day, which *might* have permitted timely adjudication of their claims and implementation of their requested relief. The voters who allegedly tried to insert their ballots into the tabulator and received notification of an overvote or undervote did so only on Election Day. *See*, *e.g.*, Swoboda Decl. ¶ 6; Barcello Decl. ¶ 3; Larsen Decl. ¶ 3; Willoughby Decl. ¶ 3. Although these voters could have secured immediate redress at their respective polling places, none of them sought any remedies—administrative or judicial—until Plaintiffs filed this suit, after the tabulation of results of the election were well underway. Plaintiffs' inexcusable delay is all the more glaring given that another set of plaintiffs filed an almost identical action the day after Election Day. *See Aguilera v. Fontes*, Case No. 2020-014083 (Maricopa Cnty. Super. Ct. Nov. 4, 2020). Needless to say, such gamesmanship does not constitute a compelling "justification for delay." *Harris*, 193 Ariz. at 412.

In sum, Plaintiffs' unacceptably delayed lawsuit presents has already created—and would certainly lead to more—prejudice for Defendants and elected officials. It is therefore barred by laches, and this Court should dismiss the Complaint.

III. Courts across the country have dismissed similar lawsuits by these Plaintiffs.

In considering Plaintiffs' claims, this Court need not—and should not—close its eyes to

the fact that Plaintiffs have filed similarly meritless lawsuits in multiple state and federal courts and have thus far been denied relief in every forum. See Donald J. Trump for President, Inc. v. Benson, No. 20-000225-MZ, slip op. at 3-5 (Mich. Ct. Cl. Nov. 6, 2020) (denying Trump Campaign's emergency motion to cease all counting and processing of absentee ballots and noting that plaintiffs provided no admissible evidence supporting their claims); Donald J. Trump for President, Inc. v. Phila. Cnty. Bd. of Elections, Civ. No. 20-5533, slip op. at 1 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 5, 2020), ECF No. 5 (denying Trump Campaign's emergency motion to stop Philadelphia County Board of Elections from counting ballots); In re Enf't of Election Laws & Securing Ballots Cast or Received After 7:00 P.M. on Nov. 3, 2020, No. SPCV2000982-J3, slip op. at 1 (Ga. Super. Ct. Nov. 5, 2020) (denying Trump Campaign's petition to segregate certain ballots and noting that "there is no evidence the ballots referenced in the petition [were invalid]" and "there is no evidence that the Chatham County Board of Elections or the Chatham County Board of Registrars has failed to comply with the law"); Kraus v. Cegavske, No. 20 OC 00142 1B, slip op. at 9 (Nev. Dist. Ct. Oct. 29, 2020) (finding Trump Campaign's claims regarding poll watching and signature matching without merit and explaining that "[t]here is no evidence that any vote that should lawfully not be counted has been or will be counted" and "[t]here is no evidence that any election worker did anything outside of the law, policy, or procedures"), aff'd, No. 82018, slip op. at 2–3 (Nev. Nov. 3, 2020) ("[Appellants'] request for relief to this court is not supported by affidavit or record materials supporting many of the factual statements made therein."); see also Stokke v. Cegavske, No. 2:20-cv-02046-APG-DJA (D. Nev. Nov. 6, 2020), ECF No. 27 (denying plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order to halt ballot counting in Clark County, Nevada); Stoddard v. City Election Comm'n, No. 20-014604-CZ, slip op. at 2–3 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Nov. 6, 2020) (denying Election Integrity Fund's motion for preliminary injunction to prohibit Detroit from certifying results and explaining that "[b]oth Republican and Democratic inspectors were present [for the counting of absentee ballots]" and "plaintiffs do not offer any affidavits or specific eyewitness evidence to substantiate their assertions").

This lawsuit is yet one more attempt by the President's unsuccessful reelection campaign

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to alter the results of a properly administered general election—or, at the very least, to cast doubt on the integrity of the election and the veracity of the results. But once again, Plaintiffs' claims are unmoored from both law and fact, with allegations strung together by rank speculation and selective generalization. This Court should follow the lead of its sister jurisdictions across the country and dismiss this case.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Plaintiffs' Complaint should be dismissed.

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DATED this 10th day of November, 2020

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