

FILED

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA IN THE GENERAL COURT OF JUSTICE  
WAKE COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT DIVISION  
20 CVS 8881  
WAKE CO., C.S.C.

NORTH CAROLINA ALLIANCE FOR  
RETIRED AMERICANS, *et al.*

Plaintiffs,

v.

THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE  
BOARD OF ELECTIONS, *et al.*,

Defendants, and

PHILIP E. BERGER in his official capacity  
as President Pro Tempore of the North  
Carolina Senate, *et al.*,

Intervenor-Defendants, and

REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE,  
*et al.*,

Republican Committee-  
Intervenor Defendants.

**FINDINGS OF FACT AND  
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW  
SUPPORTING OCTOBER 2, 2020  
ORDER GRANTING  
JOINT MOTION FOR ENTRY  
OF CONSENT JUDGMENT**

THIS MATTER CAME ON TO BE HEARD before the Court during the October 2, 2020 Session of the Superior Court of Wake County. All adverse parties received notice and participated. The Court considered the pleadings, arguments, briefs of the parties, supplemental affidavits, and the record established thus far, as well as argument submitted by counsel in attendance.

1. Following the hearing, the Court granted the Joint Motion for Entry of Consent Judgment, whereupon the Consent Judgment was signed by the Court, and filed and served on all parties. The Court sees fit to further explain the basis of its rulings in the Consent Judgment here. The Court heard argument at the October 2, 2020 hearing, considered the arguments made by the

parties, and made a series of oral rulings upon which it based the granting of the Joint Motion and entry of the Consent Judgment. These rulings, which were effective at the time they were announced from the bench, are hereby memorialized and further explained below.

### FINDINGS OF FACT

2. This matter involves claims brought by Plaintiffs involving as-applied challenges to the absentee ballot receipt deadline set forth in N.C.G.S. § 163-231(b)(1), (2), enforcement of the witness requirement for absentee ballots set forth in N.C.G.S. § 163-231(a) (as modified by SL 2020-17), the lack of prepaid postage available to absentee-by-mail voters, application of any signature verification requirement, enforcement of elections laws prohibiting individuals and organizations from assisting voters when submitting or filling out absentee ballot request forms or absentee ballots as set forth in N.C.G.S. §§ 163-226.3(a)(5), -230.2(c), (e), and -231(b)(1), and the failure to provide an additional 21 days of early voting.

3. Plaintiff North Carolina Alliance For Retired Americans is incorporated in North Carolina as a 501(c)(4) nonprofit, social welfare organization. The Alliance has over 50,000 members across all 100 of North Carolina's counties. Its members comprise retirees from public and private sector unions, community organizations, and individual activists. Some of its members are disabled, and all of its members are of an age that places them at a heightened risk of complications from coronavirus.

4. Individual Plaintiffs each have their own hardships as well as shared hardships, which encumber their abilities to vote in the election. These include, but are not limited to, significant concerns regarding the United States Postal Service's ability to timely deliver and return absentee ballots; and health concerns related to voting in person, interacting with a witness,

traveling to and from voting sites, or delivering an absentee ballot, particularly for those deemed high risk for COVID-19.

5. On July 30, 2020, Thomas J. Marshall, General Counsel and Executive Vice President of the United States Postal Service sent a letter to North Carolina's Secretary of State, warning her that North Carolina elections law relating to absentee ballot deadlines was "incongruous with the Postal Service's delivery standards." *Pennsylvania v. DeJoy*, No. 2:20-cv-04096 (E.D.P.A.), Dkt. 1-1 at 53-55. USPS also stated that "there is a significant risk" that "ballots may be requested in a manner that is consistent with your election rules and returned promptly, and yet not be returned on time or be counted." *Id.* In particular, USPS recommended that elections officials transmitting communication to voters "allow 1 week for delivery to voters" and that civilian voters "should generally mail their completed ballots at least one week before the state's due date. In states that allow mail-in ballots to be counted if they are *both* postmarked by Election Day *and* received by election officials by a specific date that is less than a week after Election Day, voters should mail their ballots at least one week before they must be received by election officials." *Id.* Accordingly, in North Carolina, voters can postmark their ballot by Election Day, but because of USPS delays and through no fault of their own, not have their ballots counted because the ballots arrived at the county board of elections office after the statutory deadline.

6. On May 12, 2020, Legislative Defendants noticed their intervention in this case purportedly "as agents of the State" and "on behalf of the General Assembly." LDs' Mot. to Intervene, ¶¶ 9-10.

7. On July 1, 2020, the Republican National Committee, the National Republican Senatorial Committee, the National Republican Congressional Committee, Donald J. Trump for

President, Inc., and the North Carolina Republican Party (the Political Committees) moved to intervene in this case to protect their “specific desire to elect particular candidates,” and “the interests of voters throughout North Carolina,” as well as their “members’ ability to participate in those elections . . . governed by the challenged rules.” Political Committees’ Mot. to Intervene, ¶¶ 1, 25. The Court granted the Political Committees permissive intervention on September 24, 2020.

8. On August 18, 2020, Plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction.

9. On September 22, 2020, Plaintiffs and State Defendants jointly moved for the entry of a consent judgment as full and final resolution of Plaintiffs’ claims against the State Defendants related to the conduct of the 2020 elections. On October 1, 2020, Plaintiffs withdrew their motion for preliminary injunction.

10. Under the consent order as proposed in the Joint Motion, plaintiffs agreed to forgo many of their demands, including expanded early voting, elimination of the witness requirement for mail-in absentee ballots, elimination of the postmark requirement, and pre-paid postage for mail-in absentee ballot return envelopes. The Executive Defendants agreed: (1) to extend the deadline for receipt of mail-in absentee ballots mailed on or before Election Day to nine (9) days after Election Day to match the UOCAVA deadline, in keeping with the guidance received on July 30, 2020 from the Postal Service; (2) implement the revised cure process set forth in Numbered Memo 2020-19; and (3) establish separate mail-in absentee ballot “drop off stations” staffed by elections officials at each early voting site and at each county board of elections to reduce the congestion and crowding at early voting sites and county board offices. Plaintiffs agreed to accept

these measures, which fell far short of their demands, “as a full and final resolution of Plaintiffs’ claims against Executive Defendants related to the conduct of the 2020 elections.”

11. The consent judgment as proposed does not enjoin any statutes. The proposed consent judgment retains fidelity to the purpose behind these statutes: (1) ensuring that all ballots that are marked in accordance with all state laws are counted so long as the delay in delivery to the county board of elections is no fault of the voter’s, (2) ensuring that there is a log of the person who returns absentee ballots so that, in the event of concerns about fraud, these concerns can be investigated, and (3) ensuring that the voter to whom the absentee ballot was issued is the one who voted the ballot that the county board of elections received. In addition, the consent order is narrowly targeted to modifications that address the exigent circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic. It therefore does not modify any election procedures beyond the 2020 election cycle.

12. As of September 29, 2020, more than 1,116,696 absentee ballots have been requested. As of October 2, 2020, 325,345 have been submitted, and 319,209 have been accepted. Early voting starts on October 15.

13. The Court hereby incorporates by reference those factual statements made in the Stipulation and Consent Judgment, Part I – Recitals, and entered on October 2, 2020 by this Court, as if set forth fully herein.

#### CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

14. North Carolina courts have a “strong preference for settlement over litigation.” *Ehrenhaus v. Baker*, 216 N.C. App. 59, 72, 717 S.E.2d 9, 19 (2011).

15. Although North Carolina courts have not articulated a standard for approval of a consent judgment, courts in this State have looked to the federal standard to provide guidance in

similar contexts. *See, e.g., Ehrenhaus*, 216 N.C. App. at 71-72, 717 S.E.2d at 18-19 (adopting federal standard for approval of class-action settlements). Before approving entry of a consent judgment, a federal court has the duty to “satisfy itself that the agreement is ‘fair, adequate and reasonable,’ and is ‘not illegal, a product of collusion, or against the public interest.’” *United States v. North Carolina*, 180 F.3d 574, 581 (4th Cir. 1999) (quoting *United States v. Colorado*, 937 F.2d 505, 509 (10th Cir. 1991)).

16. On June 10, 2020, the North Carolina General Assembly enacted House Bill 1169, which the Governor signed into law as North Carolina Session Law 2020-17 the following day. This law made a number of changes in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The legislature did not revise, in any way relevant to the Joint Motion or the Consent Judgment, the emergency powers granted to the State Board or its Executive Director under section 163-27.1 or revise powers granted to the State Board to enter into agreements to avoid protracted litigation under section 163-22.2.

17. Joint movants have demonstrated that the plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their constitutional claims.

18. The Court finds this agreement is fair, adequate, and reasonable. It is not illegal. It is not a product of collusion. On its face, comparing the complaint to the consent order, the plaintiffs did not obtain all the relief that they had sought. On its face, this is a compromise. There exists no evidence to the contrary.

19. The relief imposed by this consent judgment is very limited. It makes only minor and temporary changes to election procedures to accommodate the exigencies of the COVID-19 pandemic, which also makes it reasonable.

20. The Court finds that there is a strong public interest in having certainty in our elections procedures and rules, and the entry of this consent judgment is, therefore, in the public interest.

21. The North Carolina State Board of Elections has a strong incentive to settle this case to ensure certainty on the procedures that will apply during the current election cycle. Settlement will also provide public confidence in the safety and security in this election, in light of all the serious public-health challenges faced at this time.

22. The North Carolina State Board of Elections has authority to enter into this consent judgment under two separate provisions of the North Carolina General Statutes: sections 163-22.2 and 163-27.1.

23. First, section 163-22.2 authorizes the State Board, “upon recommendation of the Attorney General, to enter into agreement with the courts in lieu of protracted litigation until such time as the General Assembly convenes.” This section applies here. The proposed consent judgment is an “agreement with the courts.” The State Board, moreover, has made the reasonable decision to enter into this agreement to avoid “protracted litigation” regarding plaintiffs’ claims with an election fast approaching.

24. Second, section 163-27.1 authorizes the Executive Director of the State Board to “exercise emergency powers to conduct an election in a district where the normal schedule for the election is disrupted by” a “natural disaster.” A “natural disaster” includes a “[c]atastrophe arising from natural causes [that] result[s] in a disaster declaration by the President of the United States or the Governor.” 08 NCAC 01.0106. The COVID-19 pandemic constitutes a natural disaster within the meaning of the statute, as shown by the declaration of emergency by the Governor, the

declaration of disaster by the President, and the emergency order that the Executive Director issued under this authority on July 17, 2020. The Executive Director therefore had the statutory authority to issue the Numbered Memoranda that form the basis of this consent judgment pursuant to her emergency powers under section 163-27.1.

25. Accordingly, votes cast and counted pursuant to the Numbered Memoranda and the consent judgment are lawfully cast votes under North Carolina law, because the North Carolina State Board of Elections and its Executive Director validly issued the Numbered Memoranda and entered into the consent judgment under their statutory authority conferred on them by the General Assembly.

26. Sections 1-72.2 and 120-32.6 of the North Carolina General Statutes do not alter the State Board's authority under sections 163-22.2 or 163.27.1. Nor do they provide that the Speaker and the President Pro Tem are necessary parties to the consent judgment in this case. As an initial matter, the authority delegated to the State Board in sections 163-22.2 and 163-27.1 is more specific than the more general grants of authority listed in sections 1-72.2 and 120-32.6. More specific grants of statutory authority control over more general grants. Here, therefore, the more general grants of certain litigation authority in sections 1-72.2 and 120-32.6 do not displace the settlement and emergency powers of the State Board.

27. In addition, sections 1-72.2 and 120-32.6 allow the Speaker and the President Pro Tem to appear and be heard, or in some cases to request to do so, in certain lawsuits on behalf of the legislative branch alone. However, this limited authority does not allow these legislators to represent the interests of the executive branch or of the State, including any interest of the State in the execution and enforcement of its laws. These statutes do not authorize the Speaker and the



President Pro Tem, individually or jointly, to control executive officials' decisions about execution and enforcement of state law, or to prevent executive officials from entering into settlements that affect how statutes are executed or enforced after their enactment. Nor do these statutes make the General Assembly or these legislative officers necessary parties to any such settlement. To read sections 1-72.2 and 120-32.6 otherwise would violate the North Carolina Constitution's separation of powers clause. *See* N.C. Const. art. I, § 6; *Cooper v. Berger*, 370 N.C. 392, 414-15, 809 S.E.2d 98, 111-12 (2018).

28. For all these reasons, therefore, the consent of the Speaker and the President Pro Tem is not needed for this Court to approve and enter this consent judgment.

29. Because the North Carolina General Statutes delegate to the State Board the authority to issue the directives that form the basis for the proposed consent judgment, neither the Numbered Memoranda, nor the consent judgment itself, violates the Elections Clause of the U.S. Constitution, art. I, § 4, cl.1.

30. Neither the Numbered Memoranda, nor the consent judgment itself, violates the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution, amend. XIV, § 1. They provide adequate statewide standards for determining what is a legal vote, and practicable procedures to implement them. They do not dilute or discount anyone's vote. Instead, they ensure that all eligible voters have an opportunity to cast their ballots and correct any deficiencies in those ballots under the same, uniform standards.

31. The Numbered Memoranda and the consent judgment are therefore consistent with both the North Carolina Constitution and the U.S. Constitution.

32. Based upon the foregoing, on October 2, 2020, Plaintiffs' and Executive Defendants' Joint Motion for Entry of a Consent Judgment was granted and final judgment was entered.

ISSUED, this 5<sup>th</sup> day of October 2020, *nunc pro tunc* October 2, 2020.



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G. Bryan Collins  
Special Superior Court Judge

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**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

The undersigned hereby certifies that the forgoing document was served on the following parties via email:

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